Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • S. 9 of the Probation of Offenders Act
  • S. 9 of the Probation of Offender Act
  • S. 9, Probation of Offenders Act,
  • S. 4, Probation of Offenders Act
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • S. 9 of the Probation of Offenders Act
  • S. 9 of the Probation of Offender Act
  • S. 9, Probation of Offenders Act,
  • S. 4, Probation of Offenders Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, Partap Singh, was tried for an offence under Section 307, Indian Penal Code, in Sessions Trial No. 17‑S/7 of 1992/89. The learned Sessions Judge (acting as Additional Sessions Judge), by judgment dated 23‑3‑1993, convicted him for the lesser offence under Section 324, Indian Penal Code, and instead of imposing sentence granted him the benefit of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act. The trial court released him on probation for one year on a personal bond of Rs. 2,000 with one surety of like amount and directed him to keep the peace and be of good behaviour.

The original FIR (No. 197/89, Police Station Sadar, Shimla) alleged that on 1‑9‑1989 the petitioner attacked Shri A.N. Sharma (then Superintendent of Police (Enforcement)) with a dagger, causing an incised wound to the right infrascapular region.

The petitioner preferred an appeal (Cr. A. No. 62 of 1993) against the conviction, but the appeal was not pressed and was dismissed by a single Judge of the High Court on 29‑8‑1997.

While on probation the petitioner was alleged to have committed further offences. On 24‑5‑1993 he allegedly assaulted Shri M.S. Mandyal (then Additional District and Sessions Judge) with a knife; FIR No. 172 of 1993 was registered. On 27‑5‑1993 the State filed an application under Section 9 of the Probation of Offenders Act seeking cancellation of probation and imposition of sentence for the already‑recorded conviction under Section 324. The petitioner replied, admitting registration of the subsequent case(s) but pleaded false implication and requested continuance of his probation.

A full inquiry was conducted by the trial court with evidence (oral and documentary) and legal aid provided to the petitioner. The record showed involvement in two cases during the probation period: FIR No. 422 of 1993 (alleged attack on Pradeep Singh; tried in Sessions Trial No. 4‑S/7 of 1994, convicted for Section 324 and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 1½ years with a fine) and FIR No. 172 of 1993 (attack on M.S. Mandyal; tried in Sessions Trial No. 49‑S/7 of 1993, convicted for Section 323 and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year with a fine; this conviction was affirmed on appeal on 27‑11‑2001).

On 21‑1‑1999 the learned trial court recalled the probation order, found that the petitioner had failed to observe bond conditions by committing offences during probation, and after hearing on sentence sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 3,000 (with a further one year in default). Periods of custody were ordered to be set off under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

The petitioner challenged the trial court's order by Cr. Appeal No. 297 of 1999 in the High Court; that appeal was dismissed as not maintainable on 15‑3‑2000. The petitioner then appealed to the Hon'ble Supreme Court (Cr. Appeal No. 729 of 2001). The Supreme Court, by order dated 6‑8‑2002 (2002 (6) JT (SC) 441), allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court order, and directed that the appeal be treated as a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to be heard afresh. On remand the matter was registered as a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., and the present opinion is the High Court's decision on that petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, to interfere with the trial court's order under Section 9, Probation of Offenders Act, which recalled probation and imposed sentence on the petitioner.
  2. Whether the trial court, having recalled the probation and imposed sentence upon finding that the petitioner committed offences during the probationary period, exercised jurisdiction properly and lawfully (i.e., whether there was any abuse of process, lack of jurisdiction, or denial of due opportunity).

Arguments of the Parties

State's Arguments

  • The State applied under Section 9, Probation of Offenders Act, that the petitioner's probation should be cancelled because during the subsistence of probation he committed offences (registered as FIR Nos. 172/1993 and 422/1993), thereby failing to observe the terms and conditions of the bond.
  • On that basis the State sought recall of the order granting probation and imposition of sentence for the original conviction under Section 324 IPC.

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner admitted registration of the subsequent cases but contended that those cases were false and frivolous and that he was falsely implicated for ulterior motives.
  • He asked for dismissal of the State's Section 9 application and prayed for continuance of his probation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Cr. Appeal No. 729 of 2001 — Hon'ble Supreme Court order dated 6‑8‑2002 (reported: 2002 (6) JT (SC) 441) The Supreme Court held that an accused against whom an order under Section 9 of the Probation of Offenders Act has been passed must have a judicial remedy; if an appeal is not maintainable the High Court ought to treat the appeal as a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (or entertain a petition under Article 227) and decide the matter on merits. The High Court complied with the Supreme Court's direction: the matter was registered on remand as a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., and the Court proceeded to consider whether to exercise inherent jurisdiction to interfere with the trial court's Section 9 order.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first acknowledged the Supreme Court's directive to regard the matter as a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and proceeded to consider whether to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to interfere with the trial court's order recalling probation.

