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  • Sections 147, 148, 448, 353, 395 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code.
  • SECTION 2 FOREST ACT
  • Section 41 of the Indian Forests Act (2)
  • Section 41 of the Indian Forests Act,
  • Clause (b) of Section 2(4)
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  • Sections 147, 148, 448, 353, 395 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code.
  • SECTION 2 FOREST ACT
  • Section 41 of the Indian Forests Act (2)
  • Section 41 of the Indian Forests Act,
  • Clause (b) of Section 2(4)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellants in this appeal were the persons designated as accused Nos. 1 to 3 in Sessions Case No. 36 of 1958 before the Sessions Judge, Dharwar. The opinion records that accused Nos. 4 to 10 in that original case were acquitted. The accused were tried on charges under two principal heads: (1) contravention of Rule 66 framed under Section 41 of the Indian Forests Act, and (2) offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 448, 353, 395 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code.

The material facts are: on the forenoon of 9 October 1957, accused 1 to 3 (and one Shamraj, since deceased) were seen driving four carts loaded with red earth in front of the forest Naka at Banadur in Dharwar District. Forest Guards believed the red earth to be forest-produce requiring transit passes; accused 1 to 3 admitted having no passes, and the guards attached the carts (keeping the carts and earth) but released the bullocks. Later that evening the first three accused, accompanied by a number of villagers (reported as between 15 and 25 and including some persons described as accused 4 to 10), went to the Naka and removed the attached carts; one cart reportedly fell into a gutter during removal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the surface soil (red earth) being transported by the accused constituted "forest-produce" under Clause 4 of Section 2 of the Indian Forests Act, and thereby whether Rule 66 (framed under Section 41) applied so as to make the absence of a transit pass an offence.
  2. Whether the conduct of the accused in the evening—going to the Naka and removing the attached carts—amounted to participation in an unlawful assembly or offences under the listed Sections of the Indian Penal Code (i.e., acts involving force/violence), or whether their conduct was a lesser offence (technical theft) given the circumstances.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (and related) positions

  • The accused (and evidence elicited for them) asserted that the red earth had not been removed from any forest area but from a private malki (ownership) land (identified in the panchanama as S. No. 124 and described by the Ranger as malki land).
  • Counsel for the appellants asked that the trial court's order for disposal of property — returning carts and bullocks — be maintained and that any security bond taken from the accused in respect of that be cancelled (this request was expressly made to the appellate court).

Prosecution / Government arguments

  • The Forest Guards and prosecution took the view that the red earth being conveyed was forest-produce and therefore required transit passes under the relevant rules; the Forest Guards attached the carts on that basis.
  • The Forester (P.W.1) expressed the opinion that a transit pass was necessary if minor forest-produce is to be removed from forest areas, and that even when the produce belongs to a private person, a transit pass is necessary if the produce is to be removed through forest area.
  • The learned Government Pleader argued for a broad meaning of the expression "found in" a forest — contending that "found in" could mean "come across" or "discovered" in a forest even if the item originated outside the forest, and that discovery within the forest would bring such items within the definition of forest-produce.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeded along two main strands matching the two principal heads of charge: (A) whether the earth was "forest-produce" within the words of the statutory definition and thus subject to Rule 66; and (B) whether the evening removal of carts amounted to violent wrongdoing, unlawful assembly, or some other IPC offence beyond a technical taking.

