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  • Section 12(5) of the Karnataka State Universities Act, 1976 (the Act for short)
  • Section 12(5) of the K.S.U Act, 1976,
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  • Section 12(5) of the Karnataka State Universities Act, 1976 (the Act for short)
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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Bangalore University v. Respondents (appeals)

Factual and Procedural Background

On 13 March 1989, during the B.E. Degree examination (subject: Hydrology and Irrigation) at B.M.S. Engineering College, Bangalore, a Vigilance Flying Squad appointed by Bangalore University made a surprise entry into Room No. 111 at about 3:30 p.m. The Squad submitted a same-day report to the University Registrar (Evaluation) naming students allegedly indulging in examination malpractice.

Based on that report, the University framed charges against individual students (38 candidates were served charge memoranda). Each charged candidate was called to file a statement of defence and then to appear before a Malpractice Enquiry Committee. The Committee questioned the students; the record contains a stereotyped question-and-answer sequence about receipt of the article of charge and denial of the charge.

The Enquiry Committee reported that 28 of the 38 students were guilty of malpractice. Accepting that report, the Vice-Chancellor, invoking Section 12(5) of the Karnataka State Universities Act, 1976, passed an order cancelling the performance of those students in the February–March 1989 examination (while permitting them to appear in a June 1989 repeat and to pay fees by a stated date). The named students were thus individually found guilty and penalised by cancellation of their performance.

Aggrieved, the students filed writ petitions. The Single Judge allowed the petitions, quashing the orders. The Single Judge held that (a) no enquiry had been held in accordance with the University Ordinance prescribing procedure for enquiries into examination malpractice, (b) the Enquiry Committee's report was vitiated by errors apparent on the face of the record, (c) the Vice-Chancellor had no power under Section 12(5) to pass the impugned order since that power was vested in the Syndicate under Section 62, and (d) there was no application of mind by the Vice-Chancellor because the Note was put up by the Registrar and the Vice-Chancellor merely agreed with it.

The University appealed from the Single Judge's order to the court that produced the opinion summarized here.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an enquiry in accordance with the University Ordinance and the requirements of natural justice was a prerequisite before an individual student could be found guilty and penalised by cancellation of examination performance.
  2. Whether, in the circumstances of alleged mass-copying, the University could treat the situation as one permitting cancellation of performance of all students at an examination centre without individual enquiries (with reference to the Supreme Court's decision in Board of High School v. Ghanshyam, AIR 1962 SC 1110).
  3. Whether the Vice-Chancellor, in exercise of emergency powers under Section 12(5) of the Karnataka State Universities Act, 1976, could pass the impugned order (to be later ratified by the Syndicate under Section 62), or whether the power to impose penalties for examination malpractice lay exclusively with the Syndicate.
  4. Whether, having quashed the orders for procedural irregularity, the Court should reserve liberty to the University to hold a de novo enquiry or whether it is for the University to decide about any de novo enquiry (with reference to precedent cited).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (University) — Principal Arguments

  • The conduct before the Court involved mass-copying, an evil which had acquired dangerous proportions; the University had to take firm and immediate steps to meet it.
  • When action is taken by the University on the allegation of mass-copying, holding an enquiry in accordance with the ordinary ordinance procedure (applicable to ordinary cases of malpractice) is unnecessary and impracticable; therefore, the learned Single Judge erred in invalidating the impugned order for lack of such an enquiry.
  • The Vice-Chancellor was entitled to act under the emergency powers conferred by Section 12(5) of the Karnataka State Universities Act, 1976, and thereafter obtain ratification by the Syndicate (Section 62). The Vice-Chancellor could take immediate action and later regularise it; the Single Judge erred in holding that only the Syndicate could decide the matter.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' legal arguments beyond the factual and procedural descriptions and the defenses recorded in the Enquiry Committee proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Board of High School v. Ghanshyam, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1110 Holds that for cancellation of an examination (i.e., cancelling the performance of all students at a centre) the principles of natural justice may not apply; the Court can cancel an examination altogether in appropriate circumstances. The Court observed that this precedent would justify cancellation of the performance of all candidates at an examination centre with a subsequent re-examination, but found it inapplicable here because the University had proceeded against individual students (framing charges and imposing penalties individually). The Court thus declined to treat this case as one exempt from the requirements of individual enquiry under the Ordinance.
W.P. No. 1502 of 1979 and connected cases (this Court) Distinguished mass-cancellation of an entire examination from imposition of penalties on individual students without enquiry; held that when penalties are imposed individually without holding the Ordinance-mandated enquiry, relief is appropriate. The Court relied on this Court's earlier treatment to conclude that where the University imposes penalties against individual students without holding an enquiry, that action is vitiated and orders should be quashed. The present case was held to be analogous to that earlier line of decisions.
A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 75 Applied for the proposition that when an administrative decision is quashed for procedural irregularity, it is for the administrative authority to decide whether a de novo enquiry is called for; it is unnecessary for the Court to reserve liberty to the authority to hold such an enquiry. The Court invoked this precedent to state that it was for the University to decide whether to hold a de novo enquiry into the respondents' alleged malpractices after the judicial quashing of the impugned orders; the Court need not and did not reserve any such liberty specifically.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded along two principal strands: (A) the applicability of the Ordinance and principles of natural justice to individual findings of guilt, and (B) the effect of emergency powers under Section 12(5).

