Mehsana District Co-Operative Milk Producers Union Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Gujarat High Court, Judgment, Law, casemine.com

Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

Income-tax Reference No. 55 of 1986

Judges

A.R Dave
D.A Mehta, JJ.

Acts

provisions of Section 69 of the Gujarat Rajya Sahakari Co-operative Societies Act
provisions of Section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred
INCOME TAX ACT 1961
provisions of Section 32A(1)(b),

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench "A", referred nine questions to this court under Section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The references arose at the instance of both the assessee and the Revenue. The matters giving rise to the questions include claims under Section 35C (weighted deduction for certain agricultural dissemination activities), classification of roads as buildings or plant for depreciation, depreciation rate for fencing, deductibility of contributions under Section 69 of the Gujarat Rajya Sahakari Co-operative Societies Act, entitlement to investment allowance under Section 32A (particularly in respect of wireless equipment), and admissibility of depreciation on plant and machinery received by way of government subsidy.

For one contested question (Question No. 8) the factual history is developed in the opinion: the assessee claimed investment allowance under Section 32A for wireless equipment installed at chilling centres, at the factory, and on certain vehicles. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim; the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) upheld the disallowance treating the wireless equipment as office appliances; the Tribunal allowed the assessee's claim, holding the wireless equipment to be plant with a nexus to the production process. The Revenue referred Question No. 8 to this court. Other questions were disposed of by this court on the basis of previously decided cases cited in the opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in its interpretation and application of Section 35C of the Income-tax Act, 1961?
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the entire expenditure of Rs. 47,49,973 was not eligible for weighted deduction under Section 35C of the Income-tax Act?
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that only 10 per cent, of the expenses incurred on dissemination of information or demonstration of modern techniques and methods of agricultural, animal husbandry or dairy or poultry farming or advice on such techniques or method is eligible for deduction under Section 35C of the Income-tax Act?
Whether the Appellate Tribunal has been right in law and on facts in coming to the opinion that the relief under Section 35C of the Income-tax Act, 1961, requires to be granted to the assessee at 10 per cent, of the expenditure as claimed by the assessee for assessment year in question?
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in treating the roads as 'building' and not eligible to depreciation as 'plant'?
Whether the assessee is entitled in law to the depreciation on fencing at the rate of 10 per cent, applicable to plant?
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that contribution made as per the provisions of Section 69 of the Gujarat Rajya Sahakari Co-operative Societies Act is not deductible in the computation of the total income?
Whether, on the facts in law and particularly having regard to the provisions of section 32A read with the Eleventh Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Appellate Tribunal has not erred in holding that the assessee is entitled to investment allowance in respect of wireless equipment on the ground that wireless should be treated as plant?
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in holding that depreciation is not admissible on 30 per cent, of the value of the plant and machinery received by way of subsidy from the Government?

Arguments of the Parties

Revenue's Arguments

With respect to Questions Nos. 1–4, it was submitted by the learned advocates that this court has already answered similar questions in I.T.R. No. 32 of 1987 (Kaira District Co-operative Milk Producers Union Ltd. v. CIT), and accordingly the first four questions should be answered in the negative (i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue) as per the law laid down in that case.
On Question No. 5 (roads treated as 'building' vs 'plant'), the Revenue relied on the decision in CIT v. Kaira District Co-operative Milk Producers' Union Ltd. (2001) 247 ITR 314 (Guj) and submitted that the said case answers the question in favour of the Revenue.
On Question No. 6 (depreciation on fencing at plant rate), the Revenue relied on CIT, Bombay v. M/s Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (1992) 196 ITR 149 (SC) and submitted that law laid down there requires answering this question against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue.
Specifically for Question No. 8 (investment allowance for wireless equipment), Shri Akil Qureshi (for the Revenue) submitted that Section 32A(1)(b) disallows investment allowance in respect of any office appliance or road transport vehicle; although the wireless equipment was not disputed to be machinery, the Revenue's position was that use as an office appliance brings it within the prohibition of the second proviso to Section 32A(1).
For Question No. 9, the Revenue's position was met by the submission that the court had previously dealt with the issue in I.T.R. No. 51 of 1986 (the assessee's earlier matter) — the implication being reliance on that earlier decision.

