Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion: VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J. (ORAL)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal/petition under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 challenging the judgment of the Additional Rent Controller dated 1.2.2013 which dismissed a bonafide necessity eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act. The eviction petition related to one shop on the ground floor of property no. 3172, Punjabi Basti, Subzi Mandi, Delhi (identified in the site plan filed with the eviction petition).

The petitioner (landlord) claimed title to the suit shop by way of a Will dated 24.12.1997 executed by his grandfather, and sought eviction so that he could use the shop as an office for finance. The respondent (tenant) disputed the petitioner's ownership and alleged that the petitioner had alternative suitable premises (property no. 2642 — said to be residential — and two shops in property no. 2666).

At the trial level the petitioner examined himself as PW‑1 and proved several documents (including the registered Will, site plan and order sheets from an earlier suit). The respondent produced two witnesses (including herself as RW‑1) and proved two documents. The Additional Rent Controller found in favour of the petitioner on the ownership issue but dismissed the eviction petition on the ground that the petitioner had two alternative suitable premises. The present court heard the matter after noting that costs directed by an earlier interim order had not been paid and after observing that the respondent was not represented in court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner/landlord had sufficient title or ownership vis-à-vis the tenant to maintain a bonafide necessity eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
  2. Whether the petitioner had alternative suitable accommodation (specifically property no. 2642 and property no. 2666) such that the bonafide requirement ground for eviction would fail.
  3. Whether the Additional Rent Controller erred in law in dismissing the eviction petition despite findings on ownership in favour of the petitioner.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner/Landlord's Arguments

  • The petitioner claimed ownership of the suit shop by virtue of a Will dated 24.12.1997 executed by his grandfather (registered Will produced as evidence, Ex. PW1/1).
  • The respondent had earlier filed a suit for permanent injunction against the grandfather in which the petitioner was made a defendant, and the respondent had stated in that suit that she would have no objection in making payment of rent to the petitioner.
  • The petitioner sought possession to carry on his office for finance in the tenanted premises and stated he had no other alternative suitable accommodation.
  • The petitioner gave evidence (as PW‑1) and produced documents including the site plan (Ex. PW1/2) and other documentation to support his claim of ownership and need.

Respondent/Tenant's Arguments

  • The respondent disputed the petitioner's ownership of the premises and thus contested title.
  • The respondent asserted that the petitioner had alternative suitable premises: property no. 2642, Lambi Gali, Punjabi Basti (allegedly residential) and two shops in property no. 2666, Basti Punjabi, Delhi.
  • The respondent produced evidence in defence (including reply to notice — Ex. DW1/2 and a postal receipt — Ex. DW1/3) and had two witnesses (RW‑1 and RW‑2).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shanti Sharma v. Ved Prabha, AIR 1987 SC 2028 Explains that the term "owner" in rent-control contexts is not to be read as absolute ownership; ownership must be understood in the context of the rent-control legislation and emphasises the relative nature of "owner" vis-à-vis tenant for purposes of bonafide requirement under Section 14(1)(e). The court adopted the principle that "owner" need not mean absolute title; it sufficed that the petitioner was more than a tenant and had the necessary relationship to the premises to claim bonafide requirement.
Rajender Kumar Sharma & Ors. v. Leela Wati & Ors., 155 (2008) DLT 383 Holds that a landlord is not required to prove absolute ownership as under the Transfer of Property Act and need only show that he is more than a tenant for purposes of eviction under rent-control law. The court relied on this ratio to support the finding that the petitioner satisfied the ownership requirement under the Delhi Rent Control Act.
Jiwan Lal v. Gurdial Kaur & Ors., 1995 RLR 162 Affirms the proposition that absolute title is not necessary for a landlord to claim eviction on bonafide requirement grounds under rent-control jurisprudence. The court cited this authority as part of the established line of cases indicating that imperfect title does not defeat an eviction petition if the landlord's relationship to the property vis‑à‑vis the tenant is established.
Ramesh Chand v. Uganti Devi, 157 (2009) DLT 450 Observes that in rent-control cases the court must examine the landlord's title and right qua the tenant; if the landlord has been receiving rent for his own benefit (not on behalf of someone else) he may be considered the owner, and Section 116 of the Evidence Act can create estoppel against a tenant who pays rent to the landlord. The court applied this reasoning to conclude that the petitioner's ownership position (as against the tenant) was sufficiently established and that the tenant could not successfully dispute title where rent had been paid to the landlord.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two principal analytical steps: (A) ownership/entitlement to sue for eviction; and (B) availability of alternative suitable accommodation.

