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Case Number

WP(C) No.: 2761/2002

Attorney(S)

For the Petitioner: Mr. G.D Gupta, Sr. Advocate with Ms. Vivya Nagpal, Advocate.
Mr. Sanjay Ghose and Mr. Anuj Aggarwal, Advocates for R-2.

Judges

Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J.

Acts

Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT 1988

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Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner filed a writ petition seeking quashing of a chargesheet dated 28 February 2002 and the departmental inquiry instituted against him on the ground that both are based on the same facts as a criminal prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The petitioner alleged that the lists of documents and witnesses in the departmental chargesheet are identical to those in the criminal proceedings and that pursuing the departmental inquiry would force disclosure of his defence in the criminal prosecution, prejudicing him.

Procedural history (as recorded in the opinion):

The writ petition was dismissed in limine on 2 May 2002.
The petitioner filed Writ Appeal No. 443/2002; an interim order dated 24 May 2002 stayed the petitioner’s cross-examination in the departmental inquiry (to prevent disclosure of his criminal defence).
The Writ Appeal was allowed on 14 January 2004 and the writ petition was remanded for decision on merits; the Division Bench ordered that the departmental proceedings remain stayed until the writ court took up the matter.
This court continued the stay of departmental proceedings by order dated 23 February 2004; as a result, departmental proceedings that commenced in 2002 had not proceeded for eight years at the time of this opinion.
The petitioner remained under suspension. The respondent employer (National Textile Corporation Limited, NTC) reported payment of subsistence allowance amounting to Rs. 17,48,864 up to April 2010 and approximately Rs. 22,000 per month thereafter.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the departmental chargesheet and inquiry (dated 28 February 2002) should be quashed/stayed on the ground that they are based on the same facts as the pending criminal prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and that continuing the departmental inquiry would compel disclosure of defence and prejudice the criminal trial.
Whether, assuming the departmental and criminal proceedings arise from the same facts, the departmental proceedings should be stayed because the criminal charge is grave and involves complicated questions of law and fact.
Whether the petitioner should remain entitled to subsistence allowance while departmental proceedings are stayed and pending, particularly where interim orders have resulted in long delays.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

The departmental chargesheet is based on the same facts as the criminal prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; the lists of documents and witnesses are identical.
If departmental proceedings proceed, the petitioner would be compelled to disclose his defence (via cross-examination) which would prejudice his defence in the criminal prosecution.
The offence charged is grave and involves complicated questions of fact and law, warranting stay of departmental proceedings.
The petitioner asserted that certain fixed deposit receipts (FDRs) alleged to belong to him are actually in joint names with family members (wife, mother-in-law, father-in-law) and, under income tax law, are deemed to be of the first-name holder; he contended he would be compelled to disclose sources of funds that belong to family members.
In rejoinder the petitioner offered that departmental proceedings may continue so long as the final order is stayed; he also offered to be taken back into work (an offer not accepted by NTC).