A. Interpretation of "forest-produce" and application of Rule 66

  • The court examined Rule 66 (a rule framed by the Government of Bombay under Section 41 of the Indian Forests Act) which requires a pass to move forest-produce into, from, or within the State except as provided. The rule itself did not state that a transit pass was necessary for goods removed from private property unless those goods fell within the statutory definition of "forest-produce."
  • The court then set out the statutory definition of "forest-produce" from Clause 4 of Section 2, noting that the definition is divided into two categories: (a) items that are forest-produce whether found in or brought from a forest or not (listed items), and (b) items which are forest-produce only when they are found in, or brought from, a forest (including surface soil in clause (b)(iv)).
  • On linguistic and contextual analysis, the court concluded that the phrases "found in" and "brought from" indicate that the forest must be the source or location (the distinctive feature being existence, growth or deposit within the area of a forest). The court rejected the Government Pleader's argument that "found in" could mean merely "discovered in" a forest even if the item had its origin outside the forest, calling that interpretation strained both in language and logic.
  • The court explained the difference in operation between clauses (a) and (b): items in clause (a) are forest-produce by their nature irrespective of location, whereas items in clause (b) (such as surface soil) become forest-produce only by virtue of being found in or brought from a forest. The court further clarified that "found in" does not require human discovery but refers to things existing or growing in a forest.
  • Because the evidence (including admissions by forest officers and the panchanama noting S. No. 124 as malki land) indicated the earth came from private malki land and not from within a forest, the court concluded the trial judge erred in convicting the appellants under Rule 66 based primarily on the oral impressions of witnesses (notably P.W.1) without independently examining the rules and the statutory definition to determine whether the offence had in fact been established.
  • Accordingly, the court set aside the conviction and sentence for the alleged contravention of Rule 66 under Section 41 and acquitted the appellants of that particular offence.

B. Analysis of the evening incident (possession, force, unlawful assembly)

  • The court reviewed the material testimony relevant to the evening removal: P.Ws. 3 and 4 (civilians with dealings with the Forest Department) who gave only general accounts (numbers of persons coming to the Naka) and did not name accused persons; and P.Ws. 5 and 7 (Forest Guards) who provided more specific but sometimes non-identifying accounts of events and alleged assaults or attempts to restrain the guards.
  • The court criticized the trial judge's inconsistent treatment of these witnesses: the trial judge disbelieved their evidence insofar as it purported to implicate certain accused (4,5,8,10) because the witnesses had not named them in the earliest report, yet relied on the same or similar evidence to convict accused 1 to 3 even though the witnesses either did not name them initially or did not attribute violent acts specifically to them. The appellate court characterized those observations as contradictory and destructive of one another.
  • The court further observed that, according to P.W.7, the sequence included elders pleading for release of the carts and that the accused 1 to 3 began to yoke the carts when the guards' attention was thus diverted — a circumstance that, in the court's view, more reasonably suggested persuasion by elders rather than a premeditated intention by the accused to use force. The court noted that even when P.W.7 referred to assaults upon the guards he did not attribute those assaults specifically to the first three accused.
  • Given these evidential features, the court concluded there was no clear or firm basis to hold that the accused (either alone or with others) formed an unlawful assembly or acted with a common unlawful object. Nonetheless, the court recognized the factual finding that the carts were removed from the possession of the Forest Guards and that the carts belonged to the first three accused, making it reasonable to hold that those accused were interested in and actually removed the carts.
  • The court therefore reasoned that, absent reliable proof of violence or an unlawful common object attributable to the accused, their conduct amounted to a technical taking of property that was then in the actual possession of the Forest Guards — i.e., a technical offence of theft — and not the more serious offences for which the trial judge had convicted them.

C. Sentencing and consequential findings

  • The trial judge had imposed three months' rigorous imprisonment where he thought violence had been used. The appellate court reduced the punishment, holding that for this technical offence of theft — especially given the appellate finding that the initial attachment by the guards was illegal — one week's simple imprisonment was adequate.
  • The court noted the appellants had previously been on bail and had already undergone 13 days' imprisonment before release on bail; the court recorded that the appellants had thereby already suffered imprisonment for a longer period than the sentence imposed and stated that their bail bonds would stand cancelled.
  • Subject to these modifications (acquittal under Rule 66, convictions for other offences set aside except for technical theft with reduced sentence), the appeal was dismissed.
  • Finally, the appellate court directed that the trial court's order for disposal of property — the return of the carts and bullocks to the accused — would stand and that the security bond taken from the accused in respect of that should be cancelled, granting the appellants' counsel's request on this point.

Holding and Implications

Core Rulings:

  • Convictions under Rule 66 (framed under Section 41 of the Indian Forests Act) were set aside and the appellants were acquitted of that offence, because the earth in question came from private malki land and therefore did not fall within the clause making surface soil "forest-produce" unless it was found in or brought from a forest.
  • Convictions for the other, more serious offences (those implying use of force, unlawful assembly or common unlawful object) were set aside insofar as the evidence did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused acted violently or as part of an unlawful assembly with a common unlawful object.
  • The accused were held guilty only of a technical offence of theft in respect of removing their carts from the possession of the Forest Guards (the carts belonged to the accused and were taken without the guards' consent while in the guards' possession).
  • Sentence reduced: The appellate court imposed one week's simple imprisonment for this technical theft (replacing the trial judge's more severe sentence), but noted that the accused had already suffered 13 days' imprisonment earlier; the court ordered that the appellants' bail bonds stand cancelled.
  • Property order maintained and security bond cancelled: The appellate court directed that the trial court's order returning the carts and bullocks to the accused would stand and that the security bond taken from the accused for that purpose should be cancelled.

