(Per
: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE MOHIT S.SHAH)
This
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against
the High Court order dated 27.4.2005 and the Government notification
dated 16.8.2005 compulsorily retiring the petitioner, a judicial
officer holding the post of Civil Judge (SD) and Judicial Magistrate
First Class, from service after a disciplinary inquiry.
2. The
facts leading to filing of this petition, briefly stated, are as
under :-
2.1 The
petitioner who was born on 7.5.1955, joined judicial service on
9.11.1981. After his appointment to the post of Civil Judge (JD) and
JMFC, the petitioner was posted at Navsari and was thereafter
transferred to different places, such as Pardi, Valsad, Devdhar,
Bharuch, Savli, Visnagar and Baroda. The petitioner was thereafter
promoted to the post of Civil Judge (SD) on 10.6.1996 and was posted
at Amreli.
2.2 The
petitioner was placed under suspension by order dated 16.12.1997
(which order was implemented on 17.12.1997) in view of the
contemplated departmental inquiry on the basis of allegations made
against the petitioner that during his tenure as Civil Judge (JD) and
JMFC, Visnagar between 15.6.1992 and 12.6.1994, the petitioner had
granted bail orders in seven cases where the offences were punishable
with life imprisonment being offences punishable under Section 307
IPC. The petitioner was thereafter served with chargesheet dated
3.8.1998, levelling in all 17 charges including charge Nos.4 and 6
which read as under :-
(IV) In seven criminal
cases (numbers given)
?Sthe accused persons
were arrested and produced before you for a serious offence
punishable U/s 307 of Indian Penal Code for which punishment provided
is imprisonment for life and fine and though you were very well aware
that cases u/s 307 of IPC are exclusively triabe by the Court of
Sessions, and Judicial Magistrate has no jurisdiction to grant bail,
you, after accepting huge amounts released the accused persons on
bail, in the said matters, holding that there was no prima facie
case against the said accused for the offence punishable u/s 307 of
IPC.
(VI) In Regular Civil
Suit No.56/94 filed by Sumitraben Rameshchandra on 27.5.94, against
Naranbhai Prahladbhai Patel & Others, for permanent injunction,
you granted ex-parte injunction against the defendant, but on the
next day, i.e. on 28.5.94, on the application of the defendant and
without giving opportunity of being heard to the plaintiff as
provided in Rule 4 of Order 39 of Civil Procedure Code, you, with an
oblique motive, modified the said ex-parte order and directed both
the parties to maintain status quo and because of the same the
defendants took the benefit of putting up a door in the wall
adjoining the disputed land and continued the said door under order
of status quo.??
Seven
other charges also pertained to judicial orders passed by the
petitioner as Civil Judge (JD) and JMFC at Viramgam. Charge Nos.10 to
13 pertained to the petitioner's conduct at Viramgam regarding the
petitioner's dress habits, use of unparliamentary language on dias
and maintaining relations with an advocate and with an accused.
2.3 The
petitioner submitted his reply to the chargesheet and denied the
same. It was also contended that no departmental inquiry could be
held in relation to the judicial orders passed by the petitioner
which were never challenged by any party and which were not
interfered with by any appellate or revisional Court.
2.4 After
considering the evidence on record, the Inquiry Officer, a Judge of
the City Civil Court, Ahmedabad submitted report dated 22.1.2001
(Annexure-G pages 151 to 219). The findings of the Inquiry Officer
were as under :-
?SExcept charge no.
4 and 6 no other charges are proved against the delinquent.
So far as charge no.4
is concerned, there is no direct evidence to show that corrupt
practice was done by the delinquent Mr Vyas. But he has gone beyond
his power in enlarging the accused on bail in case of Section 307
I.P. Code etc. Thus we can say that there is possibility of the
delinquent for making corrupt practice and we can also say that the
delinquent is found guilty of aforesaid acts of misconduct.
So far as charge no.6
is concerned, order of ad-interim injunction was modified by him
without giving an opportunity to the other party and order of status
quo was passed by him illegally. It further shows that he is guilty
of indulging in corrupt practice and also guilty of the aforesaid
acts of misconduct.??
2.5 In
view of the above inquiry report, the High Court on the
administrative side issued show-cause notice dated 28.2.2002 calling
upon the petitioner to show cause why the High Court on the
administrative side should not accept the inquiry report and the
petitioner should not be visited with a major penalty. The petitioner
submitted his reply dated nil (Annexure-I) to the show cause notice.
