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  • provisions of Section 115 of the Civil P.C.
  • provisions of Order 23, Rule 1 (2) (a).
  • sub-rule (2) of R. 1, provision
  • (b) of Order 23, Rule 1 (2)
  • Order 23, Rule 1 (2) (b)
  • Order 23, Rule 1 (2) (a).
  • Order 23. Rule 1 (3).
  • Order 23. Rule 1 (2)
  • Order 23. Rule 1,
  • Order 23. Rule
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • provisions of Section 115 of the Civil P.C.
  • provisions of Order 23, Rule 1 (2) (a).
  • sub-rule (2) of R. 1, provision
  • (b) of Order 23, Rule 1 (2)
  • Order 23, Rule 1 (2) (b)
  • Order 23, Rule 1 (2) (a).
  • Order 23. Rule 1 (3).
  • Order 23. Rule 1 (2)
  • Order 23. Rule 1,
  • Order 23. Rule
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision arises from a dispute in Regular Civil Suit No. 78 of 1966 pending before the Third Joint Civil Judge (Junior Division) at Rajkot. The plaintiff alleged that he had entered into an agreement dated 27 March 1964 to purchase 12 plots (total 5,280 sq. yds.) out of Survey No. 443 from the defendant for Rs. 6 per sq. yd., and had paid Rs. 4,000 as earnest money. The plaintiff did not obtain conveyance within the agreed sixty days; the defendant contended the plaintiff defaulted and forfeited the earnest money. The plaintiff filed the suit seeking a declaration that the agreement was not cancelled and that a map amendment of 3 June 1964 subsisted, and sought a permanent injunction restraining alienation of the land. The plaintiff did not pray for specific performance or allege breach by the defendant in that suit.

During trial, documents and maps were produced from the Collector's office. On 6 April 1967 the plaintiff applied for permission to withdraw the suit with leave to file a fresh suit on the same subject-matter, relying on a claimed formal defect in the plaint (that specific performance was not pleaded and that the Collector's sanction only became known after production of documents). The defendant opposed the withdrawal application. The trial Court granted permission to withdraw with liberty to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action and directed the plaintiff to pay the defendant's costs. The defendant (original defendant in the suit) challenged that order by filing this Civil Revision Application.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial Court correctly exercised the discretion under Order 23, Rule 1(2) Civil P.C. in granting permission to withdraw the suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit where the plaintiff alleged a formal defect.
  2. What is the proper meaning of the term "subject-matter" in Order 23, Rule 1 and whether the proposed fresh suit would be in respect of the "same subject-matter" as required by the Rule.
  3. Whether the defect alleged by the plaintiff was a formal defect (a condition precedent for granting permission under Order 23, Rule 1(2)) or a defect going to the merits of the case.
  4. Whether the order granting permission to withdraw was a wrongful exercise of jurisdiction and therefore revisable under Section 115 of the Civil P.C.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaint suffered from a formal defect because it did not seek specific performance; this defect was discovered only after documents and maps were produced by the Collector's office showing Collector's sanction.
  • Accordingly, the plaintiff sought permission to withdraw the suit with leave to institute a fresh suit in respect of the same subject-matter to correct that formal defect.

