Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922."
  • Section 12(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.
  • Section 57(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
  • Section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961,
  • Section 57(iii) of the 1961 Act,
  • Section 12(2) of the 1922 Act,
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922."
  • Section 12(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.
  • Section 57(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
  • Section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961,
  • Section 57(iii) of the 1961 Act,
  • Section 12(2) of the 1922 Act,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (as provided)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench, referred the following question to the High Court under Section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961: "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in confirming disallowance of interest of Rs. 2,87,096 relatable to purchase of shares of Swastik Oil Mills Ltd.?"

The assessee is Sarabhai Sons (P) Ltd., which had various business streams and was a shareholder and managing agent of Swastik Oil Mills Ltd. (SOML). The assessee held 11,264 shares; two other groups held 24,975 and 12,373 shares respectively. The shareholders agreed that one group should hold all shares for SOML's benefit; the assessee decided to acquire the shares so as to hold 100% and implement expansion projects. The decision was taken in September 1967. The agreed purchase price was Rs. 197.5 per share, payable 10% on purchase and the balance in instalments (12 to 24 months) with interest at 9% on outstanding amounts.

The assessee encountered difficulty acquiring 2,522 shares. Meanwhile, Karamchand Premchand Pvt. Ltd. (KPPL) proposed to buy all SOML shares; the assessee sold 46,454 equity shares to KPPL on April 15, 1968, at Rs. 197.5 per share, with payment partly in cash and the balance in two instalments, KPPL paying 9% interest on the unpaid amount.

For the financial year ended March 31, 1969, the assessee paid interest of Rs. 6,05,291 to the shareholders from whom it purchased shares and received Rs. 3,18,195 as interest from KPPL for the unpaid sale price. The assessee claimed the net deficiency in interest (Rs. 2,87,096) as a deduction in computing income from other sources.

The Income-tax Officer disallowed the deduction, treating the expenditure as capital in nature and also holding the purchase was to hand over shares to KPPL; the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (AAC) took the view that interest formed part of the capital purchase price and was therefore not deductible under Section 36, and that the alternative claim under Section 57(iii) was not allowable as the expenditure was not incurred wholly and exclusively for earning income from other sources.

The assessee appealed to the Tribunal. The Tribunal held the interest was not capital expenditure, that interest liability arose from inability to pay the full purchase price immediately, and that for assessment year 1968-69 the deduction under Section 57(iii) was allowable (dividend income had been received), but for 1969-70 it was not (no dividend received and obligations were independent), and ultimately dismissed the assessee's appeal. The Tribunal's decision on disallowance was referred to this Court under Section 256(1).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Tribunal was right in law in confirming the disallowance of interest of Rs. 2,87,096 relatable to purchase of shares of Swastik Oil Mills Ltd. (i.e., whether that interest was deductible under Section 57(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961).

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee's (Appellant's) Arguments

  • The assessee confined its claim to deduction under Section 57(iii) and abandoned the Section 36 claim before the Court.
  • The Tribunal's reason for rejecting the claim for assessment year 1969-70 — that the source of income (dividend) was extinct — was incorrect because, per CIT v. Rajendra Prasad Moody [1978] 115 ITR 519, it is not necessary that income should in fact have been earned as a result of the expenditure to bring a case within Section 57(iii).
  • The phrase "such income" in Section 57(iii) should be interpreted broadly: a sufficient nexus between the expenditure and the earning of income (direct, indirect, or incidental) should attract the provision.
  • The assessee pointed to the assessment order where interest attributable to purchase and interest received from KPPL were treated under one head, to the Tribunal's finding that the acquisition was to improve SOML's business, and to the Tribunal's allowance in the previous assessment year as factual support for deduction.
  • Relied on several decisions of the Court (Smt. Virmati Ramhrishna v. CIT; Padmavati Jayhrishna v. CIT; CIT v. Kasturbhai Lalbhai) and a Supreme Court decision (T.S. Krishna v. CIT) to support a broader interpretation of nexus and allowance where the expenditure facilitates earning income.

