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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
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2010 DHC 4997
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short as Act)
  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.22.
  • Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25-B of Act
  • DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2010 DHC 4997
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short as Act)
  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.22.
  • Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25-B of Act
  • DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT
Smart Summary

Analytical Summary of the Opinion (V.B. Gupta, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision petition under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 challenges the order dated 8 February 2010 passed by the Additional Rent Controller (Controller), Delhi. By the impugned order the Controller dismissed the tenant's application for leave to defend and granted eviction in favour of the landlord (respondent).

The respondent/landlord filed an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25-B of the Act claiming he is the owner/landlord of premises (shop at WZ-152, Mukherjeet Park) occupied by the petitioner/tenant at a monthly rent of Rs. 715/-. The respondent asserted a bona fide requirement to occupy the shop to start a workshop/repair business (TV, VCR, remote, mobile phones, etc.) as he had no other available space and was in financial hardship.

The petitioner filed an affidavit with the leave-to-contest application alleging the respondent had not come with clean hands and making specific assertions that the respondent already had a shop (No. 111, Gaffar Market, Karol Bagh) and ran a mobile repairing institute (V.H.B Mobile Tech Institute and Repairing Centre), and that there was open space at the premises which the respondent could use instead of seeking eviction.

In reply the respondent denied ownership of the Karol Bagh shop (asserting it was taken on lease from Smt. Neelu Arora and run in partnership) and disputed the petitioner's contentions. The Controller dismissed the petitioner's application for leave to defend and ordered eviction; the present revision challenges that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner (tenant) had disclosed sufficient triable issues to disentitle the landlord from obtaining an eviction order under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, thereby entitling the petitioner to leave to defend.
  2. Whether the Rent Controller's order dismissing leave to defend and granting eviction suffered from any gross illegality, material irregularity, excess or non‑exercise of jurisdiction that would justify interference by this Court under the proviso to Section 25B(8).
  3. Whether the landlord's asserted requirement of the premises for his own bona fide use (to start/expand his repair business) was genuine and supported by the material on record.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Tenant's) Arguments

  • The respondent did not come with clean hands and sought eviction on false grounds.
  • The respondent allegedly owns another shop (No. 111, Gaffar Market, Karol Bagh) and runs a mobile repair business and an institute, facts which, if true, would disentitle the respondent from claiming bona fide need for the premises in question.
  • There is open space within the premises which the respondent could use for his proposed workshop, so eviction is not necessary.
  • The respondent allegedly concealed material facts (such as an institution on the second floor) in the eviction petition.

