(PER : HONOURABLE MS
JUSTICE SONIA GOKANI)
By
preferring this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the
petitioner has sought the following prayers :
a. Your
Lordships be pleased to issue an appropriate writ order or direction
in the nature of a writ of Certiorari, or any other appropriate writ
order or direction by quashing and setting aside the impugned order
in original dtd 23.2.2009 and resultantly the order in Appeal dated
18.12.09 and uphold the refund granted already vide order dtd.
3.3.09.
b. Your
Lordships be pleased to pending the final disposal of the present
petition stay the operation and implementation of any recovery qua
the above impugned orders dtd. 23.2.2009 & 18.12.09.
c. Your
Lordships be pleased to pending the admission and final hearing of
the present petition grant ex parte ad interim relief in terms of
prayer B above.
d. Your
Lordships be pleased to pass such other and further orders deemed
fit and proper in the facts of the present case.
The
facts in this petition are in narrow compass. The petitioner had
filed the refund claim of Rs. 1 lakhs. This was on the ground of an
inquiry initiated as per the the Directorate General of the Central
Excise Intelligence( DGCEI for short) which related to excess
payment of duty drawback. On 10.8.2001, panchnama in this respect
was drawn and no adjudication process for confirming the dues were
initiated.
The
Assistant Commissioner sanctioned the refund claim of Rs.1 lakhs
vide its order dated 2.6.2008 under order in original considering
the said amount as pre-deposit relying on the decision of this Court
rendered in case of Omkar Exports v.
Union of India reported in
2009(240) ELT 355(Guj.). Such refund had already been paid to the
petitioner. Revenue had challenged the said order raising various
grounds. Such departmental appeal was allowed by the
Commissioner(Appeals) vide its order dated 19.12.2008 and the same
was challenged before CESTAT on 19.1.2009. Tribunal relying on the
decision of this Court rendered in case of Omkar
Exports (supra)
set aside the order of the Commissioner(Appeals) vide its order
dated 3.3.2009.
In
the meantime adjudicating authority which sanctioned the refund
amount issued a fresh show cause notice on the ground that the
refund was erroneously granted. After availing the opportunity of
hearing, it confirmed the recovery of refund amount of Rs. 1 lakhs
vide its impugned order dated 23.2.2009. Adjudicating authority has
noted that personal hearing was offered to the assessee thrice who
did not avail such opportunity of being heard in person. On noting
that the principles of natural justice has been sufficiently
followed, it decided the issue
on the basis of the available evidence on record. The petitioner
herein challenged the same before the Commissioner(Appeals) raising
various grounds in such challenge. Such appeal was preferred on
3.8.2009 i.e. five months after the order impugned was passed. An
application for condonation of delay was preferred along with the
said appeal. It had been averred in the said application for
condonation that the order in original had been received, but, was
lost as the person concerned who received such an order did not file
it at the proper place. Commissioner(Appeals) rejected this on the
ground that there is delay of five months in filing the appeal.
Invoking provisions of section 35 of the Central Excise Act, it
held that it does not enjoy the powers to condone delay beyond a
period of 30 days.
This
was carried to the Tribunal by the petitioner which confirmed the
order of the Commissioner(Appeals) relying on decision of Apex Court
rendered in case of Singh
Enterprises vs. CCE Jamshedpur reported
in 2008(221) ELT 163(SC). The Tribunal also concurred with the
findings that the Commissioner(Appeals) would not have power to
condone the delay beyond the period of 30 days and the stipulated
period of 60 days and accordingly, the petitioner s appeal came to
be rejected.
Aggrieved
by such dismissal of the appeal, the present petition has been
filed.
We
have heard learned counsel Shri Hasit Dave for the petitioner and
learned counsel Shri Ravani for the respondents.
It
is submitted by the learned counsel Shri Dave that the petitioner
has a very good case on merits but only on the technical ground of
limitation by not exercising powers of condonation of delay, both
the authorities have not entertained the plea of the petitioners,
although, he had made out sufficiently satisfactory grounds for such
condonation. He also further urged that the petitioner cannot be
deprived of his substantive right only on such technical grounds. He
has sought to place reliance upon the decisions of this Court
rendered in case of D.R.
Industries Ltd. v. Union of India reported
in 2008(127) ECC 61 and also in case of Senior
Superintendent of Post Office v. Union of India dated
23.6.2011 in Special Civil Application No.7350/2011. It would be
profitable to reproduce the observations made in the said case at
this stage :
3. To
the statutory provisions contained in the Finance Act, 1994 with
respect to filing of appeal and limitation etc, there is no dispute.
It is thus not in dispute that the power of Commissioner (Appeals) to
condone the delay is only upto a maximum period of three months.
4. In
that view of the matter, we find no illegality in the order under
challenge. Counsel for the petitioner, however, drew our attention
to the judgment of this Court in the case of D.R. Industries Ltd.
and anr. vs. Union of India and ors. reported in 2008(3) G.L.H. 662
to contend that even in such cases where there is statutory limit to
which delay can be condoned, the High Court in its extraordinary
power can, in appropriate cases, interfere. To the preposition laid
down in the said decision, we are not joining the issue. In a given
case, an aggrieved person can knock the doors of the High Court
seeking redressal against the orders in original and the High Court,
in its extraordinary powers under writ jurisdiction of Article 226
of the Constitution, may for valid reasons, to obviate extreme
hardship or injustice, entertain a challenge even beyond the period
of limitation prescribed. In the present case, however, we are not
inclined to adopt such a course for the simple reason that the
amount of service tax and penalty demanded is not very large.
Further, in any case it is a question of payment of tax from one
Central Government Department to another Central Government
Department. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, we
are not inclined to exercise extraordinary discretionary
jurisdiction and, therefore, the petition is dismissed.
