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  • Section 556 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1882,
  • Rule 11, or Rule 16 or Rule 17 or Rule 30 of Order
  • Section 556 of the repealed Code of 1882
  • Order 41, Rule 17(1) of the Code
  • Rule 17(1) in the Code of 1908,
  • Rules 3, 5 and 8 of Order 9,
  • Order 41, Rule 17(1), C.P.C
  • provisions of Rule 17(1),
  • sub-rule (1) of Rule 17
  • Order XLI Rule 17(2)
  • Order XLI, Rule 17(1),
  • Order 41, Rule 17(1),
  • Rule 17(1). Rule 17
  • Order 41, Rule 19
  • Code.6. Rule 17
  • Sub-rule (2)
  • Sub-rule (1)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 556 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1882,
  • Rule 11, or Rule 16 or Rule 17 or Rule 30 of Order
  • Section 556 of the repealed Code of 1882
  • Order 41, Rule 17(1) of the Code
  • Rule 17(1) in the Code of 1908,
  • Rules 3, 5 and 8 of Order 9,
  • Order 41, Rule 17(1), C.P.C
  • provisions of Rule 17(1),
  • sub-rule (1) of Rule 17
  • Order XLI Rule 17(2)
  • Order XLI, Rule 17(1),
  • Order 41, Rule 17(1),
  • Rule 17(1). Rule 17
  • Order 41, Rule 19
  • Code.6. Rule 17
  • Sub-rule (2)
  • Sub-rule (1)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellants appealed against a judgment and decree of the District Judge, Bhadarwah. On 20-12-1974 a learned Single Judge of this Court dismissed that appeal on merits in the absence of the appellants and their counsel. The appellants filed an application under Order 41, Rule 19 for re-admission of the appeal; that application was dismissed by the learned Single Judge on 14-3-1975 by a brief order: "The application is dismissed as no ground for admitting the same is made out." The appellants obtained leave to appeal against the order of 14-3-1975, leading to the present appeal. The principal legal issue raised concerns the interpretation of Order 41, Rule 17(1), C.P.C., in these circumstances.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether under Order 41, Rule 17(1), an appellate Court can dispose of an appeal on merits in the absence of the appellant or his counsel.
  2. If an appeal is disposed of on merits in the appellant's absence, whether that order should be construed as an order passed under Rule 17(1) (i.e., dismissal for default), thereby permitting an application under Rule 19 for re-admission.
  3. Whether an application under Order 41, Rule 19 can be dismissed summarily (in limine) without affording the appellant a reasonable opportunity to show cause for his absence and, where necessary, to produce evidence.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Parihar)

  • The learned Single Judge had no jurisdiction to dispose of the appeal on merits in the absence of the appellants or their counsel; therefore the order dated 20-12-1974 must be construed as having been passed under Rule 17(1) for default.
  • If so construed, the appellants were entitled to make an application under Rule 19 for re-admission of the appeal.
  • An application under Rule 19 could not properly be dismissed in limine; the learned Single Judge was bound to afford the appellants an opportunity to show sufficient cause for their absence on 20-12-1974, before dismissing their Rule 19 application.

Respondent's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Thakur)