Assessee's Arguments

With respect to Questions Nos. 1–4, learned advocates for the assessee (as recorded) submitted that this court's decision in I.T.R. No. 32 of 1987 (Kaira District Co-operative Milk Producers Union Ltd. v. CIT) answers the first four questions in the assessee's favour.
On Question No. 5, the assessee accepted that the issue was addressed by CIT v. Kaira District Co-operative Milk Producers' Union Ltd., and the tribunal's or court's ratio in that case was relied upon.
On Question No. 8 (central factual dispute), Shri J. P. Shah (for the assessee) submitted that the wireless equipment constituted plant or machinery eligible for investment allowance under Section 32A, because the necessary conditions of Section 32A(1) were satisfied; the wireless equipment was not used in office premises and therefore could not be treated as an office appliance within Section 32A(1)(b).
The assessee argued that the Revenue bore the burden to prove that the wireless equipment was an office appliance; the Tribunal had found as fact that the wireless sets were installed at chilling centres, on vehicles and at factory premises and had nexus with the production process, and those factual findings favoured allowing investment allowance.
The assessee relied on precedent authorities (as examples) to demonstrate that items ordinarily thought of as office appliances or transport vehicles may, depending on purpose and use, be treated differently for tax purposes: CIT v. Tarun Commercial Mills Ltd. (to define "office appliance"), CIT v. Cochin Refineries Ltd. (to show special-purpose vehicle may not be road transport vehicle), and CIT v. SLM Maneklal Industries Ltd. (to show items like a wall clock can be "plant" depending on context).
For Question No. 9, the assessee relied on this court's own earlier decision in I.T.R. No. 51 of 1986 in which (according to the submission) the question was answered in its favour.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
I.T.R. No. 32 of 1987 (Kaira District Co-operative Milk Producers Union Ltd. v. CIT) [2002] 253 ITR 766	Interpretation/application of Section 35C and related questions concerning weighted deduction — used to determine Questions Nos. 1–4.	The court applied the law laid down in this decision to answer Questions Nos. 1–4 in the negative (i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue) as per the submissions in the opinion.
CIT v. Kaira District Co-operative Milk Producers' Union Ltd. [2001] 247 ITR 314 (Guj)	Authority on classification of roads/buildings and other issues (applied to Question Nos. 5 and 7 as cited).	The court relied on the ratio of this judgment to answer Question No. 5 in the affirmative (in favour of the Revenue) and Question No. 7 in the negative (in favour of the assessee), as stated in the opinion.
CIT, Bombay v. M/s Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1992] 196 ITR 149 (SC)	Law regarding classification for depreciation purposes (referred to on Question No. 6).	The court applied the law laid down in this Supreme Court decision to answer Question No. 6 in the negative (against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue).
CIT v. Tarun Commercial Mills Ltd. [1985] 151 ITR 75 (Guj)	Definition/interpretation of "office appliance" — that an appliance must be capable of being primarily used in an office to be termed an office appliance.	The court quoted and applied this explanation to conclude that wireless equipment, not being primarily used in an office, could not be treated as an office appliance for the purposes of Section 32A(1)(b).
CIT v. Cochin Refineries Ltd. [1995] 212 ITR 664 (Ker)	Illustration that a vehicle used for special purpose may not be treated as a road transport vehicle in ordinary circumstances.	The assessee relied on this precedent; the court considered this line of authority in support of the view that special-purpose use can alter classification (as part of the assessee's argument regarding wireless on vehicles).
CIT v. SLM Maneklal Industries Ltd. [1994] 205 ITR 547 (Guj)	Illustrative authority that even an item like a wall clock can be considered "plant" depending on use and context.	The court recorded the assessee's reliance on this decision to support the proposition that purpose and use determine whether an item is plant; the court used similar reasoning in upholding the Tribunal's finding of nexus with production for the wireless equipment.
I.T.R. No. 51 of 1986 (the assessee's earlier matter cited by the court)	Addressed the admissibility of depreciation on 30% of value of plant and machinery received by way of subsidy (Question No. 9).	The court relied on the law laid down in this earlier decision to answer Question No. 9 in the negative (in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded question by question, largely applying existing authorities where the parties and the court considered those authorities dispositive. The approach and analysis in the opinion are as follows:

Questions Nos. 1–4: The court accepted the submission that those questions were answered by this court in I.T.R. No. 32 of 1987 (Kaira District Co-operative Milk Producers Union Ltd. v. CIT). Applying the law laid down in that decision, the court answered Questions 1–4 in the negative (i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue).
Question No. 5: The court took the view that this question had been addressed in CIT v. Kaira District Co-operative Milk Producers' Union Ltd. (2001) 247 ITR 314 (Guj) and, applying the ratio of that case, answered Question No. 5 in the affirmative (in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee).
Question No. 6: The court relied on the decision in CIT, Bombay v. M/s Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (1992) 196 ITR 149 (SC). Looking to the law laid down therein, the court answered Question No. 6 in the negative (against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue).
Question No. 7: The court applied the ratio of CIT v. Kaira District Co-operative Milk Producers' Union Ltd. (2001) 247 ITR 314 (Guj) and answered Question No. 7 in the negative (in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue).
Question No. 8 (investment allowance in respect of wireless equipment): the opinion sets out the factual findings and the competing legal submissions in detail. The court noted:
- The assessee's claim: wireless equipments were installed at chilling centres, at the factory and on vehicles; they were used to regulate supply of milk and to contact veterinary surgeons; the items were machinery/plant and eligible for investment allowance under Section 32A because necessary statutory conditions were satisfied.
- The Assessing Officer and CIT(A) had rejected the claim on the basis that the wireless equipments were office appliances used for administration/communication, and hence excluded by Section 32A(1)(b) and its proviso.
- The Tribunal had reversed those conclusions on findings of fact: the wireless equipments were not installed in the office, were installed at production-related locations and on vehicles, and had nexus with the production process; therefore the Tribunal held the items to be plant eligible for investment allowance.
- The Revenue's legal contention relied on Section 32A(1)(b) and the second proviso to Section 32A(1) which, the Revenue argued, excludes office appliances and road transport vehicles from investment allowance.
- The assessee argued that the equipment was not an office appliance and the Revenue had to establish otherwise; the assessee relied on authorities showing that purpose and use determine classification.
The court emphasized that the Tribunal is a final fact-finding authority and accepted the Tribunal's findings that the wireless equipments were not installed in the office and had a nexus with the production process. The court quoted this court's earlier decision in Tarun Commercial Mills to explain the meaning of "office appliance": an appliance must be capable of being primarily used in an office to be so characterized. Applying that principle, the court concluded that wireless equipments in the present factual setting could not be treated as office appliances and thus were not covered by the proviso to Section 32A(1). Consequently, the assessee was eligible for investment allowance under Section 32A in respect of the wireless equipments.
Question No. 9: The court noted that this question had been answered by this court in the assessee's earlier matter (I.T.R. No. 51 of 1986) and, applying that law, answered Question No. 9 in the negative (in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue).

Holding and Implications

Final Disposition: The reference was disposed of by the court with no order as to costs.

Summary of Answers to the Questions Referred:

Questions Nos. 1–4: Answered in the negative — in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue (as per this court's earlier decision I.T.R. No. 32 of 1987).
Question No. 5: Answered in the affirmative — in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee (relying on CIT v. Kaira).
Question No. 6: Answered in the negative — against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue (relying on CIT, Bombay v. M/s Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing Co. Ltd.).
Question No. 7: Answered in the negative — in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue (relying on CIT v. Kaira).
Question No. 8: Answered in the negative — in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The court held that the wireless equipment installed at chilling centres, on vehicles and at the factory was not an "office appliance" and therefore the assessee was entitled to investment allowance under Section 32A.
Question No. 9: Answered in the negative — in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue (relying on I.T.R. No. 51 of 1986).

Implications: The decision resolves the referred questions as listed above and implements existing authorities to decide most issues; the opinion does not articulate broader, novel legal propositions beyond applying precedent and affirming the Tribunal's factual findings on Question No. 8. The direct effect is the resolution of the reference in accordance with the answers set out; the court made no order as to costs.

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Mehsana District Co-Operative Milk Producers Union Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax

1. At the instance of the assessee as well as the Revenue, the following nine questions have been referred to this court for its opinion by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench "A", under the provisions of Section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act")":

At the instance of the assessee :

"1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in its interpretation and application of Section 35C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ?

2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the entire expenditure of Rs. 47,49,973 was not eligible for weighted deduction under Section 35C of the Income-tax Act?

3. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that only 10 per cent, of the expenses incurred on dissemination of information or demonstration of modern techniques and methods of agricultural, animal husbandry or dairy or poultry farming or advice on such techniques or method is eligible for deduction under Section 35C of the Income-tax Act ?"

At the instance of the Revenue :

"4. Whether the Appellate Tribunal has been right in law and on facts in coming to the opinion that the relief under Section 35C of the Income-tax Act, 1961, requires to be granted to the assessee at 10 per cent, of the expenditure as claimed by the assessee for assessment year in question ?"

At the instance of the assessee :

"5. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in treating the roads as 'building' and not eligible to depreciation as 'plant' ?"

At the instance of the Revenue :

"6. Whether the assessee is entitled in law to the depreciation on fencing at the rate of 10 per cent, applicable to plant ?"