After hearing the petitioner, the disciplinary committee of the High
Court submitted a report recommending acceptance of the report of the
Inquiry officer and imposition of penalty of compulsory retirement on
the petitioner. In absence of any dissent from any other learned
Judge of the High Court on the administrative side, the impugned
order dated 17.5.2005 came to be passed by the High Court on the
administrative side. As regards the defence of the petitioner that
departmental inquiry could not be held in respect of judicial orders
passed by the petitioner, relying on the decisions of the Apex Court
in Union of India vs. KK Dhawan, AIR 1993 SC 1478 and in Union
of India vs. Ajay Kumar Patnaik, (1995) 6 SCC 442, the High Court
on the administrative side held as under :-
?SViewed in light of
above stated principles the report of Inquiry Officer with which the
High Court concurs establishes that the delinquent by flouting
settled principles for grant of bail has acted in a manner as would
reflect on his reputation or integrity or good faith or devotion to
duty. The material shows that in reckless manner delinquent has
exercised judicial powers contrary to well-settled norms. This is
certainly unbecoming of a judicial officer. While exercising judicial
powers the delinquent had omitted to follow the prescribed
conditions which are essential before enlarging accused involved in
serious offences on bail as well as before modifying the order of
injunction. This is not a case of mere technical violation or that
the order is wrong which can be challenged before higher forum. Many
a times it happens that powerful accused having political will
prevail upon State from challenging wrong orders. Not only the
delinquent has failed to maintain devotion to duty, he has acted
negligently and omitted to follow prescribed criteria for grant of
bail and passed orders recklessly.
Having regard to the
facts of the case the High Court is of the view that charge No.IV and
VI levelled against the delinquent are proved. It is proved that by
implication the delinquent was guilty of corrupt practice as well as
of dereliction of duty while discharging judicial function and had
acted in a manner unbecoming of a judicial officer.
As the delinquent has
completed more than 16 years service and he is under suspension since
last 7 years, the High Court is of the opinion that punishment of
compulsory retirement from service should be imposed on the
delinquent. Accordingly, the High Court recommends compulsory
retirement of the delinquent from service.??
On
the basis of the above order of the High Court on the administrative
side, the State Government issued notification dated 16.8.2005
compulsorily retiring the petitioner from service.
3. Mr
Unwala, learned advocate for the petitioner has raised the following
contentions :-
(i) As per the settled
legal position, no departmental inquiry could have been held against
the petitioner in respect of judicial orders passed by the petitioner
in discharge of his duties as Judicial Magistrate First Class. None
of those orders was challenged before any appellate or revisional
Court. Reliance is placed on several decisions of the Apex Court
discussed hereinafter.
(ii) The petitioner
rendered services as a Judicial Officer at several places from the
date of his joining service in the year 1981 till the date of his
suspension in December 1997. The petitioner has never been informed
about any complaint made against him at any place other than
Viramgam. In fact the petitioner was promoted as Civil Judge (SD) on
10.6.1996 and therefore also no complaint should have been
entertained in respect of the prior period (15.6.1992 to 12.6.1994)
when the petitioner was Civil Judge (JD) and JMFC, Visnagar.
(iii) In his entire
judicial career spanning over 16 years, the petitioner had passed
thousands of judicial orders and hundreds of orders on bail
applications. It is unfair to pick up seven orders of bail where the
disciplinary authority on the administrative side disagrees with the
orders passed by the petitioner on the judicial side and on that
basis alone comes to the conclusion of corruption by implication.
(iv) Section 437 of Cr
PC does not completely prohibit a judicial magistrate from granting
bail for an offence punishable with life imprisonment. The Magistrate
does have the jurisdiction to hold in the facts of a given case that
the allegations against the accused and the material on record are
not sufficient to constitute an offence punishable with life
imprisonment or with death.
Strong reliance is
placed on the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Harihar
Chaitanya vs. State of UP, 1990 Cr.LJ 2082 in support of the
contention that the Magistrate is not bound by the opinion of the
Investigating Officer in regard to the applicability of the section
under which the alleged offence falls. The Magistrate can prima-facie
look into the contents of the FIR and disagree with the opinion
formed by the police about the penal provision which covers the case.
Out of seven cases
under consideration, in as many as five cases, the learned Public
Prosecutor had given consent to the accused being released on bail.
Out of the remaining two cases, in one case, the complainant had
suffered only a contused laserated wound and was treated in the
hospital as an out-door patient. In the seventh case, there were
cross-complaints. None of those seven orders were either challenged
by the State Government or by the private complainant. The accused in
these seven cases were ordinary people whose liberty the petitioner
protected by exercising the power under Section 437 of the Cr PC of a
Judicial Magistrate First Class presiding over the Magistrate's Court
at Taluka headquarters and that even if the petitioner had committed
any errors they were errors of judgment and no oblique motive could
be attributed to such orders
(v) It is submitted
that even if the so-called errors could be treated as warranting any
punishment, the punishment of compulsory retirement was too harsh,
that the petitioner may be directed to be reinstated and that at the
most some minor penalty of stoppage of increments without future
effect could have been imposed.
4. On
the other hand, Mr JB Pardiwala, learned Standing Counsel for the
High Court opposed the petition and made the following submissions :-
(a) In Prakash Kaur
Vs. Sohansingh Khadaksing, 1984(1) GLR 345 and in Thakor Kanjibhai
Shakarabhai Vs. Thakor Ambaram Kanjibhai, 1985 GLH (UJ) 23, the
Hon'ble High Court on the judicial side had already interpreted the
provisions of Section 437 of the Criminal Procedure Code and held
that the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to grant bail
for offences punishable with life imprisonment or death.
The first proviso to Section
437(1) confers jurisdiction on the Magistrate to release the accused
involved in an offence punishable with capital punishment or life
imprisonment, where the accused is under the age of 16 years or is a
woman or is sick or infirm. None of the seven cases under
consideration fell in any of the above categories. There were no
special reasons for exercising the powers under proviso to Section
437(1) of the Act, The orders passed by the petitioner in the cases
under consideration did not disclose any special reasons. Hence, in
view of the aforesaid decisions, the High Court on the administrative
side was justified in drawing adverse inferences against the
petitioner.
