Whether
Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ?
To
be referred to the Reporter or not ?
Whether
their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ?
Whether
this case involves a substantial question of law as to the
interpretation of the constitution of India, 1950 or any order
made thereunder ?
Whether
it is to be circulated to the civil judge ?
=========================================================
TITANIC
RESTAURANT THROUGH DHARMENDRABHAI DASHRATHBHAI PATEL - Petitioner(s)
Versus
DY.POLICE
COMMISSIONER & 2 - Respondent(s)
=========================================================
Appearance
:
MR
YN OZA, SR.ADVOCATE with MS ROMA I FIDELIS
for
Petitioner(s) : 1,
MR PK JANI, GOVERNMENT PLEADER with MRS KRINA
CALLA, AGP for Respondent(s) : 1 -
3.
=========================================================
CORAM
:
B.PARDIWALA)
As
common questions of fact and law are involved in this batch of
petitions, they were heard together and are being disposed of by this
common judgment and order.
In
all the writ petitions the prayers are common. The petitioners who
have been issued licence under Section 33 of the Bombay Police Act,
1951 to run eating house/restaurant in the city of Ahmedabad have
preferred these petitions with the following prayers :-
"(A)
Your Lordships may be pleased to hold and declare that the respondent
no.1, his officers, servants, etc. have no power, authority and/or
jurisdiction to make any further endorsement on the licence of the
petitioner - Licence Holder and thereby to restrain the
petitioner establishment to run Hukka Bar.
(AA)
Your Lordships may be pleased to quash and set aside the
circular/notification dated 14.07.2011 issued by the Commissioner of
Police, City Ahmedabad.
(B)
Your Lordships may be pleased to hold and declare that any further
endorsement made on the License of the petitioner by the respondent
no.1, his officers, agents, etc., if any, is illegal and the same is
not binding to the petitioner - License Holder and in
conformity with the provisions of Cigarettes and Other Tobacco
Products Act, 2003 and the Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products
Rules, 2008 framed thereunder and further be pleased to hold and
declare that preventing the petitioner from carrying on their lawful
and legal business by the respondents is in violation of the rights
conferred upon the petitioner under Article 19(1)(g) of the
Constitution of India.
(C)
Your Lordships may be pleased to direct the respondents, their
agents, servants, etc. not to create any hindrance or obstructions in
the smooth running of Hukka Bar as per the conditions of the original
license and not to restrain the petitioner from giving service of
Hukka Bar on the basis of further endorsement made on the license, if
any, and permit the petitioner to run the Hukka Bar in accordance
with law.
(D)
Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of this petition, Your
Lordships may be pleased to permit the petitioner to run the service
of the petitioner of Hukka Bar, as mentioned in the title clause of
this petition and further be pleased to direct the respondents, their
agents, servants, etc. not to disturb and/or create any hindrance.
(DD)
Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of this petition, Your
Lordships may be pleased to stay the operation, execution and
implementation of the circular/notification dated 14.07.2011 issued
by the Commissioner of Police, City Ahmedabad."
Brief
facts relevant for the purpose of deciding these petitions can be
summarised as under :-
The
petitions have been preferred mainly challenging the jurisdiction of
the Police Commissioner of the city of Ahmedabad in issuing the
notification under Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code and
under Section 33(1) of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 (for short, 'the
Act of 1951')
imposing a complete ban and prohibiting providing hookah at eating
house/ restaurant.
Petitioners
are running restaurants on the strength of licence/permission
granted by the Police Commissioner of the city of Ahmedabad on their
giving an undertaking to abide by all the conditions which may be
imposed upon by the Police Commissioner under the Act of 1951. The
licences are issued to open 'eating house' as defined under Section
2(5A) of the Act of 1951.
It
appears from the record that a notification dated 2nd
December 2005 was issued by the Police Commissioner of the city of
Ahmedabad imposing two conditions for regulating hookah bar: (1) a
separate cabin would be provided over and above the other general
area for providing food in the restaurant and that hookah would not
be provided in the common area of the restaurant; and (2) that
hookah would not be provided to the persons below the age of 18
years.
Record
reveals that thereafter on 14th
May 2009 further eight conditions were added to the earlier
notification dated 2nd
December 2005 by the Police Commissioner of the city of Ahmedabad.
It
appears that at a later stage in the licence issued to the owners of
various eating houses a condition has been added to the effect that
no eating house/restaurant shall provide hookah. In short, a
complete ban has now been imposed on the petitioners who are running
eating houses/ restaurants so far as providing hookah is concerned.
It is this addition of the condition in the respective licences
which has led the respective petitioners in filing the writ
petitions.
It
appears that after addition of the condition in the respective
licences of the petitioners imposing a complete ban or restraint on
providing of hookah at a eating house/ restaurant, the Police
Commissioner of the city of Ahmedabad thought fit to issue a
notification dated 14th
July 2011 in purported exercise of powers under Section 144 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. On being satisfied that it is essential
to prevent danger to life, health, safety or peace and tranquility
of the members of the public.
It
appears that this notification was issued to give true effect to the
addition of the condition in the respective licences imposing a
complete ban and restraint on providing of hookah with a view to meet
with the emergent situation which was prevailing in the city of
Ahmedabad so far as the hookah bars are concerned. This notification
is also a subject matter of challenge substantially on the ground
that it is only temporary order which cannot last beyond two months
from the making thereof as is clear from Section 144(6) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure and proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 144
empowers only the State Government the jurisdiction to extend the
prohibitory order for a maximum period of six months beyond the life
of the order made by the Police Commissioner.
Record
also reveals that this Court had taken up the issue of hookah bars
being run by various eating houses/restaurants in a suo motu public
interest litigation being Special Civil Application No.4857/2009. In
the said petition, a report was called for from the authorities and
after inspection of about 20 such places providing hookah, 17 were
closed down as they were contravening the provisions of the
Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products (Prohibition of Advertisement
and Regulation of Trade and Commerce, Production, Supply and
Distribution) Act, 2003 (for short, 'the COTPA'). The petition was
disposed of by the Division Bench vide order dated 12th
July 2010 observing as under :-
"An
additional affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent no. 3.
From the earlier report and the present affidavit, we find that
earlier number of Hukka Bars were inspected which were found to be
running in accordance with the Cigarettes and Other Tobacco
Products Act, 2006 and the Rules framed thereunder. In the present
affidavit, it is stated that pursuant to the order passed on 17th
June, 2010, inspection of 20 Hukka Bars has been done, out of which
three Hukka Bars were found to be functioning and the remaining 17
were closed. No Hukka Bar is running in contravention of the Act and
the Rules framed thereunder.
Having
heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State and 6th
respondent and the Association of Hukka Bars Owners, we are of the
view that no further order is required to be passed in this case.
However, the State authorities will continue with the periodical
inspection of the Hukka Bars to ensure that the Act and the Rules
framed thereunder or guidelines issued by the State vide notification
dated 10th October, 2010 are not contravened by one or other Hukka
Bar owners. This petition is disposed of with the aforesaid
observations and directions. No costs."
In
the backdrop of the above referred factual background, the question
which falls for our consideration in this batch of petitions is as to
whether the imposition of complete ban on providing hookah at eating
house/restaurant can be said to be legally justified. The second
question which we need to address is as to whether the restriction
imposed can be said to be, in any manner, violative of Article 19 of
the Constitution of India, and lastly and most importantly, as to
whether the restriction which has been imposed is in consonance with
the provisions of COTPA and the rules framed thereunder, more
particularly, keeping in mind Article 47 of the Constitution of
India. These are the broad issues which we need to keep in mind over
and above the other issues which we shall deal with in our judgment.
(A)
CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS :-
The
Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products (Prohibition of Advertisement
and Regulation of Trade and Commerce, Production, Supply and
Distribution) Act, 2003 is an Act of Parliament and as per the
decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Godawat
Pan Masala Products I.P. Ltd. and another v/s. Union of India and
others,
reported in (2004)7 SCC 68, the entire field of smoking and tobacco
is covered by the said Act and the Central Government alone is
competent to deal with the subject covered under the Act. The State
Government or the authorities working under the State can act under
the said Act only to the extent it is empowered to and not beyond.
Any action beyond what is empowered under the Act by the State or
its officer would be ultra vires. The only power under the Act or
the Rules framed under the Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products
(Prohibition of Advertisement and Regulation of Trade and Commerce,
Production, Supply and Distribution) Act, 2003 or Rules framed
thereunder more particularly, the Cigarettes and Other Tobacco
Products (Prohibition of Advertisement and Regulation of Trade and
Commerce, Production, Supply and Distribution) Rules, 2004 as well
as the Prohibition of Smoking in Public Places Rules, 2008, is
search, seizure and imposition of penalty, namely, fine, and nothing
else. The prohibition on the ground of public health or closure on
the ground that youth would be misdirected would be clearly beyond
the jurisdiction of the Police Commissioner. Such an action would be
an exhibition of executive being wiser than Parliament. When
Parliament has not put an embargo on use of tobacco or its products
but, rather, has canalized and regulated its use by setting
different parameters, then it has to be presumed that the Parliament
was aware about its effects and ill-effects and has not left any
discretion in the hands of either of the officers to examine the
same.
As
per the aforesaid judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, reported in
(2004)7 SCC 68, more particularly para 60, power for prohibition or
closure vests only with the Central Government and that too based on
policy decision and not otherwise. The Parliament has consciously
taken away discretion of the above nature from the officers i.e.
Executive or bureaucrats howsoever highly placed they may be. (AIR
1980 SC 176).
Having
considered the statement of objects and reasons of the Act and also
having considered the applicability of Article 47 of the
Constitution of India, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the
powers of prohibition or closure do not vest with the State
Government or its authority.
Parliament
in its wisdom has not thought it fit to ban the consumption of
tobacco or tobacco products in toto. It has only set parameters, as
stated above and the only requirement of law is that a restaurant
must provide a separate space for smoking so as not to disturb other
guests or customers, who have come for food. Once this requirement
is answered, howsoever strong State or its officers may have ideas
they cannot stop or prohibit the petitioners from serving Hukka.
Providing
facility of Hukka in a separate smoking zone is not banned by any
law. Once a separate smoking zone is provided which answers the
parameters laid down by law and further more that tobacco product
which is offered for smoking is not banned by any law howsoever
strong the Commissioner of Police may feel, he cannot prohibit the
same.
Hukka
is covered under the definition of the Act under a larger head of
smoking and also covered under the larger head of cigarette. Thus,
it would be seen that there is nothing like smoking of cigarette on
one hand and smoking of Hukka on other hand. Cigarette or Hukka
forms a part of the very same definition. Therefore, smoking can be
always consumed through Cigarette or Hukka and there cannot be two
separate parameters for the same. Once it is held that Cigarette or
Bidi can be smoked in a smoking area, there is no differentiation
because within the definition of smoking also, Hukka is covered.
Thus, the action of the Police Commissioner is nothing else but
exhibiting wisdom which negatives the intention of the Parliament.
Time
and again the Hon'ble Supreme has observed and held that morality
effects on the society etc. are left to the Legislature because
neither executive nor the Court has mandate of the people and when
law requires an act to be done in a particular way, it has to be
done in that way only and in no other manner [AIR 2003 SC 511 Para
40, (1999)3 SCC 422 Para 31 & 32 and AIR 2001 SC Page 137]. That
powers under SECTION 144 OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE by the
Police Commissioner are absolutely unwarranted and not available to
him. Powers under SECTION 144 OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE are
transitory and of fixed duration of two months only. Assuming
without admitting and conceding to the fact that the Police
Commissioner has powers under section 144 of the code of Criminal
Procedure then such powers comes to an end on and from 14/9/2011
because Notification is dtd. 14/7/2011, as Parliament in its wisdom
has restricted the said powers only for a period of two months and
thereafter for a further period of four months such powers can be
exercised by the State and not by the Police Commissioner, which is
not a case here. Moreover, powers under section 144 of the code of
Criminal Procedure are of emergent nature and with a view to prevent
immediate damage or ill-effect on the society. Bare reading of the
Notification dtd. 14/7/2011 (page No.44 of the compilation) gives a
clear idea that it is not with a view to prevent some imminent
danger or damage but it is in form of a Policy. It is almost in
nature of Policy giving reasons and objects as to why Hukka should
not be permitted in the restaurant having a separate smoking area
and within the smoking zone. Such a policy decision is not within
the competence of the Police Commissioner inasmuch as in the
above-referred judgment reported in (2004)7 SCC 68, Honourable
Supreme Court has given the reasons as to why it cannot be executed
by the Executive officers because different Executive officers
working in the different areas may have different ideas.
Sections
32 and 33 of the Bombay Police Act which have been referred to in
the Notification, if closely read would lead to a conclusion that
those powers are bestowed on the State Government to maintain the
public order and not for laying down any Policy or the Resolution,
because that is left to the Legislature or the State Government,
which can exercise powers only under Article 162 of the Constitution
of India.