Respondent No. 2 (National Textile Corporation Limited) — Arguments

Reliance on Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Sarvesh Berry: in cases involving Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act the onus is on the accused to prove assets were not disproportionate and to prove the source of acquisition; therefore disclosure in departmental proceedings does not uniquely prejudice the accused.
The Conduct Rules require disclosure of assets of the employee and of the employee’s wife; departmental rules mandate such disclosures.
There is no bar to simultaneous conduct of departmental inquiry and criminal trial unless the criminal charge is of grave nature involving complicated questions of fact and law (relying on precedents such as Depot Manager v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya).
The respondent contended that all relevant information is within the petitioner’s knowledge and it is the petitioner’s duty to explain the assets in question.
The respondent also drew attention to prior authority distinguishing disciplinary charges for violation of Conduct Rules from criminal charges.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Kusheshwar Dubey v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (1988) 4 SCC 319	Stayed disciplinary proceedings where criminal action and disciplinary proceedings were grounded upon the same set of facts.	Cited by the petitioner; the court noted the principle but proceeded to analyse applicability in the present facts and context (concluding the petitioner’s particular grounds were negated by later authority).
Captain M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. 1999 (2) SCALE 363	If departmental proceedings and criminal case are based on identical facts and the charge is grave involving complicated questions of law and fact, it may be desirable to stay departmental proceedings.	Noted by the court but distinguished: the court observed that Capt. M. Paul Anthony did not involve simultaneous proceedings in the same manner and that an ex parte dismissal had occurred there. The court held that simultaneous proceedings remain permissible except in exceptional circumstances.
DSP, Chennai v. K. Inbasagaran (2006) 1 SCC 420	Example where accused satisfactorily established that monies and assets recovered belonged to his wife who had independent business income.	Relied on by petitioner to argue that family members may legitimately own assets; court acknowledged the authority but applied Sarvesh Berry’s onus principle to the present facts.
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Sarvesh Berry 2005 LAB. I.C 1624 (SC)	In cases under Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act the onus is on the accused to prove assets were not disproportionate; accused must account for source even in criminal case.	The court treated this authority as dispositive on the petitioner’s primary ground that disclosure in departmental proceedings would uniquely prejudice the criminal prosecution. Because the onus rests on the accused in the criminal trial as well, the court held that disclosure in departmental proceedings does not create the special prejudice contended for.
G. Chandrasekhar v. Chairman, Madras Port Trust (1990) II LLJ 5	Authority cited in the proceedings (court notes it was not found relevant).	The court recorded that this authority was cited by respondent but observed it was not relevant to the present controversy.
Depot Manager, APSRTC v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya (1997) 2 SCC 699 : AIR 1997 SC 2232	There is no bar to proceeding simultaneously with departmental inquiry and criminal trial unless criminal charge is of grave nature involving complicated questions of fact and law.	The court relied on this principle to support the position that simultaneous proceedings are generally permissible and to require the petitioner to demonstrate exceptional circumstances to justify a stay.
G. Chandrasekharan v. The Chairman, Madras Port Trust (1990 II LLJ 337)	Held that the gravamen of disciplinary charges could be violation of Conduct Rules which may not be identical to criminal charges.	The court used this to support its conclusion that the subject matter of the departmental proceeding and criminal prosecution are not identical in this case, and the two enquiries would differ.
Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank (2003) 3 SCC 583	In departmental proceedings, technical rules of evidence and "proof beyond doubt" standard do not apply; preponderance of probabilities suffices.	The court relied on this distinction between standards of proof to hold that departmental inquiry need not be stayed simply because criminal proceedings are pending.
Maharashtra State Board v. K.S. Gandhi 1991 (2) SCC 716	Strict rules of evidence and standard of proof in criminal prosecution do not apply to departmental proceedings or domestic tribunals.	Applied by the court to reinforce that different standards mean departmental proceedings can fairly progress alongside criminal trials.
Southern Railway Officers Assn. v. Union of India (2009) 9 SCC 24	An order of dismissal in disciplinary proceedings can be sustained even if the delinquent official has been acquitted criminally; acquittal alone is not a ground to interfere with disciplinary punishment.	The court cited this to underline the separate purposes and outcomes of criminal and disciplinary fora and to justify continuing disciplinary proceedings.
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Chitra Venkata Rao (1975) 2 SCC 557	Practice of treating departmental inquiries as akin to criminal prosecutions was deprecated.	Used by the court to support the principle that departmental inquiries should be treated differently from criminal trials and not automatically stayed.
State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena (1996) 6 SCC 417	Principles of natural justice do not require employers to wait for criminal court decisions before taking disciplinary action; it is not in public interest to keep accused persons in office indefinitely.	The court applied this administrative-interest principle in weighing equities against extended suspension and continued stay of departmental proceedings.
Noida Entrepreneurs Assn. v. Noida (2007) 10 SCC 385 : AIR 2007 SC 1161	Disciplinary proceedings differ in purpose from criminal proceedings and should be conducted and completed expeditiously.	Relied on to emphasize the public interest in timely completion of disciplinary proceedings rather than indefinite stays.
Abhimanyoo Ram v. State of U.P. MANU/SC/8524/2008	Courts should balance equities arising from interim orders when deciding matters at final disposal.	The court invoked this principle in determining that the petitioner should not unfairly benefit from long interim relief (subsistence allowance) and to justify denying further subsistence under conditions.
Ramesh Chandra Sankla v. Vikram Cement (2008) 14 SCC 58 : AIR 2009 SC 713	At final disposal courts should balance equities arising from interim orders previously granted.	Applied by the court to justify balancing the equities and conditioning continued payment of subsistence allowance on expedition of the departmental proceedings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through a step-by-step legal analysis based solely on the materials and precedents placed before it:

The court first considered the petitioner's primary contention that departmental proceedings would compel disclosure of defence and thereby prejudice the criminal prosecution. The court concluded that this contention was negated by the decision in Hindustan Petroleum v. Sarvesh Berry, which places the onus on the accused in cases under Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act to prove assets were not disproportionate. Since the accused must in any event account for sources in the criminal trial, disclosure in the departmental proceeding does not uniquely prejudice the criminal defence.
The court then addressed the petitioner's second ground — that the charge is grave and involves complicated questions of law and fact necessitating a stay. The court emphasized the established principle that departmental proceedings and criminal trials can ordinarily proceed simultaneously. It held that mere assertion of "complicated questions" is insufficient; the petitioner was required to demonstrate specific complexities that would justify exceptional treatment. The court found the petitioner had not done so.
The court analyzed differences in function and standards between departmental inquiries and criminal trials. Citing authorities (Lalit Popli, K.S. Gandhi, Southern Railway Officers Assn.), it noted that departmental proceedings operate on preponderance of probabilities and do not apply strict criminal evidentiary standards. This distinction supported permitting the departmental enquiry to proceed.
On the question whether the subject-matter of the two proceedings was identical, the court found they were not the same in substance: the criminal charge focused on acquisition of assets disproportionate to known sources and obtaining premature payment of FDRs while originals were in CBI custody; the departmental charge focused on acquisition of immovable property, car, and FDRs without prior intimation to the Competent Authority and breach of Conduct Rules. Thus, the inquiries would be different in scope and approach.
The court considered administrative interest and the passage of time. It observed the departmental proceedings had been stayed since 2004 and not proceeded for eight years, while the petitioner had been paid substantial subsistence allowance. The court saw a risk that further deferment would lead to evidentiary prejudice to the employer (witnesses disappearing or becoming unavailable).
Regarding suspension and subsistence allowance, the court recorded that though suspension initially arose from imprisonment, the employer's counter affidavit stated suspension was continued subsequently (implying continuation for departmental reasons). The court was concerned that the petitioner was using interim relief to obtain ongoing subsistence while not working and while proceedings remained dormant.
Balancing the equities (in light of authorities such as Abhimanyoo Ram and Ramesh Chandra Sankla), the court concluded that fairness required conditioning continued payment of subsistence allowance on expedition of departmental proceedings.
The court also distinguished Capt. M. Paul Anthony on facts, noting it was not a case of simultaneous proceedings in the same posture as the present matter.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is dismissed. The court found no merit in the petitioner's claim that the departmental proceedings must be quashed or stayed on the grounds advanced.

Implications and Direct Effects:

The departmental proceedings shall continue; the long-standing stay is lifted by implication of dismissal (the court explicitly observed no justification for further stay based on the grounds urged).
Condition on subsistence allowance: Notwithstanding any rules to the contrary, respondent No. 2 (NTC) is directed not to be liable to pay subsistence allowance to the petitioner during the pendency of the departmental proceedings provided the departmental proceedings are concluded within one year from the date of the judgment, unless any delay is attributable to the petitioner. This is an equitable balancing of interim benefits obtained by the petitioner.
No order as to costs was made.
The court explicitly noted that no new legal principle or precedent was laid down; the decision applies established authorities (notably Sarvesh Berry and other Supreme Court precedents) to the facts of this case and balances equities in the context of prolonged interim relief.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer any facts or legal conclusions beyond those expressly contained therein.

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Sh. Raj Kumar Sharma v. Union Of India & Anr.

Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J.:— The petitioner by this writ petition seeks quashing of the chargesheet dated 28th February, 2002 served on him and of the departmental inquiry instituted against him for the reason of it being based on the same facts on which he is being prosecuted for offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The senior counsel for the petitioner contends that the list of documents and list of witnesses appended to the chargsheet is identical to the list of witnesses and list of documents in the criminal prosecution. It is further contended that if the departmental proceedings are permitted to proceed, the petitioner would be compelled to disclose his defence in the criminal prosecution and which would prejudice the petitioner in the criminal prosecution. It is further contended that the offence with which the petitioner has been charged is grave and complicated questions of facts and law are involved. It is further contended that the chargesheet in the departmental proceedings is verbatim as the charge in the criminal prosecution. On enquiry it is informed that 15 witnesses of the prosecution have already been examined in the criminal prosecution. Though certain arguments on the merits were also raised but the same are not relevant at this stage since the quashing of the chargesheet/departmental proceeding is sought only on the ground aforesaid.

2. The writ petition was dismissed in limine on 2nd May, 2002. The petitioner preferred Writ Appeal 443/2002. Vide interim order dated 24th May, 2002 in the said writ appeal, the cross examination by the petitioner of the witnesses in the departmental inquiry (and which cross examination would have disclosed the defence in the criminal prosecution of the petitioner) was stayed. Though neither party placed the order allowing the Writ Appeal on record, but the file of the Writ Appeal was sent for. The Writ Appeal was allowed on 14th January, 2004 only for the reason that the writ petition was dismissed in limine on the premise that as a general principle of law both criminal prosecution and departmental proceedings could go on simultaneously, without examining whether in the facts of the present case the said course was justified or not. The writ petition was thus remanded for decision on merits. The Division Bench while so remanding the writ petition further ordered that the departmental proceedings shall remain stayed till the matter is taken up by the writ court. This court vide order dated 23rd February, 2004 which continues to be in force, stayed the departmental proceedings. Resultantly, the departmental proceedings which commenced in the year 2002 have not been proceeded with in the last eight years.

3. The petitioner is under suspension. Finding from the order sheet an attempt by the petitioner to delay, this court on 19th May, 2010 enquired from the counsels whether the petitioner was being paid subsistence allowance. The counsel for the respondent No. 2 National Textile Corporation Limited (NTC) on 24th May, 2010 informed that the petitioner is being paid subsistence allowance during the period of suspension and from 2002 till April, 2010 a sum of Rs. 17,48,864/- has been paid to the petitioner towards subsistence allowance. It is further informed that a sum of approximately Rs. 22,000/- per month is now being paid to the petitioner towards subsistence allowance. This court in the circumstances called upon the senior counsel for the petitioner to also address on as to why, even if the writ petition were to be allowed and the petitioner found entitled to stay of departmental proceedings during the pendency of criminal proceedings, should not be held disentitled from any further subsistence allowance.

4. The senior counsel for the petitioner relies on:

1. Kusheshwar Dubey v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (1988) 4 SCC 319 staying the disciplinary proceedings because the criminal action and disciplinary proceedings were found to be grounded upon the same set of facts.

2. Captain M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. 1999 (2) SCALE 363 laying down that if the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in the criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves complicated questions of law and fact, it would be desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case. It was further held that it will depend upon the nature of the offence and the nature of the case launched against the employee on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during investigation or as reflected in the chargesheet.

5. The senior counsel for the petitioner contends that in the present case the petitioner is alleged to have disproportionate assets in the form of FDRs in the joint names of his wife, mother-in-law and father-in-law. It is contended that under the income tax laws the FDRs are deemed to be of the first name holder. It is urged that the petitioner in the departmental proceedings would be unnecessarily required to disclose the source of funds of the said FDRs which belong to his father-in-law/mother-in-law and which would cause prejudice to him in the criminal prosecution. Reference is also made to DSP, Dsp, Chennai v. K. Inbasagaran (2006) 1 SCC 420 where the Supreme Court held the accused in a prevention of corruption case to have satisfactorily established that the monies and assets recovered belonged to his wife and which she has amassed from the business run by her separately. It is contended that in the present case also, the wife of the petitioner is working and his father-in-law and mother-in-law have independent sources of income.

