Vinod Kumar Gupta, C.J:— This appeal under Cl. (10) of the Letters Patent is directed against the judgment, dated 17 July, 1997, passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in C.W.J.C No. 2396 of 1994 (R) reported in [1997 (2) U.L.J.R 912], whereby the writ petition filed by the petitioner-appellant against an order passed by the Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, was dismissed with costs assessed at rupees five thousand.
2. The brief facts giving rise to the filing of the present appeal are that the petitioner-appellant, Mineral Area Development Authority (Authority for short) challenged before the learned Single Judge an order passed by the Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, on various grounds. The respondent No. 3, Sri Shyam Sundar Sanu, was an employee of the petitioner-appellant, and he had applied under rule 10 of the Payment of Gratuity (Bihar) Rules, 1972, for payment of gratuity and based on such an application filed by respondent No. 3 the controlling authority passed an order directing the petitioner-appellant to pay gratuity amount to the respondent No. 3. It is this order which was challenged before the learned Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
3. Two points were urged by the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner-appellant before us, firstly that the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, did not have any application to the case of the respondent No. 3 and, therefore, the controlling authority having no jurisdiction in the matter, any order passed by him directing the appellant to pay gratuity to the respondent No. 3 was illegal, invalid and totally bereft of any jurisdictional power and, secondly, that the application fifed by the respondent No. 3 under rule 10 of 1972 Rules was not maintainable, even if the Act could be held to be applicable because it was filed beyond the period of limitation.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have considered the rival contentions.
5. Section 1(3)(b) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, dealing with the question of application of the Act says, inter alia, that the Act shall apply to every shop or establishment within the meaning of any law for the time being inforce in relation to Shops and Establishment in a State, in which ten or more persons are employed. Sub-section (3) of S. 1 of the Act is reproduced hereinbelow, which reads thus:
“1. Short title, extent, application and commencement.— (1) This Act may be called the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.
(2) ***
(3) It shall apply to—
(a) every factory, mine, oil-field, plantation, port and railway company;
(b) every shop or establishment within the meaning of any law for the time being in force in relation to shops and establishments in a State, in which ten or more persons are employed, or were employed, on any day of the preceding twelve months.
(c) Such other establishments or class of establishments, in which ten or more employees are employed or were employed, on any day of the preceding twelve months as the Central Government may, by notification, specify in this behalf.”
The expression, “every shop or establishment within the meaning of any law” coupled with the expression “for the time being in force” in relation to shops and establishments in a State” clearly and unambiguously says and means that the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, shall apply only to such “shops” or “establishments” as would come and fall within the meaning and scope of any law for the time being in Force in a State in relation to shops and establishments in that State. Since in the State of Bihar there is a law dealing with shops and establishments Act, 1953, inevitably therefore, we have to refer to the aforesaid Act to understand and appreciate, by culling out from that Act the meaning of the expression “establishment” and then after applying its exact meaning, to find out whether the establishment of the appellant would come within the meaning, purview and scope of the 1972 Act. The expression “establishment” has been defined in Cl. (6) of S. 2 of the 1953 Act, which reads thus:
“(6) ‘establishment’ means an establishment which carries on any business, trade or profession or any work in connection with, or incidental or ancillary to, any business, trade or profession and includes—
(i) administrative or clerical service appertaining to such establishment;
(ii) a shop, restaurant, residential hotel, eating house, theatre or any place of public amusement or entertainment; and
(iii) such other establishment as the State Government may, by notification, declare to be an establishment to which the Act applies; but does not include a ‘motor transport undertaking’ as defined in Cl. (g) of S. 2 of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961 (27 of 1961).”
What we, therefore, find is that 1953 Act defines an “establishment” to mean an establishment which carries on any business, trade or profession or any work in connection with, or incidental or ancillary thereto. Whether the establishment of the petitioner-appellant carries on any business, trade or profession has to be seen in the context of the nature of activities of the petitioner-appellant and for that we have to fall back upon the facts of the case in so far as these relate to the appellant's nature of work and activities.
6. Mineral Area Development Authority was earlier known as the Coal Mining Area Development Authority and has been constituted under the Bihar Coal Mining Area Development Authority Act, 1986. The Act was brought into operation for the purpose of growth and development of Coal Mining Areas in the State and for matters ancillary thereto. The preamble, aims and objects of the aforesaid 1986 Act clearly suggest that the dominant purpose for which the aforesaid legislation was brought about and under which the Mineral Area Development Authority was created was for the development of the Coal Mining Areas and was not for engaging in commercial activities or any activities relating to trade, business or profession. The Act actually gives a clear indication that the purpose was to create the authority for providing amenities to the people living in the coal mining area, such as roads, water supply, street-lighting, housing drainage, sewerage, public works, housing, play-fields, parks, educational, health and medical community, recreational facilities and various other conveniences as the State Government may notify. We have very carefully considered the aforesaid facts and find that all the purposes and activities of the appellant are welfare in nature and the appellant cannot be called or said to be engaged in any activity by which it can be even remotely or indirectly said to be engaged in carrying on any business, trade or profession or doing any work in connection with incidental or ancillary to any such trade, business or profession.
7. The learned Single Judge in the judgment under appeal while dealing with the aforesaid question of the applicability of the Payment of Gratuity Act to the establishment of the appellant, however, unfortunately did not dwell upon the aforesaid question and without discussing the scope of S. 1(3)(i) of the 1972 Act, in conjunction with the scope of S. 2(6) of 1953 Act, went to hold, rather summarily, that the 1972 Act is applicable to the case of the appellant. We, however, do not agree with the aforesaid finding of the learned Single Judge and for the reasons indicated hereinabove are of the firm view that the provisions of the 1972 Act in the light of S. 2(b) of the 1953 Act, are not applicable to the case of the appellant and the appellant's establishment. That being so, respondent No. 3 was not entitled to apply to the controlling authority under rule 10 of the 1972 Rules for payment of gratuity.
8. Even though we have held above that the 1972 Act is not applicable to the establishment of the appellant, we also wish to observe and hold that rule 10 of 1972 Rules lays down and prescribes a limitation period of ninety days for filing an application under that rule and even though it does lay down and provide that the controlling authority may accept an application even after the expiry of the aforesaid period of ninety days on sufficient cause being shown by an applicant, what we see from the order passed by the controlling authority is that he has not assigned any reason as to how and why he was entertaining an application filed nine years after the occurrence of the cause of action. Even respondent No. 3 himself in his application did not offer any reason for seeking condonation of this inordinate delay of nine years and as to on what grounds he was seeking such condonation. We are not saying that it was beyond the jurisdiction of the controlling authority to condone the delay. All that we are saying is that when the rule provides a period of ninety days for filing an application and if an application is filed nine years after the date of accrual of the cause of action, it is incumbent upon the applicant to offer enough explanation rather to satisfactorily explain the delay, and to plead sufficient cause with reference to facts and circumstances seeking condonation of delay and on such prayer, the controlling authority is under an obligation to record his reasons as to how and why he was condoning the delay of such a long period as nine years. In the present case, however, what we find is that neither respondent No. 3, made any such effort nor did the controlling authority pass any such reasoned or speaking order condoning the delay.
9. For the foregoing reasons, therefore, we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment under appeal as passed by the learned Single Judge and consequently, by allowing the writ petition filed by the appellant, quash and set aside the impugned order of the controlling authority with all consequences. No order as to costs.
10. Eqbal, J.:— I agree.