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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
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Acts
  • section of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, namely, Section 26-A.
  • section 26-A (corresponding to section 184 of the 1961 Act)
  • INCOME TAX ACT 1961
  • provisions of the Income Tax Act. Section 184
  • section 26-A (corresponding to Section 184)
  • Section 256(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961
  • Clause (ii) of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22
  • time.5. Rule 22
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • section of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, namely, Section 26-A.
  • section 26-A (corresponding to section 184 of the 1961 Act)
  • INCOME TAX ACT 1961
  • provisions of the Income Tax Act. Section 184
  • section 26-A (corresponding to Section 184)
  • Section 256(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961
  • Clause (ii) of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22
  • time.5. Rule 22
Smart Summary

Case Summary: Reference under Section 256(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (Dr. B.P. Saraf, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter is a reference under Section 256(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 made by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Gauhati Bench, at the instance of the Commissioner of Income Tax. The referred question was whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that the assessee firm should have been granted registration under the Income Tax Act, 1961 without a fresh deed of partnership embodying the new constitution of the firm.

The assessee is a partnership firm originally constituted by a deed dated 1.5.1972 comprising three partners: Rajmohan Saha, Akhil Chandra Saha and Meghanad Saha. That deed was registered by the Income Tax Officer (ITO), A-Ward, Tripura Circle, Agartala for assessment year 1973-74, and continuation of registration was granted for assessment years 1974-75 and 1975-76.

For assessment year 1976-77 one partner (Akhil Chandra Saha) retired and an incoming partner (Gautam Chandra Saha) was admitted under an agreement dated 15.4.1975 executed between the continuing partners (Rajmohan and Meghanad) and the incoming partner (Gautam). Clause (2) of that agreement stated that the agreement and several clauses of the original deed (except clauses (3), (4), (5) and (6), which were modified) would bind and regulate the parties.

The firm applied for registration in Form No. 11-A (as required by Section 184(8) and the rules), submitting an attested copy of the 15.4.1975 agreement; the original 1.5.1972 deed was already with the ITO. The ITO refused registration on the ground that, in his view, no fresh deed of partnership had been executed and therefore the 15.4.1975 agreement could not be considered a valid partnership instrument.

On appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (A.A.C.) disagreed with the ITO and directed registration. The Revenue appealed to the Tribunal, which upheld the A.A.C. and rejected the Revenue's appeal, holding that change could be effected by agreement without executing a fresh partnership deed and that the Form No. 11-A application was competent. The Revenue then applied under Section 256(1) for a reference to this Court; the Tribunal allowed the application and made the present reference.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the assessee firm should have been granted registration under the Income Tax Act, 1961 without a fresh deed of partnership embodying the new constitution of the firm.

Arguments of the Parties

Revenue's Arguments

  • The word "instrument" in Section 184(1) should be given a narrow construction to mean a formal deed of partnership and nothing less; therefore, without execution of a fresh deed the change in constitution could not be recognized for registration purposes.

