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  • 12 of O. 22.5. Rule 12 of O. 22 of the CPC
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  • 12 of O. 22.5. Rule 12 of O. 22 of the CPC
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (T.U. Mehta, A.C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion arises from a Letters Patent Appeal (L.P.A.) challenging a judgment recorded by a single Judge in Execution Second Appeal No. 1 of 1973. Respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 (Paras Ram, Krishan Dayal and Dharmu — sons of Ram Ditta) had earlier filed a suit for possession against appellant No. 2 Tulsi, respondent No. 4 Mst. Maro and respondent No. 5 Nanku. The dispute concerned title to property arising from inheritance. Respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 obtained a decree for possession in their favour.

During execution of that decree it was discovered that the present appellants (except Tulsi) and respondents Nos. 6 to 10 were also in possession of certain parcels of the disputed land. The decree-holders joined these persons as judgment-debtors alleging induction into the land by the original judgment-debtors after the decree. Those so joined claimed they held different parcels as tenants, asserting tenancy rights were created even prior to the decree.

The Executing Court rejected these contentions; the District Judge affirmed on appeal; and a learned single Judge of the High Court dismissed the execution second appeal. With special leave from that single Judge, the present appellants filed this Letters Patent Appeal.

During the pendency of the appeal, appellant No. 1 (Sher Singh) died on 31-10-1977 and respondent No. 1 (Paras Ram) died on 26-06-1977. Neither party's legal representatives were brought on the record. The central procedural question identified was the effect of not bringing Paras Ram's legal representatives on the record of the appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Rules 3, 4 and 8 of Order XXII of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) — which concern bringing legal representatives of a deceased party on the record — apply to appeals arising out of execution proceedings, given Rule 12 of Order XXII stating that "Nothing in Rr. 3, 4 and 8 shall apply to proceedings in execution of a decree or order."
  2. What is the legal effect, in the context of this Letters Patent Appeal, of not bringing on record the legal representatives of a deceased joint decree-holder (Paras Ram)?
  3. Whether the appellate court is obliged (or may) to invoke Rule 33 of Order XLI CPC to bind parties not on the record, as a means of avoiding disparate or conflicting decrees where legal representatives are absent.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • Appellants contended that Rules 3, 4 and 8 of Order XXII CPC (which deal with bringing legal representatives on record) do not apply to execution proceedings by virtue of Rule 12 of Order XXII, which excludes those rules from "proceedings in execution of a decree or order." They argued this Letters Patent Appeal is a continuation of the original execution proceedings and hence Rr. 3, 4 and 8 would not be applicable to this appeal.
  • They relied on decisions of the Patna High Court (the Full Bench decision in Hakeem Syed Mohammad Taqi v. Fateh Bahadur Singh, AIR 1929 Pat 565, and Laxmi Narayan Singh v. Dipen Rai, AIR 1950 Pat 290) which took the view that appeals in execution proceedings are continuations of execution and, therefore, R.12 applies to exclude Rr.3,4 and 8.
  • To address the problem of absent legal representatives, appellants also suggested that the appellate court could exercise its power under Rule 33 of Order XLI CPC to pass a decree binding even parties not on the record, thus potentially avoiding adverse consequences of non-joinder.

