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  • Section 256(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (the Act)
  • Rule 6(D) of the Income Tax Rules, 1962
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  • Section 256(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (the Act)
  • Rule 6(D) of the Income Tax Rules, 1962
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

(Summary based exclusively on the opinion provided)

The Assessment Year under consideration was 1987-88 (accounting period year ended 08.07.1986). The assessee, a private limited company, filed a return declaring total income of Rs. 1,08,320/-. The Assessing Officer (AO) framed an assessment under Section 143(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 dated 30.03.1990, determining taxable income at Rs. 17,57,329/-, with additions totaling Rs. 21,75,688/- in relation to six distinct items (referenced in the assessment order's Paragraphs 2 to 7).

The assessee appealed to the Commissioner (Appeals) challenging those six items and interest charged under Sections 139 and 217. By order dated 05.02.1992 the Commissioner (Appeals) set aside the assessment and directed the AO to reframe the assessment afresh after giving the assessee a reasonable opportunity to be heard. The Commissioner (Appeals)'s set aside was issued after noting procedural defects and lack of opportunity to adduce evidence (invoking the doctrine of audi alteram partem).

The AO reframed the assessment on 29.03.1994 and made additions on four items totaling Rs. 5,08,360/-. In the body of the fresh assessment order the AO also discussed and treated unpaid excise duty of Rs. 81,62,006/- as not allowable under Section 43B; this addition was reflected by an order under Section 154 dated 08.04.1994 (the order under Section 154 was placed on record).

The assessee again appealed to the Commissioner (Appeals) challenging the AO's jurisdiction to bring to tax the excise duty collected but not paid invoking Section 43B. The Commissioner (Appeals) in an order dated 25.01.1995 rejected the assessee's jurisdictional contention, holding that the assessment had been set aside in toto and was open for fresh consideration by the AO.

The assessee carried the matter in second appeal to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (Tribunal). The Tribunal by order dated 19.10.1995 upheld the Commissioner (Appeals) and held the entire assessment was set aside and open; it concluded that the AO could examine all aspects afresh and upheld the addition of Rs. 81,62,006/- (unpaid excise duty) under Section 43B. The Tribunal, however, referred three questions to this Court under Section 256(1) of the Act at the instance of the assessee.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Tribunal was right in law in interpreting the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) dated 05.02.1992 as an open set aside (i.e., setting aside the assessment order in toto) and accordingly whether the Assessing Officer was justified in bringing to tax a new source of income while framing the de novo assessment?
  2. Whether the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the Excise Duty collected by the assessee on grey fabrics was in the nature of trading receipts and hence disallowable under Section 43B of the Act?
  3. Whether the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the bank guarantee furnished by the assessee (taken by depositing an amount in bank fixed deposit as margin money) did not tantamount to actual payment and thus Section 43B is applicable?

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The Appellate Authority's order (Commissioner (Appeals) dated 05.02.1992) must be read as a whole and in context; if the order is a total set aside it still cannot be read to permit the AO to process a new source of income which the Appellate Authority itself could not have processed.
  • If an item was taxed in the assessment order and the assessee did not challenge that item on appeal, the principle that prevented re-agitation by the assessee on a set aside should equally prevent the AO from bringing a new source of income to tax on a set aside.
  • Reliance was placed on textual authority and several precedents and texts, including extracts from Kanga, Palkhivala and Vyas (Vol. II, pages 1760–1761) and a list of cases (Katihar Jute Mills (P.) Ltd. v. CIT (Cal.), CIT v. Late Jawaharlal Nagpal, CIT v. S.V. Divakar, CIT v. Mahindra And Co., CIT v. D.N. Dosani, CIT v. Rai Bahadur Hardutroy Motilal Chamaria), in support of the contention that the appellate order could not be used to expand the scope of assessment beyond the subject-matter of the appeal.