Assessee's Arguments

  • The word "instrument" means a writing or document (a formal expression in writing of an agreement). The partnership may be evidenced by more than one document; multiple documents taken together can constitute the "instrument" under Section 184(1). Thus an agreement modifying the original deed, together with the original deed, can satisfy the statutory requirement and permit registration without a fresh deed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rose v. Otis (33 p 77, 5 Colo App 472, 473; quoted in 44 Corpus Juris Secundum p. 420) Definition of "instrument" as a formal expression in writing of some agreement or obligation. The Court adopted this broader definition to support reading "instrument" as a writing or document rather than only a formal partnership deed.
Ramlal Muralidhar v. C.I.T (5 ITC 150) (Calcutta High Court) Registration cannot be refused merely because the instrument of partnership does not contain the complete agreement in itself and requires supplementation by other evidence. The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that the statutory requirement is met even where the partnership terms are supplemented by other documents.
Chotelal Devchand v. C.I.T (1958) 34 ITR 351 (Bombay High Court) So long as the terms are specified in any document or documents which go to constitute the instrument of partnership, the condition of the corresponding section is satisfied; there may be more than one instrument. The Court quoted this to show that multiple documents collectively can satisfy Section 184 (or its predecessor) and the department should consider documents other than the partnership deed.
V.M. Pariasamy Chettiar & Co. v. C.I.T (1964) 52 ITR 134 (Madras High Court) Where partners execute several agreements for conduct of business, all documents may be treated as a composite integral whole despite being in different instruments. The Court used this authority to support the view that several documents may collectively form the instrument of partnership.
C.I.T v. Wholesale District Cloth Importers Association (1973) Tax L.R. 867 (Allahabad High Court) The instrument of partnership may be a single document or may be spelt out of several documents all existing in the relevant accounting year, which together form an instrument of partnership. The Court cited this decision to reinforce that multiple documents can, in aggregate, satisfy the statutory requirement for registration.
C.I.T v. East India Land and Components (1981) 129 I.T.R. 426 (Calcutta High Court) "Instrument" does not mean only a regular partnership deed; it may include other formal writings, correspondence or documents containing the terms of partnership. The Court relied on this survey of authorities to conclude that documents or letters, when read together, can constitute the "instrument of partnership" under Section 184.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by identifying the statutory framework: Section 184(1) requires that an application for registration be made where the partnership is "evidenced by an instrument" and the individual shares of partners are specified in that instrument. Section 185 empowers the ITO to register a firm if satisfied a genuine firm exists as constituted in the instrument, and Section 184(7) preserves registration for subsequent years where no change occurs. Rule 22 (sub-rule (2), clause (ii)) prescribes that, for changes in constitution, the application should be accompanied by the original instrument or instruments evidencing the partnership as in existence during the previous year up to the date of application.

The Court identified that the central controversy was the interpretation of the word "instrument." It noted two competing constructions advanced in the proceedings: (i) Revenue's narrow view that "instrument" means a formal partnership deed only; and (ii) the assessee's broader view that "instrument" means any writing or document (and that there may be more than one such document which, taken together, constitute the instrument).

After considering the language of the statute and the relevant rule, the Court adopted the broader construction. It relied first on a general definition (as in Rose v. Otis) that an "instrument" is a formal expression in writing of an agreement or obligation. The Court then surveyed a series of High Court authorities dealing with the corresponding provision in the 1922 Act and Section 184 of the 1961 Act. Those authorities consistently held that the terms of a partnership might be contained in more than one document and that multiple writings could, together, constitute the "instrument" required by the statute.

Applying this legal principle to the facts, the Court concluded that where a subsequent written agreement expressly modifies some clauses of an earlier registered deed while adopting the remaining terms of the earlier deed, both the original deed and the modifying agreement together constitute the instrument of partnership within the meaning of Section 184(1). Consequently, a change in constitution effected by such an agreement does not necessarily require execution of a fresh, consolidated partnership deed to permit registration.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court answered the referred question in the affirmative and against the Revenue — it held that the learned Tribunal was correct in concluding that the assessee firm was entitled to registration without execution of a fresh deed of partnership.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the assessee firm was entitled to registration on the basis of the existing registered deed together with the subsequent agreement dated 15.4.1975; the Tribunal's and the A.A.C.'s decisions were upheld.
  • The Court's reasoning affirms that a change in partnership constitution can be effected by a written agreement that modifies parts of an earlier deed while adopting the rest; both documents read together may constitute the statutory "instrument."
  • This opinion applies established authorities interpreting "instrument" broadly; the decision resolved the reference against the Revenue on the facts before the Court. The opinion does not state that it is laying down a novel precedent beyond applying and aligning with the cited authorities.

    Commissioner Of Income Tax, North Eastern Region, Shillong v. M/S. Rajmohan Saha And Others, Agartala

    Dr. B.P Saraf, J.:— This reference under Section 256(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 has been made by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Gauhati Bench, Gauhati at the instance of the Commissioner of Income Tax and the following question of law has been referred for our opinion:

    “Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the assessee firm should have been granted registration under the Income Tax Act, 1961 without a fresh deed of partnership embodying the new constitution of the firm ?”

