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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Order 22 Rules 4 and 9 CPC and IA No. 9756/2008 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act
  • SECTION 5 LIMITATION ACT
  • Order 22 Rules 2, 4 and 11 CPC
  • Order XXII Rules 4 and 9 CPC
  • Order XXII Rule 4 and 9 CPC,
  • Order 22 Rules 4 and 9 CPC
  • Order 22 Rules 4 and 9
  • Order 22 Rule 3 CPC
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Order 22 Rules 4 and 9 CPC and IA No. 9756/2008 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act
  • SECTION 5 LIMITATION ACT
  • Order 22 Rules 2, 4 and 11 CPC
  • Order XXII Rules 4 and 9 CPC
  • Order XXII Rule 4 and 9 CPC,
  • Order 22 Rules 4 and 9 CPC
  • Order 22 Rules 4 and 9
  • Order 22 Rule 3 CPC
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance against several defendants, including defendant No. 1, Smt. Bimla Devi, who passed away during the proceedings on 06.10.2003. The plaintiff was informed of her death on 13.11.2003. The deceased left behind legal heirs: Shri Rakesh Aggarwal (son), Ms. Preeti (daughter), Ms. Anju (daughter), and Shri Umesh Kumar (son). One legal heir, Shri Umesh Kumar, was already a party to the suit as defendant No. 8.

The plaintiff sought to continue the suit against the legal heirs of the deceased defendant by filing two applications: IA No. 1572/2004 under Order 22 Rules 4 and 9 CPC to set aside the abatement of the suit and implead the legal heirs as parties, and IA No. 9756/2008 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the first application. The plaintiff admitted the suit against defendant No. 1 had abated due to delay beyond the prescribed 90 days, but claimed sufficient cause for the delay, including ignorance of the defendant's death and difficulty in identifying legal heirs.

The defendants opposed the applications on grounds of excessive delay and procedural impropriety, contending that the applications were filed well beyond the limitation period and were liable to be dismissed with costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff has shown sufficient cause to condone the delay in filing the application under Order 22 Rules 4 and 9 CPC for substitution of legal heirs of the deceased defendant No. 1.
  2. Whether the delay in filing the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay is excusable and can be condoned despite being filed after more than four and a half years.
  3. Whether the abatement of the suit against the deceased defendant No. 1 can be set aside to continue the suit against her legal heirs.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff was unaware of the death of defendant No. 1 until 13.11.2003 and could not file the application within the stipulated 90 days.
  • Efforts were made to identify and obtain names of the legal heirs within the limitation period, but it was difficult.
  • The delay was not deliberate but due to fault of the previous advocate who failed to inform about the death and limitation period.
  • The application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was filed as a formality to avoid objections, with the substantive prayer already made in the main application.
  • Legal heirs were not properly served initially; some were served by substituted service.
  • Reference was made to a connected case (C.S [OS] No. 2243/1993) where similar delay was condoned by the Court.

Defendants' Arguments

  • The applications were filed well beyond the prescribed limitation period of 90 days after the death of defendant No. 1.
  • The suit against defendant No. 1 had already abated and should be dismissed.
  • The applications were improper, highly belated, and lacked sufficient explanation for the delay.
  • If the suit against defendant No. 1 is dismissed, the entire suit for specific performance would fail.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao, 2002 [3] SCC 195 Liberal approach to condoning delay for setting aside abatement and substitution of legal heirs. The Court relied on this precedent to adopt a liberal construction of 'sufficient cause' and condone delay in filing the application for substitution of legal heirs.
Nagina Singh v. Naga Singh, 2002 [7] SCC 113 Condonation of delay in filing application for substitution of legal representatives under Order 22 Rules 2, 4 and 11 CPC. The Court applied this principle to hold that delay in substitution applications should be condoned in the interest of justice, possibly awarding costs to compensate the opposing party.
Devinder Pal Sehgal & Anr. v. Partap Steel Rolling Mills Pvt. Ltd. & Ors, JT 2001 (10) SC 463 Oral prayer for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is sufficient; formal written application not mandatory. The Court used this precedent to justify condoning delay even though a separate formal application under Section 5 was filed late, as the main application contained the prayer and explanation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the applications, pleadings, and relevant judgments cited by both parties. It acknowledged the plaintiff's admission that the suit against the deceased defendant had abated due to delay exceeding the 90-day limitation period. However, the Court noted the plaintiff's explanation of ignorance about the defendant's death and difficulties in identifying legal heirs as sufficient cause for the delay.