(b) For an inquiry to
be instituted against a judicial officer under the provisions of
Gujarat Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1971 it is not necessary that
the officer should be charged with corruption. It is sufficient if
the officer is guilty of any conduct as mentioned in Rule 3 of the
said Rules.
(c) Merely because the petitioner
was promoted in 1996, that cannot be a ground for exonerating the
petitioner of the charges levelled against him in respect of his
conduct in the years 1992-94, when the petitioner was Civil Judge,
(J.D.), Viramgam.
(d) This Court exercising the
powers of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution would
not sit in appeal over the corporate decision of the High Court on
the administrative side and interfere with the order of punishment,
merely because this Court may not agree with the findings of the High
Court on the administrative side and may have taken a different view
of the matter.
5. Having heard the learned counsel
for the parties, we have given anxious consideration to the rival
submissions. Before dealing with the submissions, we may first set
out the provisions of section 437 as were in force at the relevant
time.
?S437 When bail may be taken in
case of non-bailable offence. ? (1) When any person accused
of, or suspected of, the commission of any non-bailable offence is
arrested or detained without warrant by an officer-in-charge of a
police station or appears or is brought before a Court other than the
High Court or court of Session, he may be released on bail, but ?
(i) such person shall not be so
released if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has
been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for
life;
(ii) such person shall not be so
released if such offence is a cognizable offence and he had been
previously convicted of an offence punishable with death,
imprisonment for life or imprisonment for seven years or more, or he
had been previously convicted on two or more occasions of a
non-bailable and cognizable offence.
Provided that the Court may
direct that a person referred to in clause (i) or clause (ii) be
released on bail if such person is under the age of sixteen years or
is a woman or is sick or infirm:
Provided further that
the Court may also direct that a person referred to in clause (ii) be
released on bail if it is satisfied that it is just and proper so to
do for any other special reason:
Provided also that the mere
fact that an accused person may be required for being identified by
witnesses during investigation shall not be sufficient ground for
refusing to grant bail if he is otherwise entitled to be released on
bail and gives an undertaking that he shall comply with such
directions as may be given by the Court:
(2) If it appears to such officer
or Court at any stage of the investigation, inquiry or trial, as the
case may be, that there are not reasonable grounds for believing that
the accused has committed a non-bailable offence, but that there are
sufficient grounds for further inquiry into his guilt, the accused
shall, subject to the provisions of section 446A and pending such
inquiry, be released on bail, or, at the discretion of such officer
or Court, on the execution by him of a bond without sureties for his
appearance as herein-after provided.
Sub-section (3) empowers the Court
to impose conditions while releasing the accused on bail.
(4) An officer or a Court releasing
any person on bail under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), shall
record in writing his or its reasons or special reasons for so doing.
(5) and (6) ... ... ...
(7) If, at any time after the
conclusion of the trial of a person accused of a non-bailable offence
and before judgment is delivered, the Court is of opinion that there
are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty
of any such offence, it shall release the accused, if he is in
custody, on the execution by him of a bond without sureties for his
appearance to hear judgment delivered.??
6. The above provisions came to be
interpreted by the Apex Court in Gurcharan Singh Vs. State (Delhi
Administration), AIR 1978 SC 179 as under :-
?S19. Section 437, Cr.P.C. deals,
inter alia, with two stages during the initial period of the
investigation of a non-bailable offence. Even the officer in charge
of the police station may, by recording his reasons in writing,
release a person accused of or suspected of the commission of any
non-bailable offence provided there are no reasonable grounds for
believing that the accused has committed a non-bailable offence.
Quick arrests by the police may be necessary when there are
sufficient materials for the accusation or even for suspicion. When
such an accused is produced before the court, the court has a
discretion to grant bail in all non-bailable cases except those
punishable with death or imprisonment for life if there appear to be
reasons to believe that he has been guilty of such offences. The
Courts oversee the action of the police and exercise judicial
discretion in granting bail always bearing in mind that the liberty
of an individual is not unnecessarily and unduly abridged and at the
same time the cause of justice does not suffer. After the court
releases a person on bail under sub-sec. (1) or sub-sec. (2) of S.
437, Cr.P.C. it may direct him to be arrested again when it considers
necessary so to do. This will be also in exercise of its judicial
discretion on valid grounds.
