1.
This Criminal Revision
Application under Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code is
preferred by the original accused persons
from judgment and order dated 16.10.2003 dismissing
their appeal and sentencing petitioner no.1 herein to simple
imprisonment for three months and imposing fine of Rs.3,000/-. The
petitioners were originally convicted of offence under Section 138 of
the Negotiable Instruments Act and sentenced to suffer same
penalties. The contesting parties before this Court are, for the sake
of brevity, referred as accused (petitioners) and the complainant
(respondent no.1).
2.
Accused no.1 is the
Director of Accused no.2, a private limited company. The accused
were alleged to have taken loan and given cheque for Rs.11,23,000/-
dated 13.10.1998, which was returned unpaid on 15.10.1998. Demand
notice was tendered on 28.10.1998 and was returned as unclaimed on
5.11.1998. Another copy of the notice was sent under Postal
Certificate, which was not returned, and hence, complaint was filed
on 15.12.1998. After recording verification of the complainant,
learned Magistrate had issued process.
3.
The revision application was argued and heard on several occasions
and written submissions have also been filed by learned counsel for
the parties. After the petition being entertained in the year 2003
and being admitted and the accused being released on bail in January
2004, it was supposed to be heard on 12.2.2004. However, hearing was
adjourned from time to time. At one stage, order dated 12.3.2007, as
under, had to be made by this Court.
1.
Even as the applications were partly heard on 09.3.2007 and the
hearing resumed today, learned counsel Mr.J.R.Dave along with learned
advocate Mr.T.V.Shah argued practically for the whole day on behalf
of the applicants. Upon conclusion of their arguments for the
applicants and calling upon the learned counsel for the respondent,
original complainants,
it was stated that the respondent concerned had withdrawn the
authority and papers from learned counsel Mr.V.H.Patel. He submitted
that he was left
with no time to withdraw his appearance from the record by making
appropriate application since the respondent concerned had visited
his office only on 10.3.2007 and taken away the papers after giving
it in writing that the learned counsel was not to appear for them.
Therefore, in short, the authority of the learned counsel for the
respondent is withdrawn without making any alternative arrangement
for appearance on behalf of the respondent concerned.
2.
Accordingly, name of M/s.V.H.Patel Advocates shall be removed from
appearance and office is ordered to issue URGENT NOTICE to
respondent No.1 in each petition making it returnable on 21.03.2007.
Thereafter,
the original complainant made an application for fixing the petition
for final hearing and by order dated 20th
January 2009, it was
ordered to be notified on 10.2.2009. Again the petition was listed
and adjourned from time to time and hearing was finally concluded on
7th
May 2010, whereafter
parties were reported to have been negotiating for a settlement and
hence the decision was deferred at the request of learned counsel. In
fact two other parallel cases in the same group were compounded but
the present case could not be settled by the parties.
4.
As recorded in the impugned judgment, evidence of the complainant and
two other witnesses was recorded by the Magistrate and after his
transfer the judgment was pronounced on 13.2.2003 by his successor in
office on the basis of evidence on record. On 3.8.2001, a purshis
(Exh.33) was filed before the trial court with signatures of learned
advocates for the complainant and the accused to declare that parties
had no objection to proceed with the matter on the basis of evidence
already recorded by earlier Magistrate, in terms of Section 326 of
the Criminal Procedure Code. Making that the main ground of appeal,
it was submitted that provisions of section 326 could not be availed
in case of summary trials, and therefore, oral evidence recorded by
earlier Magistrate, who conducted the trial, had to be discarded or
the matter had to be remanded. The appellate Court has adopted the
view that the complaints having been filed in the year 1998 and
decided in the year 2003 and the accused having created so many
hurdles, it would not be reasonable to remand the matter for
re-trial. Therefore, the appellate Court took into consideration the
documentary evidence, which was already exhibited, as also statement
of the accused himself and found that cheques were given in discharge
of debt or liability of accused persons. The accused raised plea of
limitation on the basis that he was served demand notice on
29.10.1998 and counting the period of 15 days from that date the
complaint filed on 15.12.1998 was time barred. However, the Court
relied upon endorsement of unclaimed on 3.11.1998 and receipt
of the returned notice on 5.11.1998 to hold that the complaint was
filed within time.