At the instance of the assessee :

"7. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that contribution made as per the provisions of Section 69 of the Gujarat Rajya Sahakari Co-operative Societies Act is not deductible in the computation of the total income ?"

At the instance of the Revenue :

"8. Whether, on the facts and in law and particularly having regard to the provisions of section 32a read with the Eleventh Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Appellate Tribunal has not erred in holding that the assessee is entitled to investment allowance in respect of wireless equipment on the ground that wireless should be treated as plant ?"

At the instance of the assessee :

"9. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in holding that depreciation is not admissible on 30 per cent, of the value of the plant and machinery received by way of subsidy from the Government ?"

2. So far as questions Nos. 1 to 4 are concerned, it has been submitted by the learned advocates that this court has answered the said questions in I. T. R. No. 32 of 1987 (Kaira District Co-operative Milk Producers Union Ltd. v. CIT [2002] 253 ITR 766) and as per law laid down by this court in the said case, the first four questions referred to hereinabove are answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

3. So far as question No. 5 is concerned, it has been submitted by the learned advocates that the said question has been answered in the case of CIT v. Kaira District Co-operative Milk Producers' Union Ltd. [2001] 247 ITR 314 (Guj). In view of the ratio of the judgment delivered in the said case, we answer question No. 5 in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.

4. So far as question No. 6 is concerned, it has been submitted by the learned advocates that the said question has been answered in the case of Cit, Bombay v. M/S Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing Co. Ltd.. [1992] 196 ITR 149 (SC). Looking to the law laid down in the said case, we answer the said question in the negative, i.e., against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue.

5. So far as question No. 7 is concerned, it has been submitted by the learned advocates that the said question has also been answered in the case of CIT v. Kaira District Co-operative Milk Producers' Union Ltd. [2001] 247 ITR 314 (Guj). In view of the ratio of the said judgment, we answer question No. 7 in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

6. There is some controversy so far as question No. 8 is concerned. The question is whether investment allowance can be allowed in respect of wireless equipments which were installed by the assessee for maintaining contact between chilling centres inter se and between chilling centres and the factory for the purpose of regulating supply of milk from one chilling centre to another or from one chilling centre to the factory. Some facts will have to be looked into for the purpose of answering the said question.

7. The assessee claimed investment allowance on wireless equipments which were installed in chilling centres, factory and on certain vehicles. According to the assessee, the said wireless equipments or wireless sets were required for the purpose of regulating supply of milk to chilling centres and to the factory. Moreover, it was also required for the purpose of contacting veterinary surgeons. As the said equipments, according to the assessee, were machinery or plant, the assessee was eligible to get deduction under the provisions of section 32a of the Act as investment allowance.

8. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim and, therefore, the assessee filed an appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) upheld the order of the Assessing Officer by observing that the said wireless equipments were not installed as factory equipments but were installed for the purpose of having better communication system and therefore they were for the purpose of giving more facility to the office administration. According to the appellate authority, the said wireless equipments were office appliances and therefore no investment allowance could have been allowed to the assessee under Section 32A of the Act.

9. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the appeal, the assessee approached the Tribunal by filing an appeal. After hearing the concerned parties, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the Assessing Officer and the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) had wrongly decided that the assessee should not get benefit under the provisions of section 32a of the Act. According to the Tribunal, the wireless equipments/sets were plants and were not office appliances and the said wireless sets had nexus with the production process. For the purpose of arriving at the said conclusion, the Tribunal had looked into the purpose for which the said wireless sets were used. It has been observed by the Tribunal that wireless equipments/sets were installed at the chilling centres, on vehicles belonging to the assessee and at the factory premises of the assessee as they were required for the purpose of maintaining contact between chilling centres inter se and between chilling centres and the factory. It also appeared to the Tribunal that the wireless equipments were very much required for the purpose of regulating supply of milk at chilling centres and at the factory of the assessee. Thus, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the wireless equipments had nexus with the production process and by observing so, the Tribunal upheld the claim of the assessee made under the provisions of section 32a of the Act.

10. The learned advocate, Shri Akil Qureshi, appearing for the Revenue, at whose instance the said question has been referred to this court, has submitted that according to the provisions of Section 32A(1)(b), no investment allowance can be allowed in respect of any office appliance or road transport vehicle. He has drawn our attention to the second proviso to Section 32A(1) and has submitted that though investment allowance can be given on machinery and plant specified in Sub-section (2) of Section 32A of the Act, no deduction can be allowed under Section 32A in respect of any office appliance or road transport vehicle as provided in section 32a(1)(b). It has not been disputed by the Revenue that the wireless equipment is a machinery. But the case of the Revenue is that if the machinery or plant which is used as office appliance, by virtue of the second proviso to Section 32A of the Act, the assessee is not eligible for investment allowance.