Assuming
without admitting and without prejudice to the rights and
contentions of the petitioners that such a power vests in
Commissioner of Police, it cannot be exercised without affording an
opportunity of being heard to the petitioners inasmuch as it has a
civil consequences and affects the rights of the petitioners and,
therefore, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Barring
Gujarat, all other States throughout the country, have not adhered
to Policy of prohibition. In cities like Mumbai and Bangalore, every
third premises is Bar and restaurant, which serves food as well as
alcohol. There the people visit with their family for food and find
next table where people consume alcohol, but Parliament or State
Legislature has not prohibited the same. The Commissioner of Police
cannot be wiser than the State Legislature by saying that young
youth below the age of 18 years would be inspired to consume the
same. If that was so, the Parliament would have totally banned and
prohibited and would not have laid down parameters of providing a
separate smoking zone.
Judicial
orders have a sanctity and they are read as precedent and have
binding effect. If on 12/7/2010 Division Bench of this Honourable
High Court, having taken into consideration all the aspects which
have been canvassed on behalf of the State Government in this
petition, found that running of Hukka Bar does not constitute an
illegal activity then without any change in circumstance it cannot
be gainsaid that the issue can be reopened. Once the Division Bench
of this Honourable High Court has found in no uncertain terms that
the issue does not violate the provisions of the Cigarettes and
Other Tobacco Products (Prohibition of Advertisement and Regulation
of Trade and Commerce, Production, Supply and Distribution) Act,
2003, then under no circumstances, no powers to prohibit can be
exercised, may be under different statute, because smoking of
tobacco is solely and wholly governed by the Cigarettes and Other
Tobacco Products (Prohibition of Advertisement and Regulation of
Trade and Commerce, Production, Supply and Distribution) Act, 2003.
If that be so, no other authority can pass order for closure of
Hukka Bar or to prevent a person from serving it when the entire
issue is covered by the Central Act. Its effect and impact cannot be
assessed and no action can be taken thereon by putting into service
the provisions of other statute.
Moreover,
if it is found that provisions of law are not being adhered to as
laid down in the Act, independent action can be taken and that too
by specified officer, but, as a result of which wholesome ban cannot
be imposed. (Decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in
2003 Criminal Law Journal 1360).
The
Honourable Supreme Court in the decision reported in AIR 1967 SC
1368 has held that question of gambling may be bad and has adverse
impact on the society, but the Parliament has not banned it. The
Parliament has provided safeguards to regulate its activity, but it
cannot be banned by an executive officer or by the Court. Executive
officer can only see to it that parameters or guidelines laid down
in the Act are strictly followed and adhered to.
Compared
to Tea, Coffee, Chocolate and Cigarette, consumption of Hukka is
less injurious in comparison to contents of Nicotine and Tar. Hukka
contains 0% Tar and 0.5% Nicotine, whereas herbal Hukka contains 0%
Tar and 0% Nicotine. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision
reported in (2004)7 SCC 68 has categorically dealt with the
arguments that other products which contains more Tobacco have not
been prohibited whereas the lesser contents product of tobacco has
been prohibited and that argument has found favour with the
Honourable Supreme Court.
(B)
PER CONTRA, CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT - STATE :-
So
far as the contention of the petitioner that the police/state
authorities have no right to issue any notification or guidelines
for implementation of the central piece of legislation i.e. COTPA
2003 and rules thereunder, as the Act and Rules are Central piece of
legislation, the same is ill founded inasmuch as that reading of
Sections 12 and 13 of the Act, 2003 makes it clear that any police
officer not below the rank of Sub Inspector or any officer of the
State Food and Drug Control Administration or any other officers if
find that the Act is not properly implemented, can enter and search
such premises and also has the power to seize the products. The
Section gives powers to the State as well as its officers to see to
it that there are no violation of Act and Rules.
According
to Section 2(5A) of Bombay Police Act 1951, "eating house"
is defined as under :
"2(5A)
"eating house" means any place to which the public are
admitted and where any kind of food or drink is supplied for
consumption on the premises by any person owning or having an
interest in or managing such place and includes a refreshment room,
coffee house or a shop where any kind of food or drink is supplied to
the public for consumption in or near such shop; but does not include
a place of public entertainment."
Therefore,
it is clear that permission is given only to start a place where one
can serve food or drink and nothing more than that.
Section
33(1)(w) gives powers to the Police Commissioner to issue any such
notification for licensing or controlling the place of public
amusement or entertainment and also prohibition in such activities
which may affect the safety of public and for preventing any
disturbances to the public.
Article
47 of the Constitution of India, inter alia, states that it is duty
of the state to raise level of nutrition and standard of living and
to improve public health; For the same, the State Authorities can
prevent any such activities which may be undergoing on or in the
State, which is harmful to the public health and safety.
The
Police Commissioner also has powers under section 144 of the crpc to
take immediate preventive action against any act which is harmful to
the public at large. Looking to the health issue of the public which
was adversely affected by the Hukka Bars, and looking at the breach
of the conditions done by the Hukka Bar owners and looking at the
provisions of cotpa, 2003 and rules thereunder immediate action was
required to be taken by the Police Commissioner and therefore by the
powers vested by the CrPC under section 144 and by section 33(1) of
Bombay Police Act, 1951, the Police Commissioner issued prohibitory
orders for stopping the operation of Hukka Bars vide notification
dated 14.07.2011.
So
far as the jurisdiction of Police Commissioner to issue notification
under section 144 of CrPC and 33(1) of BP Act is concerned, the
Police Commissioner has all the powers to issue such notification.
It
is clear that Hukkas have nicotine in it and highly injurious to
health. When the Hukkas were seized in the year 2009, many of the
samples of Hukkas were sent for Forensic Science Laboratory, wherein
the FSL report clearly shows the presence of nicotine in them. Hukka
smoking is squarely covered under COTPA, 2003 and therefore it has
to follow the Act and Rules thereunder, i.e. as smoking is not
permitted in any public place, therefore, also smoking a Hukka is
not permitted in public place.
To
make it more clear, it may be explained that while opening a
restaurant or hotel etc. permission is given under Section 2(5A) of
the Bombay Police Act, whereas if a person wants to give facilities
to its customers who are addicted to smoking, as they are not
permitted to smoke in public place like restaurant etc., the owner
of such a place has to provide a separate section or area wherein
their customers can go and smoke, but it does not give any right to
the owners of the restaurant etc. to serve or supply such tobacco
products as under Section 5 of the Act, 2003, there is a prohibition
of advertising of Cigarettes and other products.
So
far as the Hukka bars are concerned, they are actually running a
business/commercial activity of not only advertising the Hukkas but
also serving them, which is an illegal activity in itself and is a
clear contravention of Section 7 of the COTPA, 2003 which
specifically states that there are restrictions of trade and
commercial advertising of any production, supply and distribution of
Cigarettes and other Tobacco Products. Therefore, Hukka Bars are in
clear violation of the COTPA, 2003.
So
far as the Rules framed under the COTPA, 2003 are concerned and
Rules which reads as 'Prohibition of Smoking in Public Places Rules,
2008' which defines 'restaurant' at Rule 2(b); 'smoke area or place'
at Rule 2(e); and 'prohibition of smoking in public place' at Rule
3. So far as the 'prohibition of smoking in hotel,
restaurant/airport' are concerned it is stated in Rule 4. Therefore,
there are clear statutory Acts and Rules for prohibiting smoking in
public place and in the present case the Hukka bars are in clear
violation of the Rules.
The
contention of the petitioners that there is a infringement of their
fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of
India is concerned, the same is ill-founded inasmuch as it is not a
fundamental right of any citizen to contravene any Act or Rules and
do an illegal activity in any State of India and therefore it cannot
be said that there is any infringement of any fundamental right of
the petitioners.
The
main object of the COTPA, 2003 and Rules thereunder, is to see that
no person smoke in public and to see that the persons who are
addicted to smoking go to a particular place where they can smoke,
and also to see that as smoking is injurious to health, the smoke is
not exposed to others and also to see to that that by looking at the
smokers, others are not encouraged to do the same. It may be noted
that the Act does not provide for a total ban on smoking but the Act
certainly does not encourage the activity of smoking. Therefore,
there is a ban of advertising and commercializing the activity of
smoking.
The
contention of the petitioner that there are pan shops outside the
restaurant; people buy cigarettes from such pan shops and come
inside the restaurant and smoke in the smoking chamber is not
banned, is correct; but those pan shops selling cigarettes are not
given licenses to run a rest and the cigarettes etc. is not sold
inside the restaurant as a part of its providing service to its
customers. In the present case, the Hukkas are served in, within the
premises of the restaurant which itself is an illegal activity
inasmuch as that it is not only advertising but also serving tobacco
products.
Passive
smoking is considered to be as harmful as actual smoking but so far
as the smoking of Hukka is concerned, here passive smoking is much
more injurious and harmful not only to those who smoke, but also to
those who are around and in the Hukka bars. Such Hukkas are smoked
in close cabins or rooms where person who smoke are given company by
others who sit around and chat for hours together where room is
filled with smoke and the person sitting there for hours together
inhale or re-inhale the smoke which would be more injurious to the
lungs and the same would create number of diseases like Caner, Lung
Cancer, Asthma, Pneumonia, Bronchitis, Tuberculosis, Hypertension
and if a person is continuously exposed to passive smoking for a
long time, he has increased risk of suffering from diseases like
heart disease, disease of circulatory system, Dementia, Renal Cell,
Carcinoma and Brain tumor etc. It is submitted that passive smoke is
highly injurious to children and pregnant women etc.
One
of the contentions of the petitioner is that, that it contains
either no amount of tobacco or nicotine or if it does contain, the
same is in a very small percentage of tobacco or nicotine, to this
context, it may be seen that, Hukkas are smoked in closed cabins or
rooms and persons sit for hours together and inhale much more smoke
than those who smoke cigarette for 3 minutes to 4 minutes,
eventhough the contents of the percentage of tobacco is much higher
in cigarettes, but if the smoke is taken in small quantity for
hours, it may prove to be more fatal. Therefore, contention that it
has very little amount of tobacco or nicotine would not make it less
harmful.
Considering
the importance of the issue and before we proceed to consider the
contentions of the respective parties on merits, we would like to
comment on smoking in general and the ill-effects of the same. We
would also like to say something as regards hookah compared with
cigarette and other health effects of hookah smoke.
ON
SMOKING GENERALLY
One
million Indians die every year from tobacco-related diseases. This is
more than the number of deaths due to motor accidents, AIDS, alcohol
and drug abuse put together, say the Indian Medical Association (IMA)
and the Indian Academy of Paediatrics (IAP), quoting studies. (see
"The Hindu" Trivandrum Edition dt. 31-10-1998 under the
caption "Smoking kill 10 lakhs Indians a Year")
Cigarette
smoking is the major preventable cause of death in America,
contributing to an estimated 350000 deaths annually. Epidemiologic
and experimental evidence has identified cigarette smoking as the
primary cause of lung cancer and chronic obstructive pulmonary
diseases (COPD) and as a major risk factor for coronary heart
disease. Smoking has been associated with other cancers,
cerebrovascular and peripheral vascular diseases, and peptic ulcer
disease. Smokers also suffer more acute respiratory illness.
Cigarette smoke, consisting of particles dispersed in a gas phase, is
a complex mixture of thousands of compounds produced by the
incomplete combustion of the tobacco leaf. Smoke constituents
strongly implicated in causing disease are nicotine and tar in the
particulate phase and carbon monoxide in the gas phase. Smokers have
a 70 per cent higher mortality rate than non smokers. The risk of
dying increases with the amount and duration of smoking and is higher
in smokers who inhale. Coronary heart disease is the chief
contributor to the excess mortality among cigarette smokers, followed
by lung cancer and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD). Life
expectancy is significantly shortened by smoking cigarettes. Tobacco
smoke also gets dissolved in the saliva and is swallowed, exposing
the upper gastrointestinal tract to carcinogens. A strong association
between smoking and lung cancer has been demonstrated in multiple
prospective and retrospective epidemiologic studies, and corroborated
by autopsy evidence. Lung cancer has been the leading cause of cancer
death in men since the 1950s, and it surpassed breast cancer as a
leading cause of cancer death in women in 1985. Male smokers have a
tenfold higher risk of developing lung cancer, and the risk increases
with the number of cigarettes smoked. There is also strong evidence
that smoking is a major cause of cancers of the larynx, oral cavity
anoesophagus. The risk of these cancers increases with the intensity
of exposure to cigarette smoke either active or passive.
Epidemiologic studies show an association between smoking and cancers
of the bladder, pancreas stomach, and uterine cervix.
