Desai, J.:—
The petitioner was the accused in C.C No. 182/83 on the file of the J.M.F.C, Navalgund, and he will be hereinafter referred to as the ‘accused’. On 10-5-82 at Nargund the accused was found transporting and possessing 23½ gunny bags of admixtured Jayalaxmi (DCH. 32) cotton which is prohibited in Nargund area. So, the Cotton Supervisor, Nargund, seized the said cotton seeds under a mahazar and reported the seizure to the C.J.M Dharwar on 12-5-1982. He sent one portion of the sample to the cotton breeder, Dharwad, as par the provisions of the Mysore Cotton Control Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) for testing. The Cotton Breeder, Dharwar, after Testing, reported that the seeds were admixtured with Jayalaxmi (DCH. 32). Thereafter, the complainant obtained sanction from the Director of Agriculture to prosecute the accused. He received the sanction and authorisation dated 24-2-83. Thereafter on 18-3-83 the complainant filed the complaint in the Court-below against the accused for an offence under Section 6(1)(b)(ii) of the Act and Rule 9 of the Cotton Transport (Karnataka) Rules, 1963. He also prayed for condonation of delay in filing the complaint stating that the period of six months had elapsed in obtaining test report from the Cotton Breeder, Dharwar and in obtaining sanction to prosecute the accused as required under Section 12 of the Act. On receipt of the complaint, the Learned Magistrate condoned the delay and took cognizance of the offence and then the accused appeared before him the accusation for the said offence was put to him. The accused pleaded guilty to the said accusation. Accepting his plea, the Learned Magistrate convicted him on both counts and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 75/- on each count or in default to undergo simple imprisonment for 7 days on each count. Hence, this Revision Petition by the accused.
2. Mr. S.S Patil, Learned Counsel for the petitioner urged that the Learned Magistrate ought to have issued notice to the accused before taking cognizance of the offence and ought to have heard him on the question whether the delay should be condoned or not and as he has not done so, the proceedings before the Learned Magistrate are vitiated.
3. Mr. Koti, Learned High Court Government Pleader, urged that as the accused has pleaded guilty he is deemed to have waived his right of contesting the decision of the Learned Magistrate on the question of condonation of delay.
4. Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short the ‘code’) prescribes the period of limitation for taking cognizance and imposes a bar on the Court in taking cognizance of the offences which are brought to its notice after limitation period and Section 473 of the Code enables the Court to extend that period if it is satisfied that the delay has been properly explained. There is no provision in the Code prescribing any procedure for condonation of delay. But, once the period of limitation prescribed under the Code for launching the prosecution has expired, a valuable right accrues to the accused to the effect that there would be no prosecution thereafter. Therefore, even though there is no rule of law requiring the Court to issue notice to the accused to give him an opportunity of meeting the case of the complainant in regard to the extension of time, interest of justice and principles of natural justice require that the condonation of delay and extension of time must be done only after giving reasonable opportunity to the accused. The same is the view taken in Bharat Highbreed Seeds v. State . 1978 Crl. L.J 61. and Krishna Sanghi v. State of Madhya Pradesh.2
5. In this case, the learned Magistrate has not heard the accused on the question of condoning the delay before taking cognizance. Therefore, the whole proceedings in the Court-below are vitiated as the Court could not have taken cognizance before condoning the delay and as the order condoning the delay has been passed without hearing the accused. Since, the taking of cognizance of the offence by the lower Court itself is without jurisdiction, the conviction and sentence although passed on the plea of guilty of the accused cannot be sustained. Hence I see no force in the contention of the Learned High Court Government Pleader.
6. In the result, the Petition is allowed and the conviction and sentence passed on the petitioner are set aside and the case is remitted to the lower Court for fresh disposal in the light of the above observations. The fine, if paid, shall be refunded to the petitioner-accused.