Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Six appeals were consolidated because they concern identical subject-matter: apportionment of compensation for land acquired under the Notification dated 31 March 2000 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The land in the first appeal was at Jantar Mantar, Delhi and in the remaining appeals at Mall Road, Delhi. The Reference Court (in proceedings under Sections 30 & 31 of the Land Acquisition Act) awarded compensation to the respondents (lessees) while granting the appellant (the lessor/owner) the capitalized value of rent for land that had been leased in perpetuity. The appellant challenged the apportionment and sought a distribution of the compensation in the ratio 25% to the appellant (lessor) and 75% to the respondents (lessees).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the compensation awarded for the acquired land should be apportioned between the lessor (appellant) and the lessees (respondents) in the ratio 25% (lessor) : 75% (lessees).
  2. Whether the apportionment principles enunciated in Inder Parshad and Brij Behari Sahai (and related Apex Court decisions) apply where the Notification sought acquisition of leasehold rights but the Land Acquisition Collector determined compensation on the basis of the market value of the land.
  3. Whether the fact that the lessor is the Ministry of Defence (a government interest) and the acquiring agency is the Government of the NCT of Delhi affects applicability of precedents (including whether the State is a "person interested" under Section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894) and the entitlement to any part of the compensation.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant (lessor) claimed apportionment of compensation in the ratio 25% to the appellant and 75% to the respondents.
  • Counsel for the appellant argued that the principle in Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar (2003) 3 SCC 128 is inapplicable because the lessor is the Ministry of Defence while the acquiring agency is the Government of the NCT of Delhi.
  • The appellant relied on Apex Court decisions (Brij Behari Sahai, Union of India v. A. Ajit Singh) that apportion compensation between lessor and lessee in ratios such as 40%:60% or 75%:25% of market value, and argued the Land Acquisition Collector correctly assessed compensation at market value and awarded compensation for superstructure to the lessee, leading to an appropriate apportionment (60% to lessee and 40% to lessor as assessed by the Collector).
  • The appellant pointed to the lease deeds showing absolute ownership retained by the appellant and a resumption clause (right to resume on one month's notice), relying on Inder Parshad (1994) 5 SCC 239 to support the claimed 25%:75% split.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents contended that the Reference Court's judgment was sustainable on facts and law, and that the Notification specifically mentioned acquisition of leasehold rights — so compensation was properly awarded in respect of leasehold rights to the respondents.
  • They relied upon Sharda Devi; Collector Of Bombay v. Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri & Others (AIR 1955 SC 298); G.H. Grant (Dr) v. State of Vihar (AIR 1966 SC 237); Raj Kumar v. Union of India (R.F.A. No. 70/1989); Vithal Yeshwant Jathar; Kachrulal Hiralal Dhoot v. The Gurudwara Board, Nanded (AIR 1979 Bombay 31); and Sivayogeswara Cotton Press v. M. Panchaksharappa (AIR 1962 SC 413) to support the proposition that: where the State itself has an interest in the land, the State does not need to acquire its own interest and, therefore, the compensation awarded is in respect of leasehold interest only and not ownership rights of the lessor/appellant.
  • It was argued that the State is not a 'person interested' as defined in Section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and hence no compensation to the appellant (as State-lessor) is warranted beyond capitalized rent already granted by the Reference Court.
  • Respondents pointed to Inder Parshad paragraphs to assert that unless the sum total of interests of both lessor and lessee are acquired, compensation payable is towards the leasehold interest; accordingly, amounts for landlord's rights are limited to items like land revenue and capitalized rent (which the Reference Court had awarded).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Inder Parshad v. Union of India (1994) 5 SCC 239 Principle on apportionment when the Land Acquisition Collector determines total market value and reference is needed to apportion between lessor and lessee; example apportionments (e.g., 75% to lessee, 25% to lessor). The Court relied upon and quoted Inder Parshad. It held that where compensation was determined on the basis of market value for the whole interest, Inder Parshad's ratio and reasoning applied. The Court applied this precedent to justify apportioning compensation 75% to respondents and 25% to appellant.
Brij Behari Sahai (dead) through LRs. v. State of U.P (2004) 1 SCC 641 Explains that when the Land Acquisition Officer determines market value for the whole property, apportionment between Government and claimants becomes necessary; approves apportionment consistent with Inder Parshad. The Court quoted paragraphs 20 and 21 from Brij Behari Sahai and applied its reasoning. The Court found Brij Behari Sahai supports applying a 75% (lessee) : 25% (lessor) apportionment where market value has been determined for the whole property.
Union of India v. A. Ajit Singh (1997) 6 SCC 50; AIR 1997 SC 2669 Authority referenced for alternative apportionment ratios (e.g., ratios such as 40%:60% or 75%:25% appearing in precedent jurisprudence). The Court noted this decision was relied upon by the appellant for apportionment principles. However, the Court indicated that on the facts where market value was determined for the whole, Inder Parshad and Brij Behari Sahai were more appropriate.
Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar (2003) 3 SCC 128 Cited by parties regarding the apportionment principle; invoked to contest appropriate apportionment methodology. The appellant argued Sharda Devi was inapplicable; respondents relied on it. The Court held the Reference Court had misapplied Sharda Devi by failing to distinguish the factual basis (market value determination) and thus found the Reference Court's reliance on Sharda Devi unsustainable on the facts.
Collector Of Bombay v. Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri & Others (AIR 1955 SC 298) Cited in support of the proposition that the State does not acquire its own land and that, where the State has an interest, only private interests of third parties are to be acquired. Relied upon by respondents to argue acquisition concerned leasehold interest only. The Court considered this line of authority but distinguished it on the ground that, in the present matter, the Land Acquisition Collector had assessed compensation at market value for the whole.
G.H. Grant (Dr) v. State of Vihar (AIR 1966 SC 237) Authority cited to support the respondents' argument on State interest and acquisition principles. Respondents relied upon it; the Court observed such authorities but concluded they were not decisive given the factual finding that compensation had been assessed on market value.
Raj Kumar v. Union of India (R.F.A No. 70/1989, decision dated 21.12.2001) Referenced among authorities supporting respondents' position regarding State interest and acquisition of leasehold rights. Relying parties cited it; the Court noted the reliance but treated the case inapplicable to override the effect of a market-value determination by the Land Acquisition Collector.
Vithal Yeshwant Jathar v. Shikandarkhan Makhtumkhan Sardesai (AIR 1963 SC 385) Authority cited by respondents in support of limits on compensation where State interest exists. Cited by respondents; Court observed the authority but found the factual basis differed because compensation here was determined on market value.
Kachrulal Hiralal Dhoot v. The Gurudwara Board, Nanded (AIR 1979 Bombay 31) State or institutional interest cases cited in support of respondents' submission. Referenced by respondents; the Court treated it as part of the respondents' supporting authorities but distinguished on factual grounds.
Sivayogeswara Cotton Press, Devangere v. M. Panchaksharappa (AIR 1962 SC 413) Authority relied upon by respondents concerning acquisition where State has interest and apportionment issues. Cited by respondents; the Court noted reliance but held that the decisive factor remained that the Collector had assessed market value for the whole, invoking Inder Parshad/Brij Behari Sahai instead.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis focused on the factual basis upon which the Land Acquisition Collector had determined compensation. Though the Section 4 Notification stated that leasehold rights were sought to be acquired, the Award by the Land Acquisition Collector assessed compensation on the basis of the market value of the subject land (i.e., for the whole property). The Court treated this factual finding as decisive.