Revenue's / Respondent's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The Commissioner (Appeals) had the power under Section 251 to set aside the assessment and refer the case back for a fresh assessment in accordance with directions; there was no specific direction limiting the set aside and therefore the AO was entitled to reframe the assessment afresh in totality.
  • Section 251(1)(a) requires the AO to proceed to make a fresh assessment after the case is set aside and, read with the scheme of the Act (including Sections 4 and 14), the AO was empowered to make such an assessment.
  • The courts have consistently held that it is open to the Appellate Authority to process a new source of income, and the same power would be available to the AO in case of an open set aside. Once a dispute as to taxability under a particular head was at large before the Appellate Authority and the assessment set aside, the AO should not be restricted only to particular items previously under challenge.
  • In support of these submissions the respondent relied on a number of decisions including: CIT v. McMillan & Co.; CIT v. Seth Manicklal Fomra; CIT v. T.T. Krishnamachari And Co.; Smt. Vijaykunverba v. CIT (Guj.); and State of Andhra Pradesh v. Hyderabad Asbestos Cement Production Ltd. (1994) 119 CTR 240 (SC).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rai Bahadur Hardutroy Motilal Chamaria (case cited as authority) Principle that an appellate authority cannot assess a source of income not processed by the Income-tax Officer or not disclosed in the return or assessment order; appellate authority cannot travel beyond the record. The Court invoked this principle to hold that the appellate set-aside cannot be read to permit the AO to process a new source of income that was never the subject-matter of the assessment or appeal.
CIT v. D.N. Dosani Cited for the legislative scheme: different authorities have different powers to disturb finalised assessments and those powers must be exercised only after satisfying prerequisites and jurisdictional facts. The Court used this precedent to support the view that powers granted to different authorities (e.g., AO, appellate authority) are distinct and cannot be made otiose by misusing powers under Section 251 to bypass other provisions (such as Sections 147, 154, 263, 264).
Katihar Jute Mills (P.) Ltd. v. CIT (Cal.) and other cases cited by the assessee (including CIT v. Late Jawaharlal Nagpal; CIT v. S.V. Divakar; CIT v. Mahindra And Co.) Cited by the assessee in support of the contention that the appellate authority/order cannot be used to expand assessment scope beyond the subject-matter of appeal. These cases were relied upon by the assessee; the Court considered the broader line of authority and treated the principle of non-travel beyond the record as binding in the analysis (see reference to Rai Bahadur Chamaria as a leading authority).
CIT v. McMillan & Co.; CIT v. Seth Manicklal Fomra; CIT v. T.T. Krishnamachari And Co.; Smt. Vijaykunverba v. CIT (Guj.); State of Andhra Pradesh v. Hyderabad Asbestos Cement Production Ltd. (1994) 119 CTR 240 (SC) Cited by the respondent to support the proposition that appellate authorities can process new sources of income and that, where a set aside is open, the AO may examine matters afresh. The Court acknowledged these authorities were relied upon by the Revenue but proceeded to construe Section 251 and the scheme of the Act to limit the AO's power on a set aside to the subject-matter of the appeal and directions given by the Appellate Authority.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded from a careful reading of Section 251 of the Income Tax Act and the scheme of the Act. The Court examined the text of Section 251(1)(a) and Section 251(2) and noted the following points:

  1. The powers of the Appellate Authority under Section 251 (confirm, reduce, enhance, annul, or set aside and refer the case back) are exercisable "in an appeal against an order of assessment" and therefore are governed by the subject-matter of the appeal (the assessment of income reflected in the assessment order and the return).
  2. The words "make such fresh assessment" in Section 251 qualify the fresh assessment to be made in accordance with directions given by the Appellate Authority; therefore a set aside must be understood in the context of those directions and the subject-matter of the appeal.
  3. Section 251(2) requires that an Appellate Authority must not enhance an assessment without giving a reasonable opportunity of showing cause; the Court reasoned that if the Appellate Authority cannot enhance without a show-cause, it follows that a set aside cannot be used to empower the AO to make enhancements or to process new sources of income that the Appellate Authority itself could not have lawfully processed.
  4. The Court emphasised a distinction between an assessment simplicitor and the assessment order and observed that an appellate set aside cannot be read as an unfettered 'open set aside' permitting the AO to expand the scope to items not forming part of the appeal.
  5. The Court relied on the established principle (as expounded in Rai Bahadur Hardutroy Motilal Chamaria) that the Appellate Authority cannot travel outside the record or process a new source of income which was not considered by the Income-tax Officer from the point of view of taxability; there must be some indication in the assessment record that the Income-tax Officer applied his mind to the taxability of that source.
  6. The Court noted the legislative scheme gives different authorities distinct powers (as discussed in D.N. Dosani) and these powers must be exercised in their proper domain; permitting the Appellate Authority's set aside to functionally circumvent provisions such as Sections 147, 154, 263 or 264 would render those provisions otiose.
  7. Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found that the original assessment order was silent on the taxability of the unpaid excise duty under Section 43B — the AO had not considered that issue in the original assessment, and the assessee had not challenged that item before the Commissioner (Appeals). The Commissioner (Appeals)'s set aside was given in the context of the six appealed items and the doctrine of audi alteram partem (i.e., procedural defects and lack of opportunity), and thus the set aside operated only in relation to matters that formed part of the appeal.
  8. Consequently, the AO could not, by relying on the set aside order, expand his jurisdiction to bring to tax a new source (the unpaid excise duty) which was never a subject-matter of the original assessment or the appeal.

Based on that reasoning the Court concluded that the Tribunal erred in upholding the Commissioner (Appeals) and in treating the set aside as opening the door for the AO to assess the unpaid excise duty as a new source of income under Section 43B.

Holding and Implications

Holding (core ruling): Question No. 1 is answered in the Negative — in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The Tribunal was in error in treating the Commissioner (Appeals)'s set aside as permitting the Assessing Officer to process a new source of income not forming part of the appeal.

Implications (direct consequences stated in the opinion):

  • The Tribunal's view upholding the Assessing Officer's jurisdiction to bring to tax unpaid excise duty (Rs. 81,62,006/-) pursuant to the set aside was held to be incorrect.
  • Because Question No. 1 was answered in favour of the assessee, Questions Nos. 2 and 3 were left unanswered by the Court (the Court expressly stated it was not necessary to answer them).
  • The reference to the Court stands disposed of accordingly, with no order as to costs.
  • The opinion indicates the narrower, practical consequence that a set aside by an Appellate Authority must be read in the context of the directions and the subject-matter of the appeal and cannot be used to expand the AO's jurisdiction to assess new sources that were not part of the original assessment or appeal (i.e., it preserves the procedural boundaries of distinct statutory provisions such as Sections 147, 154, 251, 263 and 264).

End of summary — based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion.

    Saheli Synthetics P. Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax

    1. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench 'C' has referred three questions at the instance of the assessee under Section 256(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (the Act) as against 12 questions proposed by the assessee:

    (1) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in interpreting the order of the CIT (A) dated 5-2-1992 as open set aside i.e., setting aside the assessment order in toto and accordingly the A.O. was justified bringing to tax a new source of income while framing the de novo assessment?

    (2) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the Excise Duty collected by the assessee on grey fabrics was in the nature of trading receipts and hence disallowable under Section 43B of the Act ?

    (3) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the bank guarantee furnished by the assessee which was taken by the assessee by depositing certain amount in bank fixed deposit as margin money did not tantamount to actual payment and so Section 43B is applicable?