4.1
The accused had also raised plea of necessity of referring the cheque
in question for opinion of hand writing expert, the application for
which was rejected by learned Magistrate and Criminal Revision
Application arising therefrom was also rejected. It was found by the
appellate Court that the accused himself having admitted his
signature on the cheque in his further statement, opinion of hand
writing expert was otherwise also unnecessary. The plea of the
accused about absence of consideration or legal dues was also
rejected on the basis of legal presumption in favour of the
complainant. The accused also took the plea of having not been heard
before passing order of sentence on 13.2.2003. However, it was
noticed that the accused or his pleader had remained absent on that
date, although date was fixed well in advance in presence of the
accused, and as per provisions of Section 255 (2) of the Criminal
Procedure Code, it was not necessary for the Magistrate to hear the
accused before passing order of sentence, particularly, when the
accused had chosen to remain absent. The accused also raised the plea
that the Magistrate had not recorded reasons for not granting benefit
of probation, thereby committing breach of Section 361 of Criminal
Procedure Code. The appellate Court recorded, in that context, that
in the complaint filed in 1998, the accused had created so many
hurdles, had remained absent for long time and bailable as well as
non-bailable warrants were issued against the accused for so many
times. They had failed to produce any mitigating circumstances for
granting benefit of probation even at the time of hearing of the
appeal, and hence, the conviction could not be vitiated. Although the
issue was also raised about recording of the evidence in absence of
the accused, he was found to have admitted in his further statement
that the complainant's evidence was recorded in his presence. Besides
that, he had not raised any grievance at any point of time during
trial about recording of evidence in his absence.
5.
Thus, even after discarding oral evidence, on the basis of documents
on record and further statement of the accused, it was held to have
been proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the accused were
guilty and rightly convicted for offence under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act. The sentence was also found to be quite
reasonable in absence of any material to justify lesser punishment.
6.
Arguing the petition before this Court, it was submitted by learned
counsel Mr.J.R.Dave appearing for the accused, that the trial Court
had issued process only on the basis of verification below the
complaint, and hence, the proceedings were vitiated for violation of
Section 200 of Criminal Procedure Code. Secondly, reliance upon
documentary evidence for the purpose of conviction was illegal,
insofar as the documents could not be said to have been proved, if
the oral evidence in that regard were discarded. He also argued that
joint purshis filed by the parties could not cure illegality or
material irregularity in the face of express provision of Sub-section
(3) of Section 326. He also argued that material particulars on the
basis of which conviction was recorded were not put before the
accused persons under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code and
the order of conviction and sentence passed by the Magistrate was
illegal in view of provisions of section 273, as the accused and his
advocate were not present at the time of pronouncement of judgment.
7. As
against above arguments for the accused, it was submitted for the
original complainant, by learned counsel Mr.T.S.Nanavati, that the
accused had consistently attempted to delay and defeat justice by
seeking repeated adjournments and the trial was practically conducted
as in a summons case. As for the alleged violation of Section 200 of
Criminal Procedure Code, it was submitted that the Magistrate could
take cognizance initially under Section 190 of Criminal Procedure
Code and the Magistrate was required to examine the complainant and
witnesses present, if any, to record substance of such examination.
The word if any made the provision directory; and in any case,
subsequently verbatim evidence of the complainant and witnesses was
also recorded, as in a summons case. It was submitted that the
accused had frittered away the opportunity to further cross-examine
the witnesses by remaining absent at initial stages and had chosen to
remain absent even when judgment was to be pronounced.
7.1 It
was submitted by Mr.Nanavati that the requirements of service of
notice were substantially complied with, by repeated attempts by the
Postal Department to serve demand notice upon the accused and the
complaints were in fact filed in time. He further submitted that
there was no substance in the contention that essential and important
facts were not put before the accused, inasmuch as all the important
circumstances with regard to notice, postal slips, acknowledgment
etc. were specifically put to the accused person and the Court had
considered replies thereto.
8.
Going through the record and proceedings of the trial Court it was
seen that, before ordering issuance of summons to the accused,
verification of the complainant was recorded and it was on oath. The
material details of the evidence on record were put before the
accused in the form of separate questions and statement under Section
313 was recorded by learned Magistrate. The defence put up therein
was that false complaint was filed by misusing blank cheque signed by
the accused. He had submitted purshis dated 14.9.2001 at Exh.26 to
state that they did not want to examine anyone as witness except the
hand-writing expert. It was also seen that depositions of the
complainant's witnesses and their cross-examination were recorded in
extenso, over a long period, and the applications of the accused
for referring the cheques in question for examination by hand-writing
expert were dismissed by detailed order on 29.9.2001. The accused
persons were granted repeated opportunities to further cross-examine
the witnesses of the complainant and threatened to close their right
of further cross-examination by order dated 5.10.2002, even as the
case was fixed for arguments; but the accused had not availed the
opportunity for further cross-examination of the witnesses. Even
after conviction and order of sentence being pronounced on 13th
February 2003, the accused appears to have applied for bail on the
same date without remaining personally present or being taken into
custody. Thus, the accused persons appear from the record to have
taken all the opportunities for delaying trial and waived all the
opportunities to lead any evidence in defence and to further
cross-examine witnesses of the complainant despite an application in
that regard being granted by the Court by order dated 2.2.2002, even
after the stage of final arguments.