Learned
counsel Shri Ravani appearing for the respondent has urged that this
Court may not interfere in extraordinary jurisdiction in the instant
case when there is no error in their concurrent views. He however,
has not disputed that neither of the authorities i.e. the
Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal examined the issue on
merits. He heavily relied upon the decision of the Apex Court
rendered in case of Singh
Enterprises vs. CCE Jamshedpur (supra)
to
substantiate his decision. He has also placed reliance upon the
decision of the Apex Court in case of S.S.
Rathore v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported
in 1989 (43) E.L.T. 790 (SC) where doctrine of merger has been
explained by the Apex Court which was examining the question of
provisions of Administrative Tribunals Act. After considering the
question in detail, it has concluded that doctrine of merger is
applicable not only to the Courts but also to the Tribunal and order
of lower quasi judicial authority merged into the appellate and
revisional orders. Relevant findings are reproduced here-in-under
for better comprehension of issue.
11.
The distinction adopted in Mohammad Nooh's case between a court and
a tribunal being the appellate or the revisional authority is one
without any legal justification. Powers of adjudication ordinarily
vested in courts are being exercised under the law by tribunals and
other constituted authorities. In fact, in respect of many disputes
the jurisdiction of the court is now barred and there is a vesting of
jurisdiction in tribunals and authorities. That being the position,
we see no justification for the distinction between courts and
tribunals in regard to the principle of merger. On the authority of
the precedents indicated, it must be held that the order of dismissal
made by the Collector did merge into the order of the Divisional
Commissioner when the appellant's appeal was dismissed on 31.8. 1966.
13.
In this background if the original order of punishment is taken as
the date when cause of action first accrues for purposes of Article
58 of the Limitation Act, great hardship is bound to result. On one
side, the claim would not be maintainable if laid before exhaustion
of the remedies; on the other, if the departmental remedy though
availed is not finalised within the period of limitation, the cause
of action would no more be justiciable having become barred by
limitation. Redressal of grievances in the hands of the departmental
authorities take an unduly long time. That is so on account of the
fact that no attention is ordinarily bestowed over these matters and
they are not considered to be governmental business of substance.
This approach has to be deprecated and authorities on whom power is
vested to dispose of appeals and revisions under the Service Rules
must dispose of such matters as expeditiously as possible.
Ordinarily, a period of three to six months should be the outer
limit. That would discipline the system and keep the public servant
away from a protracted period of litigation. We are satisfied that to
meet the situation as has arisen here, it would be appropriate to
hold that the cause of action first arises when the remedies
available to the public servant under the relevant service Rules as
to redressal are disposed of.
On
thus hearing counsel for both the sides and on duly considering the
submissions made, it can be noted at the outset that the petitioner
herein when challenged the order of adjudicating authority, the
second show cause notice was issued after once the refund had
already been allowed and paid to him. Both the authorities have
rejected the appeals of the petitioner on the ground of limitation.
Both the authorities had relied upon the decision of Apex Court in
so doing. We have already held as noted here-in-above that there is
no quarrel that the power of Commissioner(Appeals) to condone the
delay is of
three months maximum. And, therefore, no fault can be found with the
approach of both the authorities as far as question of condonation
of delay is concerned. We are therefore, naturally not to interfere
with the orders of both the authorities. We have gathered from the
materials on record that none of these authorities has decided the
question on merit after the second round of litigation began and
therefore, the question of merger would not arise until the matter
is decided on merit and hence we seek to uphold the challenge to the
order-in-original treating the circumstances as extraordinary.
In
the instant case, as the petitioner has approached this Court urging
to invoke extraordinary jurisdiction relying on the decision of
D.R. Industries Ltd. v. Union
of India(supra),
recognising that this Court has extraordinary powers in appropriate
case to interfere even while upholding the contention that there is
statutory limitation to which delay can be condoned by the
authorities. We ourselves have earlier in case of Senior
Superintendent of Post Office v. Union of India (supra)
recognised that if an aggrieved person knocks the door of High
Court seeking redressal under writ jurisdiction for valid reasons,
to obviate extraordinary hardship and injustice such challenge can
be entertained even beyond the period of limitation.
In
the instant case, we have found that in the first round of
litigation present petitioner was refunded the amount by way of
order in original. The respondents have also not disputed the fact
that the petitioner has extremely good case on merit. We also need
to record the fact that the petitioner while challenging the order
impugned before the Commissioner(Appeals) not only had preferred
the application for condonation of delay, but, had also
substantiated the same grounds with sufficient and acceptable
grounds for condoning such delay and thus has explained sufficiently
from the beginning such delay. It is a different aspect that
appellate forums are bound by the law on the issue. Thus the total
length of delay being very small and with extremely good ground on
merit to sustain, we are of the opinion that non interference at
this stage would cause gross injustice to the petitioner. Therefore,
we need to step in by invoking extraordinary jurisdiction.
At
the cost of reiteration, we note that we are conscious of the fact
that such powers are required to be exercised very sparingly and in
event of extraordinary circumstances in an appropriate case where
otherwise we would fail in our duty that such powers are needed to
be invoked. We are therefore, of the opinion that orders impugned
and appellate forums dated 7.1.2011 and 18.12.2009 though not be
interfered with and yet the impugned order of order-in-original
dated 23.2.2009 requires to be quashed and set aside.
Learned
counsel Shri Dave under instructions submitted that he is not
claiming any interest on the ground of refund. Therefore, no order
in this respect is required to be made.
The
petition in the above terms stands allowed. Rule is confirmed to
above extent.
(AKIL KURESHI, J.)
(MS SONIA GOKANI, J.)
raghu
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