Step-by-step reasoning:

  1. The Court observed the Section 4 Notification referred to acquisition of leasehold rights, and noted the Reference Court had awarded compensation to respondents as if leasehold rights alone were acquired while granting the appellant capitalized rent.
  2. The Court examined the Award of the Land Acquisition Collector and found that compensation had actually been determined on the basis of the market value of the subject land (the whole interest), not merely on the basis of leasehold rights.
  3. The Court held that this factual distinction was material. If compensation had genuinely been assessed only for leasehold rights, the respondents' line of authority (that the State need not acquire its own interest and compensation would be confined to leasehold interests) might apply. But because the Collector determined market value for the whole, apportionment between lessor and lessee became necessary.
  4. On that basis, the Court applied the apportionment principles from Inder Parshad and Brij Behari Sahai, which address apportioning compensation when the Collector determines market value for the entire property and an apportionment between interests is therefore required.
  5. The Court concluded the Reference Court had misapplied precedents such as Sharda Devi and others by failing to account for the crucial factual distinction that the Award was based on market value; consequently, the Reference Court's reasoning was unsustainable.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The impugned judgment was set aside and the consolidated appeals were allowed. The Court ordered that 25% of the compensation awarded shall go to the appellant (lessor) and 75% of the compensation awarded shall go to the respondents (lessees).

Direct consequences: The appeals were allowed with the specific apportionment of compensation as above. The Court disposed of the appeals while directing that the parties shall bear their own costs.