Revenue's (Respondent's) Arguments and Lower Authorities

  • The Income-tax Officer held the interest expenditure was capital in nature and that the shares were acquired with a view to hand them over to KPPL — thus expenditure was not incurred for the assessee's business or for earning income from other sources; deduction was rejected under Section 36 and Section 57(iii).
  • The Appellate Assistant Commissioner held payment of interest was an integral part of the purchase price (capital nature) and that the alternative claim under Section 57(iii) was untenable because expenditure was not incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of earning such income.
  • The Tribunal accepted that the interest was not capital expenditure and allowed deduction for assessment year 1968-69 (dividend received) but denied it for 1969-70 on grounds that no dividend was received and that payment obligations to shareholders were independent of the right to receive interest from KPPL. The Court notes the Revenue's counsel did not support the Tribunal's extinction-of-source reasoning.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
CIT v. Rajendra Prasad Moody [1978] 115 ITR 519 (SC) To bring a case within Section 57(iii), it is not necessary that any income should in fact have been earned as a result of the expenditure. The Court relied on this proposition to hold that the Tribunal was wrong to reject the assessee's claim for 1969-70 on the ground that the dividend source was extinct.
Smt. Virmati Ramhrishna v. CIT [1981] 131 ITR 659 (Guj) States that the expenditure must be laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of making or earning "income from other sources"; the expression "such income" means income from other sources generally and one of the propositions is that the purpose must be sole (not mixed) and purpose is distinct from motive. The Court used the propositions from this decision to analyse whether the expenditure in the present case was incurred solely for earning income or for another dominant purpose; it supported the conclusion that the dominant purpose was to obtain control of SOML, making the expenditure of mixed purpose and outside Section 57(iii).
Padmavati Jayhrishna v. CIT [1981] 131 ITR 653 (Guj) After referring to Seth R. Dabnia (SC), it holds the connection between expenditure and earning income need not be direct; an indirect connection may suffice. The decision was cited by the assessee to support the contention that an indirect or incidental nexus with earning income suffices for Section 57(iii); the Court acknowledged this principle but still applied the sole-purpose test to the facts.
Seth R. Dabnia v. CIT [1977] 110 ITR 644 (SC) Referenced (via Padmavati Jayhrishna) for the proposition that the connection between expenditure and earning of income need not be direct. Used as authority supporting the proposition that indirect or incidental connections may be sufficient to attract Section 57(iii); the Court considered this but found the facts showed a different (dominant) purpose.
CIT v. Kasturbhai Lalbhai [1968] 70 ITR 267 (Guj) Explains the test under Section 12(2) (analogous to Section 57(iii)) that the expenditure's purpose must be for earning the income and that the purpose must be sole (not mixed); distinguishes purpose from motive; expenditure incurred for commercial expediency indirectly facilitating earning of income may be allowable. The Court quoted and applied this test to the facts, concluding the expenditure was incurred primarily to secure control of SOML (not solely to earn income) and therefore fell outside Section 57(iii).
T.S. Krishna v. CIT, Madras [1973] 87 ITR 429 (SC) Observation that, in the context of wealth-tax deduction and dividends, the nature of dividend income did not bear a relationship, direct or incidental, to the expenditure claimed, and therefore did not qualify under the relevant provision. Cited to illustrate that in some contexts the necessary relationship between expenditure and income may be lacking; used by assessee to argue about relationship but also shows limits to allowable deductions. The Court considered this observation in its analysis of connection between expenditure and income.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a multi-step analysis strictly following the materials and authorities cited in the opinion:

  1. The Court first addressed the Tribunal's stated reason for rejecting the claim for assessment year 1969-70 — that the source of income (dividend) was extinct. It held that the Tribunal's reasoning on this point was incorrect because the Supreme Court in CIT v. Rajendra Prasad Moody had held that actual earning of income is not a necessary precondition for attracting Section 57(iii). Consequently, the Tribunal was wrong insofar as it relied on extinction of the source to deny deduction for 1969-70.
  2. The Court then considered the contention that the expression "such income" in Section 57(iii) should be given a broad meaning and that a nexus between expenditure and earning of income — even if indirect or incidental — should suffice. The Court acknowledged authority (Padmavati Jayhrishna, Seth R. Dabnia, Smt. Virmati Ramhrishna) establishing that the connection need not be direct and that indirect/incidental connection can be sufficient.
  3. Despite recognizing the permissive principles regarding indirect nexus, the Court turned to the established test (as in CIT v. Kasturbhai Lalbhai and reiterated in Smt. Virmati Ramhrishna) that to qualify under the provision the expenditure must have been incurred solely for the purpose of making or earning the income in question. The Court emphasized the distinction between purpose and motive: the relevant inquiry is the manifest and immediate purpose, not the wider motive.
  4. Applying these principles to the facts, the Court examined the nature and object of the transaction: the shareholders had agreed that one group should hold all shares to improve SOML's business; the assessee (also managing agent) intended to acquire 100% control so as to implement expansion projects. The Court noted that the assessee subsequently sold the shares to KPPL after failing to obtain full control.
  5. From the transaction's nature, the Court concluded the shares were bought primarily to obtain full control over SOML (a commercial objective) and not for the sole purpose of earning income. While earning income (e.g., dividends) may have been the ultimate motive, the manifest and immediate purpose was control — making the expenditure one of mixed purpose.
  6. Because the expenditure was not incurred solely for the purpose of making or earning income from other sources, it did not fall within Section 57(iii). Thus, although the Tribunal was wrongly critical on the extinction-of-source point and the Court accepted broader propositions about indirect nexus, the Court nonetheless found the Tribunal's ultimate conclusion (disallowing the deduction) to be correct on proper grounds.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court answered the referred question in the affirmative — i.e., it ruled against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. The deduction of Rs. 2,87,096 (interest relatable to purchase of shares of Swastik Oil Mills Ltd.) was not allowable under Section 57(iii).