The Court considered the fault of the previous advocate in not pursuing the matter diligently as a factor contributing to the delay. It also took judicial notice of a connected case where a similar delay was condoned under comparable circumstances.

The Court referred extensively to the Supreme Court precedents emphasizing that rules of limitation are intended to prevent dilatory tactics but should not destroy substantive rights. A liberal approach must be adopted in condoning delay unless mala fide or deliberate delay is evident.

Further, the Court underscored that a formal application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not mandatory if sufficient cause is demonstrated and an oral prayer is made, relying on Devinder Pal Sehgal.

Given that one legal heir is already a party and the plaintiff had specifically prayed to set aside abatement in the main application, the Court found no prejudice to defendants in allowing the applications. The Court concluded that the plaintiff demonstrated sufficient cause for condoning the delay and for bringing the legal heirs on record.

Holding and Implications

The Court allowed the applications: the abatement of the suit against the deceased defendant No. 1 was set aside, and the legal heirs were permitted to be impleaded as parties to the suit.

The plaintiff was directed to pay costs of Rs. 10,000/- to the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee within four weeks. The amended memo of parties was taken on record, and the matter was listed for further proceedings.

This decision directly affects the parties by allowing the suit to proceed against the legal heirs, but the opinion does not establish any new legal precedent beyond applying existing principles of condonation of delay and substitution of legal heirs.

    Arun Batra v. Bimla Devi

    Manmohan Singh, J.— By this order, I shall dispose of the two applications i.e IA No. 1572/2004 under Order 22 Rules 4 and 9 CPC and IA No. 9756/2008 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act filed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff has filed this suit for specific performance claiming, inter alia, a decree for specific performance. Smt. Bimla Devi was arrayed as defendant No. 1, who expired during the course of the present proceedings on 06.10.2003 According to the plaintiff, information regarding the demise of defendant No. 1, Smt. Bimla Devi, was made available to the plaintiff on 13.11.2003 The deceased defendant No. 1, Smt. Bimla Devi, had left behind the following legal heirs:—

    (a) Shri Rakesh Aggarwal - Son (b) Ms. Preeti - Daughter (c) Ms. Anju - Daughter (d) Shri Umesh Kumar - Son

    2. One of the legal heirs of the deceased defendant No. 1 i.e Shri Umesh Kumar is already a party to the present proceedings as defendant No. 8. The contention of the plaintiff is that the right to sue survives against the legal heirs of the deceased defendant No. 1 as their successors to the interests in respect of the suit premises. The averment made in the application is that the plaintiff was ignorant of the demise of defendant No. 1. The plaintiff was informed about the demise of defendant No. 1 only on 13.11.2003 during the course of the court hearing. Although the application was to be filed within the stipulated time of 90 days, the said period had expired prior to the filing of the application. Thereafter the plaintiff has tried his best to get the name of the legal heirs of deceased defendant No. 1 within the stipulated time but it was difficult to obtain.

    3. The plaintiff has admitted in the present application filed on 5th March, 2004 that the stipulated time of limitation had expired and the suit against defendant No. 1 had abated. It is contended that in view of the sufficient cause shown by the plaintiff for filing the present application and in order to continue the suit against the legal heirs of deceased defendant No. 1, Shri Rakesh Aggarwal, Ms. Preeti Jain and Ms. Anju Jain may be impleaded as defendant No. 1[a] to 1[c] and abatement of the suit be set aside in respect of the legal heirs of deceased defendant No. 1.