    2. The Assessment Year is 1987-88 and the relevant accounting period is year ended on 08.07.1986 (Ashadh Sud Bij). The assessee, a Private Limited Company declared total income of Rs. 1,08,320/-. The Assessing Officer framed assessment at a total taxable income of Rs. 17,57,329/- under Section 143(3) of the Act vide assessment order dated 30.03.1990. In the course of framing the assessment order additions were made in relation to six different items referred to in Paragraph Nos. 2 to 7 of the assessment order totaling to Rs. 21,75,688/-. The assessee carried the matter in Appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) challenging the aforesaid six items of additions and also objected to interest levied under Sections 139 and 217 of the Act.

    3. After hearing the representative of the assessee vide order dated 05.02.1992 the Commissioner (Appeals) passed the following order:

    4. I have considered the facts and the appellant's submissions. It is the appellant company's contention that considering the facts which can be verified, no addition or disallowance on any count can be made in the appellant's case. It is the appellant's contention that the assessing officer has made the impugned additions and disallowances in an arbitrary manner without adducing any material in support of his action. It is the appellant's contention that the impugned additions/disallowances have been made without considering the relevant material and without giving to the appellant a proper opportunity of being heard and of explaining its stand with the help of necessary supporting evidence. It may be pointed out that the assessing officer officer is quasi judicial authority and therefore, as a quasi judicial authority, he is supposed to give to the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard and of adducing necessary evidence in support of its claim. It may also be mentioned that the doctrine of 'audi alteran parton' is the basic ingredient of natural justice.

    Besides, it is held that the applicant's contention discussed in detail supra deserve proper examination and consideration by the assessing officer. Considering the totality of the facts and the appellant's submissions and in the interest of justice, the impugned assessment order is set aside with the direction to the assessing officer to reframe the assessment afresh as per law after giving to the appellant a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter.

    4. Subsequent thereto the Assessing Officer framed fresh assessment order on 29.03.1994 making additions of four items totaling to Rs. 5,08,360/- comprised of following items Add : Additions made.

    1. Addition on account of stores account relating to previous year as discussed in Paragraph 5 above 0,36,040

    2. Addition on account of coal as discussed in Paragraph 6 above 42,660

    3. Addition on account of empty drums and waste materials as discussed in Paragraph 6 above 25,000

    4. Addition on account of work in process as discussed in Paragraph 8 above. 4,04,660, 5,08,360.

    However, in the body of the assessment order detailed discussion has been made in relation to unpaid excise duty amounting to Rs. 81,62,006/- by holding that same was not allowable under Section 43B of the Act. This addition is reflected in the order made under Section 154 of the Act on 08.04.1994. As the order under Section 154 of the Act was not available on record, the learned Advocate for the assessee was permitted to place the same on record with the consent of the otherside.

    5. The assessee carried the matter in Appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) and one of the principal ground of challenge was regarding jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer to bring to tax an amount of excise duty collected but not paid by invoking provisions of Section 43B of the Act. The Commissioner (Appeals) vide order dated 25.01.1995 rejected the contention regarding absence of jurisdiction in so far as the Assessing Officer is concerned by holding that there was no specific direction and the assessment was set aside to be reframed afresh in totality.

    6. The assessee carried the matter in Second Appeal before the Tribunal once again raising the issue relating to jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal vide order dated 19.10.1995 upheld the order of Commissioner (Appeals) by holding that the entire assessment was set aside and the entire assessment stood open before the Assessing Officer. That the Assessing Officer was not only free but required by law to probe into the case afresh on all aspects and arrive at a judicially correct conclusion. According to the Tribunal the scope of fresh assessment following the appellate order depended on the subject-matter of the appeal and the appellate order read as a whole in its proper context. Thus, in effect the Tribunal upheld the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer to make addition of Rs. 81,62,006/- being unpaid excise duty under Section 43B of the Act.

    7. At the hearing of the Reference both sides are in agreement that question Nos. 2 and 3 are required to be gone into only provided the first question is answered in favour the Revenue upholding the view expressed by the Tribunal.