Implications: The decision directly affects only the parties by (a) acquitting them of the statutory offence under Rule 66, (b) overturning convictions for offences requiring proof of violence or membership of an unlawful assembly, (c) convicting them of a lesser technical theft offence with a correspondingly reduced sentence, and (d) upholding the return of property and cancellation of the security bond. The opinion does not purport to establish a broader precedent beyond its statutory interpretation and application of the facts to the definitions in Clause 4 of Section 2 of the Indian Forests Act; no separate prior-case precedents were cited in this opinion.

    Yeshwant Monu Dodamani v. State Of Karnataka

    1. The appellants were accused 1 to 3 in Sessions Case No. 36 of 1958 on the file of the Sessions Judge, Dharwar Accused 4 to 10 therein were acquitted.

    2. These accused were tried under a charge for offences falling under two principal heads : (1) Disobedience of Rule 66 framed under Section 41 of the Indian Forests Act (2) offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 448, 353, 395 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code.

    3. The bare facts of the case are that on the forenoon of the 9th of October 1957 the first three accused and one Shamraj since deceased, were seen driving four carts containing red earth in front of the forest Naka at Banadur in Dharwar District. The Forest Guards taking the view that the red earth that was being conveyed was a forest produce, thought that the conveyance of the red earth required the persona to take what are called transit passes under the relevant rules. On being questioned by the guards, accused 1 to 3 replied that they had no passes, whereupon the Forest Guards attached the carts along with the earth in them and released only the bullocks with which the accused returned to the village, leaving the carts in possession of the Forest Guards.

    The further case of the prosecution is that late in the evening that day at about 6 p.m. the first three accused in the company of 20 or 25 other villagers (including accused 4 to 10) came to the Naka with the intention of forcibly recapturing the attached carta and did actually succeed in getting away with the carts. One of the carts is said to have fallen into a gutter while being driven.

    4. In holding the first three accused guilty of the contravention of the rules made Under the Forest Act, the learned Sessions Judge while accepting the case of the accused that the earth which was being conveyed had not been removed from any forest area but from a private malki land, took the view-viz., It is evident that for transporting even surface soil of private land, a transit pass is necessary when it has to be transported through the Government forest.

    That the earth was taken from a private malki land was admitted even by the forest officers deposing in favour of the prosecution. It has been elicited from the Forester Rayappa the very first witness for the prosecution, that even in the panchanama the place from where the earth was brought is written as S. No. 124 and that the Ranger by looking into a map stated that it was a maiki land and not a Government land. This fact is not disputed even in the appeal before us. For the view stated by the learned Judge m the sentence extracted above We are unable to see any basis except what has been deposed to by P.W. 1, the Forester, who states it as his opinion that-

    Transit pass is necessary if minor forest produce is to be removed from the forest areas or in case it belongs to private persons, if the produce is to be removed through forest area, a transit pass is necessary.

    5. Rule 66 referred to by the learned Judge {which both sides agree is Rule 66 framed by the Government of Bombay under Section 41 of the Act) states:

    No forest-produce shall be moved into, or from, or within any district of the State of Bombay, except as hereinafter provided; without a pass from some officer or person duly authorised by or under these rules to issue such pass, or otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of such pass or by any route or to any destination, other than the route or destination specified in such pass.

    Then, there is a proviso to the rule which refers to certain exemptions and special cases. It is nowhere stated in that rule that a transit pass is necessary even in respect of articles or goods which are removed from private property unless those goods fall within the definition of forest-produce. The term 'forest-produce' is defined in Clause 4 of Section 2 of the Forest Act, which, reads as follows:

    forest produce includes-

    (a) the following whether found in, or brought from, a forest or not, that is to say : Timber, charcoal, caoutchous, catechu, wood-oil resin, natural varnish, bark, tac, mahua flowers, mahua seeds (kuth) and myrabolams, and

    (b) the following when found in, or brought from a forest, that is to say

    (i) trees and leaves, flowers and fruits, and all other parts or produce not hereinbefore mentioned, of trees,

    (ii) plants not being trees (including grass, creepers, reeds, and moss), and all parts or produce of such plants.