9. The
following judgments and relevant observations made therein were
discussed at the bar in support of respective submissions:
a.
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhooraji and
others [AIR 2001 SC 3372]:
12.
Section 465 of the Code falls within Chapter XXXV under the caption,
"Irregular Proceedings". The chapter consists of seven
sections starting with S.460 containing a catalogue or irregularities
which the
legislature thought not enough to axe down concluded proceedings in
trials or enquiries. sections 461 of the code contains another
catalogue (of) irregularities which (in) the legislative perception
would render the entire proceedings null and void. It is pertinent to
point out that among (sic) the former catalogue contains the instance
of a magistrate, who is not empowered to take cognizance erroneously
and in good faith. The provision says that the proceedings adopted in
such a case, though based on such erroneous order, "shall not be
set aside merely on the ground of his not being so empowered."
15.
A reading of the section makes it clear that the error, omission or
irregularity in the proceedings held before or during the trial or in
any inquiry were reckoned by the legislature as possible occurrences
in criminal Courts. Yet the legislature disfavoured axing down the
proceedings or to direct repetition of the whole proceedings afresh.
Hence, the legislature imposed a prohibition that unless such error,
omission or irregularity has occasioned " a failure of justice"
the superior Court shall not quash the proceedings merely on the
ground of such error, omission or irregularity.
b.
K.Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan
[AIR 1999 SC 3762]:
25.
Thus when a notice is returned by the sendee as unclaimed such date
would be the commencing date in reckoning the period of 15 days
contemplated in Clause (d) to the proviso of Section 138 of the Act.
Of course such reckoning would be without
prejudice to the right of the drawer of the cheque to show that he
had no knowledge that the notice was brought to his address. ....
30.
It is true, if a judicial magistrate of first class were to order
compensation to be paid to the complainant from out of the fine
realised the complainant will be the loser when the cheque amount
exceeded the said limit. In such a case a complainant would get only
the maximum amount of Rupees five thousand.
31.
However, the magistrate in such cases can alleviate the grievance of
the complainant by making resort to Section 357(3) of the Code. It is
well to remember that this Court has emphasized the need for making
liberal use of that provision, (Hari Kishan v. Sukhbir Singh, AIR
1988 SC 2127). No limit is mentioned in the sub-section and
therefore, a magistrate can award any sum as compensation. Of course
while fixing the quantum of such compensation the Magistrate has to
consider what would be the reasonable amount of compensation payable
to the complainant. Thus, even if the trial was before a Court of
magistrate of first class in respect of a cheque which covers an
amount exceeding Rs. 5,000/- the Court has power to award
compensation to be paid to the complainant.
32.
The question of sentence and award of compensation must be considered
by the trial Court. We deem it feasible that the magistrate shall
hear the prosecution and the accused on those aspects. Of course, if
the complainant and accused settle their disputes regarding this
cheque, in the meanwhile, that fact can certainly be taken into
consideration in determining the extent or quantum of sentence.
c.
In Patel Dinneshkumar Shivram Somdas v.
Patel Keshavlal Mohanlal [2000
Cri.L.J. 3547], Full
Bench of this Court held as under:
8.
......Ordinarily in computing the time, the rule observed is to
exclude the first day and to include the last. Applying the said
rule, the period of one month for filing the complaint will be
reckoned from the day immediately following the day on which the
period of 15 days from the date of the receipt of the notice by the
drawer expires....
d.
Ghanshyam M.Swami v. M/s.Classic Steel Products [1991 (2) G.L.H.121]:
11.
It is quite clear that one month's period referred to in cl.(b) of
section 142 shall be reckoned only from the end of 15th
day
as provided in cl.(c) if at all the complainant has issued the
notice. Now, if he does not issue any notice, there cannot be any
cause of action and therefore, the issuance of notice is a must,
which in the instant case has been complied with.
e.
Sil Import, Usa v. Exim Aides Silk Exporters, Bangalore, Bangalore
[1999 Cri.L.J. 2276 (Supreme Court)]:
13.