Broader implications: The Court's decision applied existing Apex Court precedents (notably Inder Parshad and Brij Behari Sahai) to a factual scenario where the Collector determined compensation at market value for the whole property. The opinion does not purport to establish a new legal principle beyond applying those precedents to the facts before it.

    Union Of India & Ors. v. Adil Singh & Ors.

    Sunil Gaur, J.:— The subject matter of the above captioned six appeals is the apportionment of compensation in respect of acquisition of land at Jantar Mantar, Delhi in the first above captioned appeal and in remaining appeals, at Mall Road, Delhi vide Notification of 31st March, 2000 under Section 4 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Since the subject matter of above captioned appeals is identical, therefore these appeals were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.

    2. Reference Court's order in proceedings under section 30 & 31 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 grants compensation to respondents herein while granting to appellant capitalized value of rent of subject land which was leased out in perpetuity by appellant to respondents.

    3. Appellant in these appeals claims apportionment of compensation awarded in the ratio of 25%: 75%. That is, out of the compensation awarded 25% is claimed by appellant by virtue of being the Lessor/owner of the subject land and the remaining 75% of the compensation to the respondents.

    4. Learned counsel for appellant contends that the principle of law in respect of apportionment of compensation as enunciated in Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar (2003) 3 SCC 128, is inapplicable to the case in hand, as the Lessor is Ministry of Defence, Government of India, whereas the acquiring agency is Government of NCT of Delhi. It is pointed out by appellant's counsel that though the Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was for acquisition of leasehold rights but the subject land was assessed by Land Acquisition Collector at the market rate and so, the ratio of Apex Court decisions in Brij Behari Sahai (dead) through LRs. v. State of U.P (2004) 1 SCC 641 and Union of India v. A. Ajit Singh, (1997) 6 SCC 50 : AIR 1997 SC 2669 apportioning the compensation between the Lessor and the Lessee in the ratio of 40%: 60% or 75%: 25% of market value of the land applies. It is pointed out by learned counsel for appellant that the compensation assessed in respect of superstructure on the subject land has been awarded to the Lessee and the Land Acquisition Collector had rightly awarded compensation in the ratio of 60%: 40%. That is, 60% to Lessee and 40% to the Lessor while determining the market value of the acquired land.

    5. According to appellant's counsel, a bare perusal of the identical Lease Deeds in question reveals that appellant had retained absolute ownership of the subject land and there was a resumption clause also in the Lease Deeds in question which gives right to appellant to resume the subject land after giving one month's notice. While placing implicit reliance upon Apex Court decision in Inder Parshad v. Union of India, (1994) 5 SCC 239, apportionment of compensation in respect of acquired land in question is claimed in these appeals in the ratio of 25%: 75%, i.e, 25% to appellant and 75% to the respondents.

    6. Learned counsel, for contesting respondents maintain that the impugned judgment is sustainable on facts and in law as well. During the course of hearing, attention of this Court was drawn to Notification in question under Section 4 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to point out that it specifically mentions that leasehold rights in the subject land are sought to be acquired and so logically speaking, the compensation awarded is in respect of leasehold rights only, which has been rightly granted to contesting respondents by the Reference Court.

    7. By placing reliance upon decisions in Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar, (2003) 3 SCC 128; Collector Of Bombay v. Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri & Others, AIR 1955 SC 298; G.H Grant(Dr) v. State of Vihar, AIR 1966 SC 237; decisions in R.F.A No. 70/1989, Raj Kumar v. Union of India, rendered on 21st December, 2001; Vithal Yeshwant Jathar v. Shikandarkhan Makhtumkhan Sardesai, AIR 1963 SC 385; Kachrulal Hiralal Dhoot v. The Gurudwara Board* Nanded, AIR 1979 Bombay 31 and Sivayogeswara Cotton Press, Devangere v. M. Panchaksharappa, AIR 1962 SC 413, it was vehemently contended that the State does not acquire its own land and if Government itself has interest in the land then, it acquires other interests thereupon and the compensation awarded has been determined in respect of leasehold rights only and not of ownership rights of the Lessor/appellant. According to learned counsel for contesting respondents, reliance placed upon decision in Inder Parshad (supra) by appellant is of no avail and that the State is not a ‘person interested’ as defined in Section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It is contended on behalf of contesting respondents that there is no question of grant of any compensation awarded to the appellant.