6. Per contra the counsel for the respondent No. 2 NTC contends that the matter is now no longer res integra in view of the judgment in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Sarvesh Berry 2005 LAB. I.C 1624 (SC) laying down that in cases involving Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the onus is on the accused to prove that the assets found were not disproportionate to the known sources of income and hence the question of disclosure of any defence in the departmental proceedings does not arise; it was held that even in the criminal case, the accused has to prove the source of acquisition and satisfactorily account for the same. The counsel for the respondent No. 2 NTC thus urges that the sole ground on which the petitioner seeks stay/quashing of the departmental proceedings has been negated by the Supreme Court in the said judgment. Reliance is also placed on—

i. G. Chandrasekhar v. Chairman, Madras Port Trust (1990) II LLJ 5 which is not found relevant.

ii. Depot Manager, Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya (1997) 2 SCC 699 : AIR 1997 SC 2232 laying down that there is no bar to proceeding simultaneously with departmental inquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the charge in the criminal trial is of grave nature involving complicated questions of fact and law.

iii. Capt. M. Paul Anthony (supra)

iv. The Division Bench judgment in G. Chandrasekharan v. The Chairman, Madras Port Trust 1990 II LLJ 337 laying down that the gravamen of the charges in the disciplinary proceedings pertain to violation of the Conduct Rules which are not charges in so far as the criminal case is concerned.

It is further contended that as per the Conduct Rules of the respondent No. 2 NTC the assets of the wife of the employee are also to be disclosed. It is further argued that the petitioner has already taken a stand with respect to the charges against him and the question of his suffering any prejudice if the departmental proceedings are to continue does not arise. It is the contention of the respondent No. 2 NTC that all the relevant information is in the knowledge of the petitioner and it is for the petitioner to explain the assets with respect whereto he has been charged.

7. The senior counsel for the petitioner in rejoinder contended that the petitioner is willing for the departmental proceedings to continue provided that the final order is stayed. The senior counsel for the petitioner after the conclusion of hearing also mentioned the matter to point out that the order of suspension in the present case is only for the reason of the petitioner having remained imprisoned for over 48 hours and not pending the departmental proceedings. The counsel for the respondent No. 2 NTC however contended that since the same does not form part of the pleas of the petitioner, he is unable to respond thereto and it is quite possible that subsequently the order of suspension was continued pending the departmental proceedings. The senior counsel for the petitioner also offered that the petitioner be taken back into work but which was not acceptable to the respondent No. 2 NTC considering the charge against the petitioner.

8. The Supreme Court in Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank (2003) 3 SCC 583 held that in departmental proceedings, the technical rules of evidence and doctrine of “proof beyond doubt” has no application and mere preponderance of probabilities and some material on record are sufficient to arrive at the conclusion whether or not the delinquent has committed misconduct. Similarly, in Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. K.S Gandhi 1991 (2) SCC 716 it was held that strict rules of the Evidence Act and the standard of proof envisaged in a criminal prosecution do not apply to departmental proceedings or a domestic tribunal. Recently in Southern Railway Officers Assn. v. Union of India (2009) 9 SCC 24 it was held that order of dismissal can be passed even if the delinquent official has been acquitted of the criminal charge. It was further held that acquittal in a criminal case by itself cannot be a ground for interfering with an order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. Way back in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Chitra Venkata Rao (1975) 2 SCC 557 the practice of viewing the departmental inquiry as akin to a criminal prosecution was deprecated.

9. The Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. B.K Meena (1996) 6 SCC 417 reiterated that the principles of natural justice do not require that the employer should wait for the decision of the criminal court before taking disciplinary action against the employee and held that it is not in the interest of administration (in that case of the State) that persons accused of serious misdemeanor should be continued in office indefinitely and for long periods awaiting the result of criminal proceedings. Such a situation was held to be serving the interest of the guilty and the dishonest only. To the same effect is Noida Entrepreneurs Assn. v. Noida (2007) 10 SCC 385 : AIR 2007 SC 1161. It was held that the purpose of criminal prosecution and departmental inquiry are different. Disciplinary proceedings were held to be with the purpose of maintaining discipline and efficiency in service and it was further held that it is expedient that the disciplinary proceedings are conducted and completed as expeditiously as possible.

10. In view of the aforesaid law it was put to the senior counsel for the petitioner, as to why the post which the petitioner was occupying should be kept vacant by the respondent No. 2 NTC, as it would necessarily be required to do awaiting the disciplinary proceedings. The senior counsel states that the respondent No. 2 NTC is free to fill up the said post on an ad hoc basis. However, this court is not satisfied with the aforesaid answer. Ad hoc filling up of the post is not a satisfactory answer and is liable to lead to further disputes.