The Court recited the principles governing the exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., emphasizing that:

  • The power under Section 482 must be exercised sparingly and only to render real and substantial justice;
  • It is not a substitute for appellate or revisional powers, and the High Court should not ordinarily reappraise evidence unless compelling circumstances exist;
  • The inherent power can be invoked in three circumstances: (i) to give effect to an order of the Court, (ii) where there is an abuse of the process of the Court, and (iii) in order to secure the ends of justice;
  • The Court summarized additional guiding principles: these powers are to be exercised ex debito justitiae, not arbitrarily; they are to be used sparingly; they are inappropriate where the Code provides specific remedies; and they must not be used contrary to express bars in the Code.

Applying those principles to the facts, the Court noted the following undisputed or admitted matters from the record:

  • The petitioner admitted that during the subsistence of his probation he was involved in two separate criminal cases (FIR Nos. 172/1993 and 422/1993).
  • Subsequent trials led to convictions: in one matter he was convicted for Section 324 IPC and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 1½ years (with fine) and in the other he was convicted for Section 323 IPC and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year (with fine), the latter being affirmed on appeal.
  • These convictions and the petitioner's own admission supported the trial court's finding that the petitioner failed to observe the terms and conditions of the bond during the probationary period.

The Court concluded that, given those admitted facts and the evidence, the trial court correctly recalled the probation and imposed sentence for the offence for which the petitioner had been convicted. The Court further found:

  • The trial court possessed jurisdiction to pass the impugned order;
  • There was no material on record to demonstrate that the trial court exercised jurisdiction in a wrong or arbitrary manner;
  • Due opportunity was afforded to the petitioner to show cause before the recall of probation;
  • There was nothing to suggest an abuse of the process of the court.

The Court also observed that the sentence imposed by the trial court had already been served by the petitioner, and upon a subsequent petition (Cr. M.M.O. No. 33 of 2002) that sentence was ordered to run concurrently with a life sentence imposed in a different sessions trial (Sessions Trial No. 5‑S/7 of 1998) by a Division Bench of the High Court.

On the totality of these considerations the Court held that this was not a fit case for the exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to interfere with the trial court's order.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

DISMISSED. The petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was dismissed and the impugned order dated 21‑1‑1999 of the learned trial court (recalling probation and imposing sentence) was not interfered with.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The trial court's order recalling the probation and imposing sentence stands as the operative decision in this matter.
  • The petitioner's attempt to secure interference under Section 482 Cr.P.C. failed; the petition is dismissed and a copy of the order is to be sent to the petitioner through the Superintendent, Model Central Jail, Nahan.

Implications regarding precedent: The opinion applies established principles governing the exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and follows the Supreme Court's directive to treat the earlier appeal as a petition under Section 482. The opinion itself does not purport to establish a new legal principle beyond those applications and contains no discussion of broader law‑making implications.

    Partap Singh v. State Of H.P .

    1. The petitioner, Partap singh, upon having been tried for the offence under S. 307, Indian Penal Code, in Sessions Trial No. 17-S/7 of 1992/89 by the learned Sessions Judge (Forests), exercising the powers of Additional Sessions Judge, Shimla, came to be convicted for the offence under S. 324, Indian Penal Code, vide judgment dated 23-3-1993. Upon such conviction, the learned trial Court instead of imposing any sentence upon the petitioner granted him the benefit of S. 4, Probation of Offenders Act and ordered his release on probation for a period of one year on his executing personal bond to the tune of Rs. 2,000/- with one surety to the like amount and during the period of such probation he was directed to keep peace and be of good behaviour.

    2. The allegations against the petitioner vide FIR No. 197/89 Police Station Sadar, Shimla were that on 1-9-1989 at about 5.30 p.m at the Mall, Shimla, he had attacked Shri A.N Sharma, the then Superintendent of Police (Enforcement) with a dagger in an attempt to commit his murder. As a result of such attack Shri A.N Sharma had sustained an injury in the form of an incised wound in the right infrascapular region 10 cms. from mid line, 9th intercostal space with clean cut parallel edges, elliptical shape, skin deep.