Respondent's (Landlord's) Arguments

  • The respondent asserted he is the owner/landlord of the premises and requires the shop for his personal and bona fide need to start a repair workshop (TV, music systems, remote control and mobile phones) to support his family.
  • The respondent claimed he has no other available space except the shop in question and due to financial constraints cannot obtain alternative premises on rent.
  • In reply to the leave application, the respondent denied owning the Karol Bagh shop (contending it was taken on lease and run in partnership) and disputed the petitioner's allegations that he had other premises or that the open space could be used for the proposed purpose.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal, (2001) 5 SCC 705 That a landlord having no alternative accommodation in the town concerned may file for eviction. Cited to note the principle that absence of alternative accommodation can justify an eviction petition by a landlord.
Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India, (2008) 5 SCC 287 Premises let out for residential or commercial purposes can be vacated by the landlord for bona fide requirement. Referred to support the general proposition that bona fide requirement can ground eviction for both residential and commercial lettings.
Mohan Lal v. Ram Chopra, 1982 (2) Rent Control Journal 161 (Full Bench) Interpreted Section 25B and the proviso to Sub‑section (8): High Court's revisional jurisdiction is limited to instances of gross illegality, material irregularity, excess/non-exercise of jurisdiction, or findings arrived at by misreading/omitting relevant evidence causing gross injustice. Relied upon to define the limited scope of reappraisal available to this Court under proviso to Section 25B(8) and to frame the standard of interference.
Hari Shanker v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 698 Authority examined in Mohan Lal while construing the proviso to Section 25B(8). Noted as part of the judicial material considered in Mohan Lal; used to support the restricted scope of revisional interference described in Mohan Lal.
Bell and Co. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj, AIR 1938 Bombay (223) Authority examined in Mohan Lal while construing the proviso to Section 25B(8). Referred to as one of the precedents examined by the Full Bench in Mohan Lal in framing the limits of revisional jurisdiction.
Praveen Jain v. Dr. Mrs. Vimla, 2009 IV AD (Delhi) 653 Powers of the Court under Section 25B(8) are not appellate; Court must see only that the Trial Court acted in accordance with law and did not transgress jurisdictional limits. Cited to reinforce that this Court's powers under Section 25B(8) are supervisory and not appellate in nature.
Rajinder Kumar Sharma v. Leela Wati, 155 (2008) DLT 383 Section 25B provides a special summary procedure for bona fide requirement evictions; tenant must disclose facts that disentitle the landlord from seeking eviction. Used to emphasize the statutory scheme: summary procedure and the tenant's obligation to disclose facts in support of leave to defend.
Nem Chand Daga v. Inder Mohan Singh Rana, 94 (2001) DLT 683 Before leave to defend is granted, the respondent (tenant) must show some triable issues which disentitle the applicant (landlord) from eviction; onus is prima facie on the respondent. Applied as the test for whether the petitioner had raised triable issues sufficient to grant leave to defend.
Frank Anthony Public School v. Smt. Amur Kaur, 1984 (6) Delhi Rep. Judg. 47 Section 25B is modelled on Order 37 CPC; Legislature created a special summary procedure to reduce delays—introducing a 'summary trial' instead of a full trial. Cited to explain the summary nature of proceedings under Section 25B and the legislative objective of expeditious disposal.
Sarwan Dass Bange v. Ram Parkash, 2010 IV AD (Delhi) 252 (quoting Baldev Singh Bajwa v. Monish Saini, (2005) 12 SCC 778) Described the legislative intent: in-built presumption that a landlord's requirement is genuine; heavy burden on tenant to rebut; tenant must supply particulars and documentary evidence in affidavit. Relied upon to stress the strong presumption in favour of the landlord and the corresponding heavy onus on the tenant to prove non‑genuineness.
John Impex (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Dr. Surinder Singh, 135 (2006) DLT 265 The landlord is best judge of his requirement; bona fide requirement must be genuine and supported by facts; in rent revision the Court must not sit as an appellate Court though scrutiny is more than under Section 115 CPC. Used to support the proposition that the Court's role is supervisory and to examine whether the Controller's conclusion was unreasonable or tainted by illegality.
Ram Babu Agarwal v. Jay Kishan Das, 2009 (2) RCR 455 A person can start a new business even without prior experience; lack of experience alone does not negate bona fide requirement. Cited to reject the argument that absence of experience in the proposed business by the landlord negates bona fide need.
Sait Nagjee Purushotham & Co. Ltd. v. Vimalabai Prabhulal, (2005) 8 SCC 252 Landlord's prerogative to choose the nature and place of business; tenant cannot dictate to landlord; expansion of landlord's business can be bona fide requirement. Invoked to underscore the landlord's freedom to require premises for expansion and that tenants cannot dictate the landlord's business decisions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by reference to the statutory scheme (Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25B and the proviso to Section 25B(8)) and settled principles from precedents regarding the limited scope of interference by the High Court in revisional proceedings under Section 25B(8).

The Court reiterated the legal standard drawn from Mohan Lal (Full Bench) that the High Court's revisional jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25B(8) is neither a first appeal nor as restricted as Section 115 CPC; interference is permissible only where there is gross illegality, material irregularity, excess or non‑exercise of jurisdiction, or where a finding of fact has been reached by misreading or omitting relevant evidence resulting in gross injustice. The Court emphasized that reappraisal of evidence permitted in such revision is limited to whether the Rent Controller's conclusions were wholly unreasonable such that no reasonable person could have reached them on the materials available.

Applying the above principles, the Court examined the materials relied upon by the petitioner to obtain leave to defend. The petitioner's primary contentions were that the respondent already had a shop (No. 111, Gaffar Market) and an institute, and that there was open space in the premises which could be used by the respondent instead of dispossessing the tenant. The Trial Court had considered documentary material (lease agreements dated 16.1.2006 and 17.3.2009) which demonstrated that the petitioner himself was a tenant of the Karol Bagh shop (i.e., the petitioner was not the owner of No. 111, Gaffar Market). The Trial Court noted that the respondent had not filed a rejoinder disputing those lease agreements.

The Trial Court also observed that the tenant could not dictate to the landlord that the landlord must use the open space in the tenanted premises without first obtaining vacation of the tenanted shop or require the landlord to construct in open space for his proposed use. The Court found that the petitioner's averments were limited and did not disclose triable issues that would disentitle the respondent from obtaining eviction.

In light of the statutory summary procedure and the established presumption in favour of a landlord's bona fide requirement (and the concomitant heavy burden on the tenant to rebut that presumption with particulars and documentary evidence), the Court concluded that the Trial Court's detailed and reasoned order did not suffer from any illegality, material irregularity or erroneous exercise of jurisdiction warranting interference under Section 25B(8).