    8. Infact, attention of this Court was drawn by respondents' counsel to paragraphs no.: 4 to 6 and 8 of the decision in Inder Parshad (supra) to highlight that unless sum total of interest held by Lessor and Lessee in the land is acquired, the compensation payable is towards the leasehold interest and the Lessor in case of leasehold properties is entitled to claim land revenue etc. only, which has been already granted to appellant in the impugned order by arriving at the capitalized value of the rent while computing it for a period of twenty years. Dismissal of these appeals is sought by learned counsel for contesting respondents by implicitly relying upon the nature of the lease in question being permanent and because the acquisition was in respect of leasehold rights only.

    9. The contentions advanced by the respective parties and the decisions cited have been pondered over and the impugned judgment as well as the material on record has been perused. Thereupon, it transpires that though the Notification acquiring the subject land was in respect of leasehold rights only but, infact perusal of the Award of Land Acquisition Collector reveals that the determination of compensation is on the basis of market value of the subject land. This makes all the difference. That is to say, the ratio of decisions relied upon by learned counsel for contesting respondents could have really applied, had the assessment of compensation been actually in respect of leasehold rights only in the subject land.

    10. Since the determination of compensation in respect of subject land is at the market value of land in question, therefore the ratio of decisions of Apex Court in Inder Parshad (supra) and Brij Behari Sahai (supra) squarely applies. The pertinent observations made by Apex Court in Inder Parshad (supra) are as under:—

    “But on the facts in this case, it is seen that since the Land Acquisition Collector had determined the compensation of the sum total of the interests held by the lessor and the lessee in the land under acquisition but being not able to decide on the apportionment of such compensation between Government and the appellant reference was made to the civil court to determine the apportionment. The civil court decided by its award that apportionment of compensation fixed in the award of the Land Acquisition Collector between the lessee-claimant and the Government-landlord shall be in order of 67 per cent and 33 per cent. The High Court by its judgment and decree under the present appeal has modified the apportionment of compensation payable for land as 75 per cent for the lessee and 25 per cent for the lessor.”

    11. It would be worthwhile to quote relevant paragraph no. 20 and 21 of Apex Court decision in Brij Behari Sahai (supra) which reads as under:—

    “20. The claim on behalf of the appellants that the entire compensation determined was only in respect of the totality of the rights held by the appellants as lessees and not of the whole inclusive of the rights and interests of the Government also, though appears to be attractive, does not appeal to us for acceptance. Though as a matter of principle of law, the Government while invoking the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act for acquiring a land in which the Government also had some or other of the interest, need not go for acquiring their interest as well as what is permissible as well as obligated for acquisition is only such of the private interest of third parties other than that of the Government, the Land Acquisition Officer in this case has chosen to, while determining the market value, indisputably proceed to determine for the whole of it and only as a consequence thereof has chosen to apportion compensation between the Government and the claimants at the rate of 10 annas: 6 annas respectively. Though the Reference Court, during the course of its judgment, adverts to the principles relating to the need or desirability of acquiring land of only private parties other than that of the Government under the Land Acquisition Act, has ultimately chosen to adopt only the standard rate of market value determined by the Land Acquisition Officer. Consequently, niceties of language apart and the purported endeavour attempted to have been made by the Reference Court, we are constrained to hold that the actual market value determined was that of the acquired properties as a whole and consequently, the need for apportionment would inevitably arise.

    21. Applying the ratio of the decision of this Court reported in Inder Parshad case the fixation of apportionment in the ratio of 75% in favour of the claimants and 25% in favour of the State would be just and reasonable. The ratio fixed therein seems to us to be more appropriate on the facts of these cases, than the one approved in A. Ajit Singh case. Having regard to the fact that the Government's interest has been fixed at the proportion of 25%, there is no further need or justification to direct the capitalization of the ground rent for further being deducted or directed to be paid by the claimants either from the compensation amount or otherwise, separately.”

    12. Reference Court in the impugned judgment though had taken a note of the Apex Court decision in Inder Parshad (supra) but has failed to apply its ratio by distinguishing it and has misapplied the ratio of Apex Court decisions in Sharda Devi (supra); Vithal Yeshwant Jathar (supra) and Cotton Press (supra) while missing out the vital distinction of actual basis of the compensation assessed which undisputedly is at the market rate of the subject land and is certainly not on the basis of leasehold rights only in the acquired land. Therefore, the contentions advanced by learned counsel for contesting respondents and the reasoning in the impugned order does not hold good.

    13. In the aforesaid view, the impugned judgment is clearly unsustainable and is thus set aside and the above captioned appeals are allowed. Resultantly, appellant shall get 25% of the compensation awarded and rest of the 75% compensation awarded shall go to the respondents.

    14. The above captioned appeals are accordingly disposed of while leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Union Of India & Ors. v. Adil Singh & Ors.
    (Jan 4, 2013)