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The assessee's claim for deduction under Section 57(iii) for the amount in dispute was disallowed; the Revenue's assessment stand on disallowance was upheld.
  • The Court clarified two related points of law based on existing authorities: (a) it endorsed the settled position that actual earning of income is not a prerequisite for Section 57(iii) (per Rajendra Prasad Moody), and (b) it reiterated that an indirect nexus may suffice in principle. However, on the facts of this case, the dominant purpose test (derived from Kasturbhai Lalbhai and Smt. Virmati Ramhrishna) led to the conclusion that the expenditure was not incurred solely for earning income.
  • No new legal precedent was announced; the decision applied and reconciled existing authorities to the facts and reached the result that the expenditure was of mixed purpose and outside Section 57(iii).

No order as to costs.

    Sarabhai Sons (P.) Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax.

    1. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench, has referred the following question under Section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for the opinion of this court :

    "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in confirming disallowance of interest of Rs. 2,87,096 relatable to purchase of shares of Swastik Oil Mills Ltd. ?"

    2. The assessee in this case is Sarabhai Sons (P) Ltd, which derives income from investments, profit from systronics division, manufacturing electric and electronic equipment and from its marketing division dealing in purchasing and selling of products of sister concerns. The assessee was a shareholder of Swastik Oil Mills Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "SOML") and was also its managing agents. The assessee held 11,264 shares. The other two groups, viz., Kasturbhai group and Patel group held 24,975 shares and 12,373 shares, respectively. These three groups of shareholders decided amongst themselves that, in the larger interest of SOML, the shares of SOML should be held by one of the groups. The assessee decided to take over the shares from the other shareholders so that it could hold 100% shares in SOML and implement the expansion projects of SOML. It appears that this decision was taken in September, 1967. The assessee agreed to purchase shares at the rate of Rs. 197.5 per share. Payment of price was spread over a period of two years. 10% of the price was to be paid on the date of purchase and the balance amount was to be paid in instalments ranging from 12 to 24 months with interest at 9% to be paid on the outstanding amount. The assessee met with some difficulties in acquiring 2,522 shares as there was resistance from the owners of those shares. Meanwhile, a proposal was put forward by Karamchand Premchand Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "KPPL") to purchase all the shares of SOML. Pursuant to that proposal, the assessee sold 46,454 equity shares of SOML to KPPL on April 15, 1968, at the same purchase price, viz., Rs. 197.5 per share. The purchase price was to be paid by KPPL partly in cash at the time of delivery of shares and the balance amount was to be paid in two instalments. Interest at the rate of 9% was to be paid by KPPL on the balance amount. During the financial year which ended on March 31, 1969, the assessee paid by way of interest Rs. 6,05,291 to the shareholders from whom it had purchased shares. It received Rs. 3,18,195 as interest from KPPL for the unpaid price of the shares which it had sold to KPPL. The assessee claimed net deficiency in the interest account calculated on the basis of interest paid by the assessee to the shareholders of the SGML on the unpaid purchase price and interest received on unpaid sale price by the KPPL as a deduction in computing its income from other sources.

    3. The Income-tax Officer was of the view that the expenditure in question was of capital nature. He also held that the shares were acquired with a view to hand over the same to KPPL and as such the expenditure incurred towards interest could not be said to have been incurred for the assessee's business or for earning income from other sources. Taking this view, the Income-tax Officer rejected the claim of the assessee for deduction of Rs. 2,87,096 under Section 36 and also under Section 57(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

    4. The assessee preferred an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner was of the view that payment of interest was an integral part of the purchase price of all the shares of SGML and, therefore, the expenditure was of capital nature. He further held that, for that reason, it was not an allowable deduction under Section 36. He also held that the assessee's alternative claim for deduction under Section 57(iii) was untenable as the said expenditure could not be said to have been incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of earning such income.