(A) Requirement of enquiry and natural justice when penalty is individual

  1. The Court recognized the distinction between (i) cancellation of the performance of all students at a particular examination centre because of mass malpractice (a course that may not attract the rules of natural justice in the ordinary sense) and (ii) proceedings which target individual students with framed charges and individual penalties.
  2. In the present case the University framed individual charge memos, called each candidate to appear before the Malpractice Enquiry Committee, and ultimately accepted a report finding 28 out of 38 students individually guilty and imposing individual penalties of cancellation of performance.
  3. The Court reiterated the fundamental rule of natural justice: a person cannot be found guilty of a charge with attendant civil consequences unless preceded by an enquiry giving full opportunity to defend, to adduce evidence, and to cross-examine adverse witnesses — safeguards that are embodied in the University's Ordinance for holding enquiries.
  4. It was not disputed, and the Single Judge had found, that no enquiry in accordance with the Ordinance had been held in these cases. The Court agreed with the Single Judge that because the University imposed penalties individually without following the Ordinance, those orders were vitiated.
  5. The Court examined the University's contention that mass-copying justified dispensing with the Ordinance procedure and concluded that the contention could not be accepted because the University had not proceeded to cancel the entire centre's performance but had taken individualised action against named students.
  6. Relying on the Court's own earlier treatment of a similar situation (W.P. No. 1502 of 1979 and connected cases) and after distinguishing the Board of High School v. Ghanshyam authority (which permits centre-wide cancellation), the Court concluded that natural justice required observance of the Ordinance where individual penalties are imposed.

(B) Vice-Chancellor's emergency powers under Section 12(5)

  1. The University argued that the Vice-Chancellor could act under Section 12(5) in an emergency and later obtain ratification by the Syndicate (Section 62).
  2. The Court observed that this question of the scope of the Vice-Chancellor's powers was, in the circumstances of these cases, largely academic because the threshold defect was the absence of an Ordinance-compliant enquiry. Whether the final decision had to be made by the Syndicate or could initially be taken by the Vice-Chancellor under emergency powers, the absence of the prerequisite enquiry rendered the final order liable to be quashed.
  3. Consequently, the Court vacated the Single Judge's specific view on the scope of the Vice-Chancellor's powers under Section 12(5) and deferred consideration of that point to an appropriate case where it arises squarely. In short, the Court did not decide the full extent of emergency powers for purposes of these appeals because the procedural infirmity was dispositive.

(C) De novo enquiry and reservation of liberty

The Court noted the established principle (citing A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 75) that when a decision is quashed for procedural irregularity the administrative authority is the appropriate body to decide whether a de novo inquiry is required. Thus, it is unnecessary for the Court to reserve liberty expressly for the University to conduct a de novo inquiry; the University may itself decide whether to hold such an enquiry in these cases.