    3. The petitioner, feeling aggrieved by his conviction for the offence under S. 324, Indian Penal Code, as recorded by the learned trial Court vide judgment dated 23-3-1993, preferred an appeal, being Cr. A. No. 62 of 1993 assailing his conviction. Such appeal, however, was not pressed by the petitioner and the same was accordingly dismissed by a learned single Judge of this Court on 29-8-1997.

    4. It appears that while on probation, the petitioner on 24-5-1993 at about 7.30 p.m at the Mall, Shimla, assaulted Shri M.S Mandyal, the then Additional District and Sessions Judge with a knife in an attempt to murder him. A case for the offence under Ss. 307, 353 and 506, Indian Penal Code, came to be registered at Police Station Sadar, Shimla, vide FIR No. 172 of 1993 on 24-5-1993.

    5. On 27-5-1993, an application was made on behalf of the State by the learned Public Prosecutor, under S. 9, Probation of Offenders Act for cancellation of the probation granted to the petitioner and for imposing sentence upon him for the offence under S. 324, Indian Penal Code, for which offence he stood convicted vide judgment dated 23-3-1993. It was pleaded that the petitioner during the continuance of his probation period had committed the offence under Ss. 307, 353 and 506, Indian Penal Code and as such had failed to observe the conditions of the bond entered into by him.

    6. Notice was issued to the petitioner to show cause as to why his probation be not cancelled and he be not imposed the punishment for the offence under S. 324, Indian Penal Code, for which offence he stood convicted vide judgment dated 23-3-1993. Cause was shown by the petitioner. In his reply to the show cause notice, he admitted that a case for the offences under Ss. 307, 353 and 506, Indian Penal Code, stood registered against him on 24-5-1993 vide FIR No. 172 of 1993 at Police Station Sadar. He however, pleaded that the case against him was false and frivolous and that he was falsely implicated in the case for ulterior motives. He further pleaded that in fact he was assaulted, beaten and got arrested by the complainant and other persons. He, accordingly, prayed for the dismissal of the application made by the State under S. 9, Probation of Offenders Act, and for continuance of his probation.

    7. The application made by the State was inquired into by the learned trial Court. The parties were afforded due opportunities to lead evidence. Both oral as well as documentary evidence was led by the parties. The petitioner was provided legal aid by appointing a counsel at State expenses for him.

    8. The evidence brought on record against the petitioner shows that during the subsistence of probation period of one year, he was involved in two cases, one for the offence under S. 307, Indian Penal Code, vide FIR No. 422 of 1993 dated 4-11-1993, Police Station, Sadar, Shimla, for having assaulted one Pradeep Singh with a knife in attempt to murder him, and the second for the offences under Ss. 307, 353 and 506, Indian Penal Code, vide FIR No. 172 of 1993 dated 24-5-1993, Police Station Sadar, Shimla, for having made an attempt to com mit the murder of Shri M.S Mandyal, the then Additional District and Sessions Judge.

    9. Evidence further revealed that in the first case, the petitioner upon having been tried for the offence under S. 307, Indian Penal Code, in Sessions Trial No. 4-S/7 of 1994, was convicted for the offence under S. 324, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one and a half years and also to pay a fine of Rs. 2000/- on 25/27-5-1995.

    10. In the second case, the petitioner was convicted for the offence under S. 323, Indian Penal Code, in Sessions Trial No. 49- S/7 of 1993 and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/- vide judgment dated 25/27-5-1995.

    11. It may be noticed that the conviction and sentence of the petitioner in the above referred to second case stands affirmed in appeal by this Court on 27-11-2001.

    12. The petitioner while appearing as his own witness during the course of inquiry admitted the registration of the cases against him. He also admitted that he stood convicted and sentenced in such cases. He, however, pleaded false implication.

    13. On consideration of the material placed before it, the learned trial court vide its order dated 21-1-1999 came to the conclusion that the petitioner had failed to ob serve the terms and conditions of the bond by indulging in the commission of the of fence during the subsistence of the probation, after recalling the order releasing the petitioner on probation and upon hearing him on the question of sentence, sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 3000/-. In default of payment of fine, the petitioner was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of one year. The period of detention of the petitioner in judicial/police custody was ordered to be set off against the sentence of imprisonment imposed upon him in accordance with the pro visions contained in S. 482, Code of Criminal Procedure.

