(Per
: HONOURABLE MS.JUSTICE H.N.DEVANI)
1. The
Appellant-Revenue has challenged order dated 26.08.2008 made by the
Customs, Excise And Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (the Tribunal),
proposing the following three questions:
(a)
Whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, the date of
completion of investigation has any bearing in deciding period of
limitation to issue show cause notice in case covered by first
proviso to Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944?
(b) Whether
in the facts and circumstances of this case, the Tribunal has
committed substantial error of law in holding that show cause notice
issued in the present case is barred by limitation under Section 11A
of the Central Excise Act, 1944?
(c) Whether
in the facts and circumstances of this case, the Tribunal has
committed substantial error of law in allowing appeal of the
respondent assessee with consequential relief to the said assessee?
2. On
03.03.2010 this Court had passed an order in the following terms:
1. Heard learned Counsel for
Appellant-Revenue. While passing impugned order dated 25.8.2008,
Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (the Tribunal),
correct legal principles have been enunciated as to operation of
provisions of section 11a (1) and the Proviso thereunder of the
Central Excise Act, 1944. However, prima facie it appears that the
Tribunal has fallen into error in applying principles to the facts of
the case.
2. Hence, Notice for final disposal
returnable on 25.03.2010.
3. In
response to the notice issued by this Court, Mr. Paresh Dave learned
advocate has put in appearance on behalf of the respondent.
4. Heard
the learned advocates.
5. Admit.
The following substantial question of law arises for consideration :
Whether the Tribunal was justified in
importing the concept of knowledge in the provisions of Section 11A
of the Central Excise Act, 1944 read with sub-section (1) and the
proviso thereto?
6. Briefly
stated the facts of the case are that the respondent is engaged in
the manufacture of Man-made Fabrics on job work basis falling under
Chapter 54 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. Officers of the
Central Excise visited the factory of the respondent on 21.06.2002
for preventive checks. The officers took physical stock of grey
fabrics, semi-finished fabrics and finished fabrics lying in
different sections of the unit and on comparing the same with the Lot
Register and the Daily Stock Register maintained by the unit, found
that there was a shortage of 193717.50 L.Mtrs. of Grey fabrics. In
relation to the shortage, the statement of one Arunkumar Trivedi,
Director of the unit was recorded who admitted the shortage and
deposed that they had illicitly cleared the Grey fabrics without
issuing central excise invoices and without payment of any duty.
Statements of the merchant manufacturers from whom the short found
Grey fabrics were received and resultant processed fabrics cleared
without cover of Central Excise invoices and without payment of
Central Excise duty also came to be recorded, who admitted that the
Grey fabrics were sent for process illicitly without payment of duty.
7. Subsequently
a Show Cause Notice dated 09.05.2009 came to be issued to the
respondent unit which came to be adjudicated vide order-in-original
dated 22.2.2006 whereby demand of central excise duty amounting to
Rs.4,01,693/- came to be confirmed with interest under section 11AB
of the Act. Penalty of Rs.4,01,693/- was also imposed under section
11 AC of the Act read with Rule 25 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002
(the Rules). The respondent carried the matter in appeal before
Commissioner (Appeals), who for the reasons stated in her order dated
25.02.2008, dismissed the appeal. The respondent carried the matter
in further appeal before the Tribunal, who vide the impugned order
allowed the appeal on the ground of limitation.
8. Assailing
the impugned order of the Tribunal Mr. R.J. Oza, learned Senior
Standing Counsel for the appellant-revenue has invited attention to
the provisions
of section 11A of the Act. It is submitted that in view of the
proviso to section 11A of the Act, in case where any duty of excise
has not been levied or paid or has been short levied or short paid or
erroneously refunded by reason of fraud, collusion or any wilful
mis-statement or suppression of facts, or contravention of any of the
provisions of the Act, or of the rules made thereunder with intent to
evade payment of duty, the period of one year prescribed for service
of show cause notice under sub-section (1) of section 11a gets
extended to five years. Hence, once it is found that any excise duty
has not been paid or short levied etc, for any of the reasons
stipulated under the proviso, the period of limitation for service of
show cause notice would automatically stand extended to five years.
Adverting to the facts of the present it is pointed out that
non-payment of central excise duty by reason of suppression is
admitted, hence, the ingredients of the proviso stand duly satisfied.