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The revision petition is dismissed and the impugned order of the Rent Controller (dismissing leave to defend and granting eviction in favour of the respondent) is not interfered with.

Direct Implications:

  • The eviction order granted in favour of the respondent/landlord stands (the tenant's application for leave to defend was correctly dismissed by the Controller and affirmed on revision).
  • The interlocutory application (CM No. 11116/2010) was also dismissed as recorded in the opinion.

Broader Implications: The Court did not announce any new legal principle. It applied established jurisprudence on Section 25B(8), confirming the limited scope of revisional review (interference only in cases of gross illegality/material irregularity/excess or misapprehension of evidence causing gross injustice) and reiterated the strong presumption in favour of a landlord's bona fide requirement and the heavy burden on tenants to rebut that presumption with particulars and documentary evidence.

Disposition: Petition dismissed.

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    Tarsem Singh v. Gurvinder Singh .

    V.B Gupta, J.— Present revision petition under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short as ‘Act’) has been filed against order dated 8th February, 2010, passed by Additional Rent Controller (for short as “Controller”) Delhi. Vide impugned order, application of petitioner/tenant for leave to defend was dismissed and eviction order was passed in favour of respondent/landlord and against petitioner.

    2. Respondent filed eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25-B of Act on the ground that he is the owner and landlord of premises bearing no. WZ-152, Mukherjeet Park, Tilak Nagar, New Delhi. Petitioner is his tenant in respect of shop in above said property as shown in red colour in the site plan, at monthly rent of Rs. 715/- exclusive of other charges. Respondent is a trained and qualified technician who has obtained three years T.V, V.C.R servicing course certificate and is capable of repairing and servicing of mobile phones by virtue of his twenty years experience in this filed. He and his family is facing financial hardship due to his low income whereas, persons who are less qualified and competent than him are generating very good income because they are running their own workshops. Respondent is unable to open his own workshop due to non availability of space. He does not have any other space, except the shop in question to start his own business. Since, respondent is desirous of starting workshop for repair of TV, music systems, remote control and mobile phones, etc., thus, the shop in question is required for his bona fide need so that he can earn good income in order to meet out the requirement of his family.

    3. In affidavit filed along with leave to contest by the petitioner, it is stated that respondent has not come with clean hands and is seeking relief for bona fide requirement on false ground.

    4. It is also stated that respondent is having his own shop bearing No. 111, at Gaffar Market, Karol Bagh, where he is doing business of mobile phone, sale, repair etc. Respondent is also having own mobile repairing institute in the name and style “V.H.B Mobile Tech Institute and Repairing Centre.”

    5. It is further stated that, in the premises there is more space for work, if respondent needs to do work in the premises which space has been shown open in the site plan.

    6. In reply to application for leave to contest, it is stated that respondent does not own shop No. 111, Gaffar Market, Karol Bagh, New Delhi. Rather he has taken the said shop on lease from its owner Smt. Neelu Arora and running the business in partnership with other partner Shri Harish Kumar, under the name and style of M/s. V.H.B Electronics and is running the mobile repair shop from the said shop only. It is pertinent to mention here that, besides respondent and his partner, 2-3 people are also working in the said shop.

    7. It is contended by learned Counsel that respondent is having a shop at Karol Bagh on lease and also institution on the second floor, which fact he did not disclose in the eviction petition. Only on this sole ground, petitioner is entitled to have leave to defend and contest the eviction petition, which fact has been admitted by respondent in his reply filed to leave to defend application.

    8. Other contention is that, respondent has stated he is the owner/landlord of the premises and is employed and is getting salary, but he has not stated as to how much salary he is getting. Thereafter, respondent has come up with the plea that he has a tenanted shop. Thus, respondent has concealed this fact that, he has an institution of mobile at the second floor of the same premises.

    9. It is also contended that respondent has covered Verandah which can easily be used for the purpose for which he is seeking eviction.

    10. In support, learned Counsel for petitioner cited Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal, (2001) 5 SCC 705, in which it has been laid down that—

    “A landlord having no alternative accommodation in the town concerned may file for eviction.”

    11. There is no dispute about relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. As far as letting purpose is concerned, same is for non-residential purpose. In Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India, (2008) 5 SCC 287, it has been held:

    “The premises let out either for residential or commercial purposes can be got vacated by the landlord for bonafide requirement”.

