(Per
: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D.A.MEHTA)
1. All
the appeals have been taken up for hearing and disposal together as
admittedly they arise out of common order made by the Company Court
in Official Liquidator Report No.12 of 2006 with Company Application
No.575 of 2006 decided on 28th March, 2008. As the parties
have referred to the documents from papers of O.J. Appeal No.142 of
2008, the said Appeal has been treated as the lead matter and the
brief facts necessary for the present, have been taken from the said
Appeal. The appellant of O.J. Appeal No.142 of 2008 is State Bank of
India, a secured creditor of the Company (in liquidation), Commercial
Ahmedabad Mills Company Ltd. The appellant of O.J. Appeal No.113 of
2008 is the Textile Labour Association, while O.J. Appeal No.137 of
2008 has been filed by the Official Liquidator.
2. The
company (in liquidation) was ordered to be wound up on 11.10.1989
vide order made in Company Petition No.117 of 1989. It appears that
prior thereto on 31st August, 1976 the land owner, namely,
the Mills Company filed Form No.I under Section 6(1) of Urban Land
(Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 ( hereinafter referred to as 'ULC
Act') in relation to the land bearing Survey No.39 and 41 of
Dariyapur Kazipur, Ahmedabad. On 31st December, 1982,
notice under Section 8(3) of ULC Act was issued to the erstwhile
Company and was stated to have been received by the said Company. On
31st December, 1983, the erstwhile Company replied to the
said notice inter alia stating that there was construction on the
land in question and application made under section 20 of the ulc act
to the State Government was pending.
3. Admittedly,
pursuant to order of winding up, on 4.12.1989 the Official Liquidator
took possession of the assets of the Company. Thereafter, on
different dates notices under different provisions of the ULC Act are
shown to have been issued and served according to the competent
authority on the Official Liquidator and according to the Official
Liquidator, the notices were addressed to the erstwhile Company and
not to the Official Liquidator. In light of the view that the Court
is inclined to adopt, it has not been found necessary to enter into
any discussion on the respective contentions in this regard leaving
it open for the parties to raise their respective contentions.
Suffice it to state that, according to the competent authority under
the ULC Act, possession of the land in question was taken over on
15.5.1992.
4. Before
the Company Court on 3.12.1999 sale of plant, machinery and other
movables of the Company (in liquidation), came to be confirmed.
Similarly, vide order dated 5.2.2003, the Company Court confirmed the
sale of building and superstructure standing on the land. On
16.1.2006 an advertisement was issued for sale of land in question
and on 13.2. 2006, the Official Liquidator tendered report vide OLR
No.12 of 2006 for confirmation of sale in relation to land
admeasuring approximately 27,741 Sq.meters. The Official Liquidator
also prayed for ratification of his action in impleading the State
Government in the said proceedings of the report filed by him.
5. After
hearing the parties, the Court formulated the following three
questions :-
?S Questions
raised before the Court for its determination are as to whether
competent authority under the ULC Act was required to obtain leave
under Section 446 of the Companies Act, before initiating proceedings
under ULC Act, more particularly, from the stage of Section 10(5)
onwards of the Act and what would be the effect or consequences of
such proceedings if leave is not obtained. The second question needs
to be answered is whether alleged possession acquired by the State
Government under ULC Act can be sustained despite the fact that
actual and physical possession of the land in question is found with
the Official Liquidator. Lastly, if the actual and physical
possession is with the Official Liquidator, can it be protected by
virtue of the provisions contained in the ULC Repeal Act???
6. Thereafter,
Company Court has proceeded to determine the matter only on the basis
of operation of Section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956('the Act' for
short) and effect of section 42 of the ulc act. The Company Court
has, thereafter, considered the Apex Court's decision in the case of
Allahabad Bank Vs. Canara Bank and another reported in (2000) 4 SCC
406 for the purposes of determining the issue. The Company Court has
also considered the object and purpose of the ULC Act. The effect of
section 42 of the ulc act has been considered on the basis of the
judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of West Bengal and
others Vs. Pranob Kumar Sur and others reported in (2003)9 SCC 490
to come to the conclusion that pendency of proceedings under the
Companies Act shall not be a bar to affect the provisions of ULC
Act. Lastly, the Company Court has considered the effect of Urban
Land(Ceiling and Regulation ) Repeal Act, 1999.