It is submitted that the Tribunal has imported the concept of
knowledge and a limitation of six months from the date
of knowledge into section 11A of the Act to hold that the show cause
notice was barred by limitation, which is not permissible in law. In
support of his submissions, the learned counsel has placed reliance
upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mathania
Fabrics Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur,
2008 (221) E.L.T.481 (S.C.),
as well as the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Union
of India Vs. Rajasthan Spinning and Weaving Mills,
2009 (238) E.L.T.3 (S.C.).
9. On the
other hand, Mr. Paresh Dave learned advocate for the respondent has
vehemently opposed the appeal. It is submitted that the Tribunal has
placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Nizam
Sugar Factory Vs. Collector of Central Excise,
A.P., 2006(197) E.L.T.465
(S.C.), for holding that the show
cause notice was barred by limitation.
Attention is invited to the decision of the Larger Bench of the
Tribunal in the case of Nizam
Sugar Factory
v.
Collector of Central Excise, 1999
(114) ELT 429, wherein
the Tribunal held that relevant
date has been defined under sub-section (3) of section 11a and that
the said sub-section does not provide that the relevant date means
the date of acquiring the knowledge by the Department. It is further
held that once show cause notice was beyond the extended period of
limitation, any reference to date of acquiring knowledge has no
relevance. It is pointed out that the said decision of the Tribunal
was carried before the Supreme Court in the case of Nizam
Sugar Factory
(supra) and that the impugned orders of the Tribunal had been set
aside on the question of limitation only. It is further submitted
that the impugned order of the Tribunal is also in consonance with
the decision of this Court in case of Commissioner
of
Central Excise And
Customs Vs. Kwality Tube Industries,
2009 (240) E.L.T.20 (Guj.).
It is submitted that in the circumstances, the impugned order of the
Tribunal is just, legal, proper and does not warrant interference.
10.
Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 in so far as the same is
relevant for the present purpose reads thus:
11A. Recovery of duties not levied or
not paid or short-levied or short-paid or erroneously refunded.
-(1) When any duty of excise has not been levied or paid or has been
short-levied or short-paid or erroneously refunded, whether or not
such non-levy or non-payment, short-levy or short payment or
erroneous refund, as the case may be, was on the basis of any
approval, acceptance or assessment relating to the rate of duty on or
valuation of excisable goods under any other provisions of this Act
or the rules made thereunder, a Central Excise Officer may, within
one year from the relevant date, serve notice on the persons
chargeable with the duty which has not been levied or paid or which
has been short-levied or short-paid or to whom the refund has
erroneously been made, requiring him to show cause why he should not
pay the amount specified in the notice:
Provided that where any duty of excise has
not been levied or paid or has been short-levied or short-paid or
erroneously refunded by reason of fraud, collusion or any wilful
mis-statement or suppression of facts, or contravention of any of the
provisions of this Act or of the rules made thereunder with intent to
evade payment of duty, by such person or his agent, the provisions of
this sub-section shall have effect, as if for the words one year, the
words, five years were substituted :
Explanation. - Where the service of the
notice is stayed by an order of a Court, the period of such stay
shall be excluded in computing the aforesaid period of [one year] or
five years, as the case may be .
(1A) xxxxxxx.
xxxxxxx.
(3) For the purposes of this section -
(i) refund includes rebate of duty of
excise on excisable goods exported out of India or on excisable
materials used in the manufacture of goods which are exported out of
India;
(ii) relevant date means,-
(a) in the case of excisable goods on which
duty of excise has not been levied or paid or has been short-levied
or short-paid -
(A) where under the rules made under this
Act a periodical return, showing particulars of the duty paid on the
excisable goods removed during the period to which the said return
relates, is to be filed by a manufacturer or a producer or a licensee
of a warehouse, as the case may be, the date on which such return is
so filed;
(B) where no periodical return as aforesaid
is filed, the last date on which such return is to be filed under
the said rules;
(C) in any other case, the date on which
the duty is to be paid under this Act or the rules made thereunder;
(b) in a case where duty of excise is
provisionally assessed under this Act or the rules made thereunder,
the date of adjustment of duty after the final assessment thereof;
(c) in the case of excisable goods on
which duty of excise has been erroneously refunded, the date of such
refund.