    5. The assessee then carried the matter in appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that payment of interest was not an expenditure of capital nature as it was not possible to say that the assessee had derived any enduring benefit by purchase of the shares which were held by it for a very short period, from October, 1967, to April, 1968. The Tribunal also held that payment of interest was not an integral part of the purchase price but the liability to pay interest arose because the assessee was unable to make payment of the full purchase price at the time of purchasing the shares. The Tribunal rejected the claim made under Section 36 as it found that the assessee was already the managing agent of SGML and purchase of the shares had nothing to do with the managing agency. But, as regards the claim for deduction made under Section 57(iii), the Tribunal held that, for the assessment year 1968-69, its claim was well-founded as it had derived dividend income ; however, the assessee's claim for a similar deduction for the assessment year 1969-70 was not tenable as the assessee had not received any dividend during that year and, secondly, because the obligation of the assessee to make payment of interest to the shareholders of SOML was independent of the right to receive interest from KPPL and, therefore, it was not possible to say that payment of interest was required to be made by it to the shareholders of SGML in order to earn or derive income by way of interest from KPPL. The Tribunal, therefore, dismissed the appeal.

    6. Mr. K. C. Patel, learned counsel appearing for the assessee, at the outset stated that he was not pressing the claim for deduction under Section 36 of the Act and the claim of the assessee is now confined to Section 57(iii) only. He submitted that the first reason given by the Tribunal that, for the assessment year 1969-70, the source of income, viz., dividend was extinct and, therefore, the assessee was not entitled to any deduction under Section 57(iii) is bad as it has been held by the Supreme Court in CIT v. Rajendra Prasad Moody [1978] 115 ITR 519 that to bring a case within Section 57(iii), it is not necessary that any income should in fact have been earned as a result of the expenditure. We find considerable substance in this contention and, therefore, it will have to be held that the Tribunal was not right in rejecting the assessee's claim for deduction under Section 57(iii) on the ground that, for the assessment year 1969-70, the source of income, viz., dividend was extinct. Learned counsel appearing for the Revenue has also not tried to support this reasoning of the Tribunal while supporting its decision.

    7. It was next submitted that the Tribunal has put a very narrow interpretation on the expression "such income"appearing in Section 57(iii) of the Act. He submitted that if there is a nexus between earning of income and incurring of the expenditure, then that should be regarded as sufficient for the purpose of attracting the said provision. He further submitted that the nexus need not be direct but, even if it is indirect or incidental, it would be sufficient for the purpose of attracting that provision. In this behalf, he first drew our attention to the assessment order wherein interest attributable to purchase of shares and interest received from KPPL have been treated under one head for the purpose of computing the assessee's income. He also drew our attention to the order of the Tribunal wherein it is observed that the assessee, in consultation with other interested parties, had decided to acquire all the shares held by other shareholders in order to improve the business of SGML. He also drew our attention to the fact that, for the previous assessment year, the assessee's claim for deduction of a substantial part of interest was allowed by the Tribunal and that the Department had not challenged the said decision. After referring to this factual aspect, he drew our attention to the decision of this court in Smt. Virmati Ramhrishna v. CIt [1981] 131 ITR 659. He particularly relied upon proposition No. 3 which is to the effect that the expenditure must have been laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of making or earning "income from other sources", and submitted that the expression "such income"would, therefore, mean income from other sources and need not be confined to a particular type of income for which the expenditure was incurred. He then drew our attention to another decision of this court in Padmavati Jayhrishna v. CIT [1981] 131 ITR 653, wherein, after referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Seth R, Dabnia v. CIT [1977] 110 ITR 644, it has been held that the connection between the expenditure and the earning of income need not be direct. He also relied upon another decision of this court in CIT v. Kasturbhai Lalbhai [1968] 70 ITR 267, wherein it has been held that, if, on the ground of commercial expediency and in order to indirectly facilitate the earning of income, expenditure is incurred, then it is an allowable deduction under Section 12(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. He also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in T.S Krishna v. Cit, Madras. [1973] 87 ITR 429, wherein, while dealing with the claim of the assessee for deduction of wealth-tax paid by him while computing his income from dividends and interest under Section 57(iii) of the Act, the following observation has been made (at page 436) :

    "Even apart from the amendment disallowing the deduction, the very nature of the income from dividends in respect of which deduction of wealth-tax is claimed does not, as pointed out by the High Court, bear any relationship, direct or incidental, to the earning of that income and cannot, therefore, be said to be laid out or expended exclusively for the purpose of making or earning such income within the meaning of sub-Clause (iii) of Section 57 of the Act or under the corresponding provisions of Section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922."