Respondents' Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' separate legal arguments opposing the appellants' contentions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hakeem Syed Mohammad Taqi v. Fateh Bahadur Singh, AIR 1929 Pat 565 (Full Bench, Patna) Held that appeals in execution proceedings are mere continuation of execution proceedings and R.12 of O.22 applies so that Rrs. 3, 4 and 8 do not apply. The Court reviewed this authority but explicitly declined to follow it, noting that subsequent High Court decisions had taken a contrary view and that Rule 11 of O.22 (read with O.41) supports application of abatement rules to such appeals.
Laxmi Narayan Singh v. Dipen Rai, AIR 1950 Pat 290 Also supports the Patna view that execution appeals are continuation of execution and so R.12 excludes Rrs.3,4 and 8. The Court noted this decision as supporting appellants' contention but refused to follow it for the reasons given in the opinion.
Ahsan Elahi v. Mehr Elahi, AIR 1950 (East) Punj 302 Held that appeals from orders in execution proceedings are not "proceedings in execution" within the meaning of O.22, R.12; therefore rules relating to abatement (Rrs.3 and 4 of O.22) apply to execution appeals. The Court cited this decision approvingly as representing the contrary view to Patna, and treated it as part of settled law favouring the application of abatement rules to execution appeals.
Chandravati Bai v. Chaganlal, AIR 1962 Andh Pra 308 (Andhra Pradesh High Court) Affirmed the view that execution appeals are governed by the same rules of abatement as appeals from decrees and orders in suits (i.e., Rrs.3 & 4 of O.22 apply). The Court referenced this decision as supporting its approach and aligned itself with that view.
Ajudhia Pershad Ram Pershad v. Sham Sunder, AIR 1947 Lah 13 (Full Bench, Lahore High Court) Full Bench overruled an earlier Lahore view and dissented from the Patna approach, implying that execution appeals are not excluded from abatement rules. The Court noted this as an instance where a prior contrary position was overruled and treated it as supportive of the approach the Court adopts.
Surendranath Patnaik v. Dasarathi Dutta, AIR 1960 Orissa 14 (Orissa High Court) Adopted the view that execution appeals are governed by abatement rules (i.e., consistent with East Punjab view). The Court referenced this decision among several High Court authorities that dissented from the Patna Full Bench and endorsed the approach followed by these courts.
Kusun Samal v. Banamali Roul, AIR 1974 Orissa 105 Reiterated Orissa High Court's approach that execution appeals are subject to the same abatement rules as other appeals. Used as further authority showing consistent High Court practice contrary to the Patna view; relied upon by the Court.
Bishnu Bijoy Srimani v. Chandra Bijoy Srimany, AIR 1955 Cal 281 (Calcutta High Court) Calcutta High Court's judgment reflecting that abatement rules apply to execution appeals (contrary to Patna Full Bench). The Court cited this decision as another High Court ruling supporting the proposition that Rrs.3 & 4 of O.22 apply to appeals from execution proceedings, and aligned with these authorities.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a step-by-step analysis of the preliminary objection and the main procedural question:

  1. The appellants' reliance on Rule 12 of Order XXII CPC (which states that Rrs.3,4 and 8 shall not apply to proceedings in execution) was considered. The Court observed that the contention ignored Rule 11 of Order XXII which directs that, in application of the Order to appeals, the words "plaintiff", "defendant" and "suit" should be read as "appellant", "respondent" and "appeal" respectively. This compelled the Court to treat the procedural rules of the Order as applicable to appeals so far as they appropriately fit.
  2. The Court noted that Order XLI CPC (which governs appeals) makes no distinction between ordinary appeals from decrees and appeals arising out of execution proceedings. Therefore, even if an execution appeal is a continuation of execution procedurally, appeal procedure is distinct and relevant rules of Order XXII (read with Rule 11) apply to appeals.
  3. The Court articulated the practical problem that would arise if the legal representatives of a deceased respondent in an appeal were not brought on the record: a reversal in appeal could bind only the parties on record and not absent legal representatives, potentially producing conflicting decrees in the same matter and thereby creating inconsistent outcomes.
  4. The appellants' suggestion that the appellate court could use Rule 33 of Order XLI (permitting the appellate court to pass a decree binding even non-parties on the record) was addressed. The Court rejected reliance on this as a solution because invoking Rule 33 is discretionary, not obligatory — thus it cannot be treated as an assured cure for non-joinder.
  5. The Court reviewed conflicting authorities. It acknowledged the Patna Full Bench authorities supporting appellants' contention but refused to follow them because subsequent decisions of multiple High Courts (East Punjab, Andhra, Lahore Full Bench overruling its earlier view, Orissa, Calcutta) had taken the contrary position that execution appeals are subject to the abatement rules of Order XXII. The Court expressed alignment with those subsequent High Court decisions.
  6. Focusing on facts, the Court observed that the original decree was jointly obtained by respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 on the basis of joint title. As joint holders of interest and necessary parties to the original suit, the death of one joint decree-holder (Paras Ram) required bringing his legal representatives on record to avoid conflicting decrees. Given that Paras Ram's legal representatives were not brought on record, the Court found non-joinder to be fatal to the appeal.

The Court thus combined statutory interpretation (of O.22 Rrs.11 and 12 and O.41) with practical considerations about binding effect and consistency of decrees to reach its conclusion.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that the whole Letters Patent Appeal abates due to the non-joinder of the legal representatives of the deceased joint decree-holder Paras Ram. The appeal was disposed of and abated; the Court made no order as to costs.