21. Section 437, Cr.P.C. is
concerned only with the court of Magistrate. It expressly excludes
the High Court and the Court of Session. The language of S. 437 (1)
may be contrasted with S. 437 (7) to which we have already made a
reference. While under sub-sec (1) of S. 437, Cr.P.C. the words are:
"If there appear to be reasonable grounds for believing that he
has been guilty". Sub-sec. (7) says: "that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of
such an offence". This difference in language occurs on account
of the stage at which the two sub-sections operate. During the
initial investigation of a case in order to confine a person in
detention, there should only appear reasonable grounds for believing
that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or
imprisonment for life, whereas after submission of charge-sheet or
during trial for such an offence the court has an opportunity to form
somewhat clear opinion as to whether there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accused is not guilty of such an offence. At that
stage the degree of certainty of opinion in that behalf is more after
the trial is over and judgment is deferred then at a pre-trial stage
even after the charge-sheet. There is a noticeable trend in the
above provisions of law that even in case of such non-bailable
offences a person need not be detained in custody for any period more
than it is absolutely necessary, if there are no reasonable grounds
for believing that he is guilty of such an offence. There will be,
however, certain overriding considerations to which we shall refer
hereafter. Whenever a person is arrested by the police for such an
offence, there should be materials produced before the courts to come
to a conclusion as to the nature of the case he is involved in or he
is suspected of. If at that stage from the materials available there
appear reasonable grounds for believing that the person has been
guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life,
the court has no other option than to commit him to custody. At that
stage, the court is concerned with the existence of the materials
against the accused and not as to whether those materials are
credible or not on the merits.
22. In other non-bailable cases the
court will exercise its judicial discretion in favour of granting
bail subject to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 437, Cr.P.C. if it deems
necessary to act under it. Unless exceptional circumstances are
brought to the notice of the court which may defeat proper
investigation and a fair trial, the court will not decline to grant
bail to a person who is not accused of an offence punishable with
death or imprisonment for life. It is also clear that when an
accused is brought before the court of a Magistrate with the
allegation against him of an offence punishable with death or
imprisonment for life, he has ordinarily no option in the matter but
to refuse bail subject, however, to the first proviso to S. 437 (1),
Cr.P.C. and in a case where the Magistrate entertains a reasonable
belief on the materials that the accused has not been guilty of such
an offence. This will, however, be an extraordinary occasion since
there will be some materials at the stage of initial arrest, for the
accusation or for strong suspicion of commission by the person of
such an offence.??
(emphasis supplied)
7. Thereafter, these provisions
also came to be interpreted by two learned Single Judges of this
Court.
7.1 In Prakash Kaur Vs. Sohansingh
Khadaksing 1984(1) GLR 345, a learned Single Judge of this Court held
as under :-
?SSec. 437 of the Code provides as
to when bail may be taken in case of non-bailable offences. There is
a dichotomy dealing with non-bailable offences. There are two types
of non-bailable offences-offences punishable with death or
imprisonment for life and the rest of the non-bailable offences. As
far as the first category of non-bailable offences is concerned,
provisions of sec. 437(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code impose a bar
to grant of bail by the court or the officer in charge of a police
station to an accused person if there appear reasonable grounds, for
believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death
or imprisonment for life. At this stage the court or an officer in
charge of a police station has only to see as to whether there
appears to be reasonable grounds that the accused has been guilty of
such an offence or not. It is to be noted that what is required
to be seen is the reasonable grounds and not the evidence. In
this connection the Supreme Court in the case of Gurcharan Singh and
Others Vs. State (Delhi Administration), reported in AIR 1978 SC 179
has stated to the effect that the words ?Sor suspected of the
commission of?? were introduced in the provisions of sec. 497 of Old
Criminal Procedure Code by an amendment in 1955. These words have
been retained in the new Criminal Procedure Code in sec. 437. IN
this background the Supreme Court has observed :
?S..... It is difficult to
conceive how if a police officer arrests a person on a reasonable
suspicion of commission of an offence punishable with death or
imprisonment for life (S. 41, Cr.P.C. of the new Code) and forwards
him to a Magistrate (S. 167(1), Cr.P.C. of the new Code) the
Magistrate at that stage will have reasons to hold that there are no
reasonable grounds for believing that he has not been guilty of such
an offence. At that stage unless the Magistrate is able to act under
the proviso to sec. 437(1), Cr.P.C. Bail appears to be out of
question. The only limited inquiry may then relate to the materials
for the suspicion......??
7.2 Again in Thakor Kanjibhai
Shakarabhai Vs. Thakor Ambaram Kanjibhai, 1985 GLH (UJ) 23, (Misc.
Criminal Application No.2015 of 1984), another learned Single Judge
of this Court held as under:-
?SSection 437
provides that the Court may release the accused on bail if there
appears no reasonable ground for believing that he has been guilty of
an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. If the
circumstances of the case are such the Court trying the accused can
impose imprisonment for life for an offence punishable under Section
326. Section 437(1)(i) in terms provides that when any person accused
of or suspected of the commission of any non-bailable offence is
arrested and is brought before the Court other than the High Court or
Court of Sessions, such person shall not be released on bail if there
appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an
offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. It cannot be
said that this bar would not operate in respect of offences
punishable with imprisonment for life or in the alternative
imprisonment for ten years because the Court trying the case is
empowered to impose a maximum sentence of imprisonment for life. In
this set of circumstances, the Magistrate before whom the accused is
produced would not have jurisdiction to release him on bail except in
cases which fall in the excepted categories of proviso to section
437(1). Therefore, at the initial stage when the accused are produced
before the Magistrate and it is alleged that the accused have
committed an offence punishable under Section 326, then the
Magistrate would not have jurisdiction to release the accused on
bail.
Further, under
sub-section (4) of Section 437 if the Court releases the accused on
bail under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) he is required to
record in writing his reasons for doing so. The order passed by the
learned Magistrate on the face of it shows that he has not given any
reasons why he is releasing the accused on bail.??
