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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • T.H.Sompura
  • Sudhanshu Patel
  • R.S.Sanjanwala
Judges
  • Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mohit Shantilal Shah
Acts
  • provisions of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act").
  • Section 84C of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Tenancy Act"),
  • provisions of Section 9 of the Fragmentation Act
  • Section 7 of the Fragmentation Act
  • Orissa Estate Abolition Act,
  • Section 6(2)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • T.H.Sompura
  • Sudhanshu Patel
  • R.S.Sanjanwala
Judges
  • Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mohit Shantilal Shah
Acts
  • provisions of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act").
  • Section 84C of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Tenancy Act"),
  • provisions of Section 9 of the Fragmentation Act
  • Section 7 of the Fragmentation Act
  • Orissa Estate Abolition Act,
  • Section 6(2)
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition, filed under Article 226 read with Article 227 of the Constitution, challenges the Government's judgment and order dated 24-3-1998 in Revision Application No. SRD/CON/Ahmedabad/12 of 1995 under the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947 ("the Act").

Relevant factual and procedural events, as set out in the opinion, are:

  • Petitioner sold land measuring 1 Acre & 2 Gunthas to respondent No. 3 by registered sale deed dated 16-10-1978; mutation entry (No. 1491) made on 20-12-1978 and certified on 8-10-1979.
  • In 1993 an R.T.S. team considered the land a fragment; Deputy Collector initiated proceedings suo motu on 13-6-1993 and by order dated 30-6-1993 held the land to be a fragment, deciding the transaction violated Section 7 of the Act and was void under Section 9; an order was passed to remove respondent No. 3 from the land.
  • The matter went in revision to the State Government which remanded for a detailed inquiry about irrigation status and service of notice under Section 6(2). After inquiry, the Deputy Collector on 31-5-1996 again held that Section 6(2) notice was served, land was a fragment, and the transaction was void under Section 9, with consequential removal order.
  • Respondent No. 3 challenged the Deputy Collector's order by Revision Application No. 12 of 1995 before the State Government; the Additional Chief Secretary (Appeals) allowed the revision on two grounds: (i) proceedings were initiated after 15 years, beyond a reasonable time; (ii) the land was irrigated and, being over 20 Gunthas, not a fragment.
  • The Government order allowing revision is the subject of this Special Civil Application before This Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the State Government's revisional allowance of the Deputy Collector's order was legally maintainable where the suo motu proceedings were initiated after a lapse of about 15 years—i.e., whether the revisional/suo motu power under the Act must be exercised within a "reasonable time".
  2. Whether the land in question was a fragment under the Act (and therefore the sale was void under Section 7 and Section 9), taking into account its irrigation status and the date(s) on which irrigation commenced.
  3. Whether a purchaser can defend a transaction found to be void under Section 7 of the Fragmentation Act by relying on the passage of time (lapse of years) or whether there is an exception where the party seeking relief is guilty of fraud or suppression of material facts.
  4. How precedents concerning the exercise of revisional or suo motu powers without a statutory time-limit (and the doctrine of "reasonable time") apply to proceedings under the Fragmentation Act, including the relevance of authorities decided under other statutes (e.g., Tenancy Act, Orissa Estate Abolition Act).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner (represented by Mr. S.H. Sanjanwala, Senior Advocate)

  • Contended that the Tribunal erred in relying on This Court's decision in Ranchhodbhai Lallubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat and Ors. (1984 (2) GLR 1225) and an earlier decision of This Court, because a later decision of this Court (Patel Jividas Trikamdas v. District Collector, 1996 (2) GLR 688) and the Supreme Court decision in State of Orissa v. Brundaban Sharma (1995 Suppl. (3) SCC 249) modified those earlier ratios.
  • Relied on Patel Jividas Trikamdas which, on the petitioner’s reading, held that even if proceedings under Section 9 were initiated after 20 years, a purchaser cannot defend a void transaction on the ground of lapse of time.
  • Challenged the Tribunal's finding that the land was irrigated: submitted respondent No. 3 admitted irrigation only began from 1990 onwards, so the land was not irrigated at the time of the 1978 transfer; thus the status at the date of transfer was the relevant factor, not later irrigation.
  • Argued that Section 9 of the Fragmentation Act renders the transaction void and that the distinction between "void" and "invalid" requires the Court to apply Section 9 strictly regardless of other considerations (e.g., lapse of time).