(D) Observations and practical suggestions

Although the Court regretted having to set aside a well-intended action of the University, it emphasised that individual penalties cannot be imposed without adherence to procedural safeguards. The Court also commented (without making an order) on practical measures the University might adopt to prevent copying (e.g., preventing books/papers into halls, increased vigilance, police assistance, warnings to private colleges), expressing hope that the University would take firm administrative steps to curb examination malpractice.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeals by Bangalore University are DISMISSED.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The Court agreed with the Single Judge that the impugned orders imposing cancellation of performance against the individual students were vitiated because no enquiry was held in accordance with the University Ordinance and the rules of natural justice.
  • Those impugned orders were quashed, and the appeals seeking to overturn the Single Judge's decision were dismissed.
  • The Court left it to the University to decide whether to hold a de novo enquiry into the alleged malpractices; the Court did not reserve any specific liberty to the University and relied on the established precedent that the administrative authority should determine if a fresh enquiry is warranted.

Broader legal implications:

  • The decision reinforces the distinction between (a) administrative cancellation of an entire examination (where, in some circumstances, centre-wide cancellation may be permissible without the full panoply of individual procedural protections) and (b) individualised disciplinary action against students, where the Ordinance and principles of natural justice must be followed.
  • The Court did not lay down any new precedent on the scope of emergency powers under Section 12(5); it expressly vacated the Single Judge's view on that point and reserved consideration of the precise scope of those emergency powers for an appropriate future case.

Source limitation notice: This summary is confined to the material and statements contained in the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond what appears in the opinion text.

    Bangalore University v. Ram Narayan Sah Prabhat

    Rama Jois, A.C.J:— These appeals are presented by the Bangalore University, against the order of the learned Single Judge quashing the orders passed against respondents-1 to 25 by which the performance of each of them in the February-March, 1989 B.E Degree Examination was cancelled.

    2. The facts of the case in brief are these: On 13-3-1989 students of B.M.S Engineering College, Bangalore, were answering the question papers on the subject called Hydrology and irrigation, in Room No. 111 of the College. The examination commenced from 2.00 P.M It appears, that when the examination was going on, a Vigilance Flying Squad appointed by the University to check the menace of mass malpractice, at all the examinations of the University, made a surprise entry into the aforesaid examination room at about 3.30 p.m The Squad gave a report of the same date to the University Registrar (Evaluation), giving the names of the students who according to the Squad were found indulging in examination malpractice. On the basis of the said report, charges were framed against each of the respondents, alleging that they had indulged in malpractice. The article of the charge also stated that the charge was supported by the document viz., report of the Squad and each of the candidates was called upon to file statement of defence. Thereafter, they were called upon to appear before the Enquiry Committee. The enquiry Committee appears to have put some questions to each of the students. The questions and answers which are sterotyped are as below:—

    “Que: Have you received the article of charge?

    Ans: Yes.

    Que: Have you gone through it?

    Ans: Yes.

    Que: Do you admit the charge or deny the same?

    Ans: I deny the charge.”

    The Enquiry Committee submitted its report holding that 28 of the 38 students to whom articles of charges were served were guilty of malpractices. Accepting the report of the Enquiry Committee, the Vice-Chancellor in purported exercise of his powers under Section 12(5) of the Karnataka State Universities Act, 1976 (the Act for short) passed the following order:

    “Sub: Alleged Malpractice case of IV year B.E Examination held on 13-3-1989.

    On accepting the findings and recommendations of the Malpractice Enquiry Committee by the Vice-Chancellor on behalf of the Syndicate under Section 12(5) of the K.S.U Act, 1976, the following students who were reported for alleged malpractice during the IV Year B.E Examination held on 13-3-1989 are denied the benefit of performance of all papers (Theory and Practical) for which they had appeared during February/March, 1989 examination.

    Sl. No. Name of the Candidates Reg. No. 1. Brijesh Pratap Mathur E 83 BA 008 2. Narendra Prasad Singh E 83 BA 018 3. C. Narayanaswamy E 83 BA 029 4. A.G.P Nataraja E 83 BA 030 5. C.J Rajendra E 83 BA 038 6. Ravikumar E 83 BA 043 7. K.V Ravishankar E 83 BA 045 8. Shankar Chawan E 83 BA 052 9. Sridhar K.G E 83 BA 057 10. K.R Manjula Devi E 82 BA 040
    11. N. Srinivasa E 82 BA 076 12. Suresha T.D E 82 BA 081 13. Srinivasa S. E 82 BA 125 14. Srinivasa Raju N. E 83 BA 058 15. Sudhakar S. E 83 BA 060 16. Sireddi Adinarayana E 83 BA 062 17. B.R Subendra Kumar E 83 BA 063 18. Syed Shakir Hussain E 83 BA 068 19. Ram Narayana Sahprabhat E 83 BA 081 20. B.R Kiran E 83 BA 106 21. Md. Aleemuddin E 83 BA 108 22. Ramesh K.S E 83 BA 111 23. Sudarshan Babu S.L E 83 BA 114 24. Anand A. E 82 BA 001 25. A. Arun Kumar E 82 BA 008 26. Girian H.S E 82 BA 018 27. S.N Krishnamurthy E 82 BA 035 28. M. Laxmikanth E 82 BA 037