Cigarette
smoking is a major independent risk factor for coronary artery
disease. Retrospective and prospective epidemiologic studies have
demonstrated a strong relationship between smoking and coronary
morbidity and mortality in both men and women. The coronary disease
death rate in smokers is 70% higher than in nonsmokers, and the risk
increases with the amount of cigarette exposure. The risk of sudden
death is two to four times higher in smokers. Smoking is also a risk
factor for cardiac arrest and severe malignant arrhythmias. In
addition to increased coronary mortality, smokers have a higher risk
of non fatal myocardial infraction or unstable angina. Patients with
angina lower their exercise tolerance if they smoke. Women who smoke
and use oral contraceptives or pot-menopausal estrogen replacement
greatly increase their risk of myocardial infarction.
Autopsy
studies demonstrate more atheromatous changes in smokers than
nonsmokers. Carbon monoxide in cigarette smoke decreases oxygen
delivery to endothelial tissues. In addition, smoking may trigger
acute ischemia. Carbon monoxide decreases myocardial oxygen supply,
while nicotine increases myocardial demand by releasing
catecholamines that raise blood pressure, heart rate, and
conractility. Carbon monoxide and nicotine also induce platelet
aggregation that may cause occulision of narrowed vessels. Cigarette
smoking is the most important risk factor for peripheral vascular
disease. In patients with intermittent claudication, smoking lowers
exercise tolerance and may shorten graft survival after vascular
surgery. Smokers have more aortic atherosclerosis and an increased
risk of dying from a ruptured aortic aneurysm. Smokers under the age
of 65 have a higher risk of dying from cerebrovascular disease and
women who smoke have a greater risk of subarachnoid haemorrhage,
especially if they also use oral contraceptives.
Smoking
and Pulmonary Disease :
Cigarette
smoking is the primary cause of chronic bronchitis and emphysema.
Smokers have a higher prevalence of respiratory symptoms than non
smokers. Studies of pulmonary function indicate that impairment
exists in asymptomatic as well as symptomatic smokers. Smokers have a
higher risk of acute as well as chronic pulmonary disease. Inhaling
cigarette smoke impairs pulmonary clearance mechanisms by paralyzing
ciliary transport. This may explain the susceptibility to viral
respiratory infections, including influenza. Smokers who develop
acute respiratory infections have longer and more severe courses,
with a more prolonged cough.
Other
Health Consequences :
Smokers
have a higher prevalence of peptic ulcer disease and a higher case
fatality rate. Smoking has been associated with increased
osteoporosis in men and post-menopausal women. Female smokers weigh
less than non smokers and have an earlier age of menopause; both of
these factors are associated with osteoporosis and may contribute to
the relationship between smoking and osteoporosis. Moreover, smoking
depresses serum estrogen levels in post-menopausal women taking
estrogen replacement therapy.
ON
PASSIVE SMOKING
Passive
Smoking (Environmental Smoke Exposure) :
Nonsmokers
involuntarily inhale the smoke of nearby smokers, a phenomenon known
as passive smoking. Wives, children and friends of smokers are a
highly risk-prone group. Inhalation of sidestream smoke (sidestream
smoke is the smoke issued from the burning end of a cigarette between
puffs)
by a non-smoker is definitely more harmful to him than to the actual
smoker as he inhales more toxins. This is because sidestream smoke
contains three times more nicotine, three times more tar and about 50
times more ammonia. Passive smoking (Ibid,
the Hindu, Exposure of non-smokers to environmental tobacco smoke
(ETS) is known as passive smoking)(because
of smoking by their fathers) could lead to severe complications in
babies aged below two. It is pointed out that in India hospital
admission rates are 28 per cent higher among the children of smokers.
These children have acute lower respiratory infection, decreased lung
function, increased eczema and asthma and increased cot deaths
(Ibid).
Also children of heavy smokers tend to be shorter.
Passive
smoking is associated with an overall 23 per cent increase in risk of
coronary heart disease (CHD) among men and women who had never
smoked. The following data shows just how heavy is cigarette
smoking's toll on non-smokers. A new "meta-analysis" of
data from 14 studies involving 6,166 individuals with coronary heart
disease (CHD) finds that passive smoking was associated with an
overall 23 per cent increase in the risk of CHD among men and women
who had never smoked. It is estimated that 35,000 to 40,000
non-smokers' deaths each year in the United States can be attributed
to passive smoking (American
Heart Association SMOKING-2. HRT 19th
March, 1998 page 1).
This underscores the need to eliminate passive smoking as an
important strategy to reduce the societal burden of CHD. The United
Nations health agency insisted that passive smoking caused lung
cancer and that an environmental tobacco smoke poses a positive
health hazard. Research on the subject has found an estimated 16 per
cent increase in the risk of developing lung cancer among nonsmoking
spouses of smokers and an estimated 17 per cent rise in risk for work
place exposure. The public is left high and dry over the risks of
"second-hand smoke" (Reuter
- World 10th
March, 1998).
For non-smokers, the major source of carbon monoxide is from
passively inhaled cigarette smoke. Environmental tobacco smoke (ETS)
has been shown to reduce lung function in children. Its irritant
effect could not be ignored as this is the reason why most people
object to being the victims of passive smoking. Patients with asthma
find this irritant effect will worsen symptoms. The most remarkable
effect of environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) is the development of
lung cancer in passively exposed non-smokers as shown by reports from
Japan and Greece. Large number of controlled studies have confirmed a
relative risk of developing lung cancer in passively exposed
subjects. Estimates from the United States have suggested that 3000
to 5000 deaths per year from lung cancer can be attributed to passive
smoking.
Maternal
smoking during pregnancy increases risks to foetus and non-smokers
chronically exposed to tobacco smoke will suffer health hazards.
Maternal smoking during pregnancy contributes to fetal growth
retardation. Infants born to mothers who smoke weigh an average of
200 gm less but have no shorter gestations than infants of
non-smoking mothers. Carbon monoxide in smoke may decrease oxygen
availability to the fetus and account for the growth retardation.
Smoking during pregnancy has also been linked with higher rates of
spontaneous abortion, fetal death, and neonatal death. (Primary
Care Medicine - Respiratory Problems; Health Consequences of
Smoking Nancy A. Rigotti, page 167)
When
smoking occurs in enclosed areas with poor ventilation, such as in
buses, bars, and conference rooms, high levels of smoke exposure can
occur. Acute exposure to smoke-contaminated air decreases exercise
capacity in healthy non-smokers and can worsen symptoms in
individuals with angina, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD)
or asthma. Chronic exposure to smoky air occurs in the workplace and
in the homes of smokers. Non-smokers in smoky workplaces develop
small-airways dysfunction similar to that observed in light smokers.
Compared to the children of non-smokers, children whose parents smoke
have more respiratory infections throughout childhood, a higher risk
of asthma, and alternations in pulmonary function tests. In recent
studies of non-smoking women, those married to smokers had higher
lung cancer rates than those married to non-smokers. Chronic smoke
exposure may be associated with increased incidence of
cardiopulmonary disease in nonsmokers. (Ibid,
page 167 - 168)
Environmental
tobacco smoke (ETS) also contributes to respiratory morbidity of
children. Increased platelet aggregation also occurs when a nonsmoker
smokes or is passively exposed to smoke. Although environmental
tobacco smoke (ETS) differs from "mainstream smoke"
("Main-stream
smoke" is the one that is exhaled by the smoker after
inhalation)
in several ways, it contains many of the same toxic substances.
Infants and toddlers may be especially at risk when exposed to
environmental tobacco smoke (ETS). Considering the substantial
morbidity, and even mortality of acute respiratory illness in
childhood, a doubling in risk attributable to passive smoking clearly
represents a serious paediatric health problem. Exposure to
environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) has been associated with increased
asthma-related trips to the emergency room of hospitals. There is now
sufficient evidence to conclude that passive smoking is associated
with additional episodes and increased severity of asthma in children
who already have the disease. Exposure to passive smoking may alter
children's intelligence and behaviour and passive smoke exposure in
childhood may be a risk factor for developing lung cancer as an adult
(Active
and Passive Tobacco Exposure : A Serious Paediatric Health Problem,
page 1).
Environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) contains more than 4000 chemicals
and at least 40 known carcinogens. Nicotine, the addictive drug
contained in tobacco leads to acute increase in heart rate and blood
pressure. ETS also increases platelet aggregation, or blood clotting.
It also damages the endothelium, the layer of cells that line all
blood vessels, including the coronary arteries. In addition,
nonsmokers who have high blood pressure or high blood cholesterol are
at even greater risk of developing heart diseases from ETS exposure
(Ibid,
page 8).
An investigation in Bristol has found that the children of smokers
have high levels of cotinine, a metabolite of nicotine, in their
saliva. The results indicated that children who had two smoking
parents were breathing in as much nicotine as if they themselves were
smoking 80 cigarettes a year. A study published in the "New
England Journal of Medicine" found that the children of smoking
mothers were less efficient at breathing. A study conducted by the
Harvard Medical School in Boston, concluded that passive exposure to
maternal cigarette smoke may have important effects on the
development of pulmonary function in children. An
important discovery is that the cocktail of chemicals in a smoky room
may be more lethal than the smoke inhaled by the smoker. The
"sidstream" smoke contains three times as much
benezo(a)pyreno (a virulent cause of cancer) six times as much
toluene, another carcinogen, and more than 50 times as much
dimethylnitrosamine. It has been commenced by Dale Sandler of the
National Institute of Environmental Health Studies in the United
States that the potential for damage from passive smoking may be
greater than has been previously recognised.
Thus,
it can be safely concluded that the dangers of passive smoking are
real, broader than once believed and parallel those of direct smoke.
It has long been established that smoking harms the health of those
who smoke. Now, new epidemiological studies ( Health
- Evidence mounts on passive smoking ("The Hindu"
Sunday, August 5, 1990 )
and reviews are strengthening the evidence that it also harms the
health of other people nearby who inhale the toxic fumes generated by
the smoker, particularly from the burning end of the cigarette. Such
indirect, or second-hand, smoking causes death not only by lung
cancer but even more by heart attack, the studies show.
The studies on passive smoking, as it is often called, also
strengthen the link between parental smoking and respiratory damage
in children. According to experts, there was little question that
passive smoking is a major health hazard. What has swayed many
scientists is a remarkable consistency in findings from different
types of studies in several countries with improved methods over
those used in the first such studies a few years ago. The new
findings confirm and advance the earlier reports from the U.S.
Surgeon General, who concluded that passive smoking caused lung
cancer. According to Dr.Cedric F.Garland, an expert in the
epidemiology of smoking at the University of California at San Diego
"the links between passive smoking and health problems are now
as solid as any finding in epidemiology." The never
understanding of the health hazards of passive smoking were
underscored in a report at a world conference on lung health in
Boston recently. Dr. Stanton A.Glantz of the University of California
at San Fransisco estimated that passive smoke killed 50000 Americans
a year, two-thirds of whom died of heart disease. Passive
smoking ranks behind direct smoking and alcohol as the third leading
preventable cause of death.
Dr.Donald Shopland of the U.S. National Cancer Institute, who has
helped to prepare the Surgeon General's reports on smoking has said :
"there's no question" now that passive smoking is also a
cause of heart disease. The
new findings on passive smoking parallel recent changes in U. S. laws
and rules that limit smoking in public places. In recent years, all
but four States (Missouri, North Carolina, Tennessee and Wymoing)
have passed comprehensive laws limiting smoking in public place.
Only a decade ago many scientists were sceptical about the initial
links between passive smoking and lung cancer.
"Mainstream
smoke" is inhaled and consists of large particles deposited in
the larger airways of the lung. "Sidestream smoke" is
generated from the burning end of cigarettes, cigars and pipes during
the smouldering between puffs. It may come from someone else's
tobacco or from one's own and in the major source of environmental
tobacco smoke (ETS). It is a mixture of irritating gases and
carcinogenic tar particles that reach deeper into the lungs because
they are small. According to scientists, because of incomplete
combustion from the lower temperatures of a smouldering cigarette,
sidestream smoke is dirtier and chemically different from mainstream
smoke. Scientists have found a 30 per cent increase in risk of death
from heart attacks among nonsmokers living with smokers due to
passive smoking. Researchers have found that passive smoking makes
platelets the tiny fragments in the blood that help it clot,
stickier. Platelets can form clots on plaques in fat-clogged arteries
to cause heart attacks and they may also play a role in promoting
arteriosclerosis, the underlying cause of most heart attacks.