    8. On behalf of the applicant-assessee Mr. J.P. Shah, learned Advocate contended that the order of the Appellate Authority has to be read as a whole and with reference to context. The last paragraph of the order of the Appellate Authority viz. order dated 05.02.1992 has to be read in context of the points in Appeal. That even if the said order of the Appellate Authority has to be read as a total set aside it is not open to the Assessing Officer to process a new source of income which the Appellate Authority itself could not have done. It was further submitted that in a case where an item is taxed in the assessment order and the assessee does not challenge the same in Appeal, if it was not possible for the assessee to reagitate the said issue on a set aside by the Appellate Authority, on the same reasoning the Assessing Officer cannot be permitted to bring to tax a new source of income. In support of the submissions made reliance has been placed on:

    [1] Relevant extract from Vol. II of The Law and Practice of Income Tax by Kanga, Palkhivala and Vyas at page No. 1760 & 1761:

    [2] Katihar Jute Mills (P.) Ltd. v. CIT (Cal.) [3] CIT v. Late Jawaharlal Nagpal M.P. High Court Indore Bench [4] CIT v. S.V. Divakar [5] CIT v. Mahindra And Co. (1995) 215 ITR 922 (Raj. H.C. Jaipur Bench) [6] CIT v. D.N. Dosani [7] CIT v. Rai Bahadur Hardutroy Motilal Chamaria .

    9. Mr. M.R. Bhatt, learned Senior Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent supported the order of the Tribunal by referring to provisions of Section 251 of the Act which deals with powers of the appellate authority to point out that there was no dispute that Commissioner (Appeals) was entitled to set aside the assessment order and refer the case back to the Assessing Officer for making a fresh assessment in accordance with the directions given by Commissioner (Appeals). That in absence of any directions being given by Commissioner (Appeals) the Assessing Officer was entitled to reframe the assessment afresh in totality considering that the set aside was an open set aside and not a conditional or a limited set aside. That the latter part of Section 251(1)(a) of the Act provided that the Assessing Officer was duty bound to proceed to make such fresh assessment and determine the tax payable on the basis of such fresh assessment and therefore bearing in mind the scheme of the Act, with special reference to Sections 4 and 14 of the Act no interference was called for. In support of the submissions reliance was placed on the following decisions:

    (1) CIT v. McMillan & Co. .

    (2) CIT v. Seth Manicklal Fomra (By L.Rs.) .

    (3) CIT v. T.T. Krishnamachari And Co. .

    (4) Smt. Vijaykunverba v. CIT (Guj.) (5) State of Andhra Pradesh v. Hyderabad Asbestos Cement Production Ltd. (1994) 119 CTR 240 (SC).

    10. It was further submitted that when the Courts have consistently come to the conclusion that it is open to the Appellate Authority to process a new source of income the same power would be available to the Assessing Officer in case of an open set aside and that once a dispute as to taxability under a particular head was at large before the Appellate Authority, and the assessment was set aside, the powers of the Assessing Officer cannot be restricted only to those particular items under the head of Profits and Gains of Business or Profession but must be available to assess the real income under the said head.

    11. Section 251 of the Act reads as under:

    Powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner [or, as the case may be, the Commissioner (Appeals)].

    251.(1) In disposing of an appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner [or, as the case may be, the Commissioner (Appeals)] shall have the following powers-

    (a) in an appeal against an order of assessment, he may confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment; or he may set aside the assessment and refer the case back to the Income-tax Officer for making a fresh assessment in accordance with the directions given by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner [or, as the case may be, the Commissioner (Appeals)] and after making such further inquiry as may be necessary, and the Income-tax Officer shall thereupon proceed to make such fresh assessment and determine, where necessary, the amount of tax payable on the basis of such fresh assessment;

    (b) in an appeal against an order imposing a penalty, he may confirm or cancel such order or vary it so as either to enhance or to reduce the penalty;

    (c) in any other case, he may pass such orders in the appeal as he thinks fit.

