Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • order:(i) Rule made absolute.(ii) Section 31 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act
  • Section 30(ii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960,
  • Section was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
  • Section 31 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act (the Act
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • order:(i) Rule made absolute.(ii) Section 31 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act
  • Section 30(ii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960,
  • Section was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
  • Section 31 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act (the Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

These are a batch of writ petitions filed by tenants of non-residential premises in Bangalore and elsewhere in Karnataka challenging the constitutional validity of Section 31 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act ("the Act"). The petitions arose after landlords filed eviction suits relying on Section 31, and some petitioners had agreed to higher rents over time. The court set out the legislative scheme: Part II and Part III of the Act (including Section 21 which protects tenants against eviction and prescribes grounds and safeguards), and Section 31 which exempts certain non-residential buildings—those with monthly rent exceeding Rs. 500 or annual rental value exceeding Rs. 6,000—from the protective provisions of the Act.

The petitioners contended that the classification in Section 31, though arguably rational when enacted in 1961, had become irrational and violative of Article 14 by efflux of time because of steep rises in rent and fall in the value of the rupee. The respondents (State) opposed the contention, arguing that subsequent price/rent increases do not automatically render a once-rational legislative classification unconstitutional and that legislative change, not judicial invalidation, is the proper remedy.

The court concluded by making the rule absolute and issuing relief: it declared Section 31 void as offending Article 14, issued a writ of mandamus to the State not to enforce Section 31, and directed that there be no costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 31 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, which exempts non-residential buildings with monthly rent exceeding Rs. 500 (or annual rental value exceeding Rs. 6,000) from the protective provisions of the Act, is constitutionally valid under Article 14 of the Constitution.
  2. Whether a legislative classification that was rational at enactment can, by efflux of time and change of circumstances (notably escalation of rents and fall in the value of the rupee), lose its nexus to the object of the statute and thus become unconstitutional.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The classification in Section 31 was rational when enacted in 1961, but subsequent massive increases in rent and fall in the rupee's value have destroyed the original nexus between the class and the legislative object.
  • As a result of this change in circumstances, tenants who were intended to be protected when the Act was passed are now excluded; the exemption has become discriminatory and violative of Article 14.
  • They relied on precedent (Motor General Traders and Rattan Arya) for the principle that a provision can become unconstitutional over time.
  • Practical examples and a table in the petitions showed original rents paid by petitioners and present rents after amendments, illustrating the escalation in rents that removed the basis for the classification.

Respondent (State) Arguments

  • The classification under Section 31 was reasonable and had nexus to the Act's object when made; subsequent escalations in rental value do not by themselves render a valid classification violative of Article 14.
  • It is for the Legislature, not the court, to revise such classification if it so chooses; judicial invalidation on account of subsequent economic changes is inappropriate.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Motor General Traders v. State of A.P., 1984 1 SCC 206 Principle that a legislative provision that was once constitutional may, by efflux of time and changed circumstances, lose the "garb of constitutionality" and become unconstitutional: "The garb of constitutionality which it may have possessed earlier has become worn out and its unconstitutionality is now brought out to a successful challenge." The court relied on this principle to accept that a classification valid in 1961 may have become irrational over 25 years due to escalation of rents and fall in the rupee's value, thereby supporting the petitioners' challenge to Section 31.
Rattan Arya v. State of Tamilnadu, ILR 1986 KAR 2069 Decision striking down Section 30(ii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act as violative of Article 14, on the ground that a previously rational ceiling (Rs. 400) had become unrealistic by reason of rising rents, destroying the classification's nexus to legislative purpose. The court applied the ratio in Rattan Arya: because the rent-based ceiling in Section 31 had become outdated and resulted in depriving those the Act intended to protect, Section 31 had ceased to have a rational nexus to the object and was liable to be struck down under Article 14.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a structured manner:

  1. It set out the statutory scheme: Part II (leasing of buildings) and Part III (fixation of fair rent and protection against eviction, notably Section 21) of the Act, and the exemptions introduced by Section 31 for certain non-residential buildings.
  2. It observed that Section 31 creates a class—non-residential premises with monthly rent > Rs. 500 (or annual rental value > Rs. 6,000)—which the Legislature in 1961 treated as not requiring protection afforded by Section 21. The court recognized that the classification was deliberate and well defined.
  3. It considered the petitioners' contention that the economic conditions had changed radically since 1961: there had been a steep rise in rentals and a steep fall in the rupee's value so that premises once costing less than Rs. 500 now cost substantially more, thereby removing the original nexus between class and legislative object.
  4. The court examined concrete examples supplied by petitioners showing original rents and present rents (the opinion reproduces a table showing multiple petitioners whose rents rose from figures like Rs. 75–475 originally to current rents from Rs. 650 up to Rs. 3,200), treating these as illustrative of the nationwide escalation in rents.
  5. It addressed the State's submission that subsequent escalation in rents did not invalidate a once-rational classification and that the Legislature should change the law if necessary. The court rejected this as sufficient to defeat the constitutional challenge in the present circumstances.
  6. Relying on precedent—Motor General Traders and, more directly, Rattan Arya—the court reasoned that a classification which once had a rational basis can lose that basis by efflux of time and changed circumstances, and that the ceiling in Section 31 had become unrealistic and irrational in the light of rent escalation.
  7. Applying that ratio, the court concluded that Section 31, though perhaps rational in 1961, had ceased to have nexus to the object of the Act and had become discriminatory, thus violating Article 14 of the Constitution.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Section 31 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act is declared void as offending Article 14 of the Constitution.