Respondent / State (represented by Mr. Sudhanshu Patel for respondent No. 4)

  • Submitted that the Government made a factual finding (based on record) that the land was irrigated; village Form No. 7/12 indicated irrigation from 1976-77 with crops recorded.
  • Argued there was no evidence that the notice under Section 6(2) was served on the owner at the relevant time; asserted the petitioner's later testimony was interested and could not be the sole basis to hold the notice had been served earlier.
  • Relied on a decision of This Court dated 14-10-1997 in Special Civil Application No. 6891 of 1997 to support the proposition that equity does not favour sellers who now attempt to challenge the transaction they themselves executed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ranchhodbhai Lallubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat and Ors., 1984 (2) GLR 1225 Earlier view under the Fragmentation Act regarding the effect of delay in initiating proceedings. The Court held this decision's ratio has been modified: it remains subject to the exception that a plea of delay cannot be availed of by a person guilty of fraud or suppression of material facts when such fraud/suppression is later discovered.
Patel Jividas Trikamdas and Ors. v. District Collector, Mehsana and Ors., 1996 (2) GLR 688 Held that even where Section 9 proceedings were initiated after a long period (20 years), a purchaser could not defend a void transaction on the ground of lapse of time. The Court noted this decision prima facie supported the petitioner but reconciled it with the general reasonable-time principle and the fraud/suppression exception drawn from Supreme Court authority.
State of Orissa v. Brundaban Sharma, 1995 Suppl. (3) SCC 249 Held that suo motu/revisional power can be exercised to prevent suppression of agricultural land; limitation runs from discovery of fraud or suppression; revisional power must be exercised reasonably. The Court relied on this Apex Court decision to identify an exception: where fraud or suppression exists, authorities can act even after long lapse; this informed the Court's modification of Ranchhodbhai's ratio.
Mohemad Kavi Mohamad Amin v. Fatimabai Ibrahim, Civil Appeal No. 5023 of 1985 (decided 22-8-1996) Held that where no time-limit is prescribed for exercise of a power under a statute, the power must be exercised within a reasonable time. The Court invoked this decision to endorse the general principle that powers without a statutory limit must be exercised within a reasonable time and applied that principle to the Fragmentation Act.
State of Gujarat v. Jethmal Shaowandas Shah, Special Civil Application No. 2770 of 1979 (decided 1-3-1990) Held that power under Section 84C of the Tenancy Act should be exercised within a reasonable time. The Court noted this decision (approved by the Apex Court) as part of the line of authorities supporting the reasonable-time requirement for exercise of statutory powers.
State of Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar, 1996 (1) SCC 435 Discussed the meaning of "void": a void order/decision may be effective inter partes until successfully avoided; "void" is relative and has degrees of invalidity. The Court used this discussion to state that even a void transaction must be declared before it can be ignored and that such declarations are to be made exercising power within a reasonable time, subject to exceptions.
Special Civil Application No. 6891 of 1997 (This Court, decision dated 14-10-1997) Observed that equity does not lie in favour of petitioners who were sellers and who later seek to project illegality of the transaction they executed. Relied upon by respondent to argue against granting equitable relief to the petitioner-seller.
State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha and Ors.; Ram Chand and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. Referenced as part of a catena of decisions supporting the general proposition that powers without prescribed time limits must be exercised within a reasonable time. Cited to reinforce the general principle that "reasonable time" must govern exercise of such powers; Court treated these as consistent with the Mohemad Kavi line.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in a series of connected legal steps:

  1. The Court acknowledged two strands of authority: (a) decisions under the Fragmentation Act (including Ranchhodbhai and Patel Jividas) which had sometimes supported revival of proceedings despite long delays; and (b) Supreme Court authority (notably Mohemad Kavi Mohamad Amin) establishing that a power without a statutory time-limit must be exercised within a reasonable time.
  2. The Court identified State of Orissa v. Brundaban Sharma as articulating an important exception: where an order is vitiated by illegality, fraud, or suppression of material facts, revisional/suo motu powers can be exercised even after long lapse of time, with limitation running from discovery of the fraud or suppression.
  3. Reconciling the two lines, the Court concluded there was no real conflict: the general rule is that powers must be exercised within a reasonable time (as per Mohemad Kavi and allied authorities), but there is an exception to permit late action where fraud or suppression is discovered (as per Brundaban Sharma). Thus, earlier Fragmentation Act decisions are to be treated as modified by this exception.
  4. Applying these principles to the instant case, the Court observed that the petitioner-seller did not allege that the purchaser (respondent No. 3) committed fraud or suppressed material facts. Indeed, the Court noted the seller would be expected to know the facts better than the purchaser, and that the revenue entry itself referred to examination of whether the land was a fragment — so there was no concealment from authorities.
  5. The Court found nothing to show delay in commencing proceedings in 1993 was attributable to wrongful acts of the purchaser; therefore the Tribunal's finding that the proceedings were initiated after an unreasonable delay did not merit interference under Articles 226/227.
  6. The Court further considered the land's irrigation status. Orders from 1951 provided that irrigated land is a fragment only if under 20 Gunthas whereas non-irrigated land under 2 acres is a fragment. The land (1 Acre & 2 Gunthas) had been irrigated since about 1989-90 (a matter in dispute as to exact year), and thus for the last approximately nine years it had been irrigated. Consequently, sale after 1989-90 would not have been void; this was an additional ground to refrain from interfering, since the object of the Act was not presently being frustrated.
  7. The Court also relied on the Supreme Court's discussion in State of Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar regarding the relative meaning of "void" to emphasize that even a void transaction ordinarily remains effective inter partes until declared void, and that declarations should be made exercising revisional power within a reasonable time (subject to the fraud/suppression exception).
  8. On balance, the Court concluded that the Government's allowance of the revision (on the ground of delay and irrigation findings) did not warrant interference: the petitioner had not shown the purchaser was guilty of fraud/suppression, and there was an independent basis (irrigation status) for the Government's decision.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is dismissed. Notice is discharged. Because the main petition is disposed of, Civil Application No. 4695 of 1998 does not survive and is disposed of accordingly.

Implications and consequences of the decision as stated in the opinion:

  • The Court affirmed the general legal principle that statutory powers lacking a prescribed time-limit must be exercised within a reasonable time, while recognizing the established exception that late exercise is permissible where it is done to remedy fraud, suppression or illegality discovered later (relying on State of Orissa v. Brundaban Sharma and allied authority).
  • The Court treated the prior ratio of Ranchhodbhai Lallubhai Patel (a decision under the Fragmentation Act) as modified: it remains subject to the exception that a plea of delay cannot be availed of by a person guilty of fraud or suppression of material facts when such fraud/suppression comes to light after a long lapse of time.
  • On the facts of this case the petitioner (seller) did not establish fraud or suppression by the purchaser; the Court therefore declined to interfere with the Government's revisional order on the ground of unreasonable delay.
  • Because the land was found to have been irrigated since about 1989-90, the object of the Act was not being frustrated at present; this factual finding reinforced the decision not to disturb the Government's order.
  • The decision has the direct effect of dismissing the petition and disposing the connected civil application; the Court did not purport to lay down a novel or broad new precedent beyond treating existing Fragmentation Act authority as subject to the fraud/suppression exception and reaffirming the reasonable-time principle.

This summary is based exclusively on material contained within the provided opinion. No facts, arguments, or holdings beyond those expressly set out in the opinion have been added.

Show full summary ...

    Jiviben v. State Of Gujarat

    1. This petition purporting to be a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution read with Article 227 of the Constitution challenges the judgment and order dated 24-3-1998 passed by the State Government in Revision Application No. SRD/ CON/Ahmedabad/12 of 1995 under the provisions of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act").