    (2). The Appellate Assistant Commissioner [or, as the case may be, the Commissioner (Appeals)] shall not enhance an assessment or a penalty or reduce the amount of refund unless the appellant has had a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against such enhancement or reduction.

    Explanation: In disposing of an appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner [or, as the case may be, the Commissioner (Appeals) may consider and decide any matter arising out of the proceedings in which the order appealed against was passed, notwithstanding that such matter was not raised before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner [or, as the case may be, the Commissioner (Appeals)] by the appellant.

    12. On a plain reading of the aforesaid provisions it becomes apparent that the Appellate Authority is entitled to either confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment; or the Appellate Authority may set aside the assessment and refer the case back to the Assessing Officer for making a fresh assessment in accordance with the directions given by the Appellate Authority after making such further inquiry as may be necessary, and the Assessing Officer shall thereupon proceed to make such fresh assessment and determine, where necessary, the amount of tax payable on the basis of such fresh assessment. Thus, the section, or more specifically the clause stipulates confirmation, reduction, enhancement or annulment of the assessment. Alternatively, the section envisages setting aside of assessment and referring the case back to the Assessing Officer for making a fresh assessment in accordance with the directions given, and such fresh assessment may either result in some tax becoming payable or there may be a situation where tax may not be payable on the basis of such fresh assessment. However, the material words in provisions are: 'make such fresh assessment', viz. the word such qualifies the assessment to be made afresh in context of the directions given by the Appellate Authority. Therefore, it is not possible to define a set aside assessment as either open set aside or a conditional set aside or a limited set aside. The set aside of assessment made by the Appellate Authority is always in accordance with the directions given by the Appellate Authority for making a fresh assessment. But, the most material part of the provision is the opening portion which stipulates 'In an appeal against an order of assessment'. In other words, the entire gamut of powers which are available to the Appellate Authority is governed within the four corners of the subject matter of appeal. The subject matter of appeal is the assessment of income which forms part of the order of assessment in light of the return of income filed by an assessee. There is a subtle, fine distinction between assessment simplicitor, namely assessment of income, and the assessment order. In practice and in effect an assessment order may contain number of assessments of incomes under one head, depending upon the source of income, and/or under more than one head. Even in case where, an Appellate Authority wants to exercise powers of enhancement, under Sub-section (2) of Section 251 of the Act such powers have to be exercised after giving a notice for enhancement providing for a reasonable opportunity of showing cause and not in absence of such a notice. This provision itself gives an indication that even if the Appellate Authority wants to process a new source of income which forms part of either return of income or the order of assessment, but was not in challenge in appeal before the Appellate Authority, the Appellate Authority has to give a reasonable opportunity of hearing before processing such a source of income and enhancing the assessment.

    13. A fortiori if it is not open to the Appellate Authority to enhance an assessment of income without issuing show cause notice one can never contemplate that the Appellate Authority can set aside an assessment so as to enable the Assessing Officer to exercise powers of enhancement vested in the Appellate Authority without the Appellate Authority discharging the statutory obligation cast on the Appellate Authority by virtue of provisions of Section 251(2) of the Act.

    14. Similarly even where an assessment is set aside simplicitor, without any enhancement proposal, it is always in context of the appeal against an order of assessment and cannot be read to mean that the Appellate Authority granted powers to the Assessing Officer in relation to items of assessment which were never forming part of Appeal before the Appellate Authority. At the cost of repetition it is required to be noted that processing a new source of income which was on the record before the Assessing Officer but is not forming part of subject matter of appeal before the Appellate Authority can be undertaken by the Appellate Authority only in the course of enhancement of the assessment and therefore any set aside, which does not involve a proposal for enhancement, cannot be used for the purpose of expanding the scope of the powers available to the Assessing Officer while making fresh assessment pursuant to a set aside.

