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Summary of Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a Criminal Revision Application under Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code preferred by the original accused persons challenging a judgment and order dated 16.10.2003 which dismissed their appeal. Petitioner No.1 was sentenced to simple imprisonment for three months and a fine of Rs.3,000/-. The petitioners had originally been convicted for an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

The facts as recorded in the opinion: Accused No.1 is the director of Accused No.2 (a private limited company). A cheque dated 13.10.1998 for Rs.11,23,000/- was alleged to have been given and was returned unpaid on 15.10.1998. A demand notice was tendered on 28.10.1998; it was returned as "unclaimed" on 5.11.1998. Another copy was sent under Postal Certificate which was not returned, and consequently a complaint was filed on 15.12.1998. After recording verification of the complainant, the learned Magistrate issued process.

Procedurally, the revision application was argued on several occasions. There were multiple adjournments and delays in hearing. At one stage (order dated 12.3.2007) the respondent's counsel's authority was recorded as withdrawn and the advocate's name was ordered removed from the record with urgent notice to the respondent. The petition was later listed for final hearing (notified 10.2.2009), the hearing concluded on 7.5.2010, and parties attempted settlement although the present case was not compounded.

At trial, the complainant's evidence and that of two other witnesses were recorded by the original Magistrate; after his transfer, judgment was pronounced on 13.2.2003 by his successor. On 3.8.2001 a joint purshis (Exh.33) was filed by the parties (advocates' signatures) declaring no objection to proceeding on the basis of evidence already recorded under Section 326 CrPC. On appeal, the main ground was that Section 326 could not be availed in a summary trial; the appellate court nevertheless relied on documentary evidence and the accused's statements and held the cheques were given in discharge of liability. The appellate court also addressed limitation, handwriting expert application, Section 313, absence at pronouncement (Section 273), and probation (Section 361).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether evidence recorded by a predecessor Magistrate could lawfully be considered by the successor under Section 326 CrPC, particularly given the alleged exception for summary trials (Section 326(3)).
  2. Whether the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was time-barred—i.e., the correct calculation of limitation from the date of constructive receipt of the demand notice.
  3. Whether reliance on documentary evidence (when oral evidence is discarded) is permissible for conviction if documents are otherwise proved.
  4. Whether refusal to refer the cheque for handwriting expert opinion vitiated the trial.
  5. Whether procedural requirements under Section 200 CrPC (examination on oath of complainant/witnesses before issuing process) were complied with or whether their alleged violation vitiates proceedings.
  6. Whether material particulars were put to the accused under Section 313 CrPC and whether circumstances not put can be relied upon against the accused.
  7. Whether recording of evidence in the absence of the accused or his pleader (Section 273) or sentencing in the absence of the accused (Section 255(2)) vitiates the proceedings.

Arguments of the Parties

Accused's (Petitioners') Arguments

  • The trial Court issued process only on the basis of verification below the complaint and thereby violated Section 200 CrPC; proceedings are thus vitiated.
  • Documentary evidence relied upon for conviction was not properly proved if oral evidence is discarded; conviction based on such documentary reliance is illegal.
  • The joint purshis filed by the parties could not cure an illegality or material irregularity in view of the express provision of Section 326(3) (which exempts summary trials).
  • Material particulars on the basis of which conviction was recorded were not put to the accused under Section 313 CrPC.
  • Conviction and sentence are illegal under Section 273 since the accused and his advocate were not present at the time of pronouncement of judgment.