    (iii) wild animals and skins, tusks, horns, bones, silk cocoons, honey and wax, and all other parts or produce of animal and

    (iv) peat, surface soil, rock, and minerals (including limestone, laterite mineral oils and all products of mines or quarries);

    It will be noticed that this definition divides 'forest-produce' into two categories. The first comprises items listed in Clause (a) which are forest produce found in or brought from a forest or not; the second comprises items listed in Clause (b) which become forest produce only when found in or brought from a forest. Surface soil is included under the second category. It can therefore be forest produce only if it is found in or brought from a forest.

    6. On a plain reading of these expressions 'found in' or 'brought from', there can hardly be any doubt that both of them indicate the forest to be the source or original depository of the forest produce in question. The learned Government Pleader has very strenuously contended that the expression 'found in' a forest merely means 'come across' or 'discovered' in a forest irrespective of the fact whether the article or goods so discovered were originally sourced or deposited or grown in a forest or some other place which is not a forest. All that is necessary, according to the learned Government Pleader, is that samebody (meaning apparently a forest officer or a forest guard or other person acting under the authority of the Act or Rules) finds or discovers these goods within, the area of a forest Same argument, however, is not available nor is it pressed with, reference to other expression 'brought from' a forest. It is conceded that the expression 'brought from' a forest certainly excludes the idea of a thing being brought from outside the forest but taken through it. It is, however, contended that if an article so brought from outside the forest is 'found' i.e., discovered by somebody within a forest, it would come within the definition. We find it difficult to accept this argument which places extreme strain both on the language and upon logic. The expression at the commencement of Clause (b) of Section 2(4) should be compared with the expression at the commencement of clause (a) of section 2(4). The articles listed under Clause (a) become forest-produce by virtue of their own nature, whether they are found in a "forest or not, or brought from a forest or not. On the other hand, the articles listed under Clause (b) become forest-produce, not by virtue of their nature alone, but by virtue of the fact that they are found in or brought from a forest. The term 'found in' a forest does not necessarily, in our opinion, require an actual discovery of those items by a living person before those items can become forest-produce.

    In our opinion, the term 'found in' actually refers to things growing in a forest like timber trees, fuel trees, fruits, flowers etc. or mineral deposits or stones existing in the forest. The distinctive feature is either the existence or the growth or deposit within the area of a forest and not their discovery by some living person. The idea underlying the expression 'brought from' is equally emphatic of the source of the thing so brought being within the area of a forest. The conveyance or transport involved in the idea of a thing being brought undoubtedly has its beginning in the forest by virtue of the use of the expression 'from.'

    7. We are therefore clearly of opinion that the learned Judge misdirected himself by simply accepting the oral evidence of the witnesses giving their impressions of the effect of rules, without himself looking into the rules and satisfying himself that the accused before him in fact have been shown to have committed an offence. The conviction of the appellants, therefore, for the alleged contravention of Bombay Rule 66 framed under Section 41 of the Indian Forests Act, has to be and is hereby set aside and with it the sentence imposed on them in. respect of it. The appellants are acquitted of that offence.

    8. Regarding the incident of the evening, the evidence which is material is that of four witnesses, viz., P.W. 3 Couskhan, P.W. 4 Usmabeg, P.W. 5 Ramappa & P.W. 7 Rajasab. P.Ws. 5 & 7 are Forest Guards. P.Ws. 3 & 4 are not in the employ of the Government in the Forest Department but those who had business or other connections or dealings with the Forest Department, P.Ws. 3 and 4 do not implicate any accused by name. They merely state that a large body of persons came into the Naka compound in that evening and forcibly removed the attached carts. P. W. 3 gives the number to be 20 or 25 while P.W. 4 states it to be 15 to 20.