Implications

  • Direct effect on the parties: The appeal abates and is disposed of because the legal representatives of a joint decree-holder (Paras Ram) were not brought on the record; the procedural defect was fatal and not cured by the record as it stood.
  • On procedural law: The Court refused to follow the Patna Full Bench line of authority that R.12 of Order XXII excludes Rrs.3,4 and 8 for execution appeals, and instead followed a number of subsequent High Court decisions holding that abatement rules apply to appeals arising out of execution proceedings (read via R.11 of O.22 and O.41). The opinion therefore aligns the Court with the body of High Court decisions cited that treat execution appeals as governed by abatement rules applicable to other appeals.
  • Remedial suggestion rejected: The Court observed that reliance on Rule 33 of Order XLI to bind absent parties is not an obligatory or consistently available remedy because its exercise is discretionary; thus non-joinder cannot be remedied as of right by invoking R.33.
  • Wider precedent: The opinion does not proclaim that it is laying down an entirely novel principle beyond its application to the facts. The Court expressly places its decision within an existing line of High Court authority and does not purport to announce a broader or new legal doctrine beyond the decision that, on these facts, non-joinder of the legal representatives of a deceased joint decree-holder is fatal and causes abatement.

Note: This summary has been produced strictly from the content of the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences beyond the text of that opinion.

    Sher Singh And Others v. Paras Ram And Others

    T.U Mehta, A.C.J:— This L.P.A arises out of the judgement re corded by a single Judge of this Court in Execution Second Appeal No. 1 of 1973 Short facts of the case are that the respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3, who are respectively Paras Ram, Krishan Dayal and Dharmu and who are the sons of one Ram Ditta, had filed a suit for possession against appellant No. 2 Tulsi, respondent No. 4 Mst. Maro and respondent No. 5 Nanku the son of Lehnu. The dispute in that suit was as regards title to the property arising out of the inheritance. Respondents, Nos. 1, 2 and 3 succeeded in obtaining a decree for possession in their favour. This decree was subsequently sought to be executed, but at the time of the execution it was found that the present appellants, except Tulsi, and respondents Nos. 6 to 10, were also in possession of certain parcels of the land in dispute. The decree-holders, therefore, joined even these persons as judgement-debtors on the allegation that they were inducted in the land by the original judgement-debtors after the decree was passed. During the execution proceedings which proceeded, the appellants, and the respondent, who are said to have been inducted by the original judgement-debtor took the plea that they, were holding different parcels of the disputed land as tenants, and tenancy rights in the favour were created even before the decree was obtained by the present respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3.

    2. This contention of the objectors was rejected by the Executing Court, and thereafter, by the District Judge in appeal, as also by the learned single Judge of this High Court in second execution appeal. With a special leave by the learned single Judge, these appellants have now preferred this appeal. During the pendency of this appeal, the appellant No. 1 has died on 31-10-1977 and the respondent No. 1 Paras Ram, who was one of the original joint decree-holders, has also died on 26th June, 1977. It is an admitted fact that neither the legal representatives of the respondent No. 1 Paras Ram, nor the legal representatives of the appellant No. 1 Sher Singh are brought on record. Therefore, the question is : What is the effect of non-bringing the legal representatives of Paras Ram on the record of this case.

    3. We are not referring to the consequences of not bringing the legal representatives of Sher Singh on the record of this case because, in our opinion, non-bringing of the legal representatives of Paras Ram in the case is fatal to this appeal.

    4. The first preliminary objection which was urged by the learned Advocate of the appellants was that provisions of Rr. 3, 4 and 8 of O. 22 of the CPC which contemplates the bringing of the legal representatives of a deceased party on the record of a particular case do not apply to proceedings in execution of a decree or order as provided by R. 12 of O. 22.

    5. Rule 12 of O. 22 of the CPC is in the following terms :

    “Nothing in Rr. 3, 4 and 8 shall apply to proceedings in execution of a decree or order.”

    6. The contention was that this Letters Patent Appeal is nothing but the continuation of the original execution proceedings and therefore the rules as regards joining of the legal representatives of a deceased party as contained in Rr. 3, 4 and 8 of O. 22 have no application so far as this Letters Patent Appeal is concerned.

    7. In our view, the above contention omits to take into consideration the provisions found in R. 11 of O. 22, which is found in the following terms :

    “In the application of this order to appeals, so far as may be, the word “plaintiff” shall be held to include an appellant, the word “defendant” a respondent, and the word “suit” an appeal.”

    8. It is thus evident that according to the above quoted R. 11 of O. 22, the provisions contained in the Code as regards the procedure to be adopted in appeals apply with the only difference that the plaintiff should be understood as appellant, defendant as respondent and suit as an appeal. Now, if a reference is made to O. 41 of the CPC which refers to appeals, it will be found that it makes no distinction between the appeals preferred against the original decrees passed in suits and the appeals which arise out of execution. That being the position, even if, for the sake of argument, it is conceded that appeal arising out of execution is strictly speaking continuation of execution, the procedure contemplated for such appeals is different. If an analogy can be taken, it can be said that every appeal arising out of a suit is nothing but the continuation of the suit itself. But that does not mean that the procedure to be adopted in the original suit proceedings would be the same which could be adopted in appeal which arises out of that suit.