    14. Feeling aggrieved by the order dated 21-1-1999 of the learned trial Court, the petitioner assailed the same by way of an appeal, being Cr. Appeal No. 297 of 1999, before this Court. Such appeal was dis missed as not maintainable vide judgment dated 15-3-2000. The petitioner went up further in appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, being Cr. Appeal No. 729 of 2001. The Hon'ble Supreme Court vide order dated 6-8-2002: (2002 (6) JT (SC) 441) allowed the appeal and after setting aside the order dated 15-3-2000 of this Court to hear the case afresh after treating the appeal filed by the appellant as a petition under S. 482, Code of Criminal Procedure. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed:

    “In our opinion, an accused against whom an order under S. 9 of the Probation of Offenders Act had been passed cannot be left without a judicial remedy. Assuming for the sake of argument that an appeal was not maintainable, the High Court ought and could have regarded the appeal which was filed as being a petition under S. 482, Cr. P.C and should have decided the case on merits. The said provision is meant for situations like the present one. In the alternative, a petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India would always be filed and entertained. As long as a remedy is available to the accused, it matters little as to the nomenclature attached to it. The High Court in the present case should have regarded the appeal which was filed against the order under S. 9 of the Probation of Offender Act as a petition under S. 482, Cr. P.C and decided it according to law. As this has not been done, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court and direct the High Court to hear the case afresh by treating the appeal filed by the appellant as a petition under S. 482, Cr. P.C”

    15. On remand, the matter came to be registered as a petition under S. 482, Code of Criminal Procedure.

    16. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record of the case.

    17. It is by now well settled that the power under S. 482, Code of Criminal Procedure has to be exercised very sparingly to render real and substantial justice to the parties. It is not fair on the part of the High Court to interfere with judicial exercise of the discretion vested in the lower Courts on the mere allegations of the accused. The in herent powers under S. 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, can be exercised by this Court under the following three circum stances, namely:—

    (i) Where the jurisdiction is invoked to give effect to an order of the Court;

    (ii) If there has been an abuse of the process of the Court; and

    (iii) In order to secure the ends of justice.

    18. Under S. 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, a party gets no vested right or in herent right to seek interference. In exercise of that jurisdiction, the Court itself steps in only to meet the contingencies therein catalogued. The principles governing the exercise of inherent powers are:—

    (a) The High Court possesses the inherent powers to be exercised Ex debito justitiae to do the real and substantial justice. Such powers, however, do not confer any arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to its whims or caprice;

    (b) Such inherent powers are to be exercised sparingly to prevent the abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice;

    (c) Such powers are not be resorted to if there is specific provisions in the Code for redress of grievance of the aggrieved party; and

    (d) Such powers are not to be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

    19. It is equally well settled that the powers under S. 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, are distinct from the appellate or revisional powers of the Court and in the exercise of such powers the High Court cannot make a reappraisal of evidence and to come to a conclusion different from the one arrived at by the Court below, unless there are compelling circumstances choking the conscience of the Court.

    20. In the present case, it is the admitted case of the petitioner that during the subsistence of the probation he was involved in two cases for the offence under S. 307, Indian Penal Code, though subsequently he was convicted and sentenced only for the offences under Ss. 323 and 324, Indian Penal Code. In view of such admitted facts, the learned trial Court has rightly found that the petitioner had failed to observe and abide by the terms and conditions of the bond. The order releasing him on probation was, therefore, rightly recalled and sentence imposed upon him for the offence for which he stood convicted.

    21. There is no dispute that the learned trial Court had the jurisdiction to pass the impugned order. Therefore, it is not a case of exercise of such jurisdiction by the learned trial Court which it did not possess. Nothing has come on the record to show that the jurisdiction has been exercised by the Court below in a wrong or arbitrary manner. Due opportunity, as required by law, was given to the petitioner to show cause before the passing of the impugned order. Nor there is anything to show that there has been an abuse of any process of the Court.

    22. It is also pertinent to note that not only the sentence imposed on the petitioner vide the impugned order stood served out by him, on a petition having been made by the petitioner, being Cr. M.M.O No. 33 of 2002 the sentence of imprisonment imposed upon him in this case was ordered to run concurrently with the sentence of imprisonment for life imposed upon him in Sessions Trial No. 5-S/7 of 1998 by a Division Bench of this Court.

    23. On the facts and circumstances of case, it is not a fit case for the exercise of inherent powers under S. 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, for interfering with the impugned order dated 21-1-1999 of the learned trial Court. Resultantly, the present petition is dismissed.

    24. Let a copy of this order be sent to the petitioner for information through the Superintendent, Model Central Jail, Nahan.

    25. Petition dismissed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Partap Singh v. State Of H.P .
    (Mar 7, 2003)