    2. The assessee is a partnership firm. It was constituted by a deed of partnership dated 1.5.1972 It comprised of three partners, namely, Rajmohan Saha, Akhil Chandra Saha and Meghanad Saha, The firm, as evidenced by the said partnership deed, was registered by the Income Tax Officer, A-Ward, Tripura Circle, Agartala (hereinafter referred to as ‘the ITO’) under the Income Tax Act 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) for the assessment year 1973-74. The benefit of continuation of registration was also granted for the assessment years 1974-75 and 1975-76. During the assessment year 1976-77 there was a change in the constitution of the firm. One of the partners, Shri Akhil Chandra Saha retired and in his place Shri Gautam Chandra Saha was taken as a partner. This change was made by an agreement dated 15.4.75 The said agreement was-executed between the continuing partners, Rajmohan Saha and Meghanad Saha, and the incoming partner Gautam Chandra Saha. In Clause (2) of the agreement, it was stated that the said agreement and several clauses of the partnership deed dated 1.5.72 except clauses (3), (4), (5) and (6) which were modified by the said agreement shall bind and regulate the relationship of the parties. As the aforesaid change amounted to change in the constitution of the firm, an application was submitted for registration in Form No. 11-A, as required by Section 184(8) of the Act and the rules framed thereunder. The application was accompanied by attested copy of the agreement dated 15.4.75 The original deed of partnership dated 1.5.72 was already lying in the office of the I.T.O The I.T.O, however, refused to register the firm as, in his opinion, since no fresh deed of partnership had been executed the agreement dated 15.4.75 could not be considered a valid partnership. On appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (shortly ‘the A.A C) did not agree with the opinion of the I.T.O and held that the original partnership continued subject to the change affected by the subsequent agreement. He, accordingly, directed the I.T.O to allow registration to the firm. The Revenue went on appeal before the Tribunal against the order of the A.A.C The Tribunal upheld the decision of the A.A.C, and rejected the appeal of the Revenue. It was held by the Tribunal that the change could be effected by an agreement between the partners without undergoing the formality of executing a fresh partnership deed. It was, therefore, held that the application in Form No. 11A was competent and the firm was entitled to registration. Aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal, the Revenue applied to the Tribunal under Section 256(1) of the Act for reference of the question of law referred to above to this Court. The application was allowed by the Tribunal and the present reference was made.

    3. The question that falls of determination is whether in case of change in the constitution of a firm it is necessary to execute a fresh deed of partnership or the change can be effected by aa agreement in writing modifying some of the terms of the original deed and adopting the rest as has been done in the present case. To properly appreciate the issue, it may be expedient to refer to the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act. Section 184 lays; down the requirements for grant of registration. Sub-section (1) thereof provides that an application for registration of a firm may be made if—

    (i) the partnership is evidenced by an’ instrument; and

    (ii) the individual shares of the partners are specified in that instrument.

    4. Section 185 deals with the power of the I.T.O to grant or refuse registration. It provides that if the I.T.O is satisfied that there is or was a genuine firm in existence, constituted as shown in the instrument of partnership, he shall register the firm. Registration once granted under Section 185 continues to have effect under Section 184(7) for every subsequent year if there is no change in the constitution of the firm or in the shares of the partners, on furnishing of a declaration by the firm in the prescribed fom within the prescribed time.

    5. Rule 22 prescribes the form of application for registration. Clause (ii) of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 22 provides that an application for registration in the case of change in the constitution of the firm or in the shares of the partners should be made in form U-A and should be accompanied by the original instrument or instruments evidencing the partnership as in existence from time to time during the previous year upto the date of application.