7. Though
the parties have addressed the Court at length on merits and demerits
of the impugned order, it is not necessary to record and deal with
the respective contentions raised on merits of the issue in light of
the view that the Court is inclined to adopt. Furthermore, any
expression of opinion, even, prima facie, might result in prejudice
to one or the other party and hence the elaborate submissions made on
behalf of the parties as to the true scope and purport of provisions
of ULC Act, the powers of the competent authority, etc. are issues on
which the Court does not intend to make any observations, leaving it
open to the parties to raise the issues at appropriate time.
8. The
impugned order made by the Company Court cannot be sustained for the
reasons following hereinafter. Judgment and order dated 28th
March, 2008 is quashed and set aside and OLR No.12 of 2006 with
Company Application No.575 of 2006 stands restored to file of the
Company Court for de novo adjudication and recording of fresh
decision in accordance with law.
9. The
aforesaid course of action was disputed by the learned Government
Pleader based on provisions of Section 107 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 ('C.P.C 'for short) read with Order 41 Rule 25 of the
Code. It was submitted that, firstly, before exercising the power of
remand available under the aforesaid provisions, the Court was
required to frame issues as stipulated by Clause (c) of Sub-Section
(1) of Section 107 of C.P.C and there was no case made out for
seeking such an order.
9.1 That
in fact such an order was not pleaded and urged by any of the
appellants and, therefore, the Court should not exercise its suo motu
powers in this regard considering that all the issues raised by the
parties have been dealt with by the Company Court. That in the event,
the parties had not pleaded any issue before the Company Court, the
impugned order should not be faulted on the ground that the Company
Court has not dealt with such an issue. It was submitted that the
powers of the Appellate Court would only extend to the subject
matter, namely, what was decided by the Court of original
jurisdiction and it was not open to the Appellate Court to go beyond
the subject matter of Appeal.
9.2 That
even Rule 25 of Order 41 of CPC specifically required that where it
appeared essential to Appellate Court for arriving at a right
decision upon merits, the Appellate Court should frame issues and
refer the same for trial to the Court from whose decree, the Appeal
is preferred. Alternatively, it was pleaded that the Court may keep
the appeal pending and remand the matter only in relation to the
issue which the Appellate Court found, was necessary to be determined
by the Company Court, without disturbing the order which was in
favour of the respondent State-Government.
10. On
behalf of appellant Textile Labour Association and appellant State
Bank of India, the secured creditor, it was submitted by learned
advocate Mr.D.S.Vasavada and learned advocate Mr.R.M.Desai that
provisions of Section 529A of the Act fasten a pari passu charge in
relation to the charge of the secured creditor on the properties of
the Company (in liquidation) and the object for which the said
provision had been brought on statute book was required to be
considered before any final decision could be recorded by the Company
Court in favour of one or the other party. Therefore, there should be
no order of limited or partial remand as prayed for by
respondent-State Government.
11. The
contention on behalf of the State Government that without framing
issues, no order of remand should be made, cannot be countenanced.
Similarly, any order of partial or limited remand would not only
create multiplicity of proceedings by keeping the present appeal
pending but may result in restricting the scope of powers available
to the Company Court and also cause prejudice to one or the other
party. Hence,even this contention does not merit acceptance.
12. On
a plain reading of the provisions of Section 107 of C.P.C., it
appears that the powers of the Appellate Court are co-terminus and
co-extensive with the powers of the Court of original jurisdiction
and Clauses (a) to (d) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 107 of C.P.C
cannot be read to mean that such powers are restricted in any manner
whatsoever. It is in this context that operation of Rule 25 of Order
41 of C.P.C. will have to be considered. In fact, even in the said
provisions, the powers available are of discretionary nature when
one considers the words ?Sthe Appellate Court may, if necessary,
frame issues,??. Meaning thereby, there is no compulsion that before
exercising power of remand, the Appellate Court must frame issues and
direct the trial Court to decide only such issues.
13. Section
529-A of the Act opens with a non-obstante clause and stipulates
that notwithstanding anything contained in any other provisions of
the Act or any other law for the time being in force in the winding
up of a Company, workers' dues and debts due to secured creditors,
shall rank pari passu and shall be paid in priority to all other
debts. Therefore, the said provision has an overriding effect not
only qua the provisions of the Act but also any other law for the
time being in force. Section 529-A of the Act was inserted on the
statute book vide Act No. 35 of 1985 with effect from 24.5.1985 and,
therefore, would override all other provisions of the Act as well as
any other law in force on the said date.