Complainant's (Respondent No.1) Arguments

  • The accused repeatedly attempted to delay and defeat justice by seeking repeated adjournments; the trial was practically conducted as in a summons case and the accused waived opportunities.
  • On the alleged violation of Section 200 CrPC, the Magistrate could take cognizance initially under Section 190 and the requirement to examine complainant and witnesses is directory in the phrase "if any"; in any case, verbatim evidence of complainant and witnesses was subsequently recorded.
  • Service of notice requirements were substantially complied with; repeated attempts by the Postal Department and the returned/unclaimed endorsements supported that the complaint was filed in time.
  • Important circumstances regarding notice, postal slips and acknowledgment were specifically put to the accused and considered by the Court; there was no deficiency under Section 313.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhooraji and others [AIR 2001 SC 3372] Chapter on "Irregular Proceedings" (sections 460–466), particularly Section 465: irregularities do not automatically nullify proceedings; only those causing "failure of justice" warrant quashing. The Court applied this principle to hold that the alleged irregularities in the trial did not occasion a failure of justice and therefore did not vitiate the proceedings under Section 461 and Section 465 Cr.P.C.
K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan [AIR 1999 SC 3762] When a notice is returned as unclaimed, that date is the commencing date for reckoning the 15-day period under Section 138 of the Act. The Court relied on this rule to conclude that the complaint (filed 15.12.1998) was within time since the notice was treated as constructively received when returned unclaimed on 05.11.1998.
Patel Dinneshkumar Shivram Somdas v. Patel Keshavlal Mohanlal [2000 Cri.L.J. 3547] (Full Bench) Ordinarily in computing time exclude the first day and include the last; application to computing the period for filing complaint. The Court used this rule for correct reckoning of limitation periods related to Section 138 notices and filing of complaint.
Ghanshyam M. Swami v. M/s. Classic Steel Products [1991 (2) G.L.H.121] Issuance of notice is mandatory/necessary in cases under the relevant provisions (discussion of when periods commence). The Court cited it to support the conclusion that issuance of notice had been complied with and that the limitation calculation therefore proceeded from the relevant date.
Sil Import, USA v. Exim Aides Silk Exporters, Bangalore [1999 Cri.L.J. 2276 (Supreme Court)] Interpretation of "notice in writing" under the Act should accommodate modern means (e.g., fax); the day notice reaches drawer is the day 15-day period begins. The citation informed the Court's approach to constructive receipt and the proper commencement of limitation periods for Section 138 notices (supporting flexible approach to mode of notice and constructive receipt).
Tula Ram v. Kishore Singh [1978 Cri.L.J.8] Procedures relating to cognizance and Section 200/156/190: Magistrate's alternatives when taking cognizance and the requirement to record evidence of complainant or witnesses before issuing process. The Court relied on these principles in addressing the accused's challenge under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and in explaining the permissible course of action by a Magistrate when taking cognizance.
Harihara Iyer v. State of Kerala [2000 DCR 461] It is incumbent on the Magistrate taking cognizance to examine under oath the complainant and his witnesses present (the enquiry under Section 200 is to test whether allegations make out a prima facie case). The Court referred to this precedent in assessing whether the requirements of Section 200 had been substantially complied with and in concluding the Magistrate had applied his mind to the complaint.
Raj Kumar Agrawal v. State of Bihar [2001 (4) Crimes 264] Section 326 (and its amendment) permits a successor to pronounce judgment on evidence partly recorded by predecessor, but Section 326(3) exempts summary trials from that provision. The Court considered this precedent when analysing whether the successor Magistrate could act on evidence recorded by his predecessor and weighed that against the parties' express purshis allowing reliance on earlier evidence.
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra [AIR 1984 SC 1622] Material circumstances which are not put to the accused in his examination under Section 313 (or Section 342) cannot be used against him. The Court discussed this doctrine on Section 313 and assessed whether the accused had been given the opportunity to explain the material circumstances; it found the accused had been put specific questions in his 313 statement in this case.
Banchhanidhi Singh alias Nani Singh v. State of Orissa [1990 Cri.L.J.397] Evidence of witnesses must be recorded in the presence of the accused or his pleader; recording in absence of both can be gross violation of Section 273 and vitiate the trial. The Court considered this authority while examining the accused's claim that evidence was recorded in his absence; the record showed the accused admitted the complainant's evidence was recorded in his presence and did not object at trial.
Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat [AIR 1953 SC 468] (mentioned within Sharad Sarda) Authority for the rule that circumstances not put to the accused in examination under Section 342 cannot be used against him. Cited within the Court's discussion of Section 313/342 principles as part of the established catena relied upon in Sharad Sarda; used to frame the requirement that material adverse circumstances be put to accused.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the trial record and procedural history in detail and proceeded by applying the statutory provisions and the authorities cited. Key steps in the Court's analysis were:

  1. Review of trial conduct and delays: The Court observed prolonged litigation and repeated adjournments, finding that the accused had adopted dilatory tactics, repeatedly waived opportunities (including to further cross-examine witnesses), and in places expressly permitted the Court to rely on evidence already recorded by the predecessor Magistrate (purshis dated 03.08.2001 / Exh.33).
  2. Application of Section 326 and its exception for summary trials: Although Section 326 allows a successor to pronounce judgment on evidence partly recorded by a predecessor, Section 326(3) exempts summary trials. The Court noted the accused's joint purshis consenting to proceed on the recorded evidence and held that, having waived objections earlier, the accused could not later complain that the successor acted on earlier-recorded evidence.
  3. On the Section 200 contention: The Court considered the duties of a Magistrate when taking cognizance and the requirement to examine the complainant/witnesses "if any" (doctrinally interpreted in authorities such as Tula Ram and Harihara Iyer). The Court found verification of the complainant was recorded on oath and that verbatim evidence of complainant and witnesses was ultimately recorded, treating the requirement as being substantially complied with in the circumstances.
  4. Limitation argument under Section 138: Applying the authorities (notably K. Bhaskaran), the Court treated the returned/unclaimed endorsement as the relevant date for reckoning the 15-day period. Since the notice was unclaimed until 05.11.1998, the complaint filed on 15.12.1998 fell within the allowable period and was therefore not time-barred.
  5. Handwriting expert and proof of documents: The Magistrate had rejected the accused's application for handwriting expert; the appellate Court and this Court found handwriting expert opinion unnecessary because the accused admitted his signature on the cheque in his further statement. The Court therefore concluded the plea for expert opinion did not invalidate conviction.
  6. Section 313/Section 273 issues: The Court checked whether material particulars were put to the accused. It noted that separate questions and a statement under Section 313 had been recorded and that the accused had, in his defence, asserted misuse of a blank signed cheque and filed a purshis indicating they did not wish to examine witnesses except a handwriting expert. On absence during recording or pronouncement, the Court found that the accused or his pleader were often absent by choice and that Section 255(2) permitted sentence in such circumstances; moreover, many of the alleged grievances were not raised at trial.
  7. Application of irregularity doctrines (Sections 461 and 465 Cr.P.C.): Considering the catalogue of irregularities and the legislative approach to avoid quashing proceedings unless there is a failure of justice, the Court held that none of the alleged irregularities occasioned a failure of justice. However, the Court observed that there was "palpable injustice" in the sentencing dimension, being "constricted by limitation on the powers of the magistrate in that regard."
  8. Remedy for sentencing and compensation: While the conviction under Section 138 NI Act was upheld on the basis of documentary evidence and the accused's further statements, the Court set aside the sentence and remanded the matter to the learned Magistrate to make an appropriate order regarding sentence and compensation (if any) after hearing the parties, within three months, under Section 347 Cr.P.C., in light of the appellate observations regarding the magistrate's limited sentencing power.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The conviction for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is upheld; the sentence is set aside and the matter is remanded to the learned Magistrate for reconsideration of sentence and compensation.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The accused remain convicted of the offence under Section 138 NI Act, but the order of sentence passed by the Magistrate (dated 13.2.2003) is set aside. The case is remanded to the learned Magistrate to make an appropriate order within three months as to sentence and compensation (if any) after giving the parties a reasonable opportunity of being heard; the parties' counsel agreed to be present for such hearing on 01.09.2010.
  • Procedural consequence: The Court found no vitiating failure of justice from the alleged procedural irregularities, applying Sections 461 and 465 Cr.P.C., and therefore did not quash the conviction on those grounds.
  • Precedential effect: The opinion remanded the matter for sentencing and compensation without disturbing the conviction; the Court applied existing authorities to the facts but did not state that it was laying down any new legal principle beyond applying established precedents.
  • Other orders: The Rule was made absolute with no order as to costs; direct service was ordered.

Signed: D.H. Waghela, J.

    Nitinbhai Saevantilal Shah v. Manubhai Manjibhai Panchal

    1. This Criminal Revision Application under Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code is preferred by the original accused persons from judgment and order dated 16.10.2003 dismissing their appeal and sentencing petitioner no.1 herein to simple imprisonment for three months and imposing fine of Rs.3,000/-. The petitioners were originally convicted of offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and sentenced to suffer same penalties. The contesting parties before this Court are, for the sake of brevity, referred as accused (petitioners) and the complainant (respondent no.1).