  • The learned Single Judge had power to dispose of the appeal on merits even in the absence of the appellants or their counsel by invoking the permissive language of Rule 17(1).
  • Rule 17(1) was said to be permissive (by virtue of the language "the Court may make an order that the appeal be dismissed") and therefore the Court had three options: adjourn, dismiss for default, or dispose on merits.
  • If the appellate Court has power to dismiss an appeal on merits in the absence of the appellant, then an application under Rule 19 for re-admission would not be competent.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Musaliarakath Muhammad v. Manavikrama the Zamorin Rajah Avergal, AIR 1923 Mad 13 (ILR 45 Mad 882) Cited as authority supporting the view that Rule 17(1) does not permit disposal on merits in absence of appellant. Relied upon as one of the decisions supporting the majority view adopted by this Court that R.17(1) only allows adjournment or dismissal for default, not disposal on merits.
Taher Sheikh Chowkidar v. Otaruddi Howladar, AIR 1929 Cal 475 Cited as authority supporting the restrictive view of Rule 17(1) (no disposal on merits in absence). Counted among Calcutta High Court decisions relied on by this Court to support the conclusion that Rule 17(1) does not permit disposal on merits when appellant absent.
Digendara Chandra Pal v. Radha Ballav Pal, AIR 1953 Assam 191 Authority supporting the view that appellate Court cannot dispose on merits under Rule 17(1) in appellant's absence. Included among the High Court authorities forming the preponderant view with which this Court agreed.
Kundha Singh v. The Punjab State, AIR 1962 Punj 82 Support for the proposition that Rule 17(1) does not allow hearing on merits when appellant absent. Relied on by the Court as supporting precedent for the proposition that dismissal on merits cannot be validly made where appellant is absent.
Mosafir Mahton v. Mt. Bachani, AIR 1963 Pat 1 Patna High Court authority holding Rule 17(1) does not empower hearing on merits in appellant's absence. Quoted at length and used to reinforce the view that Rule 17(1) gives no jurisdiction to hear the appeal on merits in absence of the appellant.
Chandra Stores v. Cloth Merchants Association, AIR 1964 Raj 197 Rajasthan High Court authority supporting restrictive interpretation of Rule 17(1). Counted among decisions of various High Courts with which this Court agreed in interpreting Rule 17(1).
Deo Dutta Singh v. Ram Naresh Singh, AIR 1973 Pat 166 Patna decision supporting non-permissive construction of Rule 17(1). Relied upon by this Court (including observations of Untwalia C.J.) to support the conclusion that Rule 17(1) does not authorize disposal on merits when appellant absent.
Emmanual Simon Peters v. Mrs. Alice Peters, AIR 1976 Delhi 148 Decision consistent with the view that an appellate Court cannot dispose on merits in appellant's absence. Noted as part of the preponderant authority supporting the Court's interpretation of Rule 17(1).
Chimman Lal v. Syed Zahoor Uddin, AIR 1938 All 548 Allahabad High Court authority supporting the contrary view that Rule 17(1) is permissive and permits disposal on merits in absence. Cited as representative of the divergent line of authority (Allahabad) which this Court distinguished and ultimately did not follow.
Gujrani v. Ram Rati, AIR 1965 All 547 Allahabad decision aligning with the permissive interpretation of Rule 17(1). Noted as an example of the Allahabad High Court cases taking the opposite view; this Court considered but did not adopt that approach.
Babu Ram v. Bhagwan Din, AIR 1966 All 1 (Full Bench) Full Bench of Allahabad: Rule 17(1) permissive; appellate Court had three options including disposal on merits. Discussed at length by this Court; the Full Bench's reasoning was considered but ultimately distinguished and rejected for the present facts and statutory interpretation.
Nasir Khan v. Itwari, AIR 1924 All 144 Earlier Allahabad authority referred to in context of Rule 17(1) interpretation. Referred to in Patna discussion; used in surveying earlier decisions but did not change the Court's conclusion favouring the restrictive view.
Daulat Singh v. Kesho Prasad Singh, AIR 1921 Pat 325 A single Judge Patna decision mentioned in the debate over the scope of Rule 17(1). Referred to by a respondent in a cited Patna judgment; the Patna Division Bench regarded it as incorrectly decided in context.
Sukhpal Singh v. Kalyan Singh, AIR 1963 SC 146 Supreme Court observations addressing situations where appellant (or pleader) does not address the Court and the consequences. Relied upon by the Allahabad Full Bench for a proposition (deeming appellant to have been heard in certain circumstances); this Court distinguished Sukhpal Singh as factually different (there the appellant was present but unwilling or unable to argue).
Mathura Das v. Narain Dass, AIR 1940 All 248 Allahabad decision holding that dismissal for default in presence of appellant unwilling to argue may amount to dismissal for default of proof (i.e., a merits disposition). Discussed in relation to Sukhpal Singh; this Court observed that Mathura Das dealt with a case where appellant was present but declined to argue, a factual situation distinguishable from the present case of non-appearance.
Mathuradass (referred as Mathuradass's case), AIR 1940 All 243 Referenced in the opinion in connection with the line of authority discussed in Sukhpal Singh and Mathura Das (as cited in the text). Mentioned as part of the authorities discussed by higher courts; the present Court relied on the factual distinctions rather than applying this authority to the present facts.
Mohamadi Hussain's case, AIR 1937 All 284 Referenced in discussion of historical decisions and their subsequent treatment by courts. Mentioned in the context of earlier Allahabad decisions and their treatment by later courts; used to show evolving jurisprudence, not applied directly to change the Court's conclusion.
Krishna Charan Mondal v. Chinibasi Mondal, AIR 1925 Cal 269 Calcutta authority cited for the proposition that a court must give reasonable opportunity to establish cause for absence and not dismiss summarily. Relied upon by this Court to support the rule that an application under Rule 19 cannot be dismissed in limine and that the appellant should be given an opportunity (with evidence, if necessary) to prove cause for absence.
Gobinda Chandra Mukerjee v. Banku Behari Dass, AIR 1927 Cal 888 Calcutta authority supporting requirement of giving opportunity before dismissing applications relating to default. Used to support the proposition that the Court must allow appellants reasonable opportunity to establish cause when a Rule 19 application is made.
Jatindra Nath Mukerjee v. Surandhani Debi, AIR 1928 Cal 102 Authority cited for the need to permit parties to prove cause and not to dismiss re-admission applications summarily. Relied upon by this Court to reinforce the obligation to afford opportunity and consider evidence before dismissing a Rule 19 application in limine.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a textual and contextual analysis of Order 41, Rule 17(1) and related provisions to determine whether an appellate Court may dispose of an appeal on merits in the absence of the appellant or his counsel. The reasoning proceeded in the following steps, strictly as set out in the opinion:

  1. Identification of the competing views: The Court recognized a cleavage of authority. A preponderant line of High Court decisions (Madras, Calcutta, Assam, Rajasthan, Punjab, Patna, Delhi) holds that Rule 17(1) gives only two options when appellant absent: adjourn or dismiss for default; it does not permit disposing of the appeal on merits in the appellant's absence. A contrary line (principally the Allahabad High Court) treats the Rule as permissive, giving a third option to dispose on merits.
  2. Textual comparison of sub-rules: The Court contrasted Sub-rule (1) (appellant absent) with Sub-rule (2) (respondent absent). Sub-rule (2) expressly provides for ex parte hearing, whereas Sub-rule (1) has no comparable wording. This difference in express language was taken as significant.
  3. Interpretation of related Rules: The Court observed that Rules 19 and 21 use different expressions—"re-admission" (Rule 19) and "rehearing" (Rule 21)—and reasoned that the legislature purposely used distinct terms to convey different meanings. "Re-hearing" presupposes a prior hearing on merits; "re-admission" is consistent with a dismissal for default.
  4. Legislative intent and analogy: The Court drew an analogy with Order IX Rules (which deal with dismissal of suits for default of plaintiffs) and noted a parallel in language and legislative intent, reinforcing that Rule 17(1) was not meant to permit merits disposal in the appellant's absence.
  5. Precedent analysis: The Court surveyed and aligned with the majority of prior High Court decisions to conclude R.17(1) does not authorize disposing of an appeal on merits in the absence of the appellant. It examined and distinguished the Allahabad Full Bench's contrary view (Babu Ram) and the Supreme Court's observations in Sukhpal Singh, holding Sukhpal Singh distinguishable because that case involved an appellant present but unwilling to argue, not a case of non-appearance.
  6. Protection of fairness and opportunity: The Court emphasized that informing a party of a hearing date constitutes an opportunity to be heard, but the opportunity must be real. If a notice is inadequate or circumstances beyond the party's control prevent attendance (e.g., sudden illness), the opportunity is illusory. The Court found that dismissal on merits in the absence of an appellant could be highly inequitable and would result in unequal treatment compared to a respondent who could seek rehearing under Rule 21.
  7. Consequence for orders dismissing on merits in absence: The Court concluded that where a Court incidentally dismisses an appeal on merits in the absence of the appellant, that order shall be deemed to have been passed under Rule 17(1) (i.e., dismissal for default), and an application for re-admission under Rule 19 would be competent.
  8. Requirement to afford opportunity on Rule 19 applications: The Court held that a Court cannot dismiss an application under Rule 19 summarily; it is bound to give a reasonable opportunity to the appellant to establish the cause of absence, and to permit production of evidence if necessary.
  9. Application to the present case: Applying the above principles, the Court found that the Rule 19 application by the appellants had been dismissed in limine without affording any opportunity to prove cause for non-appearance on 20-12-1974. That course was improper, vitiating the learned Single Judge's order dismissing the Rule 19 application.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Appeal allowed.

