JUDGMENT R.K. Abichandani, J.
1. The petitioner seeks to challenge the order dated 21-7-1979 passed by the Government under Section 35 of the Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of the Holdings Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act') confirming the order of the Deputy Collector, Radhanpur passed on 8th January, 1979 in Consolidation Case No. 12 of 1978 by which he imposed a fine of Rs. 50 on the owners of the land for having effected a void transfer holding that the transfer was in violation of Section 31(b) of the said Act.
2. According to the petitioner a portion of Survey No. 46 of village Mitha was sold to the petitioner by deceased Julkhan orally in 1958-59 and by a 'simple' writing in 1964. The Deputy Collector, Radhanpur initiated inquiry under Section 9 of the said Act and held that the transfer was invalid. An appeal was filed being Appeal No. 180 of 1977 against that order before the Government and the Special Secretary by his order dated 18th April, 1978 allowed the appeal and remanded the matter for inquiry in light of observations made by him in the judgment for deciding the matter under the provisions of Section 9 of the said Act. The Deputy Collector, Radhanpur issued fresh notices to the parties on 11-7-1978 and heard the matter again coming to the conclusion that the conveyance deed was executed on 1-6-1964 in respect of the disputed land and since the document was not on stamp paper the Collector had on 13-7-1976 ordered recovery of requisite stamp duty. He found that the conveyance deed was executed after coming into force of the Consolidation Scheme in the said village. He, therefore, found that the holding could not have been sub-divided in view of the provisions of Section 31(1)(b) of the said Act. The Deputy Collector, therefore, found that it was a fit case for taking action under Section 9 of the said Act and imposed a fine of Rs. 50/- ordering the land to be restored on the ground that the transfer was void. In the revision application the Government confirmed the finding that the sale which was effected on 1-7-1964 was subsequent to the introduction of Consolidation Scheme in the village on 29-12-1960 and dismissed the revision application.
3. At the hearing of this petition the only point which was urged by the learned Counsel Mr. G.R. Shaikh appearing for the petitioner was that the Deputy Collector could not have exercised jurisdiction under Section 9(2) and (3) of the said Act after a lapse of over 12 years from the date when the conveyance deed was executed in favour of the petitioner transferring a portion of the said block of land.
4. Reliance was placed by the learned Advocate Mr. Shaikh on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Raghav Natha, reported in (1969) X GLR 992 in support of his contention that powers could not have been exercised by the authority under Section 9 of the said Act after a lapse of about 12 years from the date of the transaction. The Supreme Court was concerned in that case with the provisions of Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code which did not prescribe any period of limitation. The revisional jurisdiction was sought to be exercised by the Divisional Commissioner against the order of the Collector granting permission for N.A. use of the land. The Commissioner had set aside the order of the Collector more than a year after it was passed. In that context the Supreme Court held that though there was no period of limitation prescribed under Section 211 of the Land Revenue Code, the revisional power must be exercised in reasonable time which must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised. It will be seen that though the subsequent decisions of this Court tend to apply this ratio to the orders of the authorities dealing with void transactions, the Supreme Court was concerned only with the exercise of revisional powers against an order issued by a competent authority under Section 65 of the Land Revenue Code. In the case of Habib Nasir Khanji v. State, reported in (1970) XI GLR 307 the ratio in Raghav Natha's case (supra) was followed as it was directly applicable since the Collector was exercising power under Section 211 of the Land Revenue Code against the order of Mamlatdar sanctioning the highest bid at auction sale after a lapse of more than two years.
5. Reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in the case of Rabari Valabhai Keshrabhai v. Sejibai and Ors. reported in 1988 (1) GLH (UJ-13) page 19 where it was held that the exercise of revisional powers under Section 35 of the Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of the Holdings Act by the Special Secretary after a lapse of 10 years after the order was passed by the Deputy Collector was unreasonable. There can be no quarrel against the proposition that when no period of limitation is statutorily provided for, the revisional power prescribed under the statutes should be exercised within a reasonable time. This is necessary with a view to give finality to the orders passed by various authorities which may be subject to revisions and no revisional power is exercised for a considerable time giving rise to equities and promoting the parties to proceed on the footing that the orders passed by the authorities will not be disturbed in exercise of revisional jurisdiction after a lapse of reasonable time. However, same position may not obtain when an authority exercises his powers consequent upon a transaction which is statutorily void. Under Section 9(1) of the said Act the transfer or partition of any land contrary to the provisions of the Act shall be void. In the present case there is a clear finding of fact in the impugned orders that the transfer had taken place on 1st July, 1964 after the coming into force of the Consolidation Scheme on 29-12-1960. This finding was arrived at on 8th January, 1979 by the Deputy Collector after the remand order and was confirmed by the State Government in exercise of revisional power under Section 35 of the said Act and thus the transaction in question on this finding of fact, was clearly void in view of the provisions of Section 9(1) of the said Act. A transaction which is void is non est and cannot gel life merely because the powers of summary eviction were not exercised immediately. The delay in exercise of powers by the officers cannot validate a transaction which is void ab initio and the Courts ought not to recognise a void transaction even in an indirect way by preventing the authority to exercise its powers consequent upon a void transaction on the ground that the power should have been exercised within reasonable time from the date of transaction. In fact no question of delay in exercise of power can ever arise from the date of transaction which is void because such a transaction is non est and cannot be recognised for any purpose.