A. Ownership:

  • The court agreed with the Additional Rent Controller's findings (paras 10 and 11 of the impugned judgment) that the petitioner had established ownership vis‑à‑vis the tenant. The petitioner produced a registered Will dated 24.12.1997 (Ex. PW1/1), the site plan and documentation showing how the property came to the petitioner's grandfather. The respondent did not show who else was the owner.
  • The court adopted and relied on established authorities (including Shanti Sharma v. Ved Prabha and decisions of this Court) to emphasise that "owner" in the rent-control context is a relative concept: absolute title is not necessary and the key question is whether the landlord is more than a tenant and is receiving rent for his own benefit. The court concluded that the petitioner satisfied the ownership requirement for a bonafide necessity eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act.

B. Alternative Suitable Accommodation:

  • The Additional Rent Controller had dismissed the eviction petition on the ground that the petitioner had two alternative suitable premises (no. 2642 and no. 2666). The present court examined those findings and found them to be erroneous.
  • Regarding property no. 2642, the court observed that it was a residential house (as deposed by the petitioner in evidence) and therefore could not serve as an alternative suitable accommodation for the petitioner's need for a shop to open an office for finance. The respondent had not cross‑examined the petitioner on this point. Therefore, the controller erred in treating property no. 2642 as suitable alternative accommodation.
  • Regarding property no. 2666, the petitioner had deposed that it was not self‑acquired but ancestral and had devolved among three persons (his father, the petitioner and the petitioner's brother). The petitioner produced documents (Ex. PW1.D3 and Ex. PW1.D4) showing that the two shops in property no. 2666 were transferred to the petitioner's brother. Since documentation showed the premises belonged to the brother and not to the petitioner, the premises could not be treated as the petitioner's alternative suitable accommodation. The court further noted the principle that tenants cannot create disputes inter se family members where family transactions are not themselves disputed by family members.
  • On these bases the court concluded that the Additional Rent Controller erred in finding that the petitioner had alternative suitable accommodation and therefore erred in dismissing the eviction petition on that ground.

C. Disposition:

  • Given acceptance of the petitioner's ownership position and rejection of the alternative accommodation defence, the court allowed the petitioner's bonafide necessity eviction petition in respect of the specified shop.
  • Procedurally, the court noted earlier directions regarding costs (an interim order had imposed costs of Rs. 5,000 for an earlier adjournment) and the respondents' non‑appearance; the court nevertheless proceeded to decide the petition on merits after hearing the petitioner's counsel and perusing the record.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court's final decision was to set aside the impugned judgment of the Additional Rent Controller dated 1.2.2013 and to allow the bonafide necessity eviction petition in respect of the tenanted premises (one shop on the ground floor of property no. 3172, Punjabi Basti, Subzi Mandi, Delhi, as shown in red on site plan Ex. PW1/2). The respondent/tenant was granted the statutory period of six months to vacate the tenanted premises. The court ordered no costs.

Implications: The direct effect is that the petitioner / landlord succeeds and the respondent / tenant must vacate the specified shop within six months. The opinion applies established rent‑control principles regarding the meaning of "owner" (that absolute title is not required) and reinforces that alternative accommodation must be truly available to the petitioner (a residential house cannot be treated as suitable for a shop; property shown to belong to another family member cannot be treated as the petitioner's alternative). The court did not purport to lay down a novel principle of law; it applied existing authorities to the facts and therefore this decision resolves the dispute between the parties without creating a new precedent beyond applying established ratios.

    Nitin Sharma Petitioner v. Smt. Raj Rani

    VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J (ORAL)

    1. On the last date of hearing, the following order was passed:-

    “1. Respondent appears in person and seeks adjournment. Though there is no ground to grant adjournment simply because the counsel for the respondent has chosen not to come and also considering the fact that it is the respondent who had sought adjournment on the last two occasions to file the counter-affidavit, this petition is adjourned subject to payment of costs of Rs. 5000/- to the petitioner within a period of four weeks from today.

    2. List on 19th December, 2014.

    3. It is made clear that no adjournment will be granted on the next date of hearing.”

    2. Counsel for the petitioner states that costs have not been paid in terms of the last order. There is also no representation for the respondent although it is 1.00 P.M I have therefore heard the counsel for the petitioner and after perusing the record I am proceeding to decide the petition.

    3. This petition under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) is filed by the petitioner/landlord impugning the judgment of the Additional Rent Controller dated 1.2.2013 dismissing the bonafide necessity eviction petition filed under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act with respect to one shop in the tenancy of the respondent situated on the ground floor of property no. 3172, Punjabi Basti, Subzi Mandi, Delhi as shown in red colour in the site plan filed with eviction petition.