    2. The petitioner sold the land in question admeasuring 1 Acre & 2 Gunthas to respondent No. 3 herein by a registered sale deed dated 16-10-1978. The mutation entry to that effect being entry No. 1491 was made in the revenue record on 20-12-1978 and was certified on 8-10-1979. R.T.S. team was of the view that the land in question was a fragment and, therefore, the proceedings were initiated by the Deputy Collector on 13-6-1993. The Deputy Collector held by order dated 30-6-1993 that the land in question was a fragment and the transaction in question was in violation of Section 7 of the Act and was, therefore, void as per Section 9 of the Act. The matter was carried in revision before the Government which remanded the matter for holding a detailed inquiry on the question whether the land was irrigated, whether the notice under Section 6(2) of the Act was served upon the original owner and thereafter the Deputy Collector was to hear the parties and decide the matter afresh. Pursuant to that order of remand, the Deputy Collector held the inquiry and after hearing the parties held in his order dated 31-5-1996 that the notice under Section 6(2) of the Act was served on the owner (i.e., the petitioner herein) and that the land in question was a fragment and the transaction in question was in violation of Section 7 of the Act and, therefore, void under Section 9 of the Act. The consequential order for removing respondent No. 3 from the land in question was also passed.

    3. Aggrieved by the above order of the Deputy Collector, respondent No. 3 preferred Revision Application No. 12 of 1995 before the State Government. After hearing the parties and considering the material on record, the Additional Chief Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department exercising the powers of the revisional authority allowed the Revision Application on the following grounds:

    (i) The proceedings were initiated after a period of 15 years which was far beyond the reasonable time during which such proceedings could have been initiated.

    (ii) The land in question was irrigated land and, therefore, since it was more than 20 Gunthas in area, it was not a fragment.

    It is the aforesaid order of the Government which is under challenge in the present Special Civil Application.

    4. At the hearing of this petition, Mr. S.H. Sanjanwala, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner has submitted that the Tribunal has erred in relying on the decision of This Court in the case of Ranchhodbhai Lallubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat and Ors. 1984 (2) GLR 1225 and on the decision rendered by This Court on 29-2-1988 in Special Civil Application No. 4583 of 1985 because in the subsequent decision of This Court in the case of Patel Jividas Trikamdas and Ors. v. District Collector, Mehsana and Ors. 1996 (2) GLR 688, This Court has held that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Brundaban Sharma 1995 Suppl. (3) SCC 249, the ratio of the judgments of This Court in the case of Ranchhodbhai (supra) and the other case have been watered down. It is submitted that in the aforesaid case of Patel Jividas Trikamdas (supra), This Court had held that even if the proceedings under Section 9 of the Act were initiated after a period of 20 years, if the transaction was found to be void being in violation of the provisions of Section 7 of the Act, the purchaser cannot defend such void transaction on the ground of lapse of a number of years.

    The Learned Counsel for the petitioner also challenged the finding of the Tribunal that the land in question was an irrigated land. It is submitted that even as per the admission made by respondent No. 3 before the authorities, the land came to be irrigated from 1990 onwards and, therefore, the land was admittedly not being irrigated in the year 1978 when the transfer under the challenge took place. It is, therefore, submitted that the status of the land on the date of the order of the Deputy Collector or the judgment of the Government was not relevant.

    5. In reply, Mr. Sudhanshu Patel, Learned Counsel for respondent No. 4 has submitted that the Government has given a finding of fact, on the basis of the material on record, that the land was being irrigated. It is clearly mentioned in the village form No. 7/12 right from the years 1976-77 onwards that the land was being irrigated and the crops of brinjals, castor, cotton etc. were being taken. It is further submitted that even if the land was a fragment, there was nothing on record to show that the notice under Section 6(2) of the Act was served upon the owner at the relevant time and that the subsequent interested testimony of the petitioner to take undue advantage after 15 years cannot be made the sole basis for holding that the notice under Section 6(2) was served upon the petitioner at the relevant time. Mr. Patel has placed strong reliance on the decision dated 14-10-1997 of This Court in Special Civil Application No. 6891 of 1997 wherein This Court had an occasion to observe that equity does not lie in favour of the petitioners who were themselves sellers of the land in question and who were now trying to project the illegality of the transaction.