14. Therefore,
prima facie, provisions of Section 42 of ULC Act cannot claim
primacy over provisions of Section 529-A of the Act considering the
fact that ULC Act was brought on statue in 1976 while Section 529-A
of the Act is a subsequent legislation brought on statute book in
1985. Possibly this aspect of the matter, may not have been brought
to the notice of the Company Court. However, the jurisdiction vested
in a Company Court is a special jurisdiction and considering the true
scope and object of the provisions of Section 529-A of the Act,
Official Liquidator functions under the directions of the Company
Court and acts for and on behalf of the Company Court, primarily to
ensure that the interest of workmen of a Company ( in liquidation) do
not go unrepresented and are taken care of. This salutary feature of
functioning of Company Court could not have been overlooked by the
Company Court while determining the issue in question.
15. In
fact, when Section 529-A of the Act was proposed to be introduced
vide Companies (Amendment) Bill, 1985, the statement of object and
reasons provided as under :-
?S
Another announcement made by the Finance Minister in his Budget
speech relates to the decision of the Government to introduce
necessary legislation so that legitimate dues of workers rank pari
passu with secured creditors in the event of closure of the company
and above even the dues to Government. The resources of the companies
constitute a major segment of the material resources of the community
and common good demands that the ownership and control of the
resources of every company are so distributed that in the
unfortunate even of its liquidation, workers, whose labour and effort
constitute an invisible but easily perceivable part of the capital of
the company are not deprived of their legitimate right to participate
in the product of their labour and effort. It is accordingly proposed
to amend Sections 529 and 530 of the Companies Act and also to
incorporate a new section in the act, namely section 529a vide
clauses 4, 5 and 6 of the Bill).??
16.
In case of T.L.A. Vs. Official Liquidator reported in 2004(3) GLH
416, the Apex Court was called upon to decide the true scope of
provisions of Section 529-A of the Act in light of the priority
claimed by Oil and Natural Gas Commission on the basis of an order
made by the Apex Court in favour of ONGC. The Supreme Court has laid
down as under:-
?S8. The
effect of Sections 529 and 529-A is that the workmen of the Company
become secured creditors by operation of law to the extent of the
workmen's dues provided there exists secured creditor by contract. If
there is no secured creditor then the workmen of the company become
unsecured preferential creditors under Section 529-A to the extent of
the workmen's dues. The purpose of Section 529-A is to ensure that
the workmen should not be deprived of their legitimate claims in the
event of the liquidation of the Company and the assets of the Company
would remain charged for the payment of the workers' dues and such
charge will be pari passu with the charge of the secured creditors.
There is no other statutory provision overriding the claim of the
secured creditors except Section 529-A. This Section overrides
preferential claims under Section 530 also. Under Section 529-A the
dues of the workers and debts due to the secured creditors are to be
treated pari passu and have to be treated as prior to all other dues.
9. Therefore,
the law is clear on the matter as held in UCO Bank's case that
Section 529-A will override all other claims of other creditors even
where a decree has been passed by a Court.
10. Therefore,
claims, if any, of O.N.G.C. will have to be worked out in accordance
with Sections 529 and 529-A of the Companies Act as well. The
contention advanced on behalf of O.N.G.C. by Shri Raju Ramchandran
that if a mandamus had been issued, it will prevail over any law is
not tenable and is rejected.??
17. Thus
what is the effect of provisions of Section 529-A of the Act have to
be necessarily considered by the Company Court in every matter where
the properties/assets of the Company (in liquidation) are claimed by
a person other than secured creditors and workmen. The Company Court
could not have decided the matter as if the issue was only a dispute
between the land owner and the competent authority under the ULC Act.
It is equally well settled in law that though procedural compliance
is required to be established in justification of an action, yet at
the same time, mere form over substance cannot be preferred.
18. In
light of the view that the Court has adopted, it has not been found
necessary to enumerate and deal with various judgments cited by both
the sides on merits of the controversy as to applicability or
otherwise of provisions of the ULC Act. It will be open to the
parties to raise all contentions that may be available on facts and
in law before the Company Court.
19. Accordingly,
all the appeals are allowed in aforesaid terms and the impugned order
dated 28th March, 2008 is quashed and set aside for
recording a fresh decision de novo in accordance with law.
Order
passed in OJ.C.A. No.144 of 2008 with OJ.C.A. No.201 of 2008 with
OJ.C.A. No.218 of 2008
In
light of the view that the Court has taken in the appeals, these
Civil Applications have been rendered infructuous and are rejected
accordingly.
(D.A.
Mehta, J.)
(Bankim
N. Mehta, J.)
sudhir
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