    6. From the aforesaid provisions of the Act and the Rules, it is clear that the legal requirement, inter alia, is that partnership is “evidenced by an instrument”. What is an “instrument” has not been spelt out. The whole controversy, therefore, revolves round the meaning or true import of this expression. According to Revenue, it means a formal deed of partnership—nothing less than that. The assessee's understanding of it is in the sense of a writing-a document which gives formal expression to the agreement between the parties. If the latter view is accepted, the constitution of partnership-need not be shown in one instrument—there may be more than one instrument evidencing the partnership. In sach a case, all such documents taken together shall be the “instrument” within the meaning of Section 184(1) of the Act. On careful consideration, we find’ ourself in agreement with the latter interpretation. In our opinion, the word” instrument” has been used in Section 184(1) of the Act in the sense of a writing—a document or as observed in Rose v. Otis 33 p 77, 5 Colo App 472, 473 (quoted in 44 Corpus Juris secondum p 420,) a formal expression in writing of some agreement or obligation, or of some act upon which the rights of the parties are dependent. The word “instrument” cannot be given too narrow a construction to mean only a regular deed of partnership.

    7. A partnership may be evidenced by one document or several documents. In case of several documents, all such documents together shall constitute the instrument of partnership. The number of documents is not determinative. So long as the terms of the partnership are specified in any document or documents which goes to constitute the instrument of partnership, the condition of Section 184(I) is fulfilled. It will be a partnership ‘evidenced by an instrument’.

    8. This view of ours gets full support from a number of decision of different High Courts which had interpreted the expression “evidenced by an instrument” in the context of Section 184 of the Act or the corresponding section of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, namely, Section 26-A. In this connection we may first refer to the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Ramlal Muralidhar v. C.I.T 5 ITC 150 where it was held that registration cannot be refused merely on the ground that the instrument of partnership does not contain in itself the complete agreement constituting the partnership but requires supplementation by other evidence. We may next refer the decision of Bombay High Court in Chotelal Devchand v. C.I.T (1958) 34 ITR 351 where Chagla CJ, observed:

    “So long as the terms are specified in any document which goes to constitute the instrument of partnership, the condition of section 26-A (corresponding to Section 184) is satisfied. You may have an instrument of partnership, in which case all the terms must be found in that instrument. But you may have more than one instrument, and if all the terms of the partnership and the shares of the partners can be gathered from the various documents, then so long as the assessee is relying on these documents there is no reason why the department should refuse to look at any other doo ument than the partnership deed, and also there is no reason to hold that the terms of section 26-A (corresponding to section 184 of the 1961 Act) have not been complied with.”

    9. To the same effect is the decision of the Madras High Court in V.M Pariasamy Chettiar and Co. v. CIT, Madras, (1964) 52 I.T.R 134, where it was observed at page 138 of the report:

    “…in a particular case where the partners of a firm execute several agreements between them for the conduct of the business of the firm all the documents might be treated as a composite integral whole despite the fact that the agreements themselves are actually engrossed in different documents or instruments.”

    10. In C.I.T v. Wholesale District Cloth Importers Association, (1973) Tax L.R 867, the Allahabad High Court also held:

    “The instrument of partnership may be a single document or may be spelt out of several documents all existing in the relevant accounting year, which will together form an instrument of partnership.”

    11. The latest decision that may be referred is the decision of the Calcutta High Court in C.I.T v. East India Land and Components (1981) 129 I.T.R 426, where in a survey of a number of authorities, it was reiterated (at page 437 of the report):

    “Thus in our opinion, ‘instrument’ does not mean only a regular partnership deed but it may constitute any other formal transfer. If the terms of the partnership are Contained in a number of documents or in the correspondence between the parties, the documents or letters would constitute the “instrument of partnership.”

    12. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the clear opinion that for purpose of section 184 of the Act it is not necessary that with every change of the constitution of a firm, a fresh deed of partnership should be executed. The change may be affected by an agreement which may refer to the terms contained in the original deed of partnership and agree to run the partnership in accordance therewith subject to the modifications or changes made by such agreement. In such a case, both the agreement and the original deed of partnersnips would constitute the instrument of partnership within the meaning of section 184(1) of the Act. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the learned Tribunal was right in its conclusion that the assessee firm was entitled to registration without a fresh deed of partnership and, accordingly, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative and against the Revenue.

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