8. In view of the above decisions,
it is clear that when the Magistrate considers the application for
bail for offences punishable with death or life imprisonment,
ordinarily the Magistrate is to refuse the bail unless the case falls
under any of the excepted categories (accused being below 16 years of
age, woman, sick or infirm person). If the case does not fall in any
such excepted category, the Magistrate may grant bail only in an
exceptional or extraordinary case, where the Magistrate entertains
the reasonable belief on the material that the accused has not been
guilty of any offences punishable with death or life imprisonment.
9. Admittedly, in seven cases under
consideration, the accused were not persons below the age of 16
years or women or sick or infirm persons. The learned advocate for
the petitioner has vehemently submitted that when the learned APP had
given consent in as many as five cases and the consent was not off
the record, but actually recorded in the orders passed by the learned
Magistrate, no oblique motive could be attributed to the learned
Magistrate. It is submitted that in the facts of the seven cases,
the alleged acts did not constitute an offence punishable under
Section 307 of IPC, but were offences punishable under Section 323 or
324 of IPC, where the injuries were on the back of the complainant or
on the backside of the complainant and the injuries were simple
injuries. The learned PP had also conceded that they did not amount
to serious injuries. Merely because the police had mentioned in the
FIRs the offence punishable under Section 307 such label on the
offence was not binding on the Court and it was open to the
Magistrate to consider what offence was committed on the basis of the
allegations in the complaint and the material before the
Court. In three cases, the learned Magistrate also considered that
there were cross complaints and that the accused had filed two
complaints being Misc. Criminal Application No.61 of 1993 and Misc.
Criminal Application No.62 of 1993. It is also pertinent to note
that out of seven cases under consideration, in six cases the accused
were shown to be poor persons either doing agricultural work or some
other low paid work. In the cases arising from CR No.3 of 1994, the
accused were going to the village with their cattle and there was
altercation on account of complainant scolding the accused which
resulted into a fight. In Misc. Criminal Application No.61 of 1993,
the case of the accused was that they had gone to scold the
complainant and others for teasing wife of Narsinhbhai and that they
were falsely involved in the case by making allegations of attempt to
commit murder. The complainant and both his witnesses were only
given first aid and immediately discharged from the hospital on the
same day and in fact they were also arrested on the next day in view
of the complaint made by the accused against the complainant and his
witnesses. The learned APP had also conceded that no offence
punishable under Section 307 was made out.
In Misc. Criminal Application
No.62 of 1993, there were cross complaints. The accused as well as
the complainant were agriculturists and there was a cross fight and
the case of the accused was that the accused had used Dharia for
their self defence which resulted into the injury on the complainant
which was 4 X 1 cm. incise wound on the head.
Similarly in the case arising from
Mandal (CR No.58 of 1993 ? Ganesh Bhagwanbhai Brothers), this was
also a case of cross complaints. The complainant and his witnesses
were grazing the cattle in the field of the accused and the accused
tried to prevent that, which resulted into the incident. The learned
Magistrate held that there was a sudden fight. The injuries were
simple and there was no attempt to murder. Hence, there was no
offence punishable under Section 307 and the learned APP had also
conceded that the offences were not punishable under Section 307 or
326.
10. We may now refer to two cases,
where no consent of the learned APP was recorded in the orders. In
the bail application arising from FIR No.3 of 1994, the incident had
taken place on account of dispute between the agriculturists. There
was one contused laserated wound of 1 cm. and the other injuries were
simple stick injuries. The blow attributed by Farsi was shown in the
medical certificate as wound caused by a hard and blunt object. This
incident also occurred when there was an altercation between the
complainant and the accused when they were going with the cattle in
the outskirts of the village at about 08:30 in the morning of
06.01.1994.
The other incident was in Misc.
Criminal Application No.62 of 1993, where also there were cross
complaints and the complaint of the accused was also lodged.
11. Looking to the contents of the
bail applications and the orders passed by the petitioner, it thus
appears that while the seven cases under consideration did not fall
in the excepted categories mentioned in the first proviso to Section
437(1), with the consent of the learned APP, the petitioner granted
bail in five matters, where there were disputes between the
complainant and injured witnesses who were agriculturists and the
accused were also agriculturists. It is true that as per the
decisions of the Apex Court and of the learned Single Judges of this
Court, in such cases, the Magistrate should not have treated them as
extraordinary or exceptional cases, but we do note the submission of
the learned advocate for the petitioner that at the relevant time,
i.e. in 1993-94, the Magistrates were passing such orders when, prima
facie, they were satisfied that the offence did not amount to offence
under Section 307 of IPC. It was on account of such approach on the
part of the Magistrates that this Court on the administrative side
had to establish a State Judicial Academy for imparting proper
in-service training to the Magistrates to impress upon them that the
Magistrate is not to grant bail for offences punishable with death or
imprisonment for life unless the accused belongs to any of the
excepted categories indicated in the first proviso to Section 437(1),
or on an extraordinary occasion as observed in Gurucharan Singh's
case (supra).