Researchers have also shown that passive smoking affects heart
function, decreasing the ability of people with and without heart
disease to exercise. It has been pointed out that passive smoking
increases the demand on the heart during exercise and reduces the
heart's capacity to speed up. For people with heart disease, the
decreased function can precipitate chest pains from angina. The
children exposed to passive smoke since birth, had increased amounts
of cholesterol and lower levels of HDL, a protein in blood that is
believed to provide protection against heart attacks. The researchers
found that the greater the exposure to passive smoke, the greater
were the biochemical changes. (Ibid,
12)
A
pioneering report linking passive smoking and lung cancer came in
1981 from a 14-year Japanese study by Dr.Takeshi Hirayama. His
research methods were criticised at first. Mr.Lawrence Garfinkel, an
epidemiologist who is Vice-president of the American Cancer Society,
said that he was at present sceptical of Dr.Hirayama's report but was
convinced from later studies, including his own, that there was about
a 30 per cent increased risk of developing lung cancer from passive
smoking. Mr.Garfinkel said a study of 1.2 million Americans now being
completed should help clarify the degree of risk from all types of
cancer and other diseases. Dr.Glantz estimated that one-third of the
50,000 deaths from passive smoking were from cancer. In addition to
lung cancer, researchers have linked cancer of the cervix to both
mainstream and sidestream smoke. The American Academy of Paediatrics
estimates that 9 million to 12 million American children under the
age of 5 may be exposed to passive smoke. The
newer studies strengthened earlier conclusions that passive smoke
increases the risk of serious early childhood respiratory illness,
particularly bronchitis and pneumonia in infancy.
Increased coughing was reported from birth to the mid-teenage years
among 13 never studies of passive smoking and respiratory symptoms.
It has also been found that passive smoke can lead to middle ear
infections and other conditions in children. Asthmatic children are
particularly at risk and the lung problems in childhood can extend to
adulthood. (Ibid,
12)
In
1962 and 1964 the Royal College of Physicians in London and the
Surgeon General of the United States released landmark reports
documenting the casual relation between smoking and lung cancer
(Selections from British Medical Journal (South
Asia Edition) Vol.13, No.11, January 1998, page 1110-1111).
Thereafter, extensive research has confirmed that smoking affects
virtually every organ system. By
1990, the Surgeon General of the United States concluded that
smoking represents the most extensively documented cause of
disease over investigated in the history of biomedical research
.
Studies have shown increased risk of lung cancer in non-smoking women
whose husbands smoked. Spousal studies on passive smoking showed a
positive association between smoking and lung cancer. It
has now been shown that involuntary smoking is a cause of disease,
including lung cancer, in healthy non-smokers. Studies in various
countries have established a positive association between passive
smoking and lung cancer.
The Environmental Protection Agency of U.S. classified environmental
tobacco smoke (ETS) as a known human carcinogen, to which it
attributed 3000 lung cancer deaths annually in American non-smokers.
The agency also documented casual associations between exposure to
environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) and lower respiratory tract
infections such as pneumonia and bronchitis, middle ear disease, and
exacerbations of asthma in children. A report on environmental
tobacco smoke (ETS) published in December, 1998 by the California
Environmental Protection Agency affirmed the findings of the US
Environmental Protection Agency on the link between environmental
tobacco smoke (ETS) and lung cancer and respiratory illness. It also
concluded that passive smoking is a cause of heart disease mortality,
acute and chronic heart disease morbidity, retardation of fetal
growth, sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS) nasal sinus cancer, and
induction of asthma in children. Two important studies from the
Wolfson Institute of Preventive Medicine in London, published in 1998
show that marriage to a smoker increased the risk of lung cancer by
26%. Studies have also established strong relation between passive
smoking and ischaemic heart disease (IED). The systematic reviews
from the Wolfson Institute, the California Environmental Protection
Agency and the US Environmental Protection Agency, and the various
reports released make it clear that exposure to environmental tobacco
smoke (ETS) is a cause of lung cancer, heart disease and other
serious illness. In the United States alone, it is responsible each
year for 3000 deaths from lung cancer, 35,000 to 62,000 deaths from
ischaemic heart disease (IHD), 150,000 to 3000 000 cases of
bronchitis or pneumonia in infants and children aged 18 months and
younger causing 136 to 212 deaths, 8000 to 26,000 new cases of
asthma, exacerbation of asthma in 400 000 to 1 million children, 700
000 to 1.6 million visits of physician offices for middle ear
infection, 9700 to 18600 cases of low birth weight, and 1900 to 2700
sudden infant deaths. Those figures make passive smoking one of the
leading preventable causes of premature death in the United States.
(Ibid,
15)
Public
health action by policy makers to eliminate exposure to environmental
tobacco smoke (ETS) is long overdue. A total ban on smoking is
preferred on various grounds. Policy makers should pursue all
strategies that would help accomplish that goal, including education,
legislation, regulation, litigation and enforcement of existing laws.
Government
of India is a party to 16 or so resolutions adopted by the World
Health Organisation since the 1970s, particularly the one adopted in
1986 which urged member-countries to formulate a comprehensive
national tobacco control strategy. It was envisaged that the strategy
would contain measures (i) to ensure effective protection to
non-smokers from involuntary exposure to tobacco smoke; (ii) to
promote abstention from the use of tobacco to protect children and
young people from becoming addicted; (iii) to ensure that a good
example is set on all health-related premises by all health
personnel; (iv) to progressively eliminate all incentives which
maintain and promote the use of tobacco; (v) to prescribe statutory
health warnings on cigarette packets and the containers of all types
of tobacco products; (vi) to establish programmes of education and
public information on tobacco and health issues with the active
involvement of health professionals and media; (vii) to monitor
trends in smoking and other forms of tobacco use, tobacco-related
diseases and effectiveness of national smoking control action; (viii)
to promote viable economic alternatives to tobacco production, trade
and taxation; and (ix) to establish a national focal point to
stimulate, support and coordinate all these activities.
Every
year, 1 million tobacco-related deaths take place in India (Ibid,
1).
An estimated 65 per cent of men use tobacco and in some parts a large
proportion of women chew tobacco and biddies. About 33 per cent of
all cancers are caused by tobacco. About 50 per cent of all cancers
among men and 25 per cent among women are tobacco-related. The number
of cases of avoidable tobacco-related cancers of the upper alimentary
and respiratory tracts, coronary heart disease and chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) has been estimated as 2,00,000
every year. Many still-births, low birth infants, and pre-natal
mortality have been reported among female chewers.
Tobacco
kills 50 per cent of its regular users within 40 years. Apart from
these direct health implications of tobacco use, the hazards faced by
those engaged in the plucking and curing of tobacco leaves have been
highlighted by researchers of the Ahmedabad-based National Institute
of Occupational Health. The hands of the workers get affected by the
chemicals in tobacco and sickness is caused when nicotine gets
absorbed into the body through the skin. The symptoms are head-ache,
nausea and vomiting. All these well-documented findings are available
with the State but if it has not taken any effective action it can
only be attributed to the clout which the lethal leaf enjoys in the
corridors of power. One
of the pet contentions of the protagonists of tobacco is that it
makes a significant contribution to the exchequer by way of taxes and
hence should not be disturbed. Also a large number of tobacco farmers
will be hit if consumption is curbed. Both these have been countered
by WHO forcefully. Several studies have brought out that the cost of
healthcare of those affected by tobacco-related ailments, which is
met from the Government exchequer, is much more than what the
Government garners by way of taxes. Thus, there is a net drain on the
Government resources. Illness or the premature death of the
tobacco-users would cast a heavy economic burden on their families,
perpetuating the cycle of poverty. As regards the possible impact of
any curb on tobacco use on tobacco farmers, studies by the
Rajahmundry-based Tobacco Research Institute of the ICAR have brought
out equally remunerative alternative to tobacco cultivation, besides
use of tobacco for purposes other than smoking and chewing.
Hookahs--sometimes
called water pipes--are used to smoke specially made tobacco
that is available in a variety of flavors (e.g., apple, mint, cherry,
chocolate, coconut, licorice, cappuccino, and watermelon).
Hookah
smoking is typically practiced in groups, with the same mouthpiece
passed from person to person.
Hookahs
originated in ancient Persia and India and have been used
extensively for centuries. Today, hookah cafés are gaining
popularity around the globe, including Britain, France, Russia, the
Middle East, and the United States. An estimated 300 hookah cafés
operated in the United States in 2006, and the numbers continue to
grow. In recent years, there has been a increase in hookah use
around the world, most notably among youth.
Compared
with Cigarettes
While
many hookah smokers may consider this practice less harmful than
smoking cigarettes, hookah smoking carries many of the same health
risks as cigarettes.
Water
pipe smoking delivers the addictive drug nicotine and is at least as
toxic as cigarette smoke.
Due
to the mode of smoking--including frequency of puffing, depth
of inhalation, and length of the smoking session--hookah
smokers may absorb higher concentrations of the toxins found in
cigarette smoke.
A
typical 1-hour-long hookah smoking session involves inhaling 100-200
times the volume of smoke inhaled from a single cigarette.
Hookah
smokers are at risk for the same kinds of diseases as are caused by
cigarette smoking, including oral cancer, lung cancer, stomach
cancer, cancer of the esophagus, reduced lung function, and
decreased fertility.
Hookah
smoking is NOT a safe alternative to smoking cigarettes
Health
Effects
Hookah
Smoke and Cancer
The
charcoal used to heat tobacco in the hookah increases the health
risks by producing high levels of carbon monoxide, metals, and
cancer-causing chemicals.
Even
after it has passed through water, the smoke produced by a hookah
contains high levels of toxic compounds, including carbon monoxide,
heavy metals, and cancer-causing chemicals.
Hookah
tobacco and smoke contain numerous toxic substances known to cause
lung, bladder, and oral cancers.
Irritation
from exposure to tobacco juices increases the risk of developing
oral cancers. The irritation by tobacco juice products is likely to
be greater among hookah smokers than among pipe or cigar smokers
because hookah smoking is typically practiced (with or without
inhalation) more often and for longer periods of time.
Other
Health Effects of Hookah Smoke
Hookah
tobacco and smoke contain numerous toxic substances known to cause
clogged arteries and heart disease.
Infectious
diseases may be transmitted by sharing a hookah.
Babies
born to women who smoked one or more water pipes a day during
pregnancy have lower birth weights (were at least 3½ ounces
less) than babies born to nonsmokers and are at an increased risk
for respiratory diseases.
Hookahs
and Secondhand Smoke
Secondhand
smoke from hookahs poses a serious risk for nonsmokers, particularly
because it contains smoke not only from the tobacco but also from
the heat source (e.g., charcoal) used in the hookah.
Using
a hookah to smoke tobacco poses a serious potential health hazard to
smokers and others exposed to the smoke emitted.
References
American
Lung Association. An
Emerging Deadly Trend: Waterpipe Tobacco Use.
Washington: American Lung Association, 2007 [accessed 2011 Feb 15].
Akl
EA, Gaddam S, Gunukula SK, Honeine R, Jaoude PA, Irani J. The
Effects of Waterpipe Tobacco Smoking on Health Outcomes: A
Systematic Review.
International Journal of Epidemiology 2010; 39:834-857
[accessed 2011 Aug 18].
Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention. Tobacco
Use Among Students Aged 13-15 Years--Baghdad, Iraq, 2008.
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 2009; 58(12): 305-8
[accessed 2011 Feb 15].
World
Health Organization. Tobacco Regulation Advisory Note. Water
Pipe Tobacco Smoking: Health Effects, Research Needs and Recommended
Actions by Regulators.
Geneva: World Health Organization, Tobacco Free Initiative, 2005
[accessed 2011 Feb 15].
Nuwayhid,
I, Yamout, B., Ghassan, and Kambria, M. Narghile
(Hubble-Bubble) Smoking, Low Birth Weight and Other Pregnancy
Outcomes.
American Journal of Epidemiology 1998; 148:375-83 [accessed
2011 Feb 15].
El-Hakim
Ibrahim E., Uthman Mirghani AE. Squamous Cell Carcinoma and
Keratoacanthoma of the Lower Lips associated with "Goza"
and "Shisha" Smoking. International Journal of Dermatology
1999; 38:108-10 [cited 2011 Feb 15].
Health
effects
Contrary
to ancient lore and popular belief, the smoke that emerges from a
waterpipe contains numerous toxicants known to cause lung cancer,
heart disease, and other diseases. Waterpipe tobacco smoking delivers
the addictive drug nicotine, and, as is the case with other tobacco
products, more frequent use is associated with the smokers being more
likely to report that they are addicted.
A
waterpipe smoking session may expose the smoker to more smoke over a
longer period of time than occurs when smoking a cigarette. Cigarette
smokers typically take 8-12, 40-75 ml puffs over about 5-7 minutes
and inhale 0.5 to 0.6 litres of smoke. In contrast, waterpipe smoking
sessions typically last 20-80 minutes, during which the smoker may
take 50-200 puffs which range from about 0.15 to 1 litre each. The
waterpipe smoker may therefore inhale as much smoke during one
session as a cigarette smoker would inhale consuming 100 or more
cigarettes.
While
the water does absorb some of the nicotine, waterpipe smokers can be
exposed to a sufficient dose of this drug to cause addiction.
Nicotine intake is an important regulator of tobacco intake in
general, as evidenced by the fact that cigarette smokers tend to
smoke until they get enough nicotine to satisfy their need and
addiction, but not so much as to cause nausea. It is likely that the
reduced concentration of nicotine in the waterpipe smoke may result
in smokers inhaling higher amounts of smoke and thus exposing
themselves to higher levels of cancer-causing chemicals and hazardous
gases such as carbon monoxide than if none of the nicotine was
absorbed by the water; however, this issue needs further study. This
puts waterpipe smokers and second-hand smokers at risk for the same
kinds of diseases as are caused by cigarette smoking, including
cancer, heart disease, respiratory disease, and adverse effects
during pregnancy.