The court made the rule absolute and issued a Writ of Mandamus to the State not to enforce Section 31. The court also ordered that there be no costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The invalidation of Section 31 restores the applicability of the protective provisions of Part III (including Section 21) to the non-residential tenants who had been excluded by Section 31, irrespective of whether their present rent exceeds the Rs. 500 monthly (or Rs. 6,000 annual) threshold set in 1961.
  • The court applied established precedent on the doctrine that a legislative classification may become unconstitutional by efflux of time. The opinion does not elaborate on broader policy consequences beyond the direct judicial relief granted to the petitioners and the order to the State not to enforce Section 31.

Formal Disposition (As Recorded in the Opinion)

  1. Rule made absolute.
  2. Section 31 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act declared void as offending Article 14 of the Constitution.
  3. A Writ of Mandamus shall issue to the State not to enforce the provisions of Section 31 of the Act.
  4. No costs.

    H. Padmanabha Rao v. State Of Karnataka

    Rama Jois, J.:—

    In this batch of Writ Petitions, the petitioners who are tenants of non-residential premises in the city of Bangalore and elsewhere in the State have questioned the constitutional validity of Section 31 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act (‘the Act’ for short).

    2. In order to appreciate the question arising for consideration, it is necessary to set out briefly the scheme of the Act. The Preamble to the Act reads:

    “An Act to provide for the control of rents and evictions, for the leasing of buildings, to control rates of hotels and lodging houses and for certain other matters in the State of Karnataka.

    Whereas it is expedient to provide for the control of rents and evictions, for the leasing of buildings, to control rates of hotels and lodging houses and for certain other matters.”

    Part-II of the Act regulates the leasing of buildings. Inter alia the provisions in this pan requires the landlord of a residential or non-residential premises to give intimation of the vacancy to the jurisdictional Rent Controller within a period of two weeks from the date of occurrence of the vacancy vide Section 4 of the Act. Section 5 empowers the Rent Controller to direct the landlord to lease the vacant building in favour of a public authority or an individual as directed in his order. Section 8 of the Act prescribes the procedure to be followed by the Rent Controller before issuing the direction, which he is entitled to give under Section 5 of the Act. Part-III of the Act (vide Sections 14 to 18) provides for fixation of fair rent. Section 21 of the Act provides protection to the tenants against eviction. In view of the said provision, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract or agreement, a landlord could seek eviction of his tenant from the premises belonging to him only on one or more of the grounds specified in different clauses of Section 21 of the Act and subject to other conditions imposed by the Section. As the exclusion of this section to non-residential premises, the monthly rent of which exceeds Rs. 500/- which is the reason for challenging the validity of Section 31 of the Act, it is appropriate to refer to some of the safeguards against eviction provided in Section 21 of the Act. The Section bars the Court from making an order or decree against a tenant notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract. It, however, provides for making an order for recovery of possession of a premises from the tenant by the landlord on one or the other grounds specified in various clauses of the Section. The grounds, Inter alia, are, non-payment of rent or sub-letting or that the landlord requires the premises, reasonably bona fide, for his own occupation. In cases where the eviction of the tenants is sought on grounds of non-payment of rent, Section 21(2)(iii) of the Act provides that if the tenant were to pay the rent as directed by the Court, no order of eviction can be made. In cases where the eviction is sought for on the ground of bona fide use and occupation by the landlord, Section 21(4) provides that the Court should examine the question of comparative hardship and cannot order an eviction if the Court is satisfied that by granting eviction greater hardship would be caused to the tenant than to the landlord by not granting the eviction. A reading of different clauses of the provision would indicate the amount of protection given to the tenants against seeking their eviction by the landlords.

    3. Section 31 of the Act grants exemption from the provisions of Section 21 of the Act and other sections in the said part. The said Section reads:

    “31. EXEMPTION IN RESPECT OF CERTAIN BUILDINGS: Nothing contained in this Part shall apply to a non-residential building the monthly rent of which exceeds five hundred rupees or the annual rental value of which exceeds six thousand rupees.