Defendant's Arguments

  • One ground in the defendant's written statement was that the suit, as framed, was not maintainable.
  • The defendant resisted the plaintiff's application to withdraw the suit and to file a fresh suit in respect of the same subject-matter.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rakhmabai v. Mahadeo Narayan Bundre, ILR 42 Bom 155 = (AIR 1917 Bom 10) Interprets "subject-matter" to mean "the series of acts or transactions alleged to exist giving rise to the relief claimed." Used to support the view that "subject-matter" is broader than a mere cause of action and involves the bundle of facts giving rise to the relief claimed; court applied this to conclude the fresh suit could not be treated as the same subject-matter if it involved different facts or reliefs.
Vallabh Das v. Dr. Madan Lal, (1970) 1 SCC 761 = (AIR 1970 SC 987) Approved the meaning of "subject-matter" given by the Bombay High Court; held that "subject-matter" includes the cause of action and the relief claimed and is not merely property; mere identity of some issues does not establish identity of subject-matter. Relied on to conclude that unless cause of action and reliefs in the second suit are the same as in the first, the subject-matter is not the same; applied to hold plaintiff's proposed fresh suit would not have the same subject-matter.
Singa Reddi v. Subba Reddi, ILR 39 Mad 987 = (AIR 1917 Mad 512) (FB) Observations approved by the Supreme Court that where cause of action and relief in the second suit are not the same as in the first, the second suit cannot be regarded as in respect of the same subject-matter. Applied together with other authorities to reinforce the conclusion that identity of some issues does not equate to identity of subject-matter.
Bai Maru v. Latifalli, (1962) 3 Guj LR 800 Defines "formal defect" in Order 23, Rule 1(2) as a defect of form rather than a defect in the merits of the case. Used to support the court's conclusion that the plaintiff's defect was a merits-related defect (regarding Collector's sanction) and not a mere formal defect; thus the condition for allowing withdrawal under the Rule was not satisfied.
Tarachand v. Gaibihaji, AIR 1956 Bom 632 Explains that clauses (a) and (b) of Order 23, Rule 1(2) must be read applying the rule of ejusdem generis; causes sufficient under clause (b) must be similar to those in clause (a). Applied to interpret the scope of permissible grounds under Order 23, Rule 1(2) and to conclude that the plaintiff's grounds were not of a kind contemplated by the Rule (i.e., not a formal defect similar to clause (a)).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by stating the statutory framework: under Order 23, Rule 1 a plaintiff may withdraw a suit or abandon part of a claim; sub-rule (2) allows the Court to permit withdrawal with liberty to institute a fresh suit if it is satisfied that the suit must fail by reason of some formal defect or other sufficient grounds of a like nature. The Court emphasised that if permission is not granted the plaintiff is precluded from instituting any fresh suit on the same subject-matter (Order 23, Rule 1(3)).

The Court analysed the meaning of "subject-matter." It relied on Rakhmabai (Bombay High Court) and the Supreme Court judgment in Vallabh Das to adopt the proposition that "subject-matter" means the bundle of facts or the series of acts or transactions giving rise to the relief claimed; it includes the cause of action and the relief claimed. The Court noted that mere identity of some issues between two suits does not establish identity of subject-matter.

Applying these authorities, the Court found that the defect relied upon by the plaintiff—relating to whether the Collector had sanctioned the plans—was not a formal defect of pleading but a defect going to the merits of the plaintiff's case. The Court also cited Bai Maru to emphasise that "formal defect" in Order 23, Rule 1(2) compasses defects of form, not defects affecting merits. Tarachand was cited to show that the kinds of grounds allowing withdrawal under clause (b) must be similar to those in clause (a).

Because the statutory condition precedent for exercise of discretion under Order 23, Rule 1(2)—the existence of a formal defect or other like defect—was absent, the Court held that the trial Judge's grant of permission to withdraw with liberty to file a fresh suit was a wrongful exercise of jurisdiction. The opinion concluded that the order was revisable under Section 115 of the Civil P.C.

Holding and Implications

Holding (core ruling): The Civil Revision is allowed; the order of the trial Court granting permission to withdraw the suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit on the same cause of action is set aside.

Implications:

  • The order of the learned trial Judge that permitted the plaintiff to withdraw the suit with permission to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action has been quashed and set aside.
  • The Rule was made absolute with costs, and the Revision has been allowed (i.e., the original defendant succeeded in the revision).
  • No broader new precedent is stated in the opinion; the Court applied existing authorities about the meaning of "subject-matter" and the distinction between formal defects and defects on the merits to reach the result. The decision's direct effect is to reverse the trial Court's exercise of discretion in this case; the opinion does not purport to lay down a novel legal doctrine beyond applying the cited authorities.