Regional
and global patterns of waterpipe
smoking
Waterpipe
smoking is often social, and two or more people may share the same
waterpipe. In South-West Asia and North Africa, it is not uncommon
for children to smoke with their parents. If used in a commercial
establishment such as a cafe or restaurant, the waterpipe is ordered
(often from a menu of flavours) and an employee prepares it from an
in-house stock.
Globally,
the highest rates of smoking occur in the African Region (primarily
North Africa), the Eastern Mediterranean Region and the South-East
Asia Region. Since the 1990s waterpipe smoking appears to be
spreading among new populations such as college students and young
persons in the United States, Brazil and European countries.
Waterpipe smoking appears to be stimulated by unfounded assumptions
of relative safety compared to cigarettes, as well as the social
nature of the activity. Commercial marketing, often with implicit or
explicit safety-related claims, may also be contributing to the
spread of waterpipe smoking across the globe. Waterpipe smokers may
use waterpipes exclusively; however, many smokers may also smoke
cigarettes. In some countries in which cigarette smoking is
concentrated among men, waterpipe smoking appears more evenly
distributed between both sexes. All these findings reinforce the need
to conduct more research on waterpipes and the issues surrounding
their use, and then to disseminate the information on the health
risks to all countries.
Science
base and conclusions
Waterpipe
smoking has not been studied as intensively as has cigarette smoking;
however, preliminary research on patterns of smoking, the chemistry
of the smoke that is inhaled, and health effects supports the idea
that waterpipe smoking is associated with many of the same risks as
cigarette smoking, and may, in fact, involve some unique health
risks. The science base supports the following conclusions:
Using
a waterpipe to smoke tobacco poses a serious potential health hazard
to smokers and others exposed to the smoke emitted.
Using
a waterpipe to smoke tobacco is not a safe alternative to cigarette
smoking.
A
typical 1 -hour long waterpipe smoking session involves inhaling
100-200 times the volume of smoke inhaled with a single cigarette.
Even
after it has been passed through water, the smoke produced by a
waterpipe contains high levels of toxic compounds, including carbon
monoxide, heavy metals and cancer-causing chemicals.
Commonly
used heat sources that are applied to burn the tobacco, such as wood
cinders or charcoal, are likely to increase the health risks because
when such fuels are combusted they produce their own toxicants,
including high levels of carbon monoxide, metals and cancer-causing
chemicals.
Pregnant
women and the fetus are particularly vulnerable when exposed either
actively or involuntarily to the waterpipe smoke toxicants.
Second-hand
smoke from waterpipes is a mixture of tobacco smoke in addition to
smoke from the fuel and therefore poses a serious risk for
non-smokers.
There
is no proof that any device or accessory can make waterpipe smoking
safer.
Sharing
a waterpipe mouthpiece poses a serious risk of transmission of
communicable diseases, including tuberculosis and hepatitis.
Waterpipe
tobacco is often sweetened and flavoured, making it very appealing;
the sweet smell and taste of the smoke may explain why some people,
particularly young people who otherwise would not use tobacco, begin
to use waterpipes.
It
is in the aforesaid background that the Legislature thought fit to
enact
the Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products (Prohibition
of Advertisement and Regulation of Trade and Commerce, Production,
Supply and Distribution) Act, 2003
to achieve healthier life
style and the protection of life enshrined in the Constitution and to
improve public health. The preamble to this particular Act of 2003
i.e. COTPA is as under :-
"An
Act to prohibit the advertisement of, and to provide for the
regulation of trade and commerce in, and production, supply and
distribution of, cigarettes and other tobacco products and for
matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.
WHEREAS,
the Resolution passed by the 39th World Health Assembly (WHO), in its
Fourteenth Plenary meeting held on the 15th May, 1986 urged the
member States of WHO which have not yet done so to implement the
measures to ensure that effective protection i provided to
non-smokers from involuntary exposure to tobacco smoke and to protect
children and young people from being addicted to the use of tobacco;
AND
WHEREAS, the 43rd World Health Assembly in its Fourteenth Plenary
meeting held on the 17th May, 1990, reiterated the concerns expressed
in the Resolution passed in the 39th World Health Assembly and urged
Member States to consider in their tobacco control strategies plans
for legislation and other effective measures for protecting their
citizens with special attention to risk groups such as pregnant women
and children from involuntary exposure to tobacco smoke, discourage
the use of tobacco and impose progressive restrictions and take
concerted action to eventually eliminate all direct and indirect
advertising, promotion and sponsorship concerning tobacco;
AND
WHEREAS, it is considered expedient to enact a comprehensive law on
tobacco in the public interest and to protect the public health;
AND
WHEREAS, it is expedient to prohibit the consumption of cigarettes
and other tobacco products which are injurious to health with a view
to achieving improvement of public health in general as enjoined by
Article 47 of the Constitution;
AND
WHEREAS, it is expedient to prohibit the advertisement of, and to
provide for regulation of trade and commerce, production, supply and
distribution of cigarettes and other tobacco products and for matters
connected therewith or incidental thereto."
We
have noticed that the license/permission to run eating
house/restaurant is being issued under the provisions of the Bombay
Police Act, 1951. Since the petitioners have been granted licenses in
exercise of the powers conferred by Section 33 of the Act of 1951,
the relevant provisions are stated hereinbelow:
"Section
33. Power to make rules or regulation of traffic and for preservation
of order in public place, etc. - (1) The Commissioner, with respect
to all or any of the following matters specified in this sub-section
and the District Magistrate, with respect to all or any of the said
matters except the matters referred to in sub-section (1AA), may
make, alter or rescind rules or orders not inconsistent with this
Act, in areas under their respective charges or any part thereof,
namely :-
(a)
xxx xxx xxx
(aa)
xxx xxx xxx
(b)
xxx xxx xxx
(c)
xxx xxx xxx
(d)
xxx xxx xxx
(da)
xxx xxx xxx
(db)
xxx xxx xxx
(e)
xxx xxx xxx
(f)
xxx xxx xxx
(g)
xxx xxx xxx
(h)
xxx xxx xxx
(i)
xxx xxx xxx
(j)
xxx xxx xxx
(k)
xxx xxx xxx
(l)
xxx xxx xxx
(m)
xxx xxx xxx
(n)
xxx xxx xxx
(o)
xxx xxx xxx
(p)
xxx xxx xxx
(q)
xxx xxx xxx
(r)
xxx xxx xxx
(s)
xxx xxx xxx
(t)
xxx xxx xxx
(u)
xxx xxx xxx
(v)
xxx xxx xxx
(w)(i)
licensing or controlling places of public amusement or entertainment;
(ii)
xxx xxx xxx
(iii)
xxx xxx xxx
(wa)(i)
xxx xxx xxx
(ii)
xxx xxx xxx
(iii)
xxx xxx xxx
(iv)
xxx xxx xxx
(x)
xxx xxx xxx
(xa)
registration of eating houses, including granting a certificate of
registration in each case, which shall be deemed to be a written
permission required and obtained under this Act for keeping the
eating house for ten years and decennial renewal of such
registration, within a prescribed period;
(y)
prescribing the procedure in accordance with which any licence,
permission or certificate of registration sought to be obtained or
required under this Act should be applied for and fixing the fees to
be charged for any such licence, permission or certificate of
registration.
Section
2(5A) defines "eating house" which means any place to
which the public are admitted and where any kind of food or drink is
supplied for consumption on the premises by any person owning or
having an interest in or managing such place and includes a
refreshment room, coffee-house or a shop where any kind of food or
drink is supplied to the public for consumption in or near such shop;
but does not include a place of public entertainment.
Section
2(10) defines "place of public entertainment" which means
a boarding house, lodging house or residential hotel, and includes
any eating house in which any kind of liquor or intoxicating drug is
supplied (such as a tavern, a wine shop, a beer shop or a spirit,
arrack, toddy, ganja, bhang or opium shop) to the public for
consumption in or near such place."
Definition
of "eating house" as defined under Section 2(5A) makes it
abundantly clear that it is a place whether any kind of food or drink
can be supplied for consumption and includes a refreshment room,
coffee house or a shop and nothing beyond food or drink.
Perusal
of the provisions of Section 33 of the Act of 1951 makes it clear
that there is no prohibition imposing any valid restrictions or
conditions which were not incorporated at the time of issuance of
licences. Apart from that, firstly, the Prohibition of Smoking in
Public Places Rules, 2008 (for short, 'the
Smoke Free Rules, 2008')
framed under the COPTA are statutory provisions which are binding on
all the persons and authorities within the country and, therefore,
the action of the Police Commissioner of the city of Ahmedabad
incorporating such restrictions or conditions even in the existing
licences cannot be said to be without any authority of law. Secondly,
the licences are in any case issued on annual basis. The office of
the Police Commissioner would, therefore, in any case, have the
powers to incorporate such restrictions and conditions at the time of
renewal of the licences.
At
this stage, it is necessary to refer to the relevant statutory
provisions of COTPA.
Section
4 provides that no person shall smoke in any public place, provided
that in a hotel having thirty rooms or a restaurant having seating
capacity of thirty persons or more and in the airports, a separate
provision for smoking area or space will be made. "Public
place" is defined by section 3(l) as under :
"public
place" means any place to which the public have access, whether
as of right or not, and includes auditorium, hospital buildings,
railway waiting room, amusement centres, restaurants, public offices,
court buildings, educational institutions, libraries, public
conveyances and the like which are visited by general public but does
not include any open space;
Section
3(n) defines "smoking" as under :
"smoking",
means smoking of tobacco in any form whether in the form of
cigarette, cigar, beedis or otherwise with the aid of a pipe, wrapper
or any other instruments;"
"Tobacco
products" is defined under section 3(p) as the products
specified in the Schedule to the Act which includes various tobacco
products including cigar tobacco, pipe tobacco and hukka tobacco. It
is thus clear that smoking in public place including restaurant is
prohibited by the Legislature and only exception is made as far as
restaurant is concerned that smoking is permissible in separate
smoking area or space in restaurant having seating capacity of 30
persons or more. The Smoke Free Rules, 2008 define "restaurant"
in Rule 2(b) as under :
"(b)
"restaurant" shall mean any place to which the public has
access and where any kind of food or drink is supplied for
consumption on the premises by any person by way of business for
consideration monetary or otherwise and shall include the open space
surrounding such premises and includes-
(i)
refreshment rooms, banquet halls, discotheques, canteen, coffee
house, pubs, bars, airport lounge, and the like."
Definition
of "public place" defined in section 3(1) is further
expanded by Rule 2(d) by including the places such as work places,
shopping malls and cinema halls. Smoking area or space mentioned in
the proviso to section 4 of the Act is defined in Rule 2(e) as under
:
"(e)
"smoking area or space" mentioned in the proviso to Section
4 of the Act shall mean a separately ventilated smoking room that:
(i)
is physically separated and surrounded by full height walls on all
four sides;
(ii)
has an entrance with an automatically closing door normally kept in
closed position;
(iii)
has an air flow system, as specified in schedule I;
(iv)
has negative air pressure in comparison with the
remainder
of the building;"
Rule
3 imposes a duty upon the owner and manager of a public place
including restaurant to ensure that no person smokes in the public
place which would include a restaurant. Rule 3(1)(c) also contains
the following prohibition- "No
ashtrays, matches, lighters or other things designed to facilitate
smoking are provided in the public place." Rule
4 further provides that the owner/manager of the restaurant having
seating capacity of thirty persons or more may provide for a smoking
area or space as defined in Rule 2(e); while sub rule (2) of rule (4)
provides that space shall not be established at the entrance or exit
of the restaurant, hotel and airport and shall be distinctively
marked as "Smoking Area" in English and one Indian
language, as applicable. Sub rule (3) rule (4) reads as under :
(3)
A smoking area or space shall be used only for the purpose of smoking
and no other service(s) shall be allowed.
The
COPTA is a central
enactment made pursuant to the resolution passed by the 39th
World Health Assembly on 15 May 1986 to implement the measures to
ensure that effective protection is provided to nonsmokers from
involuntary exposure to tobacco smoke and to protect children and
young people from being addicted to the use of tobacco. Article 47 of
the Constitution of India enjoins the State to achieve improvement of
public health in general. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of
COPTA recognises the fact that tobacco is universally regarded as one
of the major public health hazards and is responsible directly or
indirectly for an estimated eight lakh deaths annually in the
country. It has also been found that treatment of tobacco related
diseases and the loss of productivity caused therein cost the country
almost Rs.13,500 crores annually, which more than offsets all the
benefits accruing in the form of revenue and employment generated by
tobacco industry. The COPTA is enacted to achieve healthier lifestyle
and the protection of life enshrined in the Constitution and seeks to
improve public health.