Chapter XVII of the act, containing sections 138 to 142, was inserted
in the Act as per Banking Public Financial Institution and Negotiable
Instruments Laws (Amendment) Act, 1968. When the legislature
contemplated that notice in writing should be given to the drawer of
the cheque, the legislature must be presumed to have been aware of
the modern devices and equipment already in vogue and also in store
for future. If the Court were to interpret the words giving notice
in writing in the section as restricted to the customary mode of
sending notice through postal service or even by personal delivery,
the interpretative precess would fail to cope up with the change of
time.
23.
The upshot of the discussion is, on the date when the notice sent by
Fax reached the drawer of the cheque the period of 15 days (within
which he has to make the payment) has started running and on the
expiry of that period the offence is completed unless the amount has
been paid in the meanwhile. If no complaint was filed within one
month therefrom, the payee would stand forbidden from launching a
prosecution thereafter, due to the clear interdict contained in
section 142 of the Act.
f.
Tula Ram v. Kishore Singh [1978 Cri.L.J.8]:
14.
(1) A Magistrate can order investigation under section 156 (3) only
at the pre-cognizance stage, that is to say, before taking cognizance
under sections 190, 200 and 204 and where a Magistrate decides to
take cognizance under the provisions of Chapter 14, he is not
entitled in law to order any investigation under section 156 (3)
though in cases not falling within the proviso to section 202 he can
order an investigation by the police which would be in the nature of
an enquiry as contemplated by section 202 of the Code.
(2) Where
a Magistrate chooses to take cognizance he can adopt any of the
following alternatives:
(a)
He can peruse the complaint and if satisfied that there are
sufficient grounds for proceeding, he can straightway issue process
to the accused but before he does so, he must comply with the
requirements of section 200 and record the evidence of the
complainant or his witnesses.
(b)
The Magistrate can postpone the issue of process and direct an
enquiry by himself.
(c)
The Magistrate can postpone the issue of process and direct an
enquiry by any other person or an investigation by the police.
3.
In case the Magistrate after considering the statement of the
complainant and the witnesses or as a result of the investigation and
the equiry ordered is not satisfied that there are sufficient grounds
for proceeding, he can dismiss the complaint.
4.
Where Magistrate orders investigation by the police before taking
cognizance under S.156(3) of the Code and receives the report
thereupon he can act on the report and discharge the accused or
straightway issue process against the accused or apply his mind to
the complaint filed before him and take action under section 190 as
described above.
g.
Harihara Iyer v. State of Kerala [2000 DCR 461]:
12.
It is undisputed that the taking of cognizance of offence under
section 142 of the Act has to precede the taking of sworn statement
of the complainant and that if the Magistrate straightway on receipt
of the complaint records the sworn statement and thereafter he takes
cognizance, it would be in contravention of section 200 of the Code
of Criminal procedure. But, it is equally well settled that when a
Magistrate after receiving the complaint applies his mind to take
further steps under Chapter XV, then he must be deemed to have taken
cognizance
of the offence and that it is unnecessary
that the Magistrate should pass specific order stating that he has
taken cognizance of the offence.
19.
We, therefore, hold that the enquiry envisaged under section 200 is
for ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint and also for
ascertaining whether there is any evidence in support of the
complaint so as to justify the issue of process. Therefore, it is
incumbent on the Magistrate taking cognizance on a complaint to
examine upon oath the complainant and his witnesses present, if any,
to satisfy himself as to the veracity of the complainant. The object
is to test whether the allegations make out a prima facie case to
enable him to issue process.....
h.
Raj Kumar Agrawal v. State of Bihar [2001 (4) Crimes 264]:
4.
.....There is no escape from the legal proposition and especially in
view of the law laid down under section 326 of the code, after its
amendment in the year 1978, that any Judge or Magistrate may proceed
to pronounce judgment on the evidence partly recorded by the
predecessor Judge or the Magistrate, but it was section 326 (3) of
the Code which has exempted summary trials from the amending section.
In such a circumstance, the order of conviction and sentence recorded
was certainly bad in law.
I.
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra [AIR 1984 SC 1622]:
142.