    2. Accused no.1 is the Director of Accused no.2, a private limited company. The accused were alleged to have taken loan and given cheque for Rs.11,23,000/- dated 13.10.1998, which was returned unpaid on 15.10.1998. Demand notice was tendered on 28.10.1998 and was returned as unclaimed on 5.11.1998. Another copy of the notice was sent under Postal Certificate, which was not returned, and hence, complaint was filed on 15.12.1998. After recording verification of the complainant, learned Magistrate had issued process.

    3. The revision application was argued and heard on several occasions and written submissions have also been filed by learned counsel for the parties. After the petition being entertained in the year 2003 and being admitted and the accused being released on bail in January 2004, it was supposed to be heard on 12.2.2004. However, hearing was adjourned from time to time. At one stage, order dated 12.3.2007, as under, had to be made by this Court.

    1. Even as the applications were partly heard on 09.3.2007 and the hearing resumed today, learned counsel Mr.J.R.Dave along with learned advocate Mr.T.V.Shah argued practically for the whole day on behalf of the applicants. Upon conclusion of their arguments for the applicants and calling upon the learned counsel for the respondent, original complainants, it was stated that the respondent concerned had withdrawn the authority and papers from learned counsel Mr.V.H.Patel. He submitted that he was left with no time to withdraw his appearance from the record by making appropriate application since the respondent concerned had visited his office only on 10.3.2007 and taken away the papers after giving it in writing that the learned counsel was not to appear for them. Therefore, in short, the authority of the learned counsel for the respondent is withdrawn without making any alternative arrangement for appearance on behalf of the respondent concerned.

    2. Accordingly, name of M/s.V.H.Patel Advocates shall be removed from appearance and office is ordered to issue URGENT NOTICE to respondent No.1 in each petition making it returnable on 21.03.2007.

    Thereafter, the original complainant made an application for fixing the petition for final hearing and by order dated 20th January 2009, it was ordered to be notified on 10.2.2009. Again the petition was listed and adjourned from time to time and hearing was finally concluded on 7th May 2010, whereafter parties were reported to have been negotiating for a settlement and hence the decision was deferred at the request of learned counsel. In fact two other parallel cases in the same group were compounded but the present case could not be settled by the parties.

    4. As recorded in the impugned judgment, evidence of the complainant and two other witnesses was recorded by the Magistrate and after his transfer the judgment was pronounced on 13.2.2003 by his successor in office on the basis of evidence on record. On 3.8.2001, a purshis (Exh.33) was filed before the trial court with signatures of learned advocates for the complainant and the accused to declare that parties had no objection to proceed with the matter on the basis of evidence already recorded by earlier Magistrate, in terms of Section 326 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Making that the main ground of appeal, it was submitted that provisions of section 326 could not be availed in case of summary trials, and therefore, oral evidence recorded by earlier Magistrate, who conducted the trial, had to be discarded or the matter had to be remanded. The appellate Court has adopted the view that the complaints having been filed in the year 1998 and decided in the year 2003 and the accused having created so many hurdles, it would not be reasonable to remand the matter for re-trial. Therefore, the appellate Court took into consideration the documentary evidence, which was already exhibited, as also statement of the accused himself and found that cheques were given in discharge of debt or liability of accused persons. The accused raised plea of limitation on the basis that he was served demand notice on 29.10.1998 and counting the period of 15 days from that date the complaint filed on 15.12.1998 was time barred. However, the Court relied upon endorsement of unclaimed on 3.11.1998 and receipt of the returned notice on 5.11.1998 to hold that the complaint was filed within time.

    4.1 The accused had also raised plea of necessity of referring the cheque in question for opinion of hand writing expert, the application for which was rejected by learned Magistrate and Criminal Revision Application arising therefrom was also rejected. It was found by the appellate Court that the accused himself having admitted his signature on the cheque in his further statement, opinion of hand writing expert was otherwise also unnecessary. The plea of the accused about absence of consideration or legal dues was also rejected on the basis of legal presumption in favour of the complainant. The accused also took the plea of having not been heard before passing order of sentence on 13.2.2003. However, it was noticed that the accused or his pleader had remained absent on that date, although date was fixed well in advance in presence of the accused, and as per provisions of Section 255 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, it was not necessary for the Magistrate to hear the accused before passing order of sentence, particularly, when the accused had chosen to remain absent. The accused also raised the plea that the Magistrate had not recorded reasons for not granting benefit of probation, thereby committing breach of Section 361 of Criminal Procedure Code. The appellate Court recorded, in that context, that in the complaint filed in 1998, the accused had created so many hurdles, had remained absent for long time and bailable as well as non-bailable warrants were issued against the accused for so many times. They had failed to produce any mitigating circumstances for granting benefit of probation even at the time of hearing of the appeal, and hence, the conviction could not be vitiated. Although the issue was also raised about recording of the evidence in absence of the accused, he was found to have admitted in his further statement that the complainant's evidence was recorded in his presence. Besides that, he had not raised any grievance at any point of time during trial about recording of evidence in his absence.

    5. Thus, even after discarding oral evidence, on the basis of documents on record and further statement of the accused, it was held to have been proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the accused were guilty and rightly convicted for offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The sentence was also found to be quite reasonable in absence of any material to justify lesser punishment.

    6. Arguing the petition before this Court, it was submitted by learned counsel Mr.J.R.Dave appearing for the accused, that the trial Court had issued process only on the basis of verification below the complaint, and hence, the proceedings were vitiated for violation of Section 200 of Criminal Procedure Code. Secondly, reliance upon documentary evidence for the purpose of conviction was illegal, insofar as the documents could not be said to have been proved, if the oral evidence in that regard were discarded. He also argued that joint purshis filed by the parties could not cure illegality or material irregularity in the face of express provision of Sub-section (3) of Section 326. He also argued that material particulars on the basis of which conviction was recorded were not put before the accused persons under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the order of conviction and sentence passed by the Magistrate was illegal in view of provisions of section 273, as the accused and his advocate were not present at the time of pronouncement of judgment.

    7. As against above arguments for the accused, it was submitted for the original complainant, by learned counsel Mr.T.S.Nanavati, that the accused had consistently attempted to delay and defeat justice by seeking repeated adjournments and the trial was practically conducted as in a summons case. As for the alleged violation of Section 200 of Criminal Procedure Code, it was submitted that the Magistrate could take cognizance initially under Section 190 of Criminal Procedure Code and the Magistrate was required to examine the complainant and witnesses present, if any, to record substance of such examination. The word if any made the provision directory; and in any case, subsequently verbatim evidence of the complainant and witnesses was also recorded, as in a summons case. It was submitted that the accused had frittered away the opportunity to further cross-examine the witnesses by remaining absent at initial stages and had chosen to remain absent even when judgment was to be pronounced.

    7.1 It was submitted by Mr.Nanavati that the requirements of service of notice were substantially complied with, by repeated attempts by the Postal Department to serve demand notice upon the accused and the complaints were in fact filed in time. He further submitted that there was no substance in the contention that essential and important facts were not put before the accused, inasmuch as all the important circumstances with regard to notice, postal slips, acknowledgment etc. were specifically put to the accused person and the Court had considered replies thereto.

    8. Going through the record and proceedings of the trial Court it was seen that, before ordering issuance of summons to the accused, verification of the complainant was recorded and it was on oath. The material details of the evidence on record were put before the accused in the form of separate questions and statement under Section 313 was recorded by learned Magistrate. The defence put up therein was that false complaint was filed by misusing blank cheque signed by the accused. He had submitted purshis dated 14.9.2001 at Exh.26 to state that they did not want to examine anyone as witness except the hand-writing expert. It was also seen that depositions of the complainant's witnesses and their cross-examination were recorded in extenso, over a long period, and the applications of the accused for referring the cheques in question for examination by hand-writing expert were dismissed by detailed order on 29.9.2001. The accused persons were granted repeated opportunities to further cross-examine the witnesses of the complainant and threatened to close their right of further cross-examination by order dated 5.10.2002, even as the case was fixed for arguments; but the accused had not availed the opportunity for further cross-examination of the witnesses. Even after conviction and order of sentence being pronounced on 13th February 2003, the accused appears to have applied for bail on the same date without remaining personally present or being taken into custody. Thus, the accused persons appear from the record to have taken all the opportunities for delaying trial and waived all the opportunities to lead any evidence in defence and to further cross-examine witnesses of the complainant despite an application in that regard being granted by the Court by order dated 2.2.2002, even after the stage of final arguments.

    9. The following judgments and relevant observations made therein were discussed at the bar in support of respective submissions:

    a.

    State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhooraji and others [AIR 2001 SC 3372]:

    12. Section 465 of the Code falls within Chapter XXXV under the caption, "Irregular Proceedings". The chapter consists of seven sections starting with S.460 containing a catalogue or irregularities which the legislature thought not enough to axe down concluded proceedings in trials or enquiries. sections 461 of the code contains another catalogue (of) irregularities which (in) the legislative perception would render the entire proceedings null and void. It is pertinent to point out that among (sic) the former catalogue contains the instance of a magistrate, who is not empowered to take cognizance erroneously and in good faith. The provision says that the proceedings adopted in such a case, though based on such erroneous order, "shall not be set aside merely on the ground of his not being so empowered."

    15. A reading of the section makes it clear that the error, omission or irregularity in the proceedings held before or during the trial or in any inquiry were reckoned by the legislature as possible occurrences in criminal Courts. Yet the legislature disfavoured axing down the proceedings or to direct repetition of the whole proceedings afresh. Hence, the legislature imposed a prohibition that unless such error, omission or irregularity has occasioned " a failure of justice" the superior Court shall not quash the proceedings merely on the ground of such error, omission or irregularity.

    b.

    K.Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan [AIR 1999 SC 3762]:

    25. Thus when a notice is returned by the sendee as unclaimed such date would be the commencing date in reckoning the period of 15 days contemplated in Clause (d) to the proviso of Section 138 of the Act. Of course such reckoning would be without prejudice to the right of the drawer of the cheque to show that he had no knowledge that the notice was brought to his address. ....

    30. It is true, if a judicial magistrate of first class were to order compensation to be paid to the complainant from out of the fine realised the complainant will be the loser when the cheque amount exceeded the said limit. In such a case a complainant would get only the maximum amount of Rupees five thousand.

    31. However, the magistrate in such cases can alleviate the grievance of the complainant by making resort to Section 357(3) of the Code. It is well to remember that this Court has emphasized the need for making liberal use of that provision, (Hari Kishan v. Sukhbir Singh, AIR 1988 SC 2127). No limit is mentioned in the sub-section and therefore, a magistrate can award any sum as compensation. Of course while fixing the quantum of such compensation the Magistrate has to consider what would be the reasonable amount of compensation payable to the complainant. Thus, even if the trial was before a Court of magistrate of first class in respect of a cheque which covers an amount exceeding Rs. 5,000/- the Court has power to award compensation to be paid to the complainant.

    32. The question of sentence and award of compensation must be considered by the trial Court. We deem it feasible that the magistrate shall hear the prosecution and the accused on those aspects. Of course, if the complainant and accused settle their disputes regarding this cheque, in the meanwhile, that fact can certainly be taken into consideration in determining the extent or quantum of sentence.

    c.

    In Patel Dinneshkumar Shivram Somdas v.

    Patel Keshavlal Mohanlal [2000 Cri.L.J. 3547], Full Bench of this Court held as under:

    8. ......Ordinarily in computing the time, the rule observed is to exclude the first day and to include the last. Applying the said rule, the period of one month for filing the complaint will be reckoned from the day immediately following the day on which the period of 15 days from the date of the receipt of the notice by the drawer expires....

    d.

    Ghanshyam M.Swami v. M/s.Classic Steel Products [1991 (2) G.L.H.121]:

    11. It is quite clear that one month's period referred to in cl.(b) of section 142 shall be reckoned only from the end of 15th day as provided in cl.(c) if at all the complainant has issued the notice. Now, if he does not issue any notice, there cannot be any cause of action and therefore, the issuance of notice is a must, which in the instant case has been complied with.

    e.

    Sil Import, Usa v. Exim Aides Silk Exporters, Bangalore, Bangalore [1999 Cri.L.J. 2276 (Supreme Court)]:

    13. Chapter XVII of the act, containing sections 138 to 142, was inserted in the Act as per Banking Public Financial Institution and Negotiable Instruments Laws (Amendment) Act, 1968. When the legislature contemplated that notice in writing should be given to the drawer of the cheque, the legislature must be presumed to have been aware of the modern devices and equipment already in vogue and also in store for future. If the Court were to interpret the words giving notice in writing in the section as restricted to the customary mode of sending notice through postal service or even by personal delivery, the interpretative precess would fail to cope up with the change of time.

    23. The upshot of the discussion is, on the date when the notice sent by Fax reached the drawer of the cheque the period of 15 days (within which he has to make the payment) has started running and on the expiry of that period the offence is completed unless the amount has been paid in the meanwhile. If no complaint was filed within one month therefrom, the payee would stand forbidden from launching a prosecution thereafter, due to the clear interdict contained in section 142 of the Act.

    f.

    Tula Ram v. Kishore Singh [1978 Cri.L.J.8]:

    14. (1) A Magistrate can order investigation under section 156 (3) only at the pre-cognizance stage, that is to say, before taking cognizance under sections 190, 200 and 204 and where a Magistrate decides to take cognizance under the provisions of Chapter 14, he is not entitled in law to order any investigation under section 156 (3) though in cases not falling within the proviso to section 202 he can order an investigation by the police which would be in the nature of an enquiry as contemplated by section 202 of the Code.

    (2) Where a Magistrate chooses to take cognizance he can adopt any of the following alternatives:

    (a) He can peruse the complaint and if satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding, he can straightway issue process to the accused but before he does so, he must comply with the requirements of section 200 and record the evidence of the complainant or his witnesses.

    (b) The Magistrate can postpone the issue of process and direct an enquiry by himself.

    (c) The Magistrate can postpone the issue of process and direct an enquiry by any other person or an investigation by the police.

    3. In case the Magistrate after considering the statement of the complainant and the witnesses or as a result of the investigation and the equiry ordered is not satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding, he can dismiss the complaint.

    4. Where Magistrate orders investigation by the police before taking cognizance under S.156(3) of the Code and receives the report thereupon he can act on the report and discharge the accused or straightway issue process against the accused or apply his mind to the complaint filed before him and take action under section 190 as described above.

    g.

    Harihara Iyer v. State of Kerala [2000 DCR 461]:

    12. It is undisputed that the taking of cognizance of offence under section 142 of the Act has to precede the taking of sworn statement of the complainant and that if the Magistrate straightway on receipt of the complaint records the sworn statement and thereafter he takes cognizance, it would be in contravention of section 200 of the Code of Criminal procedure. But, it is equally well settled that when a Magistrate after receiving the complaint applies his mind to take further steps under Chapter XV, then he must be deemed to have taken cognizance of the offence and that it is unnecessary that the Magistrate should pass specific order stating that he has taken cognizance of the offence.

    19. We, therefore, hold that the enquiry envisaged under section 200 is for ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint and also for ascertaining whether there is any evidence in support of the complaint so as to justify the issue of process. Therefore, it is incumbent on the Magistrate taking cognizance on a complaint to examine upon oath the complainant and his witnesses present, if any, to satisfy himself as to the veracity of the complainant. The object is to test whether the allegations make out a prima facie case to enable him to issue process.....

    h.

    Raj Kumar Agrawal v. State of Bihar [2001 (4) Crimes 264]:

    4. .....There is no escape from the legal proposition and especially in view of the law laid down under section 326 of the code, after its amendment in the year 1978, that any Judge or Magistrate may proceed to pronounce judgment on the evidence partly recorded by the predecessor Judge or the Magistrate, but it was section 326 (3) of the Code which has exempted summary trials from the amending section. In such a circumstance, the order of conviction and sentence recorded was certainly bad in law.

    I.

    Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra [AIR 1984 SC 1622]:

    142. Apart from the aforesaid comments there is one vital defect in some of the circumstances mentioned above and relied upon by the High Court, viz., circumstances Nos. 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 16 and 17. As these circumstances were not put to the appellant in his statement under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code they must be completely excluded from consideration because the appellant did not have any chance to explain them. This has been consistently held by this Court as far back as 1953 where in the case of Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat AIR 1953 SC 468 this Court held that any circumstance in respect of which an accused was not examined under Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be used against him. Ever since this decision, there is a catena of authorities of this Court uniformly taking the view that unless the circumstance appearing against an accused is put to him in his examination under Section 342 or Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the same cannot be used against him. In Shamu Balu Chaugule v. State Of Maharashtra , (1976) 1 SCC 438: (AIR 1976 SC 557) this Court held thus :

    The fact that the appellant was said to be absconding, not having been put to him under Section 342, Criminal Procedure Code, could not be used against him.

    144. It is not necessary for us to multiply authorities on this point as this question now stands concluded by several decisions of this Court. In this view of the matter, the circumstances which were not put to the appellant in his examination under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code have to be completely excluded from consideration .

    j. Banchhanidhi Singh alias Nani Singh v. State of Orissa [1990 Cri.L.J.397]:

    5. ......Evidence of witnesses has to be recorded in the presence of the accused or when his personal attendance has been dispensed with, in the presence of his pleader. ......As the personal attendance of the accused-petitioner has been dispensed with, when the lawyer for the accused also was not present in the court at the time when the witnesses were to be examined, the court should have adjourned the case on that day to some other date, instead of proceeding with the examination of the prosecution witnesses and should have directed the accused to be present on that adjourned date. Examination of PWs 1, 2 and 3, in the absence of the accused and when the lawyer representing him was also not present in the court is in gross violation of the mandatory provisions of S.273 of Cr.P.C. and on that score alone the entire trial is vitiated. ...

    10. Before considering the contentions of the accused in light of the above legal dicta and relevant statutory provisions, it has to be noted that a simple complaint of dishonour of cheque has been, in the facts of the present case, made the subject matter of pronolged procrastination and many a legal battles with baffling dexterity; and all of it has translated into an order of punishment which is obviously inadequate and does no justice to either party. Upon perusal of the record and proceedings, the accused could easily be perceived as not only adopting crass dilatory tactics but sowing seeds for future challenge to the effective orders. With such backdrop, it is noticed that the first and main contention regarding the evidence recorded by a magistrate being considered by his successor-in-office had its genesis not only in the express pursis dated 03.8.2001 of the accused but successful dilatory tactics. After expressly allowing the Court to rely upon the evidence already recorded by another magistrate, the accused cannot be permitted to cry foul and plead failure of justice due to violation or lack of any procedural provision. Similarly, after waiving his right to remain present before the Court at the time of pronouncement of judgment and making of the order of sentence, the accused, who sought bail on the same date, cannot make the grievance that he ought to have been granted the benefit of probation or awarded different punishment after hearing him. The contention that the complaint was barred by limitation is equally devoid of merit insofar as the notice under section 138 was not accepted by the accused till 05.11.1998, though presented, and the complaint was filed on 15.12.1998, which was within 30 days of the accused failing to pay within 15 days of the constructive receipt of the notice. If the accused had the opportunity to receive and accept the notice till 05.11.1998 when it was returned as unclaimed, the date for counting the period of 15 days has to be that date because within that period he had the option to pay and avoid the completion of the offence under section 138 of the Act.

    11. Under the above circumstances, none of the alleged irregularities are found to be vitiating the proceedings before the learned magistrate, under the provisions of section 461 of the Cr.P.C. Having regard to the provisions of section 465 of the Code, none of the alleged irregularities have occasioned a failure of justice; but there is palpable injustice in the matter of sentence which appears to have been constricted by limitation on the powers of the magistrate in that regard. Therefore, in view of the observations made by the Apex Court in K.Bhaskaran (supra), the matter is required to be remanded to learned magistrate for expeditiously making appropriate order, after hearing the parties, with regard to sentence and compensation. Accordingly, the impugned final order of sentence is set aside, without disturbing conviction for the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and the matter is remanded to the learned magistrate for making appropriate order, within three months, and after giving to the parties reasonable opportunity of being heard, with regard to sentence and compensation, if any, under section 347 of the Cr.P.C. Learned counsel for the parties have agreed to be present for hearing, as aforesaid, before the learned magistrate concerned on 01.09.2010. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. Direct service.

    Sd/-

    ( D.H.Waghela, J.) (KMG Thilake) Top

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