12. Mr Unwala, learned counsel for
the petitioner placed reliance on the following decisions in support
of his contention that disciplinary inquiry should not be held
against a judicial officer on the ground of alleged errors in passing
judicial orders :-
(i) PC Joshi vs. State of UP, AIR
2001 SC 2788
(ii) KP Tiwari vs. State of MP, AIR
1994 SC 1031 = 1994 Supp (1) SCC 540
(iii) Braj Kishore Thakur vs. Union
of India, AIR 1997 SC 1154 = (1997) 4 SCC 65
(iv) Ramesh Chander Singh vs. High
Court of Allahabad, (2007) 4 SCC 247.
In PC Joshi vs. State of UP, AIR
2001 SC 2788, the Apex Court held as under:-
?S7... ... That there was
possibility on a given act of facts to arrive at a different
conclusion is no ground to indict a judicial officer for taking one
view and too for alleged misconduct for that reason alone. The
Enquiry Officer has not found any other material,which would reflect
on his reputation or integrity or good faith or devotion to duty or
that he has been actuated by any corrupt motive. At best he may say
that the view taken by the appellant is not proper or correct and not
attribute any motive to him which is for extraneous consideration
that he had acted in that manner. If in every case where an order of
a subordinate Court is found to be faulty a disciplinary action were
to be initiated, the confidence of the subordinate judiciary will be
shaken and the officers will be in constant fear of writing a
judgment so as not to face a disciplinary enquiry and thus judicial
officers cannot act independently of fearlessly. Indeed the words of
caution are given in K. K. Dhawan's case (1993 AIR SCW 1361 : AIR
1993 SC 1478 : 1993 Lab IC 1028) (supra) and A. N. Saxena's case
(1992 AIR SCW 1336 : AIR 1992 SC 1333 : 1992 Cri LJ 1940) (supra)
that merely because the order is wrong or the action taken could have
been different does not warrant initiation of disciplinary
proceedings against the judicial officer. In spite of such caution,
it is unfortunate that the High Court has chosen to initiate
disciplinary proceedings against the appellant in this case.
Similarly, in Ramesh Chander
Singh vs. High Court of Allahabad, (2007) 4 SCC 247, a three Judge
Bench of the Apex Court after review of several decisions, held as
under:-
?S11. .......... If the
High Court were to initiate disciplinary proceedings based on a
judicial order, there should have been strong grounds to suspect
officer's bona fides and the order itself should have been actuated
by malice, bias or illegality. The appellant officer was well within
his right to grant bail to the accused in discharge of his judicial
functions. Unlike provisions for granting bail in the TADA Act or
the NDPS Act, there was no statutory bar in granting bail to the
accused in this case. A Sessions Judge was competent to grant bail
and if any disciplinary proceedings are initiated against the officer
for passing such an order, it would adversely affect the morale of
subordinate judiciary and no officer would be able to exercise this
power freely and independently.
12. This Court on several occasions has disapproved the practice of
initiation of disciplinary proceedings against officers of the
subordinate judiciary merely because the judgments/orders passed by
them are wrong. The appellate and revisional courts have been
established and given powers to set aside such orders. The higher
courts after hearing the appeal may modify or set aside erroneous
judgments of the lower courts. While taking disciplinary action
based on judicial orders, the High Court must take extra care and
caution.
13. In Ishwar Chand Jain Vs. High Court of P & H, AIR 1988 SC
1395 = (1988) 3 SCC 370, this Court observed that while exercising
control over subordinate judiciary under Article 235 of the
Constitution, the High Court is under a constitutional obligation to
guide and protect subordinate judicial officers. An honest and
strict judicial officer is likely to have adversaries. If complaints
are entertained in trifling matters and if the High Court encourages
anonymous complaints, no judicial officer would feel secure and it
would be difficult for him to discharge his duties in an honest and
independent manner. It is imperative that the High Court should take
steps to protect honest judicial officers by ignoring ill-conceived
or motivated complaints made by unscrupulous lawyers and litigants.
14. In K.P.Tiwari Vs. State of M.P., AIR 1994 SC 1038 = 1994 Supp (1)
SCC 540, where the High Court reversed the order passed by the lower
court making remarks about interestedness and motive of the lower
court in passing the unmerited order, this Court observed that one of
the functions of the higher court is either to modify or set aside
erroneous orders passed by the lower courts. Our legal system
acknowledges fallibility of judges. It has to be kept in mind that a
subordinate judicial officer works mostly in a charged atmosphere.
He is under a psychological pressure ? contestants and lawyers
breathing down his neck. He does not enjoy the detached atmosphere
of the higher court. Every error, however gross it may be, should
not be attributed to improper motives. The Judges of the High Court
have a responsibility to ensure judicial discipline and respect for
the judiciary from all concerned. No greater damage can be done to
the administration of justice and to the confidence of the people in
the judiciary if the higher courts express lack of faith in the
subordinate judiciary for some reason or the other. That amounts to
destruction of judiciary from within.
15. In Kashi Nath Roy vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1996 SC 3240 = (1996) 4
SCC 539, this Court observed under a similar circumstance that in our
system appellate and revisional courts have been set up with the
presupposition that the lower courts in some measure of cases can go
wrong in decision-making in law and in fact. The higher courts have
been established to correct errors. In cases where intolerable error
is pointed out, it is functionally required to correct the error in
an appropriate case and in a manner befitting maintaining dignity of
the court and independence of the judiciary. The higher court should
convey its message in the judgment to the officer concerned through a
process of reasoning, essentially persuasive, reasonable, mellowed
but clear and result oriented and rarely a rebuke.