11. On the other hand, the learned advocate, Shri J. P. Shah, appearing for the assessee, has submitted that the assessee is entitled to investment allowance as per the provisions of section 32a of the Act for the reason that the wireless equipment is a plant or machinery, which is eligible for investment allowance under Section 32A of the Act, as necessary conditions incorporated in Section 32A(1) have been complied with in respect of wireless equipments. It has been submitted by the learned advocate appearing for the assessee that the wireless equipment cannot be treated as an office appliance as it was admittedly not being used in the office premises of the assessee, so as to deprive the assessee of the benefit of investment allowance. According to him, the Revenue must establish that the wireless equipment is an office appliance. It has been submitted by him that the Tribunal has come to the conclusion on the facts of the case that the wireless equipments/sets had nexus with the production process. He has relied upon certain judgments to show that the wireless equipment is not an office appliance and for that purpose he has relied upon the judgment delivered in the case of CIT v. Tarun Commercial Mills Ltd. [1985] 151 ITR 75 (Guj). He has also relied upon the judgment delivered in the case of CIT v. Cochin Refineries Ltd. [1995] 212 ITR 664 (Ker), to show that the vehicle which is used for special purpose may not be treated as a road transport vehicle, though in the ordinary circumstances, it may be treated as a transport vehicle. He has also submitted that in certain cases the Revenue has to look at the purpose for which the plant or machinery is being used. So as to give an instance, he has referred to the judgment delivered in the case of CIT v. SLM Maneklal Industries Ltd. [1994] 205 ITR 547 (Guj), wherein it was held that even a wall clock can be said to be "plant" and development rebate can be given in respect of the cost of the wall clock.

12. We have heard the learned advocates at length. We are of the opinion that the Tribunal did not commit any error while coming to the conclusion that the assessee was eligible for benefit under the provisions of section 32a of the Act in respect of the wireless equipments/sets. It is pertinent to note that the Tribunal is a final fact-finding authority. The Tribunal has found that the wireless equipments were installed by the assessee at the chilling centres, the factory and on the vehicles belonging to the assessee. Thus, it is a matter of fact that the said equipments were not installed in the office. Moreover, the Tribunal has also come to the conclusion that the wireless equipments had nexus with the production process. Apart from the above findings, in our opinion, it cannot be said that the wireless equipments which were installed by the assessee were office appliances. This court, in the case of Tarun Commercial Mills [1985] 151 ITR 75, while referring to the word "appliance" has observed as under (page 82) :

"The word 'appliance' is qualified by the word 'office' and, therefore, we must give some meaning to the word 'office' and unless an appliance is capable of being primarily used in an office, it cannot be termed as 'office appliance'. It must be, therefore, an appliance which is generally used in office as an aid or a facility for the proper functioning of the office."

13. Thus, this court has observed that unless an appliance is capable of being primarily used in an office, it cannot be termed as "office appliance". In the normal circumstances, wireless equipments are not used as office appliances in the office for the purpose of communication. Normally it is issued for the purpose of communication with a person who moves around a lot and who cannot be easily contacted at fixed places where there is a facility of telephone. Looking to the meaning of the word "office appliance" given by this court in the judgment referred to hereinabove, we also come to the conclusion that, in the instant case, the wireless equipment cannot be termed or treated as an office appliance.

14. If the wireless equipment, which is not used in the office and which is not an office appliance, it cannot be said that it is covered by the second proviso to Section 32A(1) of the Act. In such a case, in our opinion, the assessee would become eligible to have benefit under Section 32A of the Act.

15. For the reasons stated hereinabove, we are of the view that the wireless equipment cannot be treated as an office appliance and, therefore, the Tribunal has rightly allowed the claim of the assessee under the provisions of section 32a of the Act, In the circumstances, we answer question No. 8 in the negative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

16. So far as question No. 9 is concerned, it has been submitted by the learned advocate that the said question has been answered by this court in the case of the assessee itself in I. T. R. No. 51 of 1986. Looking to the law laid down by this court in the said judgment, we answer the said question in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

17. The reference thus stands disposed of with no order as to costs.

Mehsana District Co-Operative Milk Producers Union Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Revenue's Arguments

Assessee's Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Mehsana District Co-Operative Milk Producers Union Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax

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