    4. In another application being IA No. 9756/2008 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it is stated that there was a fault on the part of the Advocate, who was earlier appearing on behalf of the plaintiff as he neither informed about the death of defendant No. 1, nor informed the period of limitation and did not pursue the matter in a dedicated manner. The said counsel for the plaintiff also did not give the address of the legal heirs of deceased defendant No. 1. Even the proposed defendant No. 1[a], Shri Rakesh Aggarwal had filed the reply dated 03.03.2006 to the main application under Order 22 Rule 3 CPC mentioning inter alia that there are also other legal heirs, who represent the stake left behind by the deceased defendant No. 1. under the Will executed by her. During this period, the plaintiff also came to know that there is a separate suit filed in this court by one of the other beneficiary of the alleged Will executed by deceased defendant No. 1.

    5. It is further stated that under the said complex, complicated and peculiar facts of the matter, there was sufficient cause for delay in filing of the main application and the delay in filing of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not deliberate. It is also stated that in case the abatement is not set aside, the plaintiff will suffer irreparable loss, injury and harm and if these applications are allowed there shall be no prejudice to the defendants.

    6. Both the applications have been opposed by the defendants on the ground that the application has been filed much beyond the prescribed period of limitation i.e 90 days from the date of the death of the deceased defendant No. 1. Even otherwise, the information about the demise of defendant No. 1 was given on 13.11.2003 and the application under Order XXII Rules 4 and 9 CPC was filed only on 04.03.2004 and in case the period of limitation is to be calculated from the date of death or from the date of knowledge, the application in any case has been filed beyond the period of limitation. It was also contended that the application filed by the plaintiff was not proper, highly belated, without any sufficient explanation of delay and both the applications are liable to be dismissed with costs.

    7. The contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff is that the sufficient cause in filing of the application has been mentioned in paras 7 to 10 of the application filed under Order 22 Rules 4 and 9 CPC. He admits that the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was filed more than four and a half years after filing of the application under Order 22 Rules 4 and 9 CPC. The explanation given by the learned counsel for the plaintiff is that in the main application, the plaintiff has already mentioned about the setting aside of the abatement as well as the averment pertaining to the delay in filing of the application, therefore, filing of application under Section 5 of Limitation Act is a formality and now it has been filed in order to avoid objections from the office. He further states that the legal heirs of the deceased defendant No. 1 were not served in the main application for one reason or the other and some of the legal heirs were served by substituted service. As soon as the objection about the delay in making the application was raised, the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was filed. His contention is that the delay is not deliberate. Lastly learned counsel for the plaintiff submits that in connected case relating to the dispute about the same property with the same defendants being C.S [OS] No. 2243/1993 titled as Carvan Commercial Company v. Pushpa Devi & anr., IA No. 1439/2004 [u/S.5 of the Limitation Act] was filed to bring on record the L.Rs of deceased Smt. Bimla Devi. This court vide order dated 20.05.2008 has condoned the delay of 58 days in filing the application for impleadment of said four legal heirs of deceased Smt. Bimla Devi in the same situation.

    8. Learned counsel for the defendant, on the other hand, states that there is a long delay in filing of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The suit has already been abated against defendant No. 1 and is liable to be dismissed. Since the present case is a case of specific performance, in case the suit against defendant No. 1 is dismissed as being not maintainable, the suit will also be dismissed against other defendants.

    9. I have gone through the necessary applications, replies as well as the judgments cited by the counsel for the parties. I have also gone through the order passed by this Court in another suit being C.S [OS] No. 2243/1993 in which the legal heirs of deceased Smt. Bimla Devi were brought on record and delay in filing the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was condoned by this Court. Learned counsel for the plaintiff has cited many judgments to support his contentions. He referred to the case reported as Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao, 2002 [3] SCC 195, wherein the Apex Court in the similar situation has condoned the delay by taking the liberal approach for setting aside the abatement of the suit by condoning the delay for substitution of heirs and legal representatives. In paras 11 of the said judgment, the Apex Court has held as under