    Provided that the exemption under this Section shall not apply:

    (i) to any building taken on lease by a public authority or by an educational institution; or

    (ii) to any building occupied by more than one tenant each paying a monthly rent not exceeding five hundred rupees or an annual rent not exceeding six thousand rupees.”

    A reading of the provision would at once indicate that the Legislature considered that in the matter of giving protection against eviction as provided in Section 21 of the Act, the non-residential buildings in respect of which monthly rent exceeded Rs. 500/- or the annual rental value exceeded Rs. 6,000/- other than those excepted by the provisio formed a well defined class and the Legislature considered that the protection incorporated in Section 21 of the Act need not be extended to such classes of tenants of non-residential buildings.

    4. The petitioner's grievance is that the above classification was made by the Legislature in the year 1961 when the value of Rupee was about cent per cent and therefore the Legislature might have considered that persons who were tenants of non-residential premises on a monthly rent of more than Rs. 500/- were not persons who were required to be protected against eviction, and it may be that the classification could not, at that point of time be regarded as having had no rational basis. But the contention of the petitioners is that in the last 25 years after the commencement of the Act, the basis for the classification made under Section 31 had ceased to exist long back in view of the steep fall in the value of the Rupee and the steep rise in the rentals and therefore even though the exemption then had the nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the Legislature, by efflux of time the nexus has disappeared and as a result the provision has become discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The petitioners have stated that the non-residential premises in respect of which monthly rent was much below Rs. 500/- in the year 1961 was now far more than Rs. 500/- and that if the intention of the Legislature was to protect tenants of non-residential buildings whose monthly rent was Rs. 500/- or less in 1961, by the force of the same reasoning the said exemption must have been extended to premises whose monthly rental was more than Rs. 500/- by raising the limit, having due regard to the rate of increase in rental value and the fall of value of the rupee. As the same had not been done, the Section has become violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

    5. The principle on the basis of which the contention is raised, is that though a legislative provision was constitutional at the time when it was enacted, by efflux of time and change of circumstances, it might become unconstitutional. In support of this principle, Learned Counsel have relied on the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Motor General Traders v. State of A.P . 1984 1 SCC 206 The relevant portion of the Judgment reads:

    “……. The garb of constitutionality which it may have possessed earlier has become worn out and its unconstitutionality is now brought out to a successful challenge.”

    6. Learned Counsel for the petitioners also submitted that the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Rattan Arya v. State of Tamilnadu . ILR 1986 KAR 2069., in which Section 30(ii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, was struck down as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, fully covers the point raised in these petitions.

    7. The fact that there has been steep rise in the rentals and steep fall in the value of rupee is incontrovertible. As a result the rental value of non-residential premises has increased manifold. Therefore the very non-residential premises to which Section 31 afforded protection, have ceased to have the protection only because of increase in rentals which the tenants had agreed to pay. The following statement showing the original and revised rentals makes out this point.

    W.P No. Original rent paid by the petitioner Present rent after several amendments Rs. Ps. Rs. Ps. 570/1986 325-00 3,200-00 18632/1985 250-00 650-00 3440/1986 475-00 750-00 4566/1986 225-00 1,250-00 4697/1986 75-00 1,000-00

    8. The petitioners have stated that they agreed to pay higher rents in view of the steep, rise in the value of immovable property and steep fall in the value of the rupee and to maintain cordial relationship with the landlords, and that as they were unable to agree to pay still higher rents, suits have been filed by the respective landlords for the eviction of the petitioners in view of Section 31 of the Act, and, therefore they were constrained to file these Petitions. In one case it is alleged that in view of Section 31 of the Act, the landlord demanded a rent of Rs. 502/- per month and the said petitioner had no other alternative than to agree and as a result he stands denied of the protection of Section 21 of the Act in view of Section 31 of the Act.

    9. Sri S.V Jagannath, the Learned Government Advocate, submitted that there was no basis to say that the classification made in Section 31 was not reasonable or that it had no nexus to the object sought to be achieved and that subsequent increase in rental value could not constitute the basis to say that the Section was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. He maintained that it was for the Legislature to make a change if it so considers, but the provision cannot be struck down on the basis of subsequent escalations in rental value.