    12. Present petition has been filed under Section 25B(8) of the Act. A Full Bench of this Court in Mohan Lal v. Ram Chopra, 1982 (2) Rent Control Journal 161, exhaustively considered the provisions of Section 25B of the Act. On the scope of the proviso to Sub-section (8) of this section, after examining the judgment of Supreme Court in Hari Shanker v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, A.I.R 1963 S.C 698 and Bell and Co. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj, AIR 1938 Bombay (223) it was laid down as follows:

    “In our opinion the jurisdiction of the High Court under proviso to Section 25B(8) has to be interpreted, keeping in view the legislative intent. The revision under Section 25B(8) cannot be regarded as a first appeal and nor can it be as restricted as the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115, CPC. The High Court would have jurisdiction to interfere if it is of the opinion that there has been a gross illegality or material irregularity which has been committed or the Controller has acted in excess of his jurisdiction or has not exercised the jurisdiction vested in him. A finding of fact arrived at by the Controller would not be interfered with by the High Court unless it can be shown that finding has been arrived at by misreading or omitting relevant evidence and this has resulted in gross injustice being caused. If none of the aforesaid circumstances exist the High Court would not be entitled to interfere with the order of the Controller in exercise of its jurisdiction under proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Act.”

    13. Upon examination of above judgment it may safely be held that this Court in exercise of the powers vested by proviso to Sub-section (8) of Section 25B of the Act may reappraise the evidence only for a limited purpose of ascertaining whether the conclusion arrived at by the Rent Controller were wholly unreasonable that no reasonable person acting with objectivity could have reached on the material available to test the order of the Rent Controller on the touchstone of whether it is in accordance with law.

    14. In Praveen Jain (Shri.) v. Dr. Mrs. Vimla, 2009 IV AD (Delhi) 653, this Court observed:

    “The powers of this Court under Section 25B(8) are not appellate powers and this Court has only to see that the Trial Court had acted in accordance with law and not transgressed the limits of its jurisdiction…”

    15. In Rajinder Kumar Sharma v. Leela Wati, 155 (2008) Delhi Law Times 383 the Court observed:

    “Section 25B was inserted by the Legislature in Delhi Rent Control Act as a special provision for eviction of the tenants in respect of specified category of cases as provided therein. Where a landlord seeks eviction on the basis of bona fide necessity, a summary procedure is provided and tenant has to seek leave to defend disclosing such facts which disentitled the landlord from seeking eviction.”

    16. In Nem Chand Daga v. Inder Mohan Singh Rana, 94 (2001) DLT 683, it was held:

    “That before leave to defend is granted, the respondent must show that some triable issues which disentitled the applicant from getting the order of eviction against the respondent and at the same time entitled the respondent to leave to defend existed. The onus is prima facie on the respondent and if he fails, the eviction follows.

    17. In Frank Anthony Public School v. Smt. Amur Kaur, 1984 (6) Delhi Reported Judgment 47, it was held:

    “The Legislature has devised a ‘special procedure for the disposal of the application for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement’. It is modelled on Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The object is to reduce delays in litigation. The object is to introduce a ‘summary trial’ in place of full length trial.”

    18. In Sarwan Dass Bange v. Ram Parkash, 2010 IV AD (Delhi) 252, observations made by Supreme Court in Baldev Baldev Singh Bajwa v. Monish Saini, (2005) 12 SCC 778, have been quoted as under:

    “It was held that the legislative intent is of expeditious disposal of the application for ejectment of tenant filed on the ground of requirement by the landlord of the premises for his own occupation; a special category of landlords requiring the premises for their own use has been created; if there is any breach by the landlord, the tenant is given a right of restoration of possession; the landlord who evicts a tenant on the ground of own requirement is not only prohibited from letting out the premises or disposing of the same but also required to use the same for his own residence only. It was held that these restrictions and conditions inculcate in built strong presumption that the need of the landlord is genuine; the conditions and restrictions imposed on the landlord make it virtually improbable for the landlord to approach the Court for ejectment of tenant unless his need is bona fide—no unscrupulous landlord in all probability, under this section, would approach the Court for ejectment of the tenant considering the onerous conditions imposed on him. It was further held that this in-built protection in the Act for the tenants implies that whenever the landlord would approach the Court his requirement shall be presumed to be genuine and bona fide. It was further held that a heavy burden lies on the tenant to prove that the requirement is not genuine. The tenant is required to give all the necessary facts and particulars supported by documentary evidence if available to prove his plea in the affidavit itself so that the Controller will be in a position to adjudicate and decide the question of genuine or bona fide requirement of the landlord; a mere assertion on the part of the tenant would not be sufficient to rebut the strong presumption in the landlord's favour that his requirement of occupation of the premises is real and genuine.”