16. In a series of other case also, this Court disfavoured the
practice of passing strictures or orders against the subordinate
officers. (See Braj kishore Thakur vs. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC
1157 = (1997) 4 SCC 65, Alok Kumar Roy vs. Dr. SN. Sarma, AIR 1968 SC
453.
17. In Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar vs. Union of India, AIR 1999 SC
2881 = (1999) 7 SCC 409, this Court held that wrong exercise of
jurisdiction by a quasi-judicial authority or mistake of law or wrong
interpretation of law cannot be the basis for initiating disciplinary
proceeding. Of course, if the judicial officer conducted in a manner
as would reflect on his reputation or integrity or good faith or
there is a prima facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in
discharge of his duties or he had acted in a manner to unduly favour
a party or had passed an order actuated by corrupt motive, the High
Court by virtue of its power under Article 235 of the Constitution
may exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. Nevertheless, under such
circumstances it should be kept in mind that the Judges at all levels
have to administer justice without fear or favour. Fearlessness and
maintenance of judicial independence are very essential for an
efficacious judicial system. Making adverse comments against
subordinate judicial officers and subjecting them to severe
disciplinary proceedings would ultimately harm the judicial system at
the grassroot level.??
It is significant to note that
after making the above observations, the Apex Court also noted that
apart from the merits of the case, the Court also went into the
confidential reports of the appellant-officer and noted that the
officer's integrity and honesty had never been doubted at any point
of time.
13. It is true, as pointed out by
Mr Pardiwala learned Standing Counsel for the High Court, that the
appellant officer in the above case before the Apex Court was the
Sessions Judge who was competent to grant bail and there was no
statutory bar against granting bail. On the other hand, in the
instant case, clause (i) of sub-section (1) of Section 437 prohibits
the Magistrate from granting bail to accused involved in offences
punishable with imprisonment for life or death, subject to the
exceptions contained in the first proviso. As noted above, the bail
orders were passed in the year 1993-94 and it appears that it was on
account of such orders that the High Court on the administrative side
also felt the need to set up a State Judicial Academy in 1994-95 to
impart training to the subordinate judiciary so that Judicial
Officers act within the bounds of the statutory provisions as
interpreted in the decisions of the Apex Court and this Court. Even
proceeding on the basis that the petitioner passed orders in cases
which were not exceptional cases and that in that sense, the orders
were passed beyond the scope of the authority of the Magistrate, the
question is whether the petitioner can be said to have conducted
himself in a manner as would reflect on his reputation or integrity
or good faith or whether there is prima-facie material to show
recklessness or misconduct in discharge of his duties or he had acted
in a manner to unduly favour a party or had passed an order actuated
by corrupt motive. The Apex Court has reiterated in the above
decision that in our system appellate and revisional courts have been
set up with the presupposition that the lower courts in some measure
of cases can go wrong in decision-making in law and in fact. The
higher courts have been established to correct errors.
14. In view of the above
observations, even proceeding on the basis that the petitioner
committed jurisdictional error in the seven cases under
consideration, we cannot overlook the facts that the petitioner was a
Judicial Magistrate presiding over the Criminal Court at Taluka
headquarters and in as many as five cases, out of the seven cases,
the learned PP had conceded that the alleged acts did not constitute
offences punishable under Section 307 IPC, that the accused as well
as the complainant and injured witnesses in six cases were
agriculturists (and not ?Spowerful accused??) or the incidents
arose out of sudden quarrels and in some cases there were even cross
complaints and that in five out of seven cases, the
complainants/injured witnesses were only treated as outdoor patients
and that except in one case (where PP had given consent), Section 326
was not even invoked in the FIR, in this set of circumstances, it is
not possible to hold, by implication, that the petitioner had passed
the bail orders due to corrupt motive or to unduly favour a party.
15. At the hearing of this
petition, we also requested the learned Standing Counsel for the High
Court to make available the service record of the petitioner, and on
going through the confidential reports, we found that the
petitioner's integrity and honesty had never been doubted at any
point of time. On the contrary, for a number of years, the reporting
and reviewing officers had certified that the petitioner's integrity
is beyond doubt. We also requested the learned Standing Counsel to
indicate any other material which could have a bearing on the
controversy, particularly in view of the fact that the petitioner was
promoted to the higher post of Civil Judge (SD) in the year 1996
after complaints were made in the year 1995 about the judicial orders
passed by him in the year 1993-94. On perusal of the relevant file,
we even find that a Senior Judge of this Court had visited Viramgam
and heard the advocates at Viramgam regarding the allegations. It was
thereafter that the petitioner was promoted as Civil Judge (SD) in
the year 1996. None of these aspects appear to have been noticed by
the Disciplinary Committee or the High Court on the administrative
side.