11. A
plain reading of sub-section (1) of section 11a of the Act indicates
that the provision is applicable in a case where any duty of excise
has either not been levied/paid or has been short levied/short paid,
or wrongly refunded, regardless of the fact that such non levy etc.
is on the basis of any approval, acceptance or assessment relating to
the rate of duty or valuation under any of the provisions of the Act
or Rules thereunder and at that stage it would be open to the Central
Excise Officer, in exercise of his discretion to serve the show cause
notice on the person chargeable to such duty within one year from the
relevant date.
12. The
Proviso under the said sub-section stipulates that in case of such
non levy, etc. of duty which is by reason of fraud, collusion, or
any mis-statement or suppression of facts, or contravention of any
provisions of the Act or the rules made thereunder, the provisions of
sub-section (1) of section 11a of the Act shall have effect as if the
words one year have been substituted by the words five
years .
13. The
Explanation which follows stipulates that where service of notice has
been stayed by an order of a Court, the period of such stay shall be
excluded from computing the aforesaid period of one year or five
years, as the case may be.
14. Thus
the scheme that unfolds is that in case of non levy where there is no
fraud, collusion, etc., it is open to the Central Excise Officer to
issue a show cause notice for recovery of duty of excise which has
not been levied, etc. The show cause notice for recovery has to be
served within one year from the relevant date. However, where fraud,
collusion, etc., stands established the period within which the show
cause notice has to be served stands enlarged by substitution of the
words one year by the words five years . In other words
the show cause notice for recovery of such duty of excise not levied
etc., can be served within five years from the relevant date.
15. To
put it differently, the proviso merely provides for a situation
whereunder the provisions of sub-section (1) are recast by the
legislature itself extending the period within which the show cause
notice for recovery of duty of excise not levied etc. gets enlarged.
This position becomes clear when one reads the Explanation in the
said sub-section which only says that the period stated as to service
of notice shall be excluded in computing the aforesaid period of one
year or five years as the case may be.
16. The
termini from which the period of one year or five years
has to be computed is the relevant date which has been defined in
sub-section (3)(ii) of section 11A of the Act. A plain reading of the
said definition shows that the concept of knowledge by the
departmental authority is entirely absent. Hence, if one imports such
concept in sub-section (1) of section 11a of the Act or the proviso
thereunder it would tantamount to rewriting the statutory provision
and no canon of interpretation permits such an exercise by any Court.
If it is not open to the superior court to either add or substitute
words in a statute such right cannot be available to a statutory
Tribunal.
17. The
proviso cannot be read to mean that because there is knowledge the
suppression which stands established disappears. Similarly the
concept of reasonable period of limitation which is sought to be read
into the provision by some of the orders of the Tribunal also cannot
be permitted in law when the statute itself has provided for a fixed
period of limitation. It is equally well settled that it is not open
to the Court while reading a provision to either rewrite the period
of limitation or curtail the prescribed period of limitation.
18. The
Proviso comes into play only when suppression etc. is established or
stands admitted. It would differ from a case where fraud, etc. are
merely alleged and are disputed by an assessee. Hence, by no stretch
of imagination the concept of knowledge can be read into the
provisions because that would tantamount to rendering the defined
term relevant date nugatory and such an interpretation is not
permissible.
19. The
language employed in the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 11a,
is clear and unambiguous and makes it abundantly clear that moment
there is non-levy or short levy etc. of central excise duty with
intention to evade payment of duty for any of the reasons specified
thereunder, the proviso would come into operation and the period of
limitation would stand extended from one year to five years. This is
the only requirement of the provision. Once it is found that the
ingredients of the proviso are satisfied, all that has to be seen as
to what is the relevant date and as to whether the show cause notice
has been served within a period of five years therefrom.
20. Thus,
what has been prescribed under the statute is that upon the reasons
stipulated under the proviso being satisfied, the period of
limitation for service of show cause notice under sub-section (1) of
section 11A, stands extended to five years from the relevant date.
The period cannot by reason of any decision of a Court or even by
subordinate legislation be either curtailed or enhanced. In the
present case as well as in the decisions on which reliance has been
placed by the learned advocate for the respondent, the Tribunal has
introduced a novel concept of date of knowledge and has imported into
the proviso a new period of limitation of six months from the date of
knowledge. The reasoning appears to be that once knowledge has been
acquired by the department there is no suppression and as such the
ordinary statutory period of limitation prescribed under sub-section
(1) of section 11A would be applicable. However, such reasoning
appears to be fallacious in as much as once the suppression is
admitted, merely because the department acquires knowledge of the
irregularities the suppression would not be obliterated.