    19. Only pleas worth mentioning in the affidavit filed by petitioner are that, respondent is having his own shop No. 111, Gaffar Market, Karol Bagh, Delhi, where he is doing his business of mobile phone sale/repair under the name and style of V.H.B Mobile Tec. Institute & Repairing Centre. Secondly, there is lot of open space in the premises in question, where respondent can do his work.

    20. Trial Court in this regard observed:

    “The foremost contention of the respondent is that the petitioner is owner of shop bearing No. 111, Gaffar Market, Karol Bagh, New Delhi but it has been vehemently argued by the Counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is not the owner of the said shop rather he is a tenant in the said shop. Petitioner has filed copy of Lease Agreements dated 16.1.2006 and 17.3.2009 executed by Smt. Neelu Arora, owner/landlady of the above said shop bearing No. 111, Gaffar Market, Karol Bagh, situated at MCD Building, Saraswati Marg, Karol Bagh, New Delhi-110005 as per which the petitioner is the tenant in the above said shop. Neither the respondent has denied the factum of petitioner's tenancy in the above said shop nor has disputed the above said documents i.e the lease Agreements, as the respondent has failed to file any rejoinder. Thus, it is apparent from these documents that the petitioner is not owner of the above said shop bearing No. 111, Gaffar Market, Karol Bagh, New Delhi, rather he is merely a tenant in the said shop. Trial Court further observed:

    ‘The respondent/tenant could not dictate the petitioner/landlord that he should use the open space for starting his business without getting the tenanted premises vacated from him. Similarly, he cannot also dictate the petitioner to raise any construction in the open space for carrying on his business’.”

    21. In John Impex (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Dr. Surinder Singh, 135 (2006) DLT 265, this Court held:

    “The conspectus of the aforesaid judgments shows that the broad principles have been set down of the requirement of a landlord not being a mere whim or fanciful but that it should be a genuine need of the landlord. It is only then that the requirement can be said to be bona fide within the meaning of under Section 14(1)(e) of the said Act. This would naturally require all the necessary matrix in terms of the factual averments and the evidence to be adduced in that behalf. Simultaneously it has to be kept in mind that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement and a tenant cannot dictate the terms on which the landlord should live. The bona fide requirement of the landlord would also depend on his financial status and his standard of living. The ARC found in favour of the landlord/owner and thus what has to be considered is whether there is any illegality or jurisdictional error in the impugned order and not to sit as an appellate Court though the scope of scrutiny in a rent revision would be more than a revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.”

    22. In Ram Babu Agarwal v. Jay Kishan Das, 2009 (2) RCR 455, Supreme Court observed:

    “However, as regards the question of bona fide need, we find that the main ground for rejecting the landlord's petition for eviction was that in the petition the landlord had alleged that he required the premises for his son Giriraj who wanted to do footwear business in the premises in question. The High Court has held that since Giriraj has no experience in the footwear business and was only helping his father in the cloth business, hence there was no bona fide need. We are of the opinion that a person can start a new business even if he has no experience in the new business. That does not mean that his claim for starting the new business must be rejected on the ground that it is a false claim. Many people start new businesses even if they do not have experience in the new business, and sometimes they are successful in the new business also.”

    23. In Sait Nagjee Purushotham & Co. Ltd. v. Vimalabai Prabhulal, (2005) 8 SCC 252; the Court observed:

    “It is always the prerogative of the landlord that if he requires the premises in question for his bona fide use for expansion of business this is no ground to say that the landlords are already having their business at Chennai and Hyderabad therefore, it is not genuine need. It is not the tenant who can dictate the terms to the landlord and advise him what he should do and what he should not. It is always the privilege of the landlord to choose the nature of the business and the place of business.”

    24. Respondent has sought eviction of the petitioner on the ground that he wants to start his work shop for repairing of TV, music systems, remote, mobile phones, etc. in the shop occupied by the petitioner. He has no other place, where he can start his work. Due to paucity of space, he cannot start his own work. He needs the shop in question for his personal and bona fide requirement. Further, his poor financial condition does not empower him to get a suitable place on rent for starting his work.

    25. If a landlord wants to start his own business in the premises owned by him, then by no stretch of imagination it can be said that the requirement of the landlord for premises in question is neither bona fide nor genuine.

    26. Thus, petitioner has failed to raise any triable issue in this case, which if proved might disentitle the respondent from getting an order of eviction in his favour. The trial Court has given a detailed and reasoned order which does not call for any interference nor the same suffer from any infirmity or erroneous exercise of jurisdiction.

    27. Accordingly, present petition is hereby dismissed.

    CM No. 11116/2010

    28. Dismissed.

    Petition dismissed.
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    Comments

    Tarsem Singh v. Gurvinder Singh .
    (Oct 6, 2010)