    6. It appears to the Court that the decision of This Court in the case of Patel Jividas (supra) prima facie supports the petitioner's case. However, in an unreported (now reported) decision on 22-8-1996 in Civil Appeal No. 5023 of 1985 (Mohemad Kavi Mohamad Amin v. Fatimabai Ibrahim , the Apex Court has held that where no time-limit is prescribed for exercise of a power under a statute it does not mean that it can be exercised at any time; such power has to be exercised within a reasonable time. In the aforesaid decision dated 22-8-1996, the Apex Court has also approved the ratio of the judgment of This Court speaking through Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.B. Majmudar (as His Lordship then was) in Special Civil Application No. 2770 of 1979 (State of Gujarat v. Jethmal Shaowandas Shah) decided on 1-3-1990 that the power under Section 84C of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Tenancy Act"), should be exercised within a reasonable time.

    7. Mr. Sanjanwala, however, vehemently argued that in the later line of cases, the Court was concerned with the transactions under the Tenancy Act and not under the provisions of fragmentation act which has a different object and that the case of Patel Jividas (supra) was directly concerned with the Fragmentation Act and is based on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Brundaban Sharma (supra).

    8. Having given anxious and thoughtful consideration to the submissions of the Learned Counsel, This Court is of the view that there is no conflict between the two lines of cases. Although, prima facie, it may appear that the view taken by This Court in the case of Ranchhodbhai Lallubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat and Ors. 1984 (2) GLR 1225 decided under the Fragmentation Act has been watered down by the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Brundaban Sharma 1995 Suppl. (3) SCC 249 which was a case under the Orissa Estate Abolition Act, it cannot, however, be overlooked that, while holding that the order in question could be set aside even after a lapse of 27 years, the Apex Court made the following observations:

    The obvious intendment in conferring suo motu power was to prevent suppression of the agricultural land, liable to be included, or held by the declarant and he cannot plead in his defence his own fraud or suppression and seek shelter thereunder. When the original order was vitiated by illegality or impropriety committed by officer or authority or was passed due to suppression of the material facts or fraud, it was open to the Tribunal to reopen the same. The limitation would start running from the date of the discovery of the fraud or suppression of material or relevant fact or omission thereof.

    In para 16 of the judgment, the Apex Court further made the following pertinent observations:

    It is, therefore, settled law that when the revisional power was conferred to effectuate a purpose, it is to be exercised in a reasonable manner which inheres the concept of its exercise within a reasonable time. Absence of limitation is an assurance to exercise the power with caution or circumspection to effectuate the purpose of the Act, or to prevent miscarriage of justice or violation of the provisions of the Act or misuse or abuse of the power by the lower authorities or fraud or suppression. Length of time depends on the factual scenario in a given case. Take a case that patta was obtained fraudulently in collusion with the officers and it comes to the notice of the authorities after a long lapse of time. Does it lie in the mouth of the party to the fraud to plead limitation to get away with the order? Does lapse of time an excuse to refrain from exercising the revision power to unravel fraud and to set it right? The answers would be no.

    9. The aforesaid observations of the Apex Court, therefore, clearly indicate that if a person is trying to take advantage of his own fraud or suppression of material facts by him, then he cannot complain against the authorities taking action after a long period if such fraud or suppression comes to the notice of the authorities after a long lapse of time. Hence, this proposition merely constitutes an exception to the general rule propounded by the Apex Court in the catena of decisions including State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha and Ors. in and Ram Chand and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. in and Mohemad Kavi Mohamad Amin v. Fatimabai Ibrahim, in Civil Appeal No. 5023 of 1985 decided on 22-8-1996 (, that where no time is prescribed for exercise of a power under a statute it does not mean that it can be exercised at any time and such power has to be exercised within a reasonable time. What is reasonable time would, of course, depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.