    4. The case of the petitioner/landlord was that he was the owner of the suit shop inasmuch as the property was initially owned by his grandfather Sh. Sunder Dass and the grandfather Sh. Sunder Dass executed his Will dated 24.12.1997 in favour of the petitioner/landlord making him the owner of the suit property. The petitioner/landlord stated that respondent/tenant had also filed a suit for permanent injunction against the grandfather Sh. Sunder Dass and in which the present petitioner was made as a defendant and the respondent made a statement in the said suit that she would have no objection in making the payment of the rent to the petitioner. Petitioner/landlord prayed for the eviction of the respondent/tenant from the suit premises so as to carry on his office for finance in the tenanted premises. The petitioner, a man of 30 years, had worked with ICICI Bank in the loan division of the bank from January 2005 to August 2007. Petitioner/landlord pleaded that he had no other alternative suitable accommodation.

    5. After grant of leave to defend, the respondent/tenant filed the written statement and disputed the ownership of the petitioner/landlord and also stated that the petitioner/landlord had two other alternative suitable premises being property no. 2642, Lambi Gali, Punjabi Basti, Delhi and two shops in property no. 2666, Basti Punjabi, Delhi.

    6. Petitioner/landlord examined himself as PW-1 and proved various documents and the respondent also stood in the witness box as RW-1 and proved two documents. These factual aspects of the leading of evidence are noted in paras 4 to 5B of the impugned judgment dated 1.2.2013 and which read as under:-

    “4. The petitioner has examined only one witness in support of his case. Petitioner himself stepped into witness box as PW-1 and deposed on the lines of the petition. Further he proved following documents:

    (i) Registered Will dt. 24.12.1997 - Ex. PW1/1

    (ii) Site plan of tenanted premises - Ex. PW1/2

    (iii) Order sheets in case titled as Smt. Raj Rani v. Sh. Sunder Dass from 2.08.02 to 7.07.11 - Ex. PW1/3

    (iv) Order dt. 05.03.03 in case titled as Smt. Raj Rani v. Sh. Sunder Dass - Ex. PW1/4

    (v) Notice dt. 08.06.09 - Ex. PW1/5

    (vi) Copy of power of attorney - Mark A

    (vii) Copy of Will - Mark B

    (viii) Copy of pension letter - Mark C

    5. On her turn, the respondent produced two witnesses in defence. 5A. Respondent herself stepped into witness box as RW-1 and deposed on the lines of her written statement. Further she proved following documents:

    (i) Reply to notice dt. 08.06.2009 - Ex. DW1/2

    (ii) Postal receipt - Ex. DW1/3 5B. RW-2, Rakesh Kumar, son of the respondent, also deposed on the lines of written statement.”

    7. The Additional Rent Controller by the impugned judgment has held the aspect of ownership in favour of the petitioner/landlord in paras 10 and 11 of the impugned judgment, and since I completely agree with the conclusions in those paras, I adapt the same and reproduce the said paras as under:-

    “10. Ld. Counsel for the respondent argued that petitioner is not the owner of the tenanted premises and he has not produced any title document to show his or his predecessor-ininterest/grandfather's ownership rights over the tenanted premises. On the other hand, PW1 deposed that property bearing no. 3172, Punjabi Basti, Subzi Mandi, Delhi, of which tenanted premises is a part, was bequeathed by his grandfather in his favour vide registered Will dt. 24.12.1997 Ex. PW1/1. Further plaintiff has placed on record documents Ex. PW1.X which is order passed by Smt. Manju Goel, Ld. Civil Judge, site plan and award passed by arbitrator Sh. Raja Inder Singh, whereby the suit property came to the share of grandfather of the plaintiff. Though, it has been admitted by PW-1 and it is evident that award is not a registered document but at the same time the defendant has not been able to show as to who else was the owner of the property.

    11. The concept of ownership in a landlord-tenant litigation governed by rent control law has to be distinguished from the one in a title suit. Ownership is a relative term, the import whereof depends on the context in which it is used. The word “owner” is not used in the Act in the context of an absolute owner. In this regard reference can be have to the decision of the Apex Court in “Shanti Sharma v. Ved Prabha, AIR 1987 SC 2028”, wherein it was held that:

    “14. The word ‘owner’ has not been defined in this Act and the word ‘owner’ has also not been defined in the Transfer of Property Act. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant appears to be is that ownership means absolute ownership in the land as well as of the structure standing thereupon. Ordinarily, the concept of ownership may be what is contended by the counsel for the appellant but in the modern context where it is more or less admitted that all lands belong to the State, the persons who hold properties will only be lessees or the persons holding the land on some terms from the Govt. or the authorities constituted by the State and in this view of the matter it could not be thought of that the Legislature when it used the term ‘owner’ in the provision of Sec. 14 (1) (e) it thought of ownership as absolute ownership. It must be presumed that the concept of ownership only will be as it is understood at present. It could not be doubted that the term ‘owner’ has to be understood in the context of the background of the law and what is contemplated in the scheme of the Act. This Act has been enacted for protection of the tenants. But at the same time it has provided that the landlord under certain circumstances will be entitled to eviction and bonafide requirement is one of such grounds on the basis of which landlords have been permitted to have eviction of a tenant. In this context, the phrase ‘owner’ thereof has to be understood, and it is clear that what is contemplated is that where the person builds up his property and lets out to the tenant and subsequently needs it for his own use, he should be entitled to an order or decree for eviction, the only thing necessary for him to prove is bonafide requirement and that he is the owner thereof. In this context, what appears to be the meaning of the term ‘owner’ is vis-a-vis the tenant i.e the owner should be something more than the tenant.”