    9. Moreover, another important aspect which should be borne in mind is that unlike execution proceedings appeals on the same point cannot be repeatedly filed. The result, therefore, is that if the legal representatives of a deceased respondent in an appeal are not brought on the record, the reversal of the order of the original court in appeal would bind only the parties who are already on the record but not the legal representatives of the deceased-respondent who are not brought on the record. Thus, in the same matter there would be different types of decrees which would bind the parties to the same proceedings. If these decrees are contradictory, then obviously analogous position would arise.

    10. In order to meet the above situation, Shri Kedar Ishwar pointed out that in such cases it would obviously be open to the court to exercise its powers under R. 33 of O. 41 which enables the appellate court to pass a decree which would bind even the parties who are not on the record. This contention is not acceptable because it is not obligatory on the appellate court to make orders under R. 33 of O. 41.

    11. Shri Kedar Ishwar relied upon two decisions of Patna High Court in support of this preliminary objection. He cited a Full Bench decision given by Patna High Court in Hakeem Syed Mohammad Taqi v. Fateh Bahadur Singh, reported in AIR 1929 Pat 565. The majority of the Full Bench has taken a view in this case that appeals in proceedings relating to execution of a decree are mere continuation of execution proceedings, and there can be no doubt that R. 12 of O. 22 is applicable to such appeals and consequently Rr. 3, 4 and 8 cannot apply. We have gone through this decision as well as the other decision given by the same High Court in Laxmi Narayan Singh v. Dipen Rai, reported in AIR 1950 Pat 290. Both of these decisions undoubtedly support the contention of Shri Kedar Ishwar, but, for the reasons already stated above, we find ourselves unable to follow these decisions. On the contrary, we find that subsequent decisions of almost all High Courts in India have taken a contrary view. Instead of referring to all these decisions, we may only refer to a few of them.

    12. In Ahsan Elahi v. Mehr Elahi, reported in AIR 1950 (East) Punj 302, the High Court has held that appeals from orders in execution proceedings are not proceedings in execution within the meaning of O. 22, R. 12 and therefore not excluded from the rules relating to abatement contained in that Order. It may, therefore, be taken to be settled law that execution appeals are governed by the same rules with regard to abatement as appeals from decrees and orders in suits and therefore the provisions of Rr. 3 and 4 of O. 22 apply to the appeals from the orders passed on execution applications. The same view is taken by Andhra Pradesh High Court. in Chandravati Bai v. Chaganlal, reported in AIR 1962 Andh Pra 308. Previously Lahore High Court had taken the view which was consistent with the view taken by Andhra Pradesh High Court, but subsequently in Ajudhia Pershad Ram Pershad v. Sham Sunder, reported in AIR 1947 Lah 13, a Full Bench of Lahore High Court has overruled its previous view and has dissented from the view taken by Patna High Court. Orissa High Court has taken the same view, as the above referred view of the East Punjab High Court, in Surendranath Patnaik v. Dasarathi Dutta, reported in AIR 1960 Orissa 14, and the subsequent decision in Kusun Samal v. Banamali Roul, reported in AIR 1974 Orissa 105. Calcutta High Court is also of the same opinion as found from Bishnu Bijoy Srimani v. Chandra Bijoy Srimany, reported in AIR 1955 Cal 281. All these High Courts have referred to the above referred Patna decision on which Sri Kedar Ishwar has put reliance, and have dissented from that view. Since we are also of the same opinion, we need not discuss various other rulings supporting the view which we are taking on this point. We, therefore, see no force in this preliminary objection.

    13. Now taking up the merits of the question, it is obvious that the original decree was jointly obtained by respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 on the basis of their joint title. All these three respondents were, therefore, jointly interested in the decree and as joint holders of interest all the three of them were necessary parties to the original suit. Under the circumstances, on the death of one of them, namely Paras Ram, presence of his legal representatives was legally necessary in order to avoid conflicting decrees. Under the circumstances, we find that non-joinder of the legal representatives of Paras Ram as parties to this appeal would be fatal to the whole appeal.

    14. In our opinion, therefore, the whole appeal abates.

    15. The appeal is accordingly disposed of without any order as to costs.

    16. Appeal abated.

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    Comments

    Sher Singh And Others v. Paras Ram And Others
    (Jun 23, 1978)