Section
2 reads thus :
(2)
Declaration as to expediency of control by the Union:- It is hereby
declared that it is expedient in the public interest that the Union
should take under its control the tobacco industry.
A
eating house, which is called a restaurant, is declared to be a
public place. Section 3(n) reads thus :
"(n)
"smoking" means smoking of tobacco in any form whether in
the form of cigarette, cigar, beedis or otherwise with the aid of a
pipe, wrapper or any other instruments;"
Section
4 imposes a prohibition on smoking in any public place and the
proviso thereto has carved out an exception whereby a separate
provision for smoking area or space can be made in certain specified
Hotels/Restaurants. The entire premises of a hotel or a restaurant
referred to in the proviso continue to be a "public place"
and "smoking area or space" defined under Rule 2 (e) is
essentially a part of such public place. This is also clear from Rule
4. Rule 3 casts a statutory obligation on person in charge of the
affairs of public place and sub-rule 3 of Rule 4 prohibits any other
services being allowed in a smoking area or space. Sub-Rule 4 of Rule
4 again carves out an exception in respect of a hotel having 30 rooms
or more. Considering the scheme of the Act and the Rules, it is not
possible to accept the submission that the "smoking area or
space" cannot be considered to be a "public place".
(C)
ANALYSIS OF THE CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES :-
Learned
counsel for the petitioners has heavily relied upon the judgment of
the Supreme Court in the case of Godawat Pan Masala Products I.P.
Ltd. and another (supra). He would submit that considering the facts
that the COTPA was a Central enactment and the Smoke Free Rules, 2008
has also been framed by the Central Government, even the State
Legislature will not have any jurisdiction to pass any such order as
the one which has been passed by the Police Commissioner. Relying on
Section 31 of the COTPA, it was submitted that even the power to
frame rules, which is a power of subordinate legislation, has been
conferred only on the Central Government and, hence, when even the
State Legislature or the State Government having no authority to
exercise any power of subordinate or executive legislation in respect
of any matter covered by the COTPA or the rules thereunder, the
Police Commissioner can never exercise any such power under Section
33 of the Bombay Police Act, as, according to the learned counsel,
imposition of condition no.12 in the licences of various petitioners
running eating house/restaurants amounts to a legislation, which is
impermissible. In support of this proposition, counsel relied on the
observations of the Supreme Court made in paragraphs 24 to 28 of the
said judgment. Reliance has also been placed on the observations made
in paragraphs 36 to 42 of the said judgment to contend that the
Supreme Court having conclusively laid down that the provisions of
the COTPA being a special statute dealing with tobacco and tobacco
products must override the provisions of any other enactment and
since the COTPA is a special law as against the Bombay Police Act
which, according to the counsel, is a State Local Act, and since the
COTPA is enacted by Central Legislature as against the Bombay Police
Act which has been enacted by the State Legislature, the special law
prevail over the general law to the extent of inconsistency and
since, the special law does not impose any absolute prohibition
against the sale of tobacco products, such prohibition could not have
been imposed by the State enactment.
Learned
counsel would also submit that when the Parliament has not considered
hookah to be a product inherently or viciously dangerous to health,
it is not open for the Police Commissioner to treat the activity of
smoking of hookah with very little content of tobacco, as dangerous
or injurious to public health.
We
do not find any merit in the contentions of the learned counsel so
far as the interpretation sought to be placed of the ratio laid down
by the Supreme Court in Godawat Pan Masala Products I.P. Ltd. (supra)
is concerned. As a matter of fact, identical issue fell for
consideration before the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court and
the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court exhaustively dealt with
this issue and we also propose to follow the same reasonings. In the
case of Berrys
Hotel Pvt. Ltd. (MOCHA), a private limited company v/s. The Municipal
Corporation of Greater Mumbai and others,
Writ Petition (L) No.1531 of 2011 decided on 11th
August 2011, the Bombay High Court ruled as under :-
"22.
It is now necessary to consider the submissions of Dr.Sathey that the
law laid down by the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of
Godawat Pan Masala (supra) is applicable to the facts of the present
case. The said Judgment no doubt deals with the provisions of COTPA
2003. However, the factual and legal controversy involved in that
case was entirely different. Various Pan Masala/gutka manufacturer
from the State of Maharashtra, State of Karnataka, State of Tamil
Nadu and State of Goa had challenged the notifications of 2002 and
2003 issued by the Officers of the Food and Drug Administration of
the States of Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Goa which
officers were having different designation. All the notifications had
been issued in purported exercise of powers conferred by Section
7(iv) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 thereby
completely banning the manufacture, sale and distribution of Pan
Masala/Gutaka; in some cases for a period of 5 years for State of
Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu, and without specifying any outer limit in
Andhra Pradesh and Goa. The respective Writ Petitions were therefore
filed in the Supreme Court and 2 other cases, parties who had earlier
approached the Bombay High Court and Andhra Pradesh High Court had
filed appeals in the Supreme Court for challenging the orders of
dismissal of the Writ Petitions filed by them.
23.
The core issue in those proceedings was the one noted by the Supreme
Court in paragraph 12 which reads thus :
"12.
These appeals and the writ petition raise the common issue as to the
power of the Food (Health) Authority to issue an order of
prohibition, whether permanently or quasi-permanently, under Section
7(iv) of the Act."
In
that context, the provisions of Section 7 of Prevention of Food
Adulteration Act, 1954 and the Rules framed thereunder were
considered. After consideration of the said provisions, the Supreme
Court
recorded its conclusions in paragraph-24 and 25 which read thus :
24.
There appears to be merit in the contentions of the appellants. Rule
3 of the Maharashtra Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1962 and
the corresponding rule in the Goa, Daman & Diu Prevention of Food
Adulteration Rules, 1982 suggest that the power given to the Food
(Health) Authority is only a pro tem power to deal with an emergent
situation, such as outbreak of any infectious disease, which may be
due to any article of food. In such a contingency, the Food (Health)
Authority is empowered to take all such action as it deemed necessary
to ascertain the cause of such infectious disease and to prevent the
outbreak of such disease or the spread thereof. Certainly, such power
would include the power to ban "for the time being" the
sale of such injurious articles of food. Hence, correspondingly
Section 7(iv) of the Act provides that no person shall manufacture
for sale, or store, sell or distribute "any article of food the
sale of which is for the time being prohibited by the Food (Health)
Authority in the interest of public health." In other words,
when a contingency envisaged by Rule 3, or one similar thereto,
arises and it becomes necessary for the Food (Health) Authority to
take immediate steps, the Food (Health) Authority is empowered to
prohibit "for the time being" the concerned injurious
article and to take any appropriate step "in the interest of
public health".
25.
On the collocation of the statutory provisions, we are unable to
accept the contention of the learned counsel for the States that
clause (f) of Section 7 of the Act is an independent source of power.
This conclusion of ours is also supported by the legislative history.
Prior to the amendment by act 49 of 1964, with effect from 1.3.1965,
clause (iv) of Section 7 read as under:
"7.
(iv) any article of food the sale of which is for the time being
prohibited by the Food (Health) Authority with a view to preventing
the outbreak or spread of infectious diseases."
24.
The question regarding conflict between the Prevention of Food
Adulteration Act, 1954 and COTPA, 2003 was also considered and the
effect of the COTPA, 2003 is considered in paragraph-37 which reads
thus :-
"37.
The aforesaid internal evidence in the statute, by reason of the
preamble, and the external evidence in the Statement of Objects and
Reasons, indicate that Parliament has evinced its intention to bring
out a comprehensive enactment to deal with tobacco and tobacco
products. However, the provisions of the statute do not suggest that
Parliament had considered it to be expedient to ban tobacco or
tobacco products in public interest or to protect public health. Act
34 of 2003 passed by Parliament does not totally ban the manufacture
of tobacco or tobacco products. Section 6 merely prohibits sale of
cigarettes and tobacco products to a person under the age of eighteen
years. There are stringent provisions made in the Act containing the
prohibition of advertisement of cigarettes and tobacco products.
Section 3(p) defines the expression "tobacco products" as
the products specified in the Schedule. Entry 8 of the Schedule to
the Act reads:
"8.
Pan masala or any chewing material having tobacco as one of its
ingredients (by whatever name called)."
Thus,
pan masala or any chewing material having tobacco is also one of the
products in respect of which the Act could have imposed a total
prohibition, if Parliament was so minded. On the other hand, there is
only conditional prohibition of these products against sale to
persons under eighteen years of age."
25.
The conclusions in the Judgment were recorded in
paragraph-77
which reads thus :
"77.
As a result of the discussions, we are of the view that:
1.
Section 7(iv) of the Act is not an independent source of power for
the state authority.
2.
The source of power of the state Food (Health) Authority is located
only in the valid rules made in exercise of the power under Section
24 of the Act by the State Government, to the extent permitted
thereunder.
3.
The power of the Food (Health) Authority under the rules is only of
transitory nature and intended to deal with local emergencies and can
last only for short period while such emergency lasts.
4.
The power of banning an article of food or an article used as
ingredient of food, on the ground that it is injurious to health,
belongs appropriately to the Central Government to be exercised in
accordance with the rules made under Section 23 of the Act,
particularly, sub-section (1A)(f).
5.
The state Food (Health) Authority has no power to prohibit the
manufacture for sale, storage, sale or distribution of any article,
whether used as an article or adjunct thereto or not used as food.
Such a power can only arise as a result of wider policy decision and
emanate from Parliamentary legislation or, at least, by exercise of
the powers by the Central Government by framing rules under Section
23 of the Act.
6.
The provisions of the Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products
(Prohibition of Advertisement and Regulation of Trade and Commerce,
Production, Supply and Distribution) Act, 2003 are directly in
conflict with the provisions of Section 7(iv) of the Prevention of
Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The former Act is a special Act intended
to deal with tobacco and tobacco products particularly, while the
latter enactment is a general enactment. Thus, the Act 34 of 2003
being a special Act, and of later origin, overrides the provisions of
Section 7(iv) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 with
regard to the power to prohibit
the
sale or manufacture of tobacco products which are listed in the
Schedule to the Act 34 of 2003.
7.
The impugned notifications are ultra vires the Act and, hence, bad in
law.
8.
The impugned notifications are unconstitutional and void as abridging
the fundamental rights of the appellants guaranteed under Articles 14
and 19 of the Constitution."
26.
It is thus clear that the controversy involved in the case of Godawat
Pan Masala (supra) was entirely different. We are dealing with the
situation where after the enactment of the COTPA, 2003; in exercise
of powers conferred by Section 31 thereof, the Central Government has
itself framed the 2008 Rules for implementation of the said Act and
all that has been done by the Municipal Commissioner by the impugned
circular is to incorporate conditions in the licences issued under
M.M.C. Act, 1888 so as to implement the provisions of the COTPA, 2003
and Smoke Free Rules, 2008. The question regarding any conflict
between a Central Statute and a State enactment or the question
regarding any enactment being a special Statute and other being
General Statute does not arise even remotely. For the same reason,
the argument regarding "occupied field" also deserves to
be and is rejected.
27.
Principal activity for which the licence has been applied for and
issued is the activity of running an eating house and in that
context, word "licenced premises" will have to be
construed and interpreted and it is in this context that the argument
advanced in the contention Nos. (c) and (g) will have to be rejected.
In the case of Godawat Pan Masala(supra), the Supreme Court was
dealing with the product "Pan Masala" and since that was
one of the products described in paragraph-A.30 in appendix B of
Part-9 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 framed
under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 it was held by
the Supreme Court that Pan Masala or gutka were "food"
within the meaning of said enactment and the rules. Such is not the
case in respect of a cigarette or a hookah. By section 97 of the Food
Safety and Standards Act, 2006, the earlier Prevention of Food
Adulteration Act, 1954 has been repealed with effect from 29/7/2010
vide SO 1885(E) dated 29/7/2010."
In
this view of the matter, the contention of the learned counsel that
the entire field of smoking and tobacco is covered by the COTPA and
the Central Government alone is competent to deal with the subjects
covered under the Act is outright rejected.
As
a matter of fact, practically all contentions as canvassed by learned
counsel for the petitioners are taken care of by the reasonings
assigned by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court which we have
also followed and adopted.
Learned
counsel for the petitioner vehemently submitted that in each of the
eating houses/ restaurants run by the respective petitioners, a
separate smoking area has been provided. Counsel would submit that
earlier a condition was imposed that there shall be a separate area
for smoking which shall be transparent so that one can notice the
activities being going on in the enclosed area specifically for
smoking. Counsel would submit that the prohibition contained in Rules
3(1)(b) and (c) against providing ashtrays, matches, lighters or
other things designed to facilitate smoking is applicable to a public
place which is not a smoking area. It is submitted that smoking area
or smoking space is governed by Rule 4(3) of the Rules. It is
submitted that it is open to the owner/manager of the eating places
having hookah bar to provide ashtrays, matches, lighters or other
things (including hookah) designed to facilitate smoking and it is
also open to the owner/manager of the eating houses to provide hookah
tobacco.