    In another case law, “Rajender Kumar Sharma & Ors.… v. Leela Wati & Ors.…, 155 (2008) DLT 383”, it was laid down that a landlord is not required to prove absolute ownership as required under Transfer of Property Act and he is required to show only that he is more than a tenant. Same was the ratio of decision given in “Jiwan Lal… v. Gurdial Kaur & Ors.… 1995 RLR 162.” Further, the High Court of Delhi made important observations in the decision given in the case titled as “Ramesh Chand v. Uganti Devi, 157 (2009) DLT 450” in following terms:

    “7. It is settled preposition of law that in order to consider the concept of ownership under Delhi Rent Control Act, the Court has to see the title and right of the landlord qua the tenant. The only thing to be seen by the Court is that the landlord had been receiving rent for his own benefit and not for and on behalf of someone else. If the landlord was receiving rent for himself and not on behalf of someone else, he is to be considered as the owner, howsoever imperfect his title over the premises may be. The imperfectness of the title of the premises cannot stand in the way of an eviction petition under Section 14 (1) (e) of the DRC Act, neither the tenant can be allowed to raise the plea of imperfect title or title not vesting in the landlord and that too when the tenant has been paying rent to the landlord. Section 116 of the Evidence Act creates estoppels against such a tenant. A tenant can challenge the title of landlord only after vacating the premises and not when he is occupying the premises. In fact, such a tenant who denies the title of the landlord, qua the premises, to whom he is paying rent, acts dishonestly……”

    In view of above, it may be held that petitioner has satisfied this court about his ownership rights over tenanted premises.” (underlining added)

    8. The reason why the Additional Rent Controller dismissed the bonafide necessity eviction petition was by giving the finding that the petitioner/landlord had with him two other alternative suitable premises being property no. 2642, Lambi Gali, Punjabi Basti, Delhi and two shops in property no. 2666, Basti Punjabi, Delhi. Let us examine this issue.

    9. In my opinion, the Additional Rent Controller has fallen into a clear cut error in holding that the aforesaid two property nos. 2462 and 2666 are alternative suitable accommodations, and the reasons for the same are given hereunder:-

    (i) So far as property no. 2642 is concerned, this is a residential house and therefore these premises cannot be alternative suitable premises with respect to the need for a shop for opening of an office for finance. That the property no. 2642 is a residential property is deposed by the petitioner/landlord in his evidence and there is no cross-examination by the respondent/tenant that the property no. 2642 is not a residential property. In this view of the matter, Additional Rent Controller has erred in holding that property no. 2642 is an alternative suitable accommodation.

    (ii) So far as the other property no. 2666 is concerned, it has been deposed by the petitioner/landlord that this property was not his self-acquired property but it was an ancestral property which had devolved upon him i.e the property had belonged to three persons i.e his father, the petitioner/landlord and the brother of the petitioner/landlord. Petitioner/landlord filed and proved in his evidence as Ex.PW1.D3 and Ex.PW1.D4, the documents whereby the suit property was transferred to the brother of the petitioner/landlord. Once the property no. 2666 was shown by means of documentation not to belong to the petitioner/landlord, but to his brother, the same cannot be said to be alternative suitable premises. A tenant has no right to dispute transactions which have taken place inter se the family members once the family members themselves do not dispute the transaction. Tenants cannot create disputes between the family members when no disputes exist with respect to the transactions of the transfer of the property. Therefore the Additional Rent Controller has erred in holding that the premises no. 2666 which had two shops would amount to alternative suitable accommodation.

    10. In this view of the matter, the impugned judgment of the Additional Rent Controller dated 1.2.2013 is set aside and the bonafide necessity eviction petition is decreed with respect to the tenanted premises being one shop on the ground floor of property no. 3172, Punjabi Basti, Subzi Mandi, Delhi and as shown in red colour in site plan Ex.PW1/2. Respondent/tenant is granted the statutory period of six months to vacate the suit/tenanted premises. No costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Nitin Sharma Petitioner v. Smt. Raj Rani
    (Dec 19, 2014)