The Court set aside the order dated 14-3-1975 dismissing the appellants' application under Order 41, Rule 19. It directed that the matter be remitted to the learned Single Judge with directions to give the parties an opportunity to produce evidence in support of the appellants' application and to dispose of the same after hearing them.

Implications:

  • The Court clarified that Order 41, Rule 17(1) does not permit an appellate Court to dispose of an appeal on merits when the appellant and his counsel are absent; the Court may only adjourn or dismiss for default of appearance under that sub-rule.
  • Where a Court nevertheless dismisses an appeal on merits in the appellant's absence, that order shall be treated as a dismissal under Rule 17(1) permitting an application under Rule 19 for re-admission.
  • An application under Rule 19 cannot be dismissed summarily; the Court must give the appellant a reasonable opportunity to establish the cause for absence and to lead evidence if necessary.
  • Direct effect on the parties: The appellants' Rule 19 dismissal was set aside and the matter remitted for hearing of the Rule 19 application with opportunity to adduce evidence. The opinion does not purport to create a new legislative rule but clarifies and applies existing interpretations and precedents; it aligns the present decision with the preponderant line of High Court authorities on the issue.

Appeal allowed. (M.B. Farooqi, A.C.J. concurred.)

    Ghulam Qadir And Others v. Sikander And Others

    Kotwal, J.:— This appeal raises an important question of interpretation of Order 41, Rule 17(1), C.P.C which arises in the following circumstances:

    2. The appellants filed an appeal against a judgment and decree of District Judge, Bhadarwah, which in their absence, as well as in the absence of their counsel, was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of this Court, on merits, on 20-12-1974. Application under Order 41, Rule 19 for its re-admission was also dismissed by him on 14-3-1975 by a brief order which runs as under:—

    “The application is dismissed as no ground for admitting the same is made out.”

    The appellants then moved an application for leave to file an appeal against the said order dated 14-3-1975, which was granted. Hence the appeal.

    3. Mr. Parihar's contention in the appeal is twofold. According to him, the learned Single Judge had no jurisdiction to decide the appeal on merits in the absence of the appellants, or their counsel as such, order dated 20-12-1974, even if it purports to dispose of the appeal on merits, shall still be construed to have been passed under R. 17(1) for default, and not on merits, entitling the appellants to make an application under Rule 19 for re-admission of the appeal. His next contention is that an application under R. 19 could not have been dismissed in limine, and the learned single Judge was bound to afford the appellants an opportunity of showing sufficient cause for their absence on 20-12-1974, when he proceeded to dismiss their appeal on merits. Mr. Thakur's contention on the other hand is that the learned single Judge had ample power to dispose of the appeal on merits, even in the absence of the appellants, or their counsel, under the provisions of Rule 17(1), and no application under Rule 19 was competent, for the Rule was attracted to only those cases where an appeal was dismissed for default of appearance of the appellants under Rule 17(1). There is, however, no dispute on the point that in case an appellate Court has power to dismiss an appeal on merits in the absence of the appellant, then an application under Rule 19 for its re-admission does not he. The fate of the appeal, therefore, turns upon the interpretation of Rule 17(1). Rule 17 reads as below:

    “(1) Where on the day fixed, or on any other day to which the hearing may be adjourned, the appellant does not appear when the appeal is called on for hearing the Court may make an order that the appeal be dismissed.

