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  • provisions of s. 60 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882
  • s. 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • s. 9 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • provisions of s. 60 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882
  • s. 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • s. 9 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary: Apportionment of Compensation — Survey No. 41, Nanded

Factual and Procedural Background

These appeals concern apportionment of the compensation of Rs. 17,000 awarded for acquisition of Survey No. 41 at Nanded. The land was proposed to be acquired to provide residential quarters for employees of Zilla Parishad, Nanded. Two claimants disputed entitlement to the compensation:

  • Kachrulal Dhut (referred to as Kachrulal) — in occupation of the property and whose ancestors had constructed a bungalow thereon; and
  • Gurudwara Takhat Sri Huzur Upchal Nagarsaheb (referred to as Gurudwara) — claimed proprietary rights in the land, asserting the land was Inam land of the Gurudwara and that Kachrulal's ancestors occupied under a permission/licence to build and were liable to pay double land revenue as licence fee.

At trial the court held that Kachrulal and his ancestors were permanent tenants (not mere licencees) and apportioned the compensation between Gurudwara and Kachrulal in the ratio 15% : 85% (i.e., Gurudwara 15%). The appeals arise from that apportionment.

The plea of adverse possession (raised at trial) was not advanced before the appellate Bench hearing these appeals.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Gurudwara is entitled to the whole amount of compensation awarded in respect of Survey No. 41.
  2. If Gurudwara is not entitled to the whole amount, what portion of the compensation should be directed to be paid to Gurudwara (and correspondingly to Kachrulal)?

Arguments of the Parties

Kachrulal's Arguments (as presented before the court)

  • Claimed that he (and his ancestors) had acquired absolute ownership of the land by adverse possession through open and continuous occupation for more than twelve years, and therefore the entire compensation should be awarded to him.
  • Alternatively, contended that if the Gurudwara were to receive a share, the 15% awarded to Gurudwara by the trial court was excessive and should be reduced.

Gurudwara's Arguments

  • Asserted that the land was Inam land belonging to the Gurudwara and that the Gurudwara had proprietary title; hence the entire compensation ought to have been paid to Gurudwara.
  • Alternatively, if Kachrulal was only a permanent tenant or licensee, the amount awarded to him was greater than his legitimate share and should be reduced.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dossibai Nanabhoy Jeejeebhoy v. P.M. Bharucha, 1958 60 Bom. L.R. 1208 Held that a "person interested in the land" under the Land Acquisition Act (s. 3(b) read with s. 9) includes persons who claim interest in compensation even if their right is not a legal or proprietary estate; rights such as an irrevocable licence, a right to remain in occupation, or an easement may suffice to sustain a claim to apportionment. The court relied on this decision to conclude that whether Kachrulal and his ancestors were permanent tenants or held an irrevocable licence, they were nonetheless "persons interested" and entitled to share in the compensation; consequently it was unnecessary to decide definitively between licence and tenancy.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeded in these main steps, strictly following the material cited in the opinion:

  1. Statutory definition and scope: The court invoked the definition of "person interested" in s. 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and the related concept in s. 9 (as explained in the cited precedent) to frame who may claim a share of compensation. The court accepted the principle that entitlement to compensation is not confined to those with legal or proprietary estate in the land.
  2. Reliance on precedent: The court relied on Dossibai (1958) which held that persons with rights such as an irrevocable licence or a continuing right of occupation may claim apportionment with the owner; therefore a proprietary title is not an absolute prerequisite for compensation.
  3. Licence versus tenancy: Because the division bench precedent established the broader rule, the court found it unnecessary to resolve—on appeal—whether Kachrulal's ancestors held an irrevocable licence or were permanent tenants as held by the trial court. Either status would render them entitled to compensation.
  4. Permanence of licence: The court referred to s. 60 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 to explain how a licence may be irrevocable where the licensee, acting upon the licence, has executed work of a permanent character and incurred expenses. Given the pleaded facts that structures (a bungalow) had been constructed, a licence (if that were the arrangement) would be rendered permanent/irrevocable within the statutory exceptions and therefore compensable.
  5. Quantification of Gurudwara's interest: Accepting the trial court's finding that Gurudwara's only right was to receive annually Rs. 5.50 (double the land revenue), the court analyzed the proper apportionment by capitalizing twenty years' income. The court calculated Gurudwara's capitalized entitlement as Rs. 5.50 × 20 = Rs. 110.
  6. Final apportionment: On the basis that Gurudwara's capitalized interest equalled Rs. 110, the court concluded that Gurudwara's share of the Rs. 17,000 compensation should be limited to Rs. 110, with the balance payable to Kachrulal.
  7. Practical direction and costs: The court directed that if Gurudwara had already received a larger amount under the trial court's order, Kachrulal may apply for refund of the excess. It also directed that, given the nature of the dispute (between a religious institution and a person permitted to construct structures), each party would bear its own costs for the two First Appeals that were allowed; a separate First Appeal (No. 858 of 1973) was dismissed, with no order as to costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court allowed First Appeals Nos. 210 and 211 of 1972 and substituted the trial court's order by directing that out of the total compensation of Rs. 17,000 awarded for Survey No. 41 of Nanded:

Gurudwara shall be entitled to Rs. 110, and the remainder of the compensation shall be paid to Kachrulal. If Gurudwara has already received an amount in excess of Rs. 110 pursuant to the trial court's order, Kachrulal is at liberty to apply for refund of the excess amount.