    8. From the decisions referred to above, it can be said that the connection between the expenditure incurred and the income earned need not be direct. Even if the connection is indirect or incidental, that can be regarded as sufficient for the purpose of Section 57(iii). It is also equally clear that, for attracting Section 57(iii), it is not necessary that any income in fact should have been earned as a result of the expenditure. To the extent the Tribunal has taken a different view, it will have to be stated that its reasoning is not correct. Even then, we are of the opinion that the final decision of the Tribunal is correct.

    9. This court while dealing with the claim for deduction under Section 12(2) of the 1922 Act, which provision is similar to Section 57(iii) of the 1961 Act, in the case of Kasturbhai Lalbhai [1968] 70 ITR 267 (Guj), has held as under (at page 273) :

    "... in order to decide whether an expenditure is a permissible deduction under Section 12(2), we have to examine the nature of the expenditure. The purpose for which the expenditure is incurred must be in order to earn the income and here we must not confuse purpose with motive. What Section 12(2) emphasizes is the purpose for which the expenditure is incurred and the word 'purpose' does not mean motive for the transaction. The motive which may have operated on the minds of assessees in making the expenditure is quite irrelevant . . . Moreover, the purpose of making or earning the income must be the sole purpose for which the expenditure is incurred. If the expenditure is incurred for the purpose of making or earning the income as also for another purpose or, in other words, the purpose of making or earning the income is mixed up with another purpose in making of the expenditure . . . the expenditure would be outside the scope and ambit of Section 12(2) and would not be a permissible deduction under that Section. The expenditure in order to fall within Section 12(2) must, therefore, be incurred solely for the purpose of making or earning the income sought to be assessed . . ."

    10. Again, in Smt. Virmati Ramkrishna's case [1981] 131 ITR 659 (Guj), this court, after considering the case-law on the point, has stated the propositions which follow therefrom. One of the propositions so stated is that the purpose of making or earning such income must be the sole purpose for which the expenditure must have been incurred, that is to say, the expenditure should not have been incurred for such purpose as also for another purpose, or for a mixed purpose. Another proposition which is stated therein is that the distinction between purpose and motive must always be borne in mind, for, what is relevant is the manifest and immediate purpose and not the motive or personal considerations weighing in the mind of the assessee for incurring the expenditure.

    11. Now, if we turn to the facts of this case, what is required to be noted is that the shares of SGML were held by the assessee along with two other groups of shareholders, viz., Kasturbhai group and Patel group. The assessee held 11,264 shares, Kasturbhai group held 24,975 shares and the Patel group held 12,737 shares. The assessee was also the managing agent of SGML. It was agreed amongst the shareholders that the assessee should purchase all the shares in order to improve the business of SGML by holding 100% shares of SGML, which would have enabled it to implement the expansion projects. Thus, the shares which were purchased by the assessee were not for the purpose of earning income, though that can be regarded as the ultimate motive. The shares were purchased by the assessee with a clear purpose or object of getting 100% control over SOML. If the purpose was to earn income only, or even if that was the dominant purpose, it would not have sold the shares again to KPPL as, by that time, it had already acquired more than 90% shares, and that would have satisfied its object of earning more income by possessing more shares. The reason why the asses-see sold the shares was that it was not able to get 100% control by purchasing all the remaining shares. Thus, from the nature of the transaction, it becomes apparent that the expenditure which was incurred by the assessee was not for the purpose of earning income, but for the purpose of getting full control over SOML. Thus, applying the test as laid down in Kasturbhai Lalbhai's case 11968] 70 ITR 267 (Guj) and Smt. Virmati Ramkrishna's case [1981] 131 ITR 659 (Guj) to the facts of this case, it becomes clear that the dominant purpose for which expenditure was incurred was not to earn income. At the highest, it was a mixed purpose. For that reason, it will have to be held that the expenditure incurred in that behalf fell outside the purview of Section 57(iii) of the Act.

    12. For the reasons stated above, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, that is, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. No order as to costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Sarabhai Sons (P.) Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax.
    (Jan 19, 1993)