    They are permitted to appear for June 1989 examination in IV Year B.E in all papers for which they had appeared during February/March 1989. They are also permitted to pay the examination fee for the said year till 20-5-1989 without any time.

    The students may please be informed accordingly.

    Yours faithfully,

    Registrar (Evaluation).”

    Aggrieved by the said order, the students had presented the Writ Petitions.

    3. The learned Judge, allowed the Writ Petitions holding that no enquiry was held in accordance with the ordinance prescribing the procedure for an enquiry, regarding examination malpractice and on the ground that the report of the Enquiry Committee stood vitiated due to errors apparent on the face of the record. The learned Judge also held that the Vice-Chancellor had no power under sub-section (5) of Section 12 of the Act to pass the impugned order as the said power was conferred on the Syndicate under Section 62 of the Act. He further held that there was no application of mind by the Vice-Chancellor as the Note was put by the Registrar and the Vice-Chancellor had only agreed with It.

    4. Aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge, the University is in appeal before us.

    5. Sri Gopala Hegde, learned Counsel for the University, strenuously contended that this was a case of mass-copying which evil had acquired dangerous proportion during recent year and in order to combat the said evil, the University had to take a firm step and therefore the Vice-Chancellor had passed the order cancelling the performance of the examination of 28 students. He maintained that when action was taken by the University on the allegation of mass-copying, the question of holding an enquiry in accordance with the ordinance prescribed for ordinary cases of malpractice would be of no avail and therefore the learned Judge erred in holding that the impugned order was invalid on the ground that no enquiry was held.

    6. If, on the report by the Vigilance Squad that there had been mass copying or malpractice in the examination hall concerned, the University had proceeded to cancel the performance of all the candidates who took examination in that hall without reference to any individual students, and to hold a fresh examination in the subject concerned for all such students, the contention of the learned Counsel for the University would have been unexceptionable in view of the ratio of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Board of High School v. Ghanshyam . AIR 1962 SC 1110.. But in the present case, what the University had done was not the cancellation of the performance of all the students at the examination on the ground that there had been a report of mass malpractice; but the action was taken against 38 candidates individually in that charge memo was served on each of them and they were called upon to appear before the Mal-practices Enquiry Committee and they were interrogated by the Committee and thereafter the Committee submitted its report recording a finding that 28 of them committed malpractice and 10 did not. That report was accepted by the Vice-Chancellor and orders were passed. Though the names of all the 28 students are set out in the same communication, it is an order passed against each of the students. Each of the students is found guilty of malpractice and the penalty imposed is cancellation of performance of the particular examination. It is a fundamental rule of natural justice that no person can be found guilty of any charge or no order can be passed which has got evil or civil consequences unless it is preceded by the holding of an enquiry in that giving full opportunity to defend himself by adducing evidence in support of the charge before the authority holding the enquiry and giving full opportunity to the person against whom an enquiry is being held to cross-examine the witnesses who gave evidence against him or giving opportunity to cross-examine the persons who had made report against him. All these safeguards are incorporated in the Ordinance framed by the University for holding an enquiry. It is not disputed that in these cases no enquiry in accordance with the said ordinance had been held. This is also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge. But the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants is that this was a case where no individual enquiry was necessary. We are unable to agree. This is a case in which the University has found each of the students guilty of malpractice and on that basis imposed penalty of cancellation of the performance of the examination against each of the students. An exactly similar situation was considered by this Court in W.P No. 1502 of 1979 and connected cases2 in which the Karnataka University had imposed penalty against as many as 30 students without holding an enquiry on the ground that there was a report about mass-copying. In that case, also the University relied on the Judgment of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R 1962 S.C 1110 in which the Supreme Court has held that for cancellation of examination on any ground, the principles of natural justice would not be applicable. That case was distinguished by this Court and pointed out that if the University had proceeded to cancel the performance of all the students in any particular examination centre and decided to hold re-examination, the question of applying rules of natural justice does not arise because the power of the University to hold the examination necessarily includes the power to cancel the performance of the entire examination and to hold re-examination if the given situation demands such a course of action. On this reasoning, orders impugned in the said Writ Petition were quashed. The position is not different in these cases. Therefore we respectfully agree with the view taken by the learned single Judge.