    Kurji Jinabhai Kotecha v. Ambalal Kanjibhai Patel

    1. The petitioner herein is the original defendant and the opponent is original plaintiff. The plaintiff had filed a suit being Regular Civil Suit No. 78 of 1966, which was pending for hearing and final disposal in the Court of the learned Third Joint Civil Judge (Junior Division) at Rajkot. The averment in the plaint was that the plaintiff had entered into an agreement to purchase 12 plots of non-agricultural land of Survey No. 443 which plots were situate on Kalawad Road in Rajkot; and the defendant was the owner and was in possession of the said land. It was contended by the plaintiff that the defendant had entered into the agreement on March 27, 1964 with the plaintiff to sell 12 plots of land aggregating in all to 5280 sz. yds. out of Survey No. 443 to the plaintiff and the plaintiff had paid a sum of Rs. 4,000/- as earnest money towards that agreement to purchase. It was agreed between the parties that the plaintiff should get the conveyance of he said land executed in his favour by paying the balance of the consideration within sixty days from March 27, 1964. The price that was agreed upon between the parties was Rs.6/- per sq. yd. The conveyance was not obtained by the plaintiff within the stipulated period and according to the defendant he called upon the plaintiff to pay the balance of the consideration and to get the conveyance executed in his favour. Still, the plaintiff did not pay any heed to it. Ultimately, it appears that the defendant intimated to the plaintiff that the plaintiff had committed a breach of the agreement and that the amount of earnest money had been forfeited by the defendant. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed Regular Civil Suit No. 78 of 1966 and in that suit he prayed for a decree for declaration declaring that the agreement dated March 27, 1964 was not cancelled and the amendment in the map of June 3, 1964 was still subsisting and he also prayed for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from transferring or alienating the land till the final disposal of the suit. In that suit the plaintiff did not ask for specific performance of the agreement dated March 27, 1964 and he also did not allege that the defendant had committed any breach of the contract; not had he prayed for any damages in respect of the said alleged breach of the contract on the part of the defendant. Once of the contentions raised by the defendant in his written statement was that the suit was not maintainable in the form in which it was framed and one of the issues was relating to the maintainability of the suit. After the suit reached hearing and evidence was recorded, the plaintiff summoned a Clerk from the office of the Collector, Rajkot, and through him certain documents and maps were got produced in the suit they were exhibited by the learned trial Judge. On April 6,, 1967, the plaintiff submitted an application for permission to withdraw the suit with permission to file a fresh suit in respect of the same subject-matter and the contention which was urged in support of this application was that the plaintiff's suit as framed was suffering from a formal defect inasmuch as he had not asked for the relief of specific performance. The argument was that it was only when the documents and maps were produced from the office of the Collector that the plaintiff came to know that the Collector had sanctioned the plans whereas at the time when he filed the suit he had proceeded on the footing that the Collector has not sanctioned the plans. This application for withdrawal with permission to file a fresh suit in respect of the same subject-matter was resisted by the defendant. The objections of the defendant were overruled by the learned Third Joint Civil Judge (Junior Division). Rajkot and he granted the permission to the plaintiff to withdraw the suit with permission to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action and the plaintiff was directed to pay defendant's cost of the suit. It is against this order of the learned trial Judge that this Civil Revision Application has been filed by the original defendant.