    15. Consistently the Courts have held that the powers available to an Appellate Authority are co-extensive and co-terminus with that of the assessing authority and though such powers are plenary powers, yet the Appellate Authority has no power to enhance the assessment by discovering a new source of income not mentioned in the return of income filed by the assessee or considered by the Assessing Officer in the assessment order. In other words, the Appellate Authority cannot travel outside the record. In the case of CIT v. Rai Bahadur Hardutroy Motilal Chamaria (supra) the Supreme Court has stated thus:

    The principle that emerges as a result of the authorities of this court is that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner has no jurisdiction, under Section 31(3) of the Act, to assess a source of income which has not been processed by the Income-tax Officer and which is not disclosed either in the return filed by the assessee or in the assessment order, and therefore the Appellate Assistant Commissioner cannot travel beyond the subject-matter of the assessment. In other words, the power of enhancement under Section 31(3) of the Act is restricted to the subject-matter of assessment or the source of income which have been considered expressly or by clear implication by the Income-tax Officer from the point of view of the taxability of the assessee. It was argued by Mr. Viswanatha Iyer on behalf of the appellant that, by applying the principle to the present case, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had jurisdiction to enhance the quantum of income of the assessee. It was pointed out that the fact of the alleged transfer of Rs. 5,85,000 to Forbesganj branch was noted by the Income-tax Officer and also the fact that it did not reach Forbesganj on the same day. So, it was argued that in the appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had jurisdiction to deal with the question of the taxability of the amount of Rs. 5,85,000 and to hold that it was taxable as undisclosed profits in the hands of the assessee. We are unable to accept the argument put forward on behalf of the appellant as correct. It is true that the Income-tax Officer has referred to the remittance of Rs. 5,85,000 from the Calcutta branch; but the Income-tax Officer considered the despatch of this amount only with a view to test the genuineness of the entries relating to Rs. 4,30,000 in the books of the Forbesganj branch. It is manifest that the Income-tax Officer did not consider the remittance of Rs. 5,85,000 in the process of assessment from the point of view of its taxability. It is also manifest that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner has considered the amount of remittance of Rs. 5,85,000 from a different aspect, namely, the point of view of its taxability. But since the Income-tax Officer has not applied his mind to the question of taxability or non-taxability of the amount of Rs. 5,85,000 the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had no jurisdiction in the circumstances of the present case to enhance the taxable income of the assessee on the basis of this amount of Rs. 5,85,000 or of any portion thereof. As we have already stated, it is not open to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to travel outside the record, i.e., the return made by the assessee or the assessment order of the Income-tax Officer with a view to find out new sources of income and the power of enhancement under Section 31(3) of the Act is restricted to the source of income which have been the subject-matter of consideration by the Income-tax Officer from the point of view of taxability. In this context 'consideration' does not mean 'incidental' or 'collateral' examination of any matter by the Income-tax Officer in the process of assessment. There must be something in the assessment order to show that the Income-tax Officer applied his mind to the particular subject-matter or the particular source of income with a view to its taxability or to its non-taxability and not to any incidental connection. In the present case, it is manifest that the Income-tax Officer has not considered the entry of Rs. 5,85,000 from the point view of its taxability and, therefore, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had no jurisdiction, in an appeal under Section 31 of the Act, to enhance the assessment.

    16. Considering the issue from a slightly different angle one cannot lose sight of the scheme of the Act wherein different provisions have been incorporated for the purpose of disturbing a finalised assessment in light of the fact that the Revenue does not have any power of Appeal against an order of assessment. Though in a slightly different context, this Court has stated thus in relation to the legislative scheme in the case of CIT v. D.N. Dosani (supra). The scheme of the Act has provided different powers to different authorities and these are required to be exercised after satisfying the pre-requisite conditions and jurisdictional facts. The Assessing Officer can disturb/reopen a finalised assessment by invoking his powers either under Section 154 or under Section 147 of the Act, provided he can show that the necessary requirements are fulfilled. If, what the Revenue contends today is accepted, these and other such provisions which empower different authorities to exercise jurisdiction at different points of time in distinct settings would be rendered otiose and that can never be the legislative intent. It is almost akin to providing separate keys for separate locked doors and the person wanting to open a particular door is required to apply the correct key which matches the concerned lock. Therefore, in proceedings to give effect to an order under Section 263 of the Act, the Assessing Officer cannot be permitted to undertake an exercise not warranted by the legislative scheme.