    7. Learned Counsel for the appellants next contended that the learned Judge erred in holding that the Vice-Chancellor had no power under Section 12(5) of the Act to pass an order and to get it ratified by the Syndicate. Section 12(5) of the Act confers emergency powers on the Vice-Chancellor. That provision reads:

    “In case of any emergency which, in his opinion, requires immediate action the Vice-Chancellor shall take such action as he deems necessary and shall at the earliest opportunity thereafter report the action taken to such Authority or body as would in the ordinary course have dealt with the matter.

    Provided that if the action taken by the Vice-Chancellor is not approved by the Authority or body concerned it may through the State Government refer the matter to the Chancellor whose decision shall be final:

    Provided further that if the decision taken by the Authority or body on the report of the Vice-Chancellor under this sub-section affects adversely any person in the service of the University, that person may prefer an appeal to the Chancellor through the State Government within thirty days from the date on which the decision was communicated to him and the decision of the Chancellor on such appeal shall be final.”

    According to that provision, if, in the opinion of the Vice-Chancellor, there exists an emergency in which he has to act immediately, though according to the provisions of the Act, decision on the topic arising for consideration has to be taken by a specified authority of the University, he could exercise the powers of such authority forthwith and later in the normal course get it ratified by the designated authority. The learned Counsel submitted that under Section 62 of the Act, the Syndicate of the University was empowered to impose any penalty for examination malpractices acting on the report of the Mal-practices Enquiry Committee and in view of the urgency, it was open for the Vice-Chancellor to take the decision in the first instance and thereafter to get it ratified I by the Syndicate. He submitted that the view taken by the learned Judge that the matter could be decided only by the Syndicate and it did not fall within the scope of emergency powers of the Vice-Chancellor under Section 12(5) of the Act, was erroneous.

    8. In our opinion, the above question was purely academic as far as these cases are concerned. Whether the Syndicate had to take a final decision in the matter or the Vice-Chancellor could take final decision in the matter, the holding of an enquiry in accordance with the Ordinance and rules of natural justice was a condition precedent. Once it is found that no enquiry was held in accordance with the Ordinance - whether the final order was passed by the Vice-Chancellor or the Syndicate - the final order is liable to be quashed. Therefore, we vacate the view taken by the learned Single Judge on the scope of the powers of the Vice-Chancellor under Section 12(5) and reserve it for consideration in an appropriate case.

    9. It is unfortunate that a well intended action of the University had to be set aside; but there is no alternative for the Court when an individual is visited with penalty without holding inquiry and in violation of Rules of Natural Justice. We are, however, unable to understand as to why it has not been possible for the University to ensure that no copying takes place in examination by preventing students from taking any book or even any piece of paper into the examination hall and also by keeping a vigil throughout the examination period, if necessary even by seeking the assistance of the Police, and also by administering a stern warning to private colleges that if they do not prevent copying in their respective colleges, their recognition would be cancelled. It is well known that ‘where there is a will there is a way’. We hope that the University authorities would examine this aspect of the matter and put down examination malpractice which is a menace to the examination system with a heavy hand.

    10. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned Judge had not reserved liberty for the University to hold do novo enquiry against the respondents petitioners. It is well settled, that when, in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, any decision of an Administrative Authority is quashed on procedural irregularities, it is for that authority to decide as to whether de novo inquiry is called for and it is unnecessary for the Court to reserve any such liberty to the authority concerned to hold a de novo inquiry (see A.I.R 1961 S.C 75)3. therefore, it is for the University to decide as to whether in these cases, it is desirable to hold a de novo inquiry.

    In the result, we make the following:

    The appeals are dismissed.

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    Bangalore University v. Ram Narayan Sah Prabhat
    (Sep 26, 1989)