    2. Under Order 23. Rule 1, the plaintiff may, as against all or any of the defendants, withdraw his suit or abandon part of his claim. Under sub-rule (2) of R. 1, provision is made for permission being granted by the Court in which the first suit is pending, such permission having to be obtained at the time of the withdrawal of the suit. The Court can grant the permission if it is satisfied that the suit must fail by reason of some formal defect or that there are other sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit for the subject-matter of the suit or part of a claim. It is so satisfied, it may, on such terms as it thinks fit, grant the plaintiff permission to withdraw from such suit or abandon such part of a claim with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject-matter of such suit or such part of a claim. The consequence of not granting permission is that the plaintiff is precluded from instituting any fresh suit respect of such subject-matter or such part of the claim and that is the effect of Order 23. Rule 1 (3). Some confusion seems to prevail in many subordinate courts as to the precise meaning of the words "subject-matter" occurring in Order 23. Rule 1. In many cases. I have found that the word "sub-matter" is treated as equivalent to cause of action and in fact in the instant case, the learned trial Judge has granted permission to institute a fresh suit in respect of the same cause of action; whereas the correct phraseology should have been in respect of 'the same subject-matter.' In Rakhmabai v. Mahadeo Narayan Bundre, ILR 42 Bom 155 = (AIR 1917 Bom 10 (1) a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court consisting of Sir Basil Scott, C.J. and Bachelor, J. held that the word "subject-matter" means "the series of acts or transactions alleged to exist giving rise to the relief claimed." This interpretation of the Bombay High Court has been approved by the Supreme Court in Vallabh Das v. Dr. Madan Lal (1970) 1 SCC 761 = (AIR 1970 SC 987. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the expression "subject-matter" is not defined in the Civil P.C. It does not mean property. That expression has a reference to a right in the property which the plaintiff seeks to enforce. That expression includes the cause of action and the relief claimed. Unless the cause of action and the relief claimed in the second suit are the same as in the first suit, it cannot be said that the subject-matter of the second suit is the same as that in the previous suit. Mere identity of some of the issues in the two suits does not bring about an identity of the subject-matter in the two suits. The Supreme Court approved of the meaning which the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court put on the word "subject-matter" in Rakhma Bai's case (supra); and proceeded to observe that in other words "subject-matter" means the bundle of facts which have to be proved in order to entitle the plaintiff to the relief claimed by him. The observations of Wallis. C.J. in Singa Reddi v. Subba Reddi. ILR 39 Mad 987 = (AIR 1917 Mad 512 (2) ) (FB) were approved by the Supreme Court and it was observed that where the cause of action and the relief claimed in the second suit are not the same as the cause of action and the relief claimed in the first suit, the second suit cannot be considered to have been brought in respect of the same subject-matter as the first suit. In view of these two decisions, viz decision of the Bombay High Court which has now received approval of the Supreme Court it is clear that the subject-matter of the fresh suit which the plaintiff proposes to bring cannot be said to be the same as the subject-matter of the first suit and in any event, the defect from which the present suit of the plaintiff is alleged to have been suffering cannot be said to be a formal defect. Bhagwati. J. (As he then was) in Bai Maru v. Latifalli, (1962) 3 Guj LR 800 has pointed out that the formal defect referred to in Order 23. Rule 1 (2) can only mean a defect of form and not a defect in the merits of the case. If it is a defect of form and not a defect which affects the merits of the case then only the case would fall under the provisions of Order 23, Rule 1 (2) (a). Gajendragadkar, J. (as he the was) has pointed out in Tarachand v. Gaibihaji, AIR 1956 Bom 632 that Cls. (a) and (b) of Order 23, Rule 1 (2) have to be read by applying the rule of 'ejusdem generis' and a cause which is sufficient within the meaning of Order 23, Rule 1 (2) (b) must be similar or alike to the cause mentioned in Order 23, Rule 1 (2) (a). Under these circumstances, even on the allegations of the plaintiff himself, it cannot be said that there was a defect of form or a similar other defect from which first suit of the plaintiff was likely to fail. It was a defect on merits, namely, about the factum of Collector's sanction having been granted or not granted which would have come in the way of the plaintiff in getting the reliefs that he had claimed. In any event. If the cause of action and the reliefs claimed in the first suit are not going to be the same as the cause of action and the reliefs claimed in the second suit, there was nothing which he had to fear and even by way of abundant caution it was not necessary for him to obtain permission which he applied for the instant cause.

    3. In may opinion, the condition precedent to the exercise of the discretion vested in the trial Court by Order 23, Rule 1 (2), namely, existence of formal defect or any other defect of a like nature, is wanting in the instant case and therefore, the exercise by the court of its discretion to grant permission must be held to be a wrongful exercise of the jurisdiction vested in it by law. Under these circumstances, the order is clearly revisable under the provisions of Section 115 of the Civil P.C.

    4. In the result, I allow this Civil Revision Application and set aside the order passed by the learned trial Judge by which permission was granted to the plaintiff to withdraw the suit with permission to bring a fresh suit on the same cause of action. The Rule is, therefore, made absolute with costs.

    5. Revision allowed.

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    Kurji Jinabhai Kotecha v. Ambalal Kanjibhai Patel
    (Jul 28, 1971)