    17. Similarly the position in law is well settled that an assessment which is reopened under Section 147 of the Act for bringing to tax an escaped income cannot be converted by an assessee into an entirely fresh assessment by making claims which were not originally made. The principle in law is, that every particular provision operates within the limited sphere for which the provision is enacted and hence powers under Section 251 of the Act granted to an Appellate Authority cannot be used to render other provisions of the Act like Sections 154, 147, 263 and 264 of the Act otiose or redundant.

    18. Applying the aforesaid tests to the facts on hand it becomes apparent that when the assessment order was originally framed the Assessing Officer had not considered the issue as regards taxability or non taxability of excise duty collected in context of provisions of Section 43B of the Act. The assessment order was silent in this regard. The assessee had only challenged six items of additions before Commissioner (Appeals) along with charging of interest under Sections 139 & 217 of the Act. Therefore, when Commissioner (Appeals) framed the order on 05.02.1992 the set aside that was envisaged was in context of the additions or disallowances which were in appeal. The grievance voiced on behalf of the assessee before Commissioner (Appeals) was that considering the facts which could be verified no addition or disallowance was called for, the additions and disallowance were made in an arbitrary manner without adducing any evidence in support of such additions or disallowance, the same have been made without considering the relevant material and without giving an opportunity to the assessee to explain the stand of the assessee. In light of the aforesaid submissions after referring to the doctrine of audi alteram partem, Commissioner (Appeals) held that: It is held that the appellant's contention discussed in detail supra deserve proper examination and consideration by the assessing officer. Considering the totality of the facts and the appellant's submissions and in the interest of justice, the impugned assessment order is set aside with the direction to the assessing officer to reframe the assessment afresh as per law after giving to the appellant a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter. Hence, even on facts the set aside is with specific directions only, i.e. directions issued by Commissioner (Appeals) in relation to and in context of the grounds of appeal raised before Commissioner (Appeals) ventilating the grievances of the assessee. The aforesaid finding by Commissioner (Appeals) cannot be read to mean that the items of assessment which were not under challenge like depreciation, travelling expenditure under Rule 6(D) of the Income Tax Rules, 1962 etc. deserve to be disturbed. If such items could not be disturbed by referring to the order of set aside made by Commissioner (Appeals) the Assessing Officer could not have processed a new source of income which did not form subject matter of assessment in the first round, and thus not a subject matter of appeal before the Appellate Authority. Even the assessee is not permitted to seek deduction/allowance of an item which was not originally claimed, or after being claimed has been disallowed, if the same was not challenged by way of an Appeal. The only remedy that an assessee would have in such circumstances is seeking relief under Section 264 of the Act in accordance with law.

    19. In the aforesaid set of facts and circumstances and in light of what is stated hereinbefore it becomes apparent that if the Appellate Authority could not have processed the item relating to unpaid excise duty the order of set aside in relation to six items of additions alongwith interest charged could not have been read by the Assessing Officer to expand jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer in the course of fresh assessment made in pursuance of directions issued by Commissioner (Appeals) on 05.02.1992. Hence, the Tribunal was in error in upholding the view expressed by Commissioner (Appeals) in the second round vide order dated 25.01.1995. Question No. 1 referred for the opinion of this Court is therefore answered in the Negative i.e. in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

    20. In light of the answer to question No. 1 it is not necessary to answer question Nos. 2 and 3 and the same are left unanswered. Reference stands disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.

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