6. In the case of Govindbhai Somabhai Nai v. State, reported in [1987 (2)] XXVIII (2) GLR 760 this Court after considering the authorities including Raghav Natha's case (supra) held that an order which is ab initio void had no efficacy in the eye of law and being non-existent it has no legal validity or existence. Such an order is not worth the paper on which it is written and no rights flow and no obligations arise therefrom. An order which is a nullity in the eye of law, has therefore, to be ignored. No question of limitation or reasonableness of time for setting aside such an order can really arise.
7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Ranchhodbhai v. State, reported in [1984 (2)] XXV (2) GLR 1225 contending that inaction on the part of the authorities exercising powers under the said Act in that case was only for 7 years while in the present case it was 12 years and, therefore, the impugned orders should be set aside. It will be noticed that in paragraph 4 of that judgment it was in terms stated that the decision was given on peculiar facts of that case. In that case the petitioner who had purchased the land which was a house site for the purpose of putting up residential house, spent substantial amount of Rs. 25,000/~ and put up a house having facilities of latrine and store room. The Court found that the petitioner had changed his position to his detriment and summary eviction may not be effected aganist him. This decision was followed in the case of Nanji Mulji Thumar v. Slate of Gujarat and Ors., reported in 1988 (1) GLH (UJ-20) at page 27. Even in that case the power was sought to be exercised after a period of 24 years and after the mutation entry was already made for the transaction.
8. The learned Counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the decision of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 5505 of 1990 rendered on 16th August, 1990 (Evergreen Apartment Co-op. Housing Society v. Spl. Secretary, Revenue Department, ). In that case mutation was effected on the basis of a sale transaction in the record of rights and entry was certified on 5th July, 1983 by the competent authority under the provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. That entry was taken in suo motu revision and by an ex-parfe order dated 2-12-1985 it was cancelled without informing or hearing the petitioner. In that case the petitioner-Society had completed construction of 60 tenaments and houses were occupied since 1987. There was no question of any void ab initio transaction involved in that case. Therefore the said decision cannot help the petitioner.
9. It will be noticed that in none' of these cases was it urged that no question of limitation or reasonableness of time for setting aside a transaction can arise where a transaction is void ab initio, and therefore nullity in the eye of law. It may further be pointed out that nowhere in the petition nor before the revisional authority was it ever urged that there was any unjustifiable delay in passing of the order by the Deputy Collector. It is only at the stage of arguments in this petition that the point has been urged. It will be noticed from the decision in Raghav Natha's case (supra) that even in cases where such a question arises in the context of exercise of revisional powers, the length of reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised. In the instant case there is absolutely no case putforth either before the authorities or before this Court that the parties had materially altered their position as was the case in Ranchhodbhai v. State (supra) which was decided "on the peculiar facts of the case". Since consideration of the question of reasonableness of time involves considering the questions of facts, in absence of any contentions having been raised either before the authority or in the petition, it would not be appropriate to go into those aspects at this belated stage and more so in absence of there being any averments in the petition. Moreover, as held above, the question of exercise of powers within reasonable time will not arise in case where power is sought to be exercised in respect of transactions which are void ab initio.
10. From the facts of the case on record it is clear that there is no error committed by the authorities in passing the impugned orders. On the facts and circumstances of the case this does not appear to be a fit case for exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for disturbing the impugned orders on the ground that there is delay in exercising the powers under Section 9(2)(3) of the said Act by the compstent authority. This petition therefore fails and is dismissed. 'Rule is discharged with no order as to costs. Interim relief vacated.