    (2) Where the appellant appears and the respondent does not appear, the appeal shall be heard ex parte.”

    4. There is a cleavage in judicial opinion over the ambit and scope of R. 17(1). One view which is near unanimous is that the Court has only two options under Sub-rule (1) i.e either to adjourn the appeal, or to dismiss it for default of appellant's appearance. It has no third option of disposing of the same on merits, which is only possible after hearing both the parties as contemplated by Rule 30, or at least the appellant as provided under Rule 16. According to this view, a subsequent change in the language of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 17 by substitution of the words “the Court may make an order that the appeal be dismissed” for the words “the appeal shall be dismissed for default”, which occurred in Section 556 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1882, did not make any difference. The decisions wherein this view has been taken are: Musaliarakath Muhamad v. Manaviakrama the Zamorin Rajah Avergal, AIR 1923 Mad 13, Taher Sheikh Chowkidar v. Otaruddi Howladar*, AIR 1929 Cal 475, Digendara Chandra Pal v. Radha Ballav Pal, AIR 1953 Assam 191, Kundha Singh v. The Punjab State, AIR 1962 Punj 82, Mosafir Mahton… v. Mt. Bachani…., AIR 1963 Pat 1, Chandra Stores v. Cloth Merchants Association, AIR 1964 Raj 197, Deo Dutta Singh v. Ram Naresh Singh, AIR 1973 Pat 166 and Emmanual Simon Peters v. Mrs. Alice Peters, AIR 1976 Delhi 148.

    A contrary view has, however, been taken by the Allahabad High Court, according to which, the legislature by substituting the aforesaid words in Sub-rule (1) of Rule 17 for the words which originally existed in Section 556 of the repealed Code of 1882 were aimed at making the sub-rule permissive in character and the Court had not only two but three options open to it, i.e either to adjourn the appeal, or to dismiss it for default in appearance of the appellant, or to dispose it of on merits. The decisions reflecting the aforesaid view are: Chimman Lal v. Syed Zahoor Uddin, AIR 1938 All 548, Gujrani v. Ram Rati, AIR 1965 All 547, and Babu Ram v. Bhagwan Din, AIR 1966 All 1 (FB).

    5. It is thus obvious that there is preponderance of authorities supporting the view that an appellate Court cannot dispose of an appeal on merits in the absence of the appellant and the contrary view has been taken by the High Court of Allahabad alone. I am in respectful agreement with the view taken by the High Courts of Madras, Calcutta, Assam, Rajasthan, Punjab, Patna and Delhi, as in my opinion, it is the only view possible on the plain language of Rule 17(1) and some other provisions contained in the Code.

    6. Rule 17 runs into two parts. Its first part deals with a situation where the appellant is absent, whereas its second part deals with a situation where the respondent is absent. Sub-rule (2) gives a clear mandate in favour of ex parte hearing of the appeal on merits, whereas Sub-rule (1) does not say so in clear terms. Where an appeal has been dismissed under Rule 17(1), an application for its re-admission can be made under Rule 19. Similarly, where an appeal has been dismissed on merits in the absence of the respondent, he too can make an application for its re-hearing under Rule 21. Significantly, two different expressions have been used in Rules 19 and 21. Whereas the former speaks of re-admission of the appeal, the latter speaks of its rehearing. These two expressions have been purposely used by the legislature to convey different meanings. There can be no question of re-hearing, unless an appeal has been heard previously. Hearing clearly implies hearing on merits, whether it is a hearing under Rule 11, or Rule 16 or Rule 17 or Rule 30 of Order 41. In case the legislature contemplated hearing of an appeal on merits in the absence of the appellant as well, nothing could have stopped it from saying so in clear terms in Sub-rule (1) also, as it said while enacting Sub-rule (2). Even in the absence of any specific words, such an intention could have been gathered, had the legislature used the expression “rehearing” in place of the expression “re-admission” in Rule 19, as it did in the case of Rule 21.