We
do not find any merits in this contention also and we are in complete
agreement with the contention on behalf of the respondent that if the
contentions advanced on behalf of the private respondents is
accepted, this Court would be permitting the private respondents to
commit violation of the COTPA and Smoke Free Rules, which have been
specifically enacted by the legislature to ensure that no person in
charge of the public place facilitates smoking. It is also submitted
that young students below the age of 18 years visiting different
places such as restaurants having hookah bars are thrown into smoking
hookah and the owner and manager of the restaurants provide hookah as
well as tobacco. Proviso to section 4 is in the nature of exception
and there is nothing
in
the said section or Rule 2 (e) which would warrant the interpretation
advanced on behalf of the private respondents. If such interpretation
is accepted, it would amount to defeating the very purpose of
enactment and would also not be in consonance with the settled norms
of interpretation of Statute. An exception cannot be interpreted in
the manner which will defeat the substantive statutory provisions. It
is also not possible to accept the submission that prohibition
contained in Rule 3(1)(c) is not applicable in a "smoking area
or space" within a restaurant/hotel and the contention that
there is no prohibition against supplying ashtray, matches, lighters
or other things designed to facilitate smoking in such smoking area
or space. This argument cannot be accepted since it would defeat the
legislative intent. The definition of the word "smoking"
includes "any other instruments" and tobacco products
defined in Section 2(p) read with the Schedule includes hookah
tobacco. The "smoking area or space" within a public
place, which is an exception carved out, is thus in the nature of a
concession which has been given to an individual and cannot be
construed to be conferring any right on the owner, proprietor,
manager, supervisor or person in charge of any restaurant or hotel.
It was also sought to be contended that in view of Rule 4(4), since
"services" are allowed to be provided in specified
separate smoking rooms in a hotel, there is no justification for
prohibiting such "services" in a "smoking area or
space" in a restaurant or a hotel. This argument clearly
overlooks that Rule 4(4) deals with only "separate smoking
rooms" which cannot be equated with a "smoking area or
space". The articles mentioned in Rule 3(1)(c) are those
"designed to facilitate smoking" and cannot be termed as
"services" as contemplated by Rule 4(3). Rule 4(3)
imposes blanket restriction against providing any services in
"smoking area or space" and such a restriction will
obviously apply to such smoking area or space in a restaurant or in
hotel.
This
issue as regards Rule 3 of the Rules read with Section 4 of the Act
was a subject matter of adjudication before the Division Bench of the
Bombay High Court in the case of Crusade
Against Tobacco (A branch of The Nell Charitable Trust) and others
v/s. Union of India and others [Public
Interest Litigation (L) No.111 of 2010}. The Division Bench of the
Bombay High Court, vide its judgment and order dated 13th
July 2011 speaking through Hon'ble the Chief Justice, held as under
:-
"13.
The submission made on behalf of the private respondents on the basis
of instruction (i) is also misconceived. All that this instruction
means is that the prohibition against providing any services in a
smoking area or space does not apply to smoking rooms in a hotel.
That is to say, in a smoking room in a hotel, food and beverages may
be provided by way of room services, but such services cannot be
provided in the smoking area/space in a restaurant.
14.
The rationale underlying instruction (i) is obvious. A smoking room
in a Hotel may be occupied by the guest for one day or several days.
Such a guest can not be denied food and beverages by way of room
service or other services like laundry service or entertainment
through television watching in the smoking room in a hotel.
15.
On the other hand, the customer in a restaurant, who is otherwise not
allowed to smoke in any public place including a restaurant [Sec. 3
(l)] is merely given a concession to smoke in a separate area or
space called smoking area or smoking space in the restaurant. He may
smoke one cigarette or more in the smoking area, but the rule making
authority, in consonance with the legislative object as emerging from
the Preamble and the Statement of Objects and reasons for the Act,
does not want to encourage the customer in the restaurant to spend
long hours in the smoking area of the restaurant. He would be
encouraged to spend long hours in the smoking area if he were to be
provided with services like food and beverages there or were to be
provided other services like entertainment through television
watching in the smoking area.
16.
It, therefore, stands to reason that the rule making authority, which
prohibits person in charge of public places including restaurants as
defined in the Sec. 3 (l) from providing devices like lighter which
facilitate smoking and which prohibits a restaurant owner from
providing any services to the customers in the smoking area of the
restaurant, could not be attributed the intention to permit the
restaurant owner to provide gadgets like hookas in the smoking area
of the restaurant. Hooka is more than a device that facilitates
smoking. Hooka is the gadget through which the person smokes.
Providing a gadget like hooka to young boys and girls with
impressionable minds is not merely facilitating them to smoke, but
indeed encouraging and even exciting them to smoke. However exciting
the service may be, it falls within the mischief of Sub-rule (3) of
Rule 4."
We
follow the same reasonings as assigned by the Division Bench of the
Bombay High Court and are in complete agreement with the same.
We
may also quote some paragraphs of the Division Bench judgment of the
Bombay High Court in the case of Berrys Hotel Pvt. Ltd. (MOCHA)
(supra), where the Division Bench, considering the Preamble of
Statement of Objects and Reasons for COTPA, held as under :-
"19.
As regards the contention that COTPA does not prohibit sale of
tobacco to persons above the age of 18 years and therefore, the first
part of Condition No. 35 goes beyond the provisions of COTPA, 2003,
it is necessary to note that the impugned condition does not impose
any prohibition against sale of tobacco or tobacco related products
within the Municipal limits of City of Mumbai. Condition No.35 merely
regulates sale of tobacco and tobacco related products by not
permitting the licensee to keep or sell or provide any tobacco
related products in the licensed premises i. e. in an eating house.
It does not prohibit a person above the age of 18 years from bringing
from outside cigarettes, cigars, bidis or other tobacco related
product inside the smoking area of a restaurant with seating capacity
of 30 persons or more seats in respect of which the license is
granted by the Municipal Commissioner.
20.
We may refer to the preamble and statement of objects and reasons for
COTPA. The preamble specifically states that COTPA is enacted
pursuant to the resolution passed by the 39th
World Health Assembly on 15 May 1986 to implement the measures to
ensure that effective protection is provided to nonsmokers from
involuntary exposure to tobacco smoke and to protect children and
young people from being addicted to the use of tobacco. The preamble
further mentions that "the 43rd World Health Assembly in its
fourteenth Plenary meeting held on 17 May 1990, reiterated the
concerns expressed in the above resolution and urged Member States to
consider in their tobacco control strategies plans for legislation
and other effective measures for protecting their citizens with
special attention to .......discourage the use of tobacco and impose
progressive restrictions and ........
AND
WHEREAS, it is considered expedient to enact a comprehensive law on
tobacco in the public interest and to protect the public health.
AND
WHEEAS, it is expedient to prohibit the consumption of cigarettes and
other tobacco products which are injurious to health with a view to
achieving improvement of public health in general as enjouined by
Article 47 of the Constitution;
(emphasis
supplied)
Article
47 of the Constitution of India enjoins the State to achieve
improvement of public health in general.
The
Statement of Objects and Reasons of COTPA recognises the fact that
tobacco is universally regarded as one of the major public health
hazards and is responsible directly or indirectly for an estimated
eight lakh deaths annually in the country. It has also been found
that treatment of tobacco related diseases and the loss of
productivity caused therein cost the country almost Rs.13,500 crores
annually, which more than offsets all the benefits accruing in the
form of revenue and employment generated by tobacco industry. The
COTPA is enacted to achieve healthier lifestyle and the protection of
life enshrined in the Constitution and seeks to improve public
health.
29.
The object of the said enactment is not merely to
reduce
the exposure of people to tobacco smoke and to completely prevent the
sale of tobacco products to minors. The statement of objects and
reasons of COTPA makes it clear that COTPA is made by Parliament
pursuant to the resolution passed by the 39th World Health Assembly
on 15 May 1986 to implement the measures, inter alia, to protect
children and young prople from being addicted to the use of tobacco.
The statement of objects and reasons of COTPA further recognises the
fact that tobacco is universally regarded as one of the major public
health hazards and is responsible directly or indirectly for an
estimated eight lakh deaths annually in the country. The COTPA is,
therefore, enacted to achieve healthier lifestyle and to improve
public health.
It
was the contention of the petitioners in the PIL that large number of
children and young people were being attracted to the hookah bars and
getting addicted to the tobacco through hookah smoking and that this
fact was brought to the notice of the Municipal Corporation and
impugned circular dated 4/7/2011 came to be issued. It cannot
therefore be stated that the impugned conditions in the circular
dated 4/7/2011 are contrary to law or without any authority of law.
30.
The argument of Dr. Sathey that owner of an eating house/restaurant
cannot be prohibited from providing hookah in a smoking area can also
not be accepted. As indicated in our earlier Judgment, the entire
premises of eating houses are defined as a "public place"
under section 3(l) of the COTPA 2003, the prohibition against smoking
applies under section 4 and only an exception is carved out in the
proviso to section 4. "Smoking area" in a
restaurant/eating house is obviously not excluded from the definition
of the word "public place" but only an exception is
carved out for individuals who want to smoke with their own
cigarettes and the legislative intent is clear from sub clause (c) of
Rule 3(1) of the 2008 rules.
36.
The customer in a restaurant, who is otherwise not allowed to smoke
in any public place including a restaurant [Sec. 3(l)] is merely
given a concession to smoke in a separate area or space called
smoking area or smoking space in the restaurant. He may smoke one
cigarette or more in the smoking area, but the rule making authority,
in consonance with the legislative object as emerging from the
Preamble and the statement of objects and reasons for the Act, wants
to discourage the customer in the restaurant from spending long hours
in the smoking area of the restaurant. He would be encouraged to
spend long hours in the smoking area if he were to be provided with
services like food and beverages there or were to be provided other
services like entertainment through television watching in the
smoking area. It, therefore, stands to reason that the rule making
authority, which prohibits person in charge of public places
including restaurants as defined in the Sec.3(l) from providing
devices like lighter which facilitate smoking and which prohibits a
restaurant owner even from providing any services to the customers in
the smoking area of the restaurant, could not be attributed the
intention to permit the restaurant owner to provide apparatus or
gadget like hookah in the smoking area of the restaurant. Hookah is
more than a device that facilitates smoking. Hookah is the apparatus
through which the person smokes. Providing an apparatus like hookah
to young people with impressionable minds is not merely facilitating
them to smoke, but indeed encouraging and even exciting them to
smoke. However exciting the service may be, it falls within the
mischief of Sub-rule (3) of Rule 4.
37.
As already indicated hereinabove, the statement of objects and
reasons of COTPA specifically refers to the resolution passed by the
39th World 39th World Health Assembly on 15 May 1986 to implement the
measures interalia to provide the effective protection to children
and young people from being addicted to the use of tobacco. Article
47 of the Constitution of India enjoins the State to achieve
improvement of public health in general and in U.P.
State Electricity Board and anr. v. Hari Shanker Jain and ors.4,
the Supreme Court has observed thus-
The
mandate of Art. 37 of the Constitution is that while the Directive
Principles of State Policy shall not be enforceable by any Court, the
principles are 'nevertheless fundamental in the governance of
the country' and 'it shall be the duty of the State to
apply these principles in making laws'. Addressed to Courts,
what the injunction means is that while Courts are not free to direct
the making of legislation, Courts are bound to evolve, affirm and
adopt principles of interpretation which will further and not hinder
the goals set out in the Directive Principles of State Policy. This
command of the Constitution must be ever present in the minds of
Judges when interpreting statutes which concern themselves directly
or indirectly with matters set out in the Directive Principles of
State Policy.
While
interpreting the provisions of COTPA and the Rules framed thereunder,
we must have due regard to Article 47 and the fact that the Act was
enacted with the expressly stated objective of improving public
health and in accordance with the resolutions passed by the WHO.
38.
As the statement of Objects and Reasons to COTPA states, it is
enacted to protect not only children but also "young people"
from being addicted to use of tobacco. Hence we find no substance in
the petitioners' contention that hookah can be provided to
young people above the age of 18 years."
(D)
FREEDOM OF TRADE UNDER Article 19(1)(g) AND LIMITATIONS SPECIFIED IN
ARTICLE 19(6) - REASONABLE RESTRICTIONS :-
Article
19(1)(g) read with Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India spells
out fundamental rights given to the citizens to practice any
profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business so long
as it is not prevented or is within the frame work of the regulation,
if any. There cannot be any dispute that certain professions,
occupations, trade or business which are not in the interest of
general public may be completely prohibited while others may be
permitted with reasonable restrictions. Further, Article 47 of the
Constitution enjoins on the State and contains a Directive Principle
of the State Policy and provides that the State shall regard the
improvement of public health as amongst its primary duties.
Restrictions permitted to be imposed by sub-clauses (2) to (6) of
Article 19 must be read as a whole, each throwing light on the scope
of the other and that the common thread running through these several
provisions was the ground of public policy understood in a
comprehensive sense. The public policy thus enforced might be founded
on the principles of the common law; vide for instance Egerton v.