    9. According to P.W. 5, the accused and some others came to the Naka at about 5 or 5-30 p.m. and entered inside the compound. He further states), without specifically naming any accused, that all these persons started yoking the carts and when he tried to obstruct them on the ground that the carts had been attached, accused 5 and 8 caught hold of him and that when another Forest Guard P.W. 7 intervened, he too was caught. According to this witness his shirt was torn and Rajasab's shirt was not torn but was smeared with cart-grease. P.W. 7 gives some more details, According to him, when he returned to the Naka from the jungle at about 5 P.M. some elders from Tatvangi, viz., Somaningappa, Somalingappa, Fattesa and Jiva, came to him to request the release of the attached carts. When this discusion was going on^ according to this witness, accused 1 to 3 and another started to take away the carts. When P.W. 5 tried to obstruct them, they assaulted him (without naming who the assailants of P.W. 5 were) and when he (P.W. 7) intervened, accused 4 and 10 caught hold of him.

    10. The learned trial Judge, did not place any reliance upon their evidence in so far as it purported to implicate the accused Nos. 4, 5, 8 and 10. Among other reasons, he states that these witnesses did toot name these accused specifically at the earliest opportunity when they made the first report to their superior officers in which they named only the first three accused. Put when he came to discuss their evidence as against accused 1 to 3, the learned Judge was prepared to place what he describes as implicit belief in the evidence of these witnesses.

    In our opinion, these observations are contradictory and destructive of each other; If the learned Judge thought that the evidence of these witnesses was not reliable for the purpose of convicting the accused particularly named by them, one fails to understand how the learned Judge could rely upon the evidence of P.W. 5 for convicting accused 1 to 3 whom he does not name at all and to whom he does not attribute any particular conduct. There is another aspect of the matter which the learned Judge has overlooked, i.e., the discussion between P. W. 7 and the elders spoken to by him. According to P.W. 7, it was when his attention was diverted by these elders pleading with him for the release of the carts that accused 1 to 3 started yoking the carts to take them away. Even he, when he refers to assault being made upon him, imputes no violence or violent act to the first three accused persona.

    11. In the light of this evidence, the question is whether there was any basis for the learned Judge's conclusion that these accused persona in the company of others had gone with the intention of using force for getting back their carts. If the incident of the evening ccrni1-menced with a discussion or a pleading by the village elders for getting the carts released, the more reasonable view to take, in our opinion, is that the elders on behalf of the accused were trying to persuade the forest guards either that the attachment of the carts carrying private property was not legal or that in any event, the circumstances of the case did not justify such a drastic action as attaching the carts with their contents. If as, there could hardly be any ground for imputing any illegal object to the accused persons.

    12. We are, therefore, of the opinion that there is no clear or firm basis for holding either that these accused by themselves or in the company of several others constituted themselves into an unlawful assembly or that they were acting with any common object which was unlawful.

    13. There can, however, be no doubt that the carts were removed in the evening from the possession of the Forest Guards. As the carts were those that belonged to the first three accused, it is not unreasonable to hold that they were interested in getting them back and they were the persons who actually took them. Though we are not prepared to believe that they used violence or force in doing so, there can hardly be any doubt that at the time they removed, them, the cants were in the actual possession of the Forest Guards (whether their post-session was or was not lawful) and the accused removed them without the consent of the Forest Guards. They can, therefore, be held to be guilty only of a technical offence of theft and nothing more. Their convictions for other of, fences by the learned Judge are set aside.

    14. Even when he took the view that these accused had used violence, the learned Judge felt that a sentence of three months' rigorous imprisonment was sufficient. For this technical offence of theft especially in the light of our finding that the attachment was illegal, one Week's simple imprisonment is, in our opinion, adequate. The appellants have been on bail, and before they were released on bail, they had undergone imprisonment for a period of 13 days, which means that they have already sufferred imprisonment for a longer period. Their bail bonds will, therefore, stand cancelled.

    15. Subject to the above modifications, the appeal stands dismissed.

    16. Although in our opinion it is not necessary to say so, the learned Counsel for the appellants wants us to direct that the order for disposal of the property made by the trial Court, viz., the return of carts and bullocks to the accused will stand and that the security bond taken from the accused persons in respect of that should stand cancelled. We direct accordingly.

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    Yeshwant Monu Dodamani v. State Of Karnataka
    (Oct 10, 1960)