    It is manifest that while enacting Sub-rule (1) the legislature never contemplated dismissal of an appeal on merits as it did while enacting Sub-rule (2). It was for this reason that it employed two different expressions “re-admission” and “rehearing” in Rules 19 and 21, respectively. This inference is further fortified by similar expressions used in Rules 3, 5 and 8 of Order 9, which are in pari materia with Order 41, Rule 17(1), inasmuch as, these Rules deal with dismissal of suits, not on its merits, but for default of the plaintiff. In dealing with Rule 17(1) a Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Mosafir Mahton… v. Mt. Bachani…., AIR 1963 Pat 1 made the following observations:

    “……… This view is supported by the contrast of the language of Order XLI Rule 17(2) which empowers the appellate Court to hear the appeal ex parte “where the appellant appears and the respondent does not appear”. For these reasons we hold that upon a proper interpretation of Order XLI, Rule 17(1), the appellate Court has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal on merits where the appellant does not appear at the time the appeal is called on for hearing. The only course open to the appellate Court in these circumstances is to adjourn the case to another date, or to make an order dismissing the appeal ex parte. This view is borne out by the decision of the Madras High Court in Musaliarakath Muhammad v. Manavikrama, ILR 45 Mad 882 : (AIR 1923 Mad 13), the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Taher Sheikh Chowkidar v. Otaruddi Howladar*, AIR 1929 Cal 475, and the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Nasir Khan v. Itwari, AIR 1924 All 144. Reference was made on behalf of the respondent to a decision of a single Judge of the Patna High Court in Daulat Singh v. Kesho Prasad Singh, AIR 1921 Pat 325, but with great respect we think that this case has not been correctly decided.”

    7. The proposition, that Rule 17(1) does not envisage dismissal of an appeal on merits, has not been disputed by the High Court of Allahabad as well. Its Full Bench in Babu Ram's case (AIR 1966 All 1) (supra) has, however, taken the view that the change introduced in the language of Rule 17(1) in the Code of 1908, is not without any purpose. By substituting the expression “the appeal shall be dismissed in default”, which occurred in Section 556 of the Act of 1882, for the expression, “the Court may make an order that the appeal be dismissed” employed in R. 17(1), the Legislature intentionally made the said Rule permissive in character, and gave three options to the court; i.e either to adjourn the appeal, or to dismiss it for default of the appellant's appearance, or to dispose it of on merits by invoking Rule 30. This is borne out from the following observations made by the Full Bench in its judgment:

    “It does not admit of any doubt that the dismissal provided for by O. XLI, R. 17(1) is not a dismissal on merits, but a dismissal only for default of appearance. On the language of the sub-rule the order that the appeal be dismissed has to be casually connected with the situation mentioned therein, and the order of dismissal which the appellate Court is empowered to pass thereunder cannot have its basis in anything else except the failure of the appellant to appear when the appeal is called on for hearing…………”

    And, again:

    “……… I have examined these decisions with great care and profound respect, but I have failed to see how this limitation can be placed upon the discretion of the Court and from where, it can be derived, once the existence of the discretion is accepted. Of course, if there had been nothing in the Code empowering the Court to dispose of the appeal of an appellant who is absent at the hearing in any other manner save the one provided by O. XLI, R. 17(1) it would have been indisputable that in case the appeal is not adjourned it has to be dealt with in the manner provided by the said provision. But if there is under the Code a general power of dealing with an appeal otherwise as well, that power, unless expressly excluded will remain exercisable by the Court even where O. XLI, R. 17(1) is applicable. In that case the power conferred by O. XLI, R. 17(1) has to be regarded only as an additional power that may be used in the situation mentioned in it and not as also a limitation upon the generality of the power given elsewhere. The general power of the Court of appeal is contained in Rr. 30, 32 and 38 of O. XLI.”