    10. In view of the above, there is no reason why the same general principle with the same exception as aforesaid should not apply to the exercise of powers under the provisions of the Fragmentation Act. Hence, the ratio of the judgment of This Court in the case of Ranchhodbhai Lallubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat and Ors. 1984 (2) GLR 1225, should be treated to have been only modified to the effect that it is subject to the exception that plea against exercise of power beyond reasonable time cannot be availed of by a person who is guilty of fraud or suppression of material facts, when such fraud or suppression comes to the notice of the authorities after a long lapse of time.

    10-A. Now applying the aforesaid principles to the instant case, it is not the case of the petitioner-seller that respondent No. 3-purchaser had committed any fraud or suppression of any material fact. On the contrary, the petitioner-seller was bound to know the facts better than the purchaser. So also there is no suppression of fact from the authorities because the entry itself had stated that the question whether the land was a fragment and whether there was any violation of the Act was required to be examined. Hence, it cannot be said that it was on account of any act or omission on the part of respondent No. 3-purchaser which was responsible for the delay in commencement of the suo motu proceedings in 1993 for invalidating the transaction which had taken place as far back as in 1978. The finding of the Tribunal that the suo motu proceedings in the instant case were initiated after unreasonable delay does not, therefore, call for any interference by This Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution.

    11. Mr. Sanjanwala further tenaciously submitted that the provisions like section 84c of the tenancy act and similar other provisions dealt with by the Apex Court did not provide that violation of particular statutory provisions would render the transaction void. It is submitted that there is distinction between the expressions "void" and "invalid" and, therefore, the Court must apply the provisions of Section 9 of the Fragmentation Act with full force without any other consideration whatsoever.

    12. Apropos the aforesaid submission of Mr. Sanjanwala, it would be useful to refer to the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of State of Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar 1996 (1) SCC 435, where the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the expression "void". Of course, it was the case of order of a Tribunal but the following general discussion does throw some light on the meaning of the word "void":

    In our opinion, even void order or decision rendered between parties cannot be said to be non-existent in all cases and in all situations. Ordinarily, such an order will, in fact, be effective inter partes until it is successfully avoided or challenged in a higher forum. Mere use of the word "void" is not determinative of its legal impact. The word "void" has a relative rather than an absolute meaning. It only conveys the idea that the order is invalid or illegal. It can be avoided. There are degrees of invalidity depending upon the gravity of the infirmity, as to whether it is, fundamental or otherwise.

    In view of the above observations, it must be held that even a void transaction must be so declared, may be even in collateral proceedings, before it can be ignored. The authority or Court, while making such a declaration is, therefore, bound to consider the aforesaid general principle that power must be exercised in a reasonable manner which inheres the concept of its exercise within a reasonable time, subject to the exception referred to above.

    13. There is one more aspect which is required to be referred to. As per the orders which were passed in 1951, a non-irrigated land less than 2 Acres in area would be a fragment but so as far as the irrigated land is concerned, it would a fragment only if it has an area of less than 20 Gunthas. In the instant case, the land in question admeasuring 1 Acre & 2 Gunthas is admittedly being irrigated since the year 1989-90. Of course, there is some controversy about the date from which the land came to be irrigated. Even if one were to proceed on the footing that the land came to be irrigated only from 1989-90, the fact remains that the land is since last about 9 years an irrigated land and, therefore, even according to the petitioner, sale of such land after 1989-90 would not have been void. This is an additional ground for This Court not to interfere with the order of the Tribunal in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution, when the object underlying the Act is not being frustrated now.

    14. In light of the above discussion, it is not possible to accept the submission of Mr. Sanjanwala that a transaction falling foul of Section 7 of the Fragmentation Act must be set aside at any point of time irrespective of any other consideration. The petition, therefore, deserves to be dismissed.

    The petition is accordingly dismissed. Notice is discharged. Since the main petition is disposed of, Civil Application No. 4695 of 1998 does not survive and is disposed of accordingly.

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    Comments

    Jiviben v. State Of Gujarat
    (Jun 30, 1998)