    10. The submission made for the petitioners that their challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 31 of the Act must succeed in view of the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Rattan Arya's case is well founded. In that case the validity of Section 30(ii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, as amended in the year 1973 making the protective provisions of the Act inapplicable to residential premises, the monthly rental of which was Rs. 400/- or more, was challenged. The Supreme Court held that even on the basis that a rational basis for classification existed in the year 1973, when the Section was amended, in view of escalation of rents between 1973 and 1986, the classification had become unrealistic and irrational. Relevant part of the Judgment reads:

    “3…. By one stroke, this provision denies the benefits conferred by the Act generally on all tenants to tenants of residential buildings fetching a rent in excess of four hundred rupees. As a result of this provision, while the tenant of a non-residential building is protected, whether the rent of Rs. 50/-, Rs. 500/- or Rs. 5,000/- per month, a tenant of a residential building is protected if the rent is Rs. 50/-, but not if it is Rs. 500/- or Rs. 5,000/- per month. Does it mean that the tenant of a residential building paying a rent of Rs. 500/- is better able to protect himself than the tenant of a non-residential building paying a rent of Rs. 500/- per month? Does it mean that the tenant of a residential building who pays a rent of Rs. 500/- per month is not in need of any statutory protection is there any basis for the distinction between the tenant of a residential building and the tenant of a non-residential building and that based on the rent paid by the respective tenants? Is there any justification at all for picking out the class of tenants of residential buildings paying a rent of more than four hundred rupees per month to deny them the rights conferred generally on all tenants of buildings residential or non-residential by the Act? Neither from the Preamble of the Act nor from the provisions of the Act has it been possible for us even to discern any basis for the classification made by Section 30(ii) of the Act.

    xxxxxxxxxxxx

    4. The counter affidavit does not explain why any distinction should be made between residential and non-residential buildings in the matter of affording the protection of the provisions of the Act. To say that a non-residential building is different from a residential building is merely to say what is self-evident and means nothing. Tenants of both kinds of buildings equally need the protection of the beneficient provisions of the Act. No attempt has been made to show that the tenants of non-residential buildings are in disadvantageous position as compared with tenants of residential buildings and therefore they need greater protection. There is and there can be no whisper to that effect. To illustrate by analogy, it is not enough to say that man and woman are different and therefore, they need not be paid equal wages even if they do equal work. The counter affidavit has repeatedly referred to the weaker sections of the people, and stated that in order to protect the weaker sections of the people a distinction has been made between them and those who are in a position to pay higher rent. It is difficult to understand how the exclusion of tenants who pay higher rent from the protection afforded by the Act will help to protect tenants belonging to the weaker sections of the community. It is one thing to say that tenants belonging to the weaker sections of the community need protection and an altogether different thing to say that denial of protection to tenants paying higher rents will protect the weaker sections of the community. Further the distinction suggested in the counter appears to be quite antipathic to the actual provision because as we pointed cut earlier, there is no such ceiling in the case of tenants of non-residential buildings and therefore a tenant of a non-residential building who is in a position to pay a rent of Rs. 5,000/- per month is afforded full protection by the Act, whereas, inconsistently enough, the tenant of a residential building who pays a rent of Rs. 500/- is left high and dry. It certainly cannot be pretended that the provision is intended to benefit the weaker sections of the people only. We must also observe here that whatever justification there may have been in 1973 when Section 30(ii) was amended by imposing a ceiling of Rs. 400/- on rent payable by tenants of residential buildings to entitle them to seek the protection of the Act, the passage of time has made the ceiling utterly unreal. We are entitled to take judicial notice of the enormous multifold increase of rents throughout the Country, particularly in urban areas. It is common knowledge today that the accommodation which one could have possibly got for Rs. 400/- p.m in 1973 will today cost at least five times more. In these days of universal, day to day escalation of rentals any ceiling such as that imposed by Section 30(ii) in 1973 can only be considered to be totally artificial and irrelevant today.”

    Value of a non-residential premises has increased manifold in the last 25 years. Therefore, there can be least doubt that if in 1961 a person paying a rent of more than Rs. 500/- for a non-residential building belonged to economically stronger section, at present a person who requires a small non-residential building for even carrying a petty business would be required to pay rental of more than Rs. 500/- for a premises whose rental value was Rs. 100/- or Rs. 150/- in 1961. The facts relating to the rentals paid by some of the petitioners originally and at present, extracted earlier clearly indicates the escalation in rents between 1961 and 1986. In view of non-variation of the classification in Section 31 of the Act, the very persons for whose benefit the Section was enacted in the year 1961 stand deprived of the said benefit. It is for this reason it can safely be said that though the original classification was made on a rational basis and it had nexus to the object sought to be achieved, by efflux of time, not only the classification has become unreasonable but it has also ceased to have nexus to the object sought to be achieved. Applying the ratio in Rattan Arya's case Section 31 of the Act is liable to be struck down on the ground that it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

    11. In the result, we make the following order:

    (i) Rule made absolute.

    (ii) Section 31 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act is declared void as offending Article 14 of the Constitution.

    (iii) A Writ of Mandamus shall issue to the State not to enforce the provisions of Section 31 of the Act.

    (iv) No Costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    H. Padmanabha Rao v. State Of Karnataka
    (Jul 1, 1986)