Additional disposition: First Appeal No. 858 of 1973 is dismissed; there will be no order as to costs for that appeal. For the appeals that were allowed, each party will bear its own costs.

Implications

  • Direct effect: The immediate consequence is a new apportionment of the Rs. 17,000 compensation: Rs. 110 to Gurudwara and the balance to Kachrulal; potential refund proceedings are permitted if Gurudwara already received more than Rs. 110 under the prior order.
  • Legal principle applied (not newly created): The court applied established authority (Dossibai) and statutory provisions (s. 3(b) and s. 9 of the Land Acquisition Act, and s. 60 of the Indian Easements Act) to reaffirm that persons without proprietary title (e.g., permanent tenants or holders of irrevocable licences) may share in compensation. The opinion did not purport to set a new precedent beyond applying existing law.

    Kachrulal Hiralal Dhoot v. The Gurudwara Board

    Kantawala, C.J:— All these appeals arise out of apportionment of compensation awarded in respect of survey No. 41 situate at Nanded. The dispute in all these appeals pertains to apportionment and the controversy is between claimant Kachruli Dhut who is in occupation of the property and who has consrtucted a house and Gurudwara Takhat Sri Huzur Upchal Nagarsaheb. Survey No. 41 of Nanded has been proposed to be acquired for providing residential quarters for employees of Zilla Parishad, Nanded. The compensation for this survey number was determined under the award as payable to the persons interested at Rs. 17,000 and the disputes between these two claimants relate only to apportionment.

    2. In First Appeals Nos. 210 and 211 of 1972 the contention of Mr. Paranjpe on behalf of claimant Kachrulal is that the claimant has become the absolute owner of this survey number by reason of adverse possession thereof by him and his ancestors openly and continuously for a period of more than twelve years and the entire amount of compensation has to be awarded to his client.

    3. In the alternative it is submitted that when the trial Court awarded 15 per cent out of the total amount of compensation to Gurudwara the amount paid to the Gurudwara was much more than its legitimate share as it should have been reduced. Mr. Deshpande on behalf of the Gurudwara submitted that the trial Court held Gurudwara to be the owner of survey No. 41 and once Gurudwara is held to be the owner the entire amount of compensation ought to have been, paid to Gurudwara and no amount ought to have been given to Kachrulal who was in occupation thereof and whose ancestors had constructed a bungalow thereon. In the alternative he submitted that even if Kachrulal is held to be a permanent tenant or a permanent licensee, still the amount of compensation that has been awarded to him is much more than his legitimate share.

    4. At the outset it may be stated that though the contention as regards title by adverse possession is raised before the trial Court that plea has not been advanced before us. The short question we have to consider in the present case is, is Gurudwara entitled to the whole of the amount of compensation and if not, what part of the compensation should be directed to be paid to Gurudwara. It is the case of Gurudwara in its statement of claim that survey No. 41 which formed part of old survey No. 12 was an Inam land belonging to Nanded Sikh Gurudwara Saheb. It was allotted to Kachrulal's ancestors for construction of bungalows under the scheme of Abadi. The ownership of the land was not allotted but only permission was granted to construct bungalows retaining the ownership of the land with its owner. It is the case of Gurudwara that Kachrulal and his ancestors were merely licensees who were given permission to construct buildings and the liability was to pay double the land revenue as licence fee. So far as this plea is concerned, the trial Court has held that Kachrulal and his ancestors were not mere licensees but they were permanent tenants of this survey No. 41 and has directed the total amount of compensation of Rs. 17,000 awarded in respect of survey No. 41 to be apportioned between Gurudwara and Kachrulal in the ratio of 15 per cent.: 85 per cent. The question to be considered in this group of appeals is whether such apportionment is justified.