21. It
may be noticed that where the statute does not prescribe a period of
limitation, the Apex Court as well as this Court have imported the
concept of reasonable period and have held that where the statute
does not provide for a period of limitation, action has to be taken
within a reasonable time. However, in a case like the present one,
where the statute itself prescribes a period of limitation the
question of importing the concept of reasonable period does not arise
at all as that would mean that the Court is substituting the period
of limitation prescribed by the legislature, which is not permissible
in law.
22. The
Apex Court in the case of Rajasthan
Spinning and Weaving Mills
(supra) has
held thus :
From
sub-section 1 read with its proviso it is clear that in case the
short payment, non
payment, erroneous refund of duty is unintended and not attributable
to fraud, collusion or any wilful mis-statement or suppression of
facts, or contravention of any of the provisions of the Act or of the
rules made under it with intent to evade payment of duty then the
Revenue can give notice for recovery of the duty to the person in
default within one year from the relevant date (defined in
sub-section 3). In other words, in the absence of any element of
deception or malpractice the recovery of duty can only be for a
period not exceeding one year. But in case the non-payment etc. of
duty is intentional and by adopting any means as indicated in the
proviso then the period of notice and a priory the period for which
duty can be demanded gets extended to five years.
23. This
decision would be applicable on all fours to the facts of the present
case, viz. when non-payment etc. of duty is intentional and by
adopting any of the means indicated in the proviso, then the period
of notice gets extended to five years.
24. The
decision of the Apex Court in the case of Nizam
Sugar Factory
(supra) on which reliance has been placed upon by learned advocate
for the respondent was rendered in totally different set of facts
wherein when the first show cause notice was issued all the relevant
facts were in the knowledge of the authorities. The Court has held
that later on, while issuing the second and third show cause notices
the same/similar facts could not be taken as suppression of facts on
the part of the assessee as those facts were already in the knowledge
of the authorities. Thus, it was in these circumstances, that the
Apex Court had held that there was no suppression of facts on the
part of the assessee and set aside the order impugned before it on
the question of limitation only. The ratio of the said judgment
cannot be deduced to mean that concept of knowledge is applicable
even in a case of first show cause notice. Thus, once the Court had
come to the conclusion that there was no suppression, it is but
natural that the proviso would not come into play and the ordinary
the period of limitation would be applicable.
25. The
decision of this Court in the case of Commissioner
of
Central
Excise And Customs Vs. Kwality Tube Industries
(supra) also does not carry the case of the respondent any further
inasmuch as in the facts of the said case the Court had interalia
found that in absence of weighment slips the alleged shortage itself
was doubtful and the finding to that effect arrived at by the
Tribunal was neither unreasonable nor unjustified. Thus, as discussed
above, when fraud, suppression etc., are not established the matter
stands on a different footing.
26. In
the facts of the present case the record indicates that the Director
of the respondent has admitted shortage of Grey fabrics as well as
illicit clearance thereof without issuance of central excise invoices
or any other duty paying documents, without payment of central excise
duty and without entering in the Daily Stock Account Register and Lot
Register during the months May-2002 and June 2002. The merchant
manufacturers from whom the short found Grey fabrics were received
and resultant processed fabrics cleared illicitly without cover of
central excise invoices and without payment of central excise duty
had also been summoned by the Central Excise Officers. Statements of
those merchant manufacturers who appeared indicate that they had
agreed that they had sent the grey fabrics to the respondent and
received the resultant processed fabrics, without cover of central
excise invoices and without payment of central excise duty leviable
thereon during the relevant period. Thus, in the facts of the present
case suppression stands admitted by the respondent assessee and
established by evidence on record and as a natural corollary, the
proviso to sub-section (1) of section 11a would stand attracted. In
the circumstances, the impugned order of the Tribunal whereby it has
been held that the show cause notice issued beyond the period of six
months from the date of knowledge is barred by limitation is clearly
contrary to the provisions of section 11A of the Act and as such
cannot be sustained.
27. In
light of the aforesaid, the questions stand answered accordingly. The
impugned order dated 26th
August, 2008 bearing No.A.1676-1677/WZB/Ahmedabad/08 made by the
Tribunal in Central Excise Appeals No.569 and 570 of 2008 is hereby
quashed and set aside. The Appeal is, accordingly, allowed with no
order as to costs.
Sd/-
Sd/-
(D.A.