11. The Division Bench had set aside the order of dismissal of the writ petition in limine only for the reason of the grounds urged having not been considered on merits. The grounds urged are only two i.e of the petitioner being required to disclose his defence and of the matter involving complicated questions of law and fact. As far as the first of the aforesaid grounds is concerned, the same is now no longer available in view of the judgment in Sarvesh Berry (supra). Since the onus in the criminal prosecution also is on the petitioner, the question of the petitioner suffering any prejudice by disclosure of defence in the disciplinary proceedings does not arise. As far as the second reason aforesaid is concerned, in view of the legal position aforesaid of the standard of proof and evidence in the two proceedings being different, this court is of the considered opinion that no case for keeping the departmental proceedings stayed is made out. Merely averring that complicated questions of law and fact are involved is not sufficient. Every criminal prosecution and every departmental proceeding entails questions of law and facts. The petitioner is required to show the complication in proving the same before two fora. Capt. M. Paul Anthony was not a case where simultaneous proceedings of domestic inquiry and criminal prosecution were in question; the ex parte order of dismissal in that case had already been passed before the decision of the criminal case resulting in acquittal. The Supreme Court also noticed the general principle that the two proceedings can go on simultaneously. Exception is only when facts are “not simple” or the court feels it “appropriate” to stay the departmental proceedings. The petitioner in the present case is unable to satisfy as to what complexity is involved in the facts and as to why it is appropriate to stay the departmental proceedings further. While weighing the equities, it is found that if the departmental proceedings are deferred any further, the witnesses required to be examined by respondent No. 2 NTC therein may also disappear or may not be then available.

12. The subject matter of criminal prosecution and departmental proceeding is also not found to be same. While the charge in criminal prosecution is of acquisition of assets in own name and in the name of family members, disproportionate to known sources of income and obtaining premature payment of FDRs while originals thereof were in custody of CBI, the charge in departmental proceedings is of acquisition of immovable property, car, FDRs without prior knowledge of/intimation to Competent Authority, as required under the Rules and thereby failing to maintain absolute integrity, devotion and manner becoming of a public servant, amounting to violation of Rules. The enquiry in the two proceedings would be different.

13. The contention of the senior counsel that the suspension was because of imprisonment and not because of the pending departmental proceedings is not correct. The respondent No. 2 NTC in its counter affidavit has stated that though initially the petitioner was suspended for the reason of having been imprisoned for more than 48 hours but subsequently it was decided to continue the suspension; obviously for the reason of initiation of the departmental proceedings.

14. This court therefore does not find any merit in this petition. The conduct of the petitioner, as would also be borne out from the order sheet of 31st March, 2009, to keep this petition pending is found to be intended to avail benefits of the substantial subsistence/suspension allowance being received by him without working for the respondent No. 2 NTC. The petitioner has availed of substantial benefits of over 17 lacs in this way under interim order in this writ petition. The Supreme Court in Abhimanyoo Ram v. State of U.P MANU/SC/8524/2008 and also recently in Ramesh Chandra Sankla v. Vikram Cement (2008) 14 SCC 58 : AIR 2009 SC 713 had held that the courts at the time of final disposal should balance equities arising from the interim orders granted in the petition. But for the interim orders obtained by the petitioner, the departmental proceedings may have concluded by now and if resulted in a finding against the petitioner, would have meant no further obligation on the respondent No. 2 NTC to pay subsistence allowance to the petitioner. In the circumstances while dismissing the writ petition, it is directed that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the rules the respondent No. 2 NTC shall not be liable to pay subsistence allowance to the petitioner during the pendency of the departmental proceedings provided the same are concluded within one year from today unless the delay is again attributable to the petitioner. Though the petition is found to be misconceived, however no order as to costs.

Sh. Raj Kumar Sharma v. Union Of India & Anr.

Judgment Summary — Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

Respondent No. 2 (National Textile Corporation Limited) — Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Sh. Raj Kumar Sharma v. Union Of India & Anr.

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