Earl Brownlow, (1853)4 HLC 1 at p.256(G), where the House of Lords
said :
No
subject can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to
the public, or against the public good.
Another
instance which can be afforded is through a leading case of
Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co., 1894 AC
535(H), where the House of Lords had to deal with the scope of the
common law prohibition against improper restraint of trade. This
principle of public policy was not confined to that which the common
law recognised or enforced, and it extended equally to the public
policy involved in the enforcement of statutes.
Every
public statute was enacted in the public interest and, therefore,
both public policy and public interest demanded its enforcement. The
public interest justifying the restrictions might, therefore, arise
from the very provisions of the enactment and might be grounded on
the necessity to prevent its evasion.
Having
considered the matter carefully, we have reached the conclusion, that
the view pressed upon us by learned counsel for the petitioners, that
the public interest to justify restrictions of the rights conferred
by Article 19(1)(g) must arise from the inherent nature of the
particular trade, involves an unduly narrow interpretation of the
words employed in Article 19(6) and ought to be rejected. We see
considerable force in the argument of the learned counsel for the
State that the restrictions permitted by sub-clauses (2) to (6)
follow a pattern i.e. they are imposed by the Legislature for reasons
of public policy. The precise aspect of public policy involved in the
case of each of the several fundamental rights conferred by the
several sub-clauses of Article 19(1) might differ, but one underlying
principle - the requirement of public policy - runs
through the various classes of restrictions and pervades the scheme.
While
considering
the effect of the Directive Principles contained in part IV of the
Constitution of India, particularly in the context of principles of
interpretation of a statute, in case of U.
P. State Electricity Board and Anr. v/s. Hari Shanker Jain and ors.,
AIR 1979 SC 65, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed thus :
The
mandate of Art. 37 of the Constitution is that while the Directive
Principles of State Policy shall not be enforceable by any Court, the
principles are 'nevertheless fundamental in the governance of
the country' and 'it shall be the duty of the State to
apply these principles in making laws'. Addressed to Courts,
what the injunction means is that while Courts are not free to direct
the making of legislation, Courts are bound to evolve, affirm and
adopt principles of interpretation which will further and not hinder
the goals set out in the Directive Principles of State Policy. This
command of the Constitution must be ever present in the minds of
Judges when interpreting statutes which concern themselves directly
or indirectly with matters set out in the Directive Principles of
State Policy.
While
interpreting the provisions of COPTA and the Rules framed thereunder,
we must have due regard to Article 47 and the fact that the Act was
enacted with the expressly stated objective of improving public
health and in accordance with the resolutions passed by the WHO.
section 2 of copta contains declaration of expediency to enact the
Act in public interest. Hence the challenge based on Article 19 is
also without substance.
MEANING
OF THE WORD "REGULATION"
We
would also like to deal with one another contention which assumes
importance in the peculiar facts of the present case. It was
contended during the course of argument on behalf of the petitioners
that the license which is being issued by the Police Commissioner of
the city of Ahmedabad or as the case may be, is in exercise of powers
under Section 33 of the Bombay Police Act. We have quoted in the
earlier part of our judgment Section 33 of the Bombay Police Act,
more particularly, the relevant provisions, so we need not repeat the
same. However, the contention is that Chapter IV of the Bombay Police
Act, 1951 provides for police regulations. In fact, Chapter IV of the
Act is with regard to police regulations. Section 33 empowers the
authority concerned to make rules or regulations of traffic and for
preservation of order in public place, etc. The contention of the
counsel for the petitioners is that the powers under Section 33 are
merely regulatory and there is no specific power to impose a complete
ban or prohibition of a particular activity, like in the instant
case, a hookah or providing with a hookah at a eating
house/restaurant registered under Sections 33(xa). To understand the
true meaning and import of the word "regulate" we may
refer to a Division Bench judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in
the case of D.K.V.Prasada
Rao and others v/s. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh,
reported in AIR 1984 Andhra Pradesh 75, where the Division Bench of
the Andhra Pradesh High Court interpreted the word "regulation"
while considering the matter under A.P.Cinemas (Regulation) Act and
the rules framed thereunder. This is how the word "regulation"
has been understood and explained.
The
heart of the title is the word "Regulation". The prominence
thus ascribed is to the word was "Regulation". But it lacks
legislative definition of its own. Therefore, it is profitable to
find what meaning has been ascribed to it either under the
dictionaries or analogous statutes or Judge made law to understand
its scope and reach and whether it would comprehend within its ambit
the power to make rules to regulate maximum rates of admission. The
term "Regulate" is defined in Oxford Dictionary, am follows
:
to
control, to govern, to protect by rules or regulations, to subject to
guidance or restrictions, to adopt to circumstances or surroundings.
In
Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 76, p. 610, the meaning of the word
"regulate" is stated thus :
The
word 'regulate' is derived from the latin word 'rego and regula'. It
is a word of broad import having a broad meaning and is very
comprehensive in scope.
(Emphasis
supplied.)
In
Municipal Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Virgo, (1896) AC 88
at 93 (House of Lords (Privy Council- Ed.), Lord Davey. while
considering the word "Regulation" has held that:
There
is a marked distinction to be drawn between the prohibition or
prevention of trade and the regulation or governance of it and indeed
......... a power to regulate and to govern seems to
imply the continued existence of that which is to be regulated or
governed.
(Empasis
supplied.)
Sri
C.Herman Prechette in "The American Constitution" III
Edition, at page 186, gives the meaning of the word "Regulation"
as the breadth of regulatory power which the Congress may exercise
within its recognised scope of authority has seldom successfully
questioned. Efforts to read restrictive interpretations into the word
"regulate" have almost uniformly failed. Regulations, the
Court has said, means not only "protection and promotion"
but also "restriction and even prohibition".
In
Cook v. Marshall Country, (1904) 196 US 261 at 272 Mr. Justice Brown
of the Supreme Court of America while considering the power of
Congress to regulate inter State Commerce, observed that:
"
.... but so long as they are adopted in good
faith, with an eye single to the public welfare,
they are as much entitled to the recognition of the general
Government as if they were uniformly adopted by all the States."
(Emphasis
supplied.)
In
this context, it is appropriate to refer to a decision of their
Lordships of the Supreme Court in Indu Bhushan v. Rama Sundari, AIR
1970 SC 228 at p. 231, where the scope of the word 'regulation' was
considered, it was held:
"The
Dictionary meaning of the word 'regulation' in Shorter Oxford
Dictionary is "the act of regulating" and the word
"regulate" is given the meaning "to control, govern,
or direct by rule or regulation". This entry thus, gives the
power to Parliament to pass legislation for the purpose of directing
or controlling all house accommodation in cantonment areas. Clearly,
this power to direct or control will include within it all aspects as
to who is to make the constructions under that conditions the
constructions can be altered, who is to occupy the accommodation and
for how long, on what terms is to be occupied, when and under what
circumstances the occupant is to cease to occupy it, and the manner
in which the accommodation is to be utilised. All these are
ingredients of regulation of house accommodation and we see no reason
to hold that this word "regulation" has not been used in
this wide sense in this entirety".
It
would, therefore, be reasonable to deduce that the word "regulation"
is a word of broad import having wide meaning comprehending all
facets not only specifically enumerated in the Act but also embrace
within its fold the powers incidental to the regulation envisaged in
good faith with an eye single to the public welfare. Court has to
recognise this power of the Government in public interest.
In
Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 76, at page 612, it is stated : "The
power to regulate carries with it full power over the thing subject
to regulation, and in the absence of restrictive words the power must
be regarded as "plenary over the entire subject."
... ... It has been held to contemplate or imply the continued
existence of the subject matter to be regulated. The power to
regulate includes the power to restrain, and indicate restriction in
some respects and the term "regulate" embraces the idea of
fixing limitations and restrictions, and contemplates the power of
restriction or restraint." "The
word necessarily denotes some degrees of restraint of acts usually
done in connection with the thing to be regulated."
...... "The power to regulate may include the power to licence
or to refuse a licence, or to require a bond from an applicant
therefor, or to require the taking out of a licence and it may
include
the power to tax or to exempt from taxation but not the right to
impose a tax for revenue."
Thus,
it could be seen that the power to regulate would also include the
power to restrain and embrace
the idea of fixing limitations and restrictions on the acts usually
done in connection with the right to trade or business under a
license.
SECTION
144 OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Now
we may proceed to deal with the contention of the learned counsel for
the petitioners as regards the legality and validity of the
notification dated 14th
July 2011 issued by the Police Commissioner of the city of Ahmedabad
in exercise of powers under section 144 of the code of Criminal
Procedure (for short, 'the Code'). The contention is that the kind of
orders mentioned in Section 144(3) of the Code are intended only to
prevent danger to life, health, safety, peace and tranquility of
members of the public. They are only temporary orders which cannot
last beyond two months from the making thereof as is clear from
Section 144(6) of the Code. It is contended that even by virtue of
proviso sub-section (4) to Section 144, it is only the State
Government which is empowered to extend the prohibitory order for a
maximum period of six months beyond the life of the order made by the
Police Commissioner is clearly indicative of the position that
Parliament never intended the life of an order under Section 144 to
remain in force beyond two months when made by a Magistrate. It is
also contended that the scheme of that section does not contemplate
repetitive orders and in case the situation so warrants, steps have
to be taken under other provisions of the law. It is further
contended that if repetitive orders are made it would clearly amount
to abuse of power conferred by Section 144 as the nature of the order
under Section 144 is intended to meet emergent situation and the
order under Section 144 is not intended to be either permanent or
semi-permanent in character.
There
is no dispute as regards the position of law and we accept the
contentions on behalf of the petitioners so far as Section 144 of the
Code is concerned. However, solely on this ground alone the entire
action on the part of the Police Commissioner cannot be said to be
unlawful or beyond his jurisdiction. Prima facie, we are convinced
that the notification invoked under section 144 of the code was
issued with a definite idea and the idea was to immediately give true
effect to the addition of the condition in respect of licences of
persons running eating house/restaurant. It appears that the
authorities felt that it would be difficult to stop the activity of
providing hookah at eating house/restaurant by solely adding one of
the conditions not to provide hookah at a eating house/restaurant. It
appears from the affidavit-in-reply filed by the Police Commissioner
that with a view to meet with such an emergent situation prevailing
in the city and as it was very difficult to keep constant vigilant
and monitoring as regards compliance of the condition which was added
in the licence, the Police Commissioner thought fit to invoke Section
144 of the Code.
Assuming
for a moment that the action of the Police Commissioner of the city
of Ahmedabad in issuing the notification in purported exercise of
powers under section 144 of the code is not tenable in law by itself
would not be sufficient to grant the relief as prayed for by the
petitioners. Though we do not find error in the same but assuming for
a moment that it is found to be illegal and invalid, the High Court
while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction thereunder can refuse
to upset it in public interest. It is a settled principle of law that
the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is
discretionary in nature and in a given case even if such action or
order challenged in the petition is found to be improper and invalid,
the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction
thereunder can refuse to upset it.
In
the case of M/s.Shiv Shanker Dal Mills v. State of Haryana and
others, reported in AIR 1980 SC 1037, while disposing of the petition
and laying down guidelines, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India held
as under :-
Article
226 grants an extraordinary remedy, which is essentially
discretionary, although founded on legal injury. It is perfectly open
for the Court, exercising this flexible power, to pass such order as
public interest dictates and equity projects. Courts of equity may,
and frequently do, go much further both to give and withhold relief
in furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to go
where only private interests are involved. Accordingly, the granting
or withholding of relief may properly be dependent upon
considerations as of public interest.
It
has been rightly observed that legal formulations cannot be enforced
divorce from the realities of the fact situation of the case. While
administering law it is to be tempered with equity and if the
equitable situation demands after setting right the legal
formulations not to take it to the logical end, the High Court would
be failing in its duty if it does not notice equitable considerations
and mould the final order in exercise of its extraordinary
jurisdiction. Any other approach would render the High Court a normal
Court of Appeal.
In
this view of the matter, the State in enforcement of its duties to
improve the health is absolutely justified in prohibiting and banning
supply of hookahs at eating houses/restaurants. Such a decision can
never be struck down as violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the
Constitution of India. A citizen would have no fundamental right to
trade in hookahs. Petitioners' contention that by imposition of such
an absolute ban and prohibition they will be deprived of practicing
such trade and thus they will lose their livelihood cannot be
countenanced. Interest of the public outweighs the inconvenience
caused to persons like the petitioners.
In
the aforesaid view of the matter and for the reasons recorded in the
judgment, we hold that there is no merit in the petitions and none of
the contentions canvassed on behalf of the petitioners can be
accepted.
In
the result, all the petitions fail and are hereby rejected. No order
as to cost.
(A.L.Dave,
J.)
(J.B.Pardiwala,
J.)
/moin
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