    8. It is, therefore, manifest that there are no two opinions on the point that a Court does not have the power to dispose of an appeal on merits under Rule 17(1) as such, when the appellant is absent. The view taken by the Allahabad High Court in Babu Ram's case (AIR 1966 All 1) (FB) (supra), however, is that an appellant shall be deemed to have been heard within the meaning of Rule 30, even in a case where he has been afforded an opportunity of being heard, no matter whether he fails to appear to argue his appeal when it is called for hearing, or fails to argue it even when he is present in the Court. In taking this view the Court relied upon certain observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Sukhpal Singh v. Kalyan Singh, AIR 1963 SC 146 at different places, which were summed up by the Full Bench to make a complete whole as follows:

    “Where the appellant and his pleader are not prepared to address the Court there is no hearing and, therefore, nothing is shewn to the appellate Court as to why it should interfere with the decision of the Court below. The burden of proof is on an appellant to show that the decision which he appeals from was wrong and where he does not address the Court at all it appears to us that there is no point raised for determination and it is not necessary, therefore, to give a decision on any point or the reasons for the decision. It is sufficient for the court to pass an order of dismissal for default. Such an order does not necessarily mean that the appeal is dismissed for default of appearance. In such circumstances the order means that the appeal is dismissed for default of proof.”

    9. There can be no manner of doubt that the moment the Court informs a party that its case will come up for hearing on a particular day, it shall be deemed to have afforded to it an opportunity of being heard. It cannot go further and compel it to argue its case. Nevertheless, the opportunity which the Court provides should be real, which a party can avail of, if it so chooses. Where it is not real, e.g where the notice is too short, or where the party is prevented from availing it for reasons beyond its control, e.g where it is suddenly taken ill, the same would be rendered illusory and, therefore, no opportunity at all. The Allahabad High Court in Baboo Ram's case (AIR 1966 All 1) (FB) (supra) took both these elements for granted. It assumed that a party served with a reasonable notice would be always deemed to have had the opportunity of being heard, and it further assumed that the party would be always in a position to avail of the opportunity. With respects, if I may say so, the second assumption may not be always right, for the party absenting itself on the date of hearing may have excellent reason for justifying its absence. A respondent may have an opportunity of justifying his absence in case he would make an application under Rule 21, but an appellant in similar circumstances shall have none. Dismissal of an appeal on merits in the absence of the appellant may often times render the decision of the Court highly iniquitous. There is no understandable reason for such an unequal treatment to the parties similarly situated.

    10. The facts in Thakur Sukhpal Singh's case (AIR 1963 SC 146) (supra) are clearly distinguishable, and on the ratio of that judgment it is not possible to conclude that a Court can dispose of an appeal on merits in the absence of the appellant. In that case, an appeal had been “dismissed for default” by the High Court of Madhya Bharat in the presence of the appellant, as he had expressed his inability to argue the appeal himself, and his request for engaging a counsel had been turned down on the ground that it was not bona fide. While dismissing the appeal, the Court had relied upon a Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court reported as Mathura Das v. Narain Dass, AIR 1940 All 248, wherein it had been held that dismissal of an appeal for default in the presence of the appellant, who is unwilling to argue his appeal, tantamounted to dismissal for default of proof and not to dismissal for default of appellant's appearance. In the appeal taken to the Supreme Court from the aforesaid judgment, it was contended that the judgment was bad, because it failed to take into account the record of the trial Court as well as the grounds contained in the memo of appeal, which was a mandatory requirement of Rule 31.

    This argument was repelled by their Lordships, for the reason, that unless and until the appellant discharged his burden of showing that the judgment under appeal was wrong by addressing arguments in the case, the appellate Court would be under no obligation to refer to the record of the case, including the grounds mentioned in the memo of appeal. Dismissal of an appeal for default in such circumstances in their Lordships' opinion would not be a dismissal for default in appearance, but would be a dismissal for default in proving the judgment under appeal to be wrong and, therefore, a judgment on merits. While approving the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in Mathuradass's case (AIR 1940 All 243) (supra) their Lordships observed as under:—

    “………We find it difficult to uphold the view that even when no arguments are urged and no reasons put forward in arguments against the correctness of the decision appealed against the appellate Court should peruse the record and find out for itself whether the judgment is right or wrong.

    We, therefore, repel the contention for the appellant that the High Court had to decide the appeal after going through the record of the case and the judgment of the Court below and must have complied with the provisions of R. 31 of O. XLI, C.P.C, when the appellant did not address the Court.”