16. In the above background, we are
of the view that the petitioner's granting bail for offences
punishable under Section 307 IPC in the years 1993 and 1994 cannot
be construed as acting in a manner to unduly favour a party or
passing orders with corrupt motive. Granting bail in the cases under
consideration in 1993- 1994 cannot warrant the penal order of
compulsory retirement which has resulted into denial of pensionary
benefits for the services rendered since 1981. We are informed that
the officer compulsorily retired by way of punishment is not entitled
to any pensionary benefits, unless the Government decides in its
discretion to grant compassionate pension which is very rarely
granted and that too of a very small amount. The impugned order of
compulsory retirement, therefore, deserves to be set aside as
shockingly disproportionate.
18. Mr
Pardiwala has relied upon the decision in SN Jog vs. State of MP,
1981 (2) SLR 352 in support of the contention that when the impugned
decision was in case of a subordinate Judge, reached in a Judges'
meeting of the High Court, it is actually a corporate decision
emerging as a result of discussion in the meeting, where all possible
points of view are likely to be visualized and duly protected and
that the corporate decision reached by a large body of individuals of
equal authority after discussion in a meeting is an inherent
safeguard against arbitrariness or want of bonafides.
19. We
have considered the above submission and the decision relied upon.
While there is no question of want of bonafides on the part of the
respondents, having given anxious consideration to all the aspects of
the case at hand and having watched the decision making process in
this Institution in several disciplinary jurisdiction matters from
close quarters for the last five years, we may only say that the
principle is required to be applied with great caution.
20. Our attention has also been
invited to the decision of the Apex Court in Nawal Singh vs. State of
UP, 2004 (1) SLR 3, where the Court considered the provisions of UP
Fundamental Rules, Rule 56 providing for compulsory retirement and of
the UP Judicial Officers (Retirement on Superannuation) Rules, 1992.
In the said decision, the Court while upholding the exercise of
power of compulsory retirement (not after a disciplinary inquiry, but
by way of premature retirement or by not extending the services of an
officer beyond the age of 58 years) impressed upon the High Court
the need to exercise this power more frequently.
21. In response to a query from the
Court, the learned Standing Counsel for the High Court has stated
that apart from the cases where disciplinary inquiries were held and
orders of dismissal/ removal/ compulsory retirement from service were
passed or apart from the cases where the services of officers were
not continued beyond the age of 58 years, that is they were not
continued upto 60 years, no orders of premature retirement under
Rule 161 BCSR have been passed by the High Court in the last ten
years.
22. Even while taking the view that
the penal order of compulsory retirement deserves to be set aside for
the reasons indicated hereinabove, the next question is what reliefs
may be granted to the petitioner. Ordinarily, in such cases of the
disciplinary inquiry, the matter is to be remitted back to the
disciplinary authority which would consider the matter afresh after
taking into consideration the observations made in the judicial
verdict. However, it is now also recognized that in rare cases where
there has been long delay in the time taken by the disciplinary
proceedings and in the time taken in the Courts, in such extreme or
rare cases, the Court can substitute its own view while setting aside
the order of the disciplinary authority [vide Om Kumar & Ors. vs.
Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386 (paras 69 to 71)]
23. In the instant case, the orders
of bail in question were passed in the years 1993-94 and the
petitioner who had otherwise unblemished record remained under
suspension pending departmental inquiry from 17.12.1997 till the
impugned notification was issued on 16.8.2005. The petition is now
allowed more than three years after it was filed. In this set of
circumstances, we have considered the matter in light of the above
principles enunciated in Om Kumar's case (supra), we are of the view
that a Judicial Magistrate who has not remained within the bounds of
his jurisdiction is not required to be continued in service. At the
same time, having regard to the facts that in as many as five out of
seven cases, the learned PP had given consent recorded in the orders
and that in almost all cases the accused were poor agriculturists or
lowly paid persons (not powerful accused), that the judicial orders
in question were passed in the year 1993 -94 and that the petitioner
had otherwise unblemished record, that the petitioner remained under
suspension from 17.12.1997 till the impugned notification was issued
on 16.8.2005 and that the petitioner had completed 50 years of age
when the impugned notification was issued and having regard to the
principles laid down by the Apex Court in Om Kumar vs. Union of
India, AIR 2000 SC 3689 (para 71), the impugned order / notification
dated 27.4.2005/16.8.2005 be substituted by an order to be passed
under the relevant service rule prematurely retiring the petitioner
from service w.e.f. 16.8.2005, without paying the petitioner any
monetary benefit for the period of suspension except the
subsistence allowance already paid to the petitioner, but the
petitioner shall be entitled to receive the retiral benefits on the
basis of his pay which he would have drawn on 16.8.2005 had he not
been suspended.
24. In view of the above
discussion, the impugned order dated 27.4.2005/ notification dated
16.8.2005 is set aside and the same shall be substituted by the
order/notification to be issued by the respondents under the relevant
service rules prematurely retiring the petitioner from service w.e.f.
16.8.2005 without paying the petitioner any monetary benefit for the
period of suspension except the subsistence allowance already paid to
the petitioner, but the petitioner shall be entitled to receive the
retiral benefits on the basis of his pay which he would have drawn on
16.8.2005 had he not been suspended.
25. The above directions shall be
complied with within three months from the date of receipt of this
judgment.
Rule is made absolute to the above
extent only.
(M.S.
SHAH, J.)
(RAVI
R. TRIPATHI, J.)
zgs/-
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