    5. In the first place it should be noted that the expression “person interested” as defined in s. 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 includes all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under that Act and a person shall be deemed to be interested in land if he is interested in an easement affecting the land. It is the argument of Mr. Deshpande on behalf of Gurudwara that only person having proprietary interest in the property is entitled to share in the compensation amount but if he has no such proprietary interest then he is not entitled to have any share in the compensation amount awarded in respect of the property acquired. In the present case, the trial Court has rejected the contention of Gurudwara that Kachrulal and his ancestors were mere licensees and has taken the view that they were permanent tenants who erected bungalows on this survey number. For the purposes of these appeals, it is unnecessary to decide whether Kachrulal and his ancestors were mere licensees or they were permanent tenants. It is held by a division Bench of this Court in Dossibai Nanabhoy Jeejeebhoy v. P.M Bharucha* . 1958 60 Bom. L.R 1208. as under:

    “A ‘person interested in the land’ under s. 9 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, would, by the definition in s. 3(b) of the Act, include a person who claims interest in compensation to be paid on account of the acquisition of land, and the interest contemplated by s. 9 and the other relevant sections of the Act, is not restricted to legal or proprietary estate or interest in the land but such interest as will sustain a claim to apportionment with the owner of the land.

    If a person has a right to remain in occupation or has a claim against the land, or some obligation or restriction is imposed upon the ownership of the land, the person in whom the right or claim is vested or who is entitled to the benefit of the obligation or restriction will, in our judgment, be entitled to compensation, even though the right, claim or the benefit may not amount to an interest or estate in the land. If a person has, without having any interest, a right to remain in occupation or possession of land of the ownership of another, compensation for extinction of that right by compulsory acquisition will be payable to the person having the right of occupation or possession. For instance, a person who has a license which is irrevocable will be a person interested, even though the licence does not amount to an interest in the land. The owner of a dominant tenement, having an easement over a servient tenement, even though the easement does not amount to an interest in the land, is by the definition declared expressly to be a person interested in land. In our judgment, the right to receive compensation for compulsory acquisition of land is not restricted to those persons who have a legal or proprietary interest or estate in the land and is available to all persons who have a right or claim to land, even if such right or claim does not amount to legal or proprietary estate or interest in the land.”

    6. In view of these clear observations of the division Bench of this Court it is unnecessary for us to decide whether Kachrulal and his ancestors had an irrevocable licence or they were permanent tenants as held by the trial Court. Looked at from any point of view they will be entitled to claim compensation. It cannot be disputed that a permanent tenant has the right to remain in possession of the leasehold property for indefinite period and his obligation is merely to pay the rent reserved either monthly, annually or periodically as the case may be. Even if Kachrulal and his ancestors were to be regarded as persons having a licence then having regard to the provisions of s. 60 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 a licence is irrevocable and it is what is otherwise called in law a permanent licence. That section provides:

    “A licence may be revoked by the grantor, unless:—

    (a) it is coupled with a transfer of property and such transfer is in force;

    (b) the licensee, acting upon the licence, has executed a work of a permanent character and incurred expenses in the execution.”

    7. In view of these provisions of s. 60 even on the case pleaded by Gurudwara in its statement of claim if Kachrulal and his ancestors were to be treated as mere licensees the licence in their favour was entirely irrevocable. Thus either on the footing that they are treated as permanent lessees or on the footing that they are having an irrevocable licence they are entitled to share in the compensation.

    8. The question then arises, how is the amount of compensation of Rs. 17,000 to be apportioned-between Gurudwara and Kachrulal. It is not disputed in view of the finding given by the trial Court that the only right of Gurudwara was to receive every year a sum of Rs. 5.50 being double the amount of land revenue in respect of this survey number. Since the plea as to adverse possession has been given up it is unnecessary for us to consider whether such payment was being made regularly from time to time by Kachrulal and his ancestor. If the right of Gurudwara is only to receive annually a sum of Rs. 5.50, then naturally upon acquisition of the property including their interest in the land, namely, survey No. 41, their right will be to receive the amount which can be arrived at upon capitalization of twenty years' income. Either on the footing that Kachrulal and his ancestors are permanent licensees or permanent tenants in a period of twenty years the only amount which Gurudwara could have got from them would have been Rs. 5.50×20 i.e Rs. 110. Thus the amount compensation of Rs. 17,000 has to be apportioned between Gurudwara and Kachrulal in such a manner that Gurudwara will be entitled to only Rs. 110 and the rest of the amount of compensation shall have to be paid to Kachrulal.

    9. In the result First Appeals Nos. 210 and 211 of 1972 are allowed and the order passed by the trial Court is substituted by the following order:

    10. Out of the total amount of compensation awarded for survey No. 41 of Nanded, Gurudwara shall be entitled to be paid a sum of Rs. 110 and the rest of the amount of compensation will be payable to Kachrulal. If pursuant to the order of the trial Court Gurudwara has received any larger amount than that directed to be paid under this order, Kachrulal will be at liberty to make an application for refund of the excess amount that might have been received by Gurudwara. Bearing in mind that this is a dispute between Gurudwara and a person who had been permitted to construct structures, each party will bear its own costs.

    11. First Appeal No. 858 of 1973 is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

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    Comments

    Kachrulal Hiralal Dhoot v. The Gurudwara Board
    (Sep 7, 1977)