    11. Clearly, therefore, it was not a case where no one was present on behalf of the appellant. On the other hand, it was a case where the appellant was present but was unwilling to argue the case and his prayer for adjournment was found not to be bona fide. In such a case, there can be no manner of doubt, that the appellant may be deemed to have been heard within the meaning of Rule 30. This authority has no application to the facts of the present case, because neither the appellants, nor their counsel, were present on 20-12-1974, when the learned single Judge dismissed the appeal on merits. In taking this view, which in my opinion, is the only possible view in the circumstances of the case, I am supported by the following observations made by Untwalia C.J as his Lordship then was, in Deo Dutta Singh's case (AIR 1973 Pat 166) (supra) which may be reproduced with advantage as below:—

    “The decision of Niamatullah, J., in Mohamadi Hussain's case in AIR 1937 All 284 was not approved. It (its?) overruling by a Division Bench in AIR 1940 All 248 seems to have been referred to with approval. Thinking that the Supreme Court case lays down that in a case of default the appellate Court may dismiss an appeal for default or proceed to dispose it of on merits, the Full Bench of Allahabad Court in AIR 1966 All 1 has obliterated the distinction between a case of non-appearance of the appellant or his counsel and case where he appears but for one reason or the other does not address the court. I am unable to subscribe to this view. My considered opinion is that the decision of the Supreme Court does not in any way disturb the consistent line of authorities of the various High Courts given with reference to Order 41, Rule 17(1) of the Code that in a case of non-appearance of the appellant simpliciter the Court has no power to dispose of an appeal on merits. The Supreme Court was not concerned with a case of this kind………”

    12. Not only that, Dass Gupta J. speaking for himself in Sukhpal Singh's case (AIR 1963 SC 146) (supra) even went to the extent of saying:

    “It appears to me that when a counsel engaged by a party refuses to address the Court on behalf of his client, it is next to impossible for a client to engage another counsel on the spot to argue the case and ordinarily, impossible for the counsel thus engaged to address the Court then and there. It is not also reasonable, in my opinion, to expect that a lay client should be able to argue his appeal. To ask the appellant personally, in circumstances like these, to argue the appeal is to ask for the impossible. It appears to me to be neither fair nor just that when a counsel suddenly withdraws from a case, the lay client should be asked to argue the appeal himself. Justice, in my opinion, requires that in such a case the client should be given some time—however short—to engage a counsel.”

    13. I have, therefore, no doubt in my mind that a court has no power to dismiss an appeal on merits when the appellant is not present in the court either personally or through his counsel. The court can either adjourn it, or dismiss it for default of appellant's appearance. Where in such circumstances the court incidentally dismisses the appeal on merits, its order shall be deemed to be one passed by it under Rule 17(1) and an application for its re-admission under Rule 19 shall be competent. (AIR 1962 Punj 82 (supra), (AIR 1973 Pat 166) (supra), and AIR 1976 Delhi 148 (supra)). Furthermore, the court cannot dismiss such an application summarily, but is bound to give reasonable opportunity to the appellant to establish the cause for his absence by producing evidence, if necessary. (Krishna Charan Mondal v. Chinibasi Mondal, AIR 1925 Cal 269, Gobinda Chandra Mukerjee v. Banku Behari Dass, AIR 1927 Cal 888 and Jatindra Nath Mukerjee v. Surandhani Debi, AIR 1928 Cal 102).

    14. In the instant case, admittedly no opportunity was afforded to the appellants to show cause as to why they or their counsel remained absent when the appeal was called for hearing. Their application under Rule 19, as already noticed, was dismissed in limine. This course was not warranted by law. The learned single Judge ought to have given the appellants an opportunity of proving the cause. This he never did. His order, therefore, stands vitiated.

    15. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed, and the order dated 14-3-1975 passed by the learned single Judge dismissing the appellants' application under Rule 19 is set aside. The case will now go back to him with the direction that he will allow the parties opportunity to produce evidence in the appellants' aforesaid application and proceed to dispose of the same after hearing them.

    M.B Farooqi, A.C.J:— I agree.

    Appeal allowed.

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    Ghulam Qadir And Others v. Sikander And Others
    (Jun 6, 1980)