Apart from the aforesaid comments there is one vital defect
in some of the circumstances mentioned above and relied upon by the
High Court, viz., circumstances Nos. 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 16
and 17. As these circumstances were not put to the appellant in his
statement under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code they must
be completely excluded from consideration because the appellant did
not have any chance to explain them. This has been consistently held
by this Court as far back as 1953 where in the case of Hate Singh
Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat AIR 1953 SC 468 this Court
held that any circumstance in respect of which an accused was not
examined under Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be
used against him. Ever since this decision, there is a catena of
authorities of this Court uniformly taking the view that unless the
circumstance appearing against an accused is put to him in his
examination under Section 342 or Section 313 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, the same cannot be used against him. In Shamu Balu Chaugule v. State Of Maharashtra , (1976) 1 SCC 438: (AIR 1976 SC 557)
this Court held thus :
The
fact that the appellant was said to be absconding, not having been
put to him under Section 342, Criminal Procedure Code, could not be
used against him.
144.
It is not necessary for us to multiply authorities on this point as
this question now stands concluded by several decisions of this
Court. In this view of the matter, the circumstances which were not
put to the appellant in his examination under Section 313 of the
Criminal Procedure Code have to be completely excluded from
consideration .
j. Banchhanidhi
Singh alias Nani Singh v. State of Orissa [1990 Cri.L.J.397]:
5.
......Evidence of witnesses has to be recorded in the presence of the
accused or when his personal attendance has been dispensed with, in
the presence of his pleader. ......As the personal attendance of the
accused-petitioner has been dispensed with, when the lawyer for the
accused also was not present in the court at the time when the
witnesses were to be examined, the court should have adjourned the
case on that day to some other date, instead of proceeding with the
examination of the prosecution witnesses and should have directed the
accused to be present on that adjourned date. Examination of PWs 1, 2
and 3, in the absence of the accused and when the lawyer representing
him was also not present in the court is in gross violation of the
mandatory provisions of S.273 of Cr.P.C. and on that score alone the
entire trial is vitiated. ...
10.
Before considering the contentions of the accused in light of the
above legal dicta and relevant statutory provisions, it has to
be noted that a simple complaint of dishonour of cheque has been, in
the facts of the present case, made the subject matter of pronolged
procrastination and many a legal battles with baffling dexterity; and
all of it has translated into an order of punishment which is
obviously inadequate and does no justice to either party. Upon
perusal of the record and proceedings, the accused could easily be
perceived as not only adopting crass dilatory tactics but sowing
seeds for future challenge to the effective orders. With such
backdrop, it is noticed that the first and main contention regarding
the evidence recorded by a magistrate being considered by his
successor-in-office had its genesis not only in the express pursis
dated 03.8.2001 of the accused but successful dilatory tactics. After
expressly allowing the Court to rely upon the evidence already
recorded by another magistrate, the accused cannot be permitted to
cry foul and plead failure of justice due to violation or lack of any
procedural provision. Similarly, after waiving his right to remain
present before the Court at the time of pronouncement of judgment and
making of the order of sentence, the accused, who sought bail on the
same date, cannot make the grievance that he ought to have been
granted the benefit of probation or awarded different punishment
after hearing him. The contention that the complaint was barred by
limitation is equally devoid of merit insofar as the notice under
section 138 was not accepted by the accused till 05.11.1998, though
presented, and the complaint was filed on 15.12.1998, which was
within 30 days of the accused failing to pay within 15 days of the
constructive receipt of the notice. If the accused had the
opportunity to receive and accept the notice till 05.11.1998 when it
was returned as unclaimed, the date for counting the period of 15
days has to be that date because within that period he had the option
to pay and avoid the completion of the offence under section 138 of
the Act.
11.
Under the above circumstances, none of the alleged irregularities
are found to be vitiating the proceedings before the learned
magistrate, under the provisions of section 461 of the Cr.P.C. Having
regard to the provisions of section 465 of the Code, none of the
alleged irregularities have occasioned a failure of justice; but
there is palpable injustice in the matter of sentence which appears
to have been constricted by limitation on the powers of the
magistrate in that regard. Therefore, in view of the observations
made by the Apex Court in K.Bhaskaran (supra), the
matter is required to be remanded to learned magistrate for
expeditiously making appropriate order, after hearing the parties,
with regard to sentence and compensation. Accordingly, the impugned
final order of sentence is set aside, without disturbing conviction
for the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
and the matter is remanded to the learned magistrate for making
appropriate order, within three months, and after giving to the
parties reasonable opportunity of being heard, with regard to
sentence and compensation, if any, under section 347 of the Cr.P.C.
Learned counsel for the parties have agreed to be present for
hearing, as aforesaid, before the learned magistrate concerned on
01.09.2010. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to
costs. Direct service.
Sd/-
(
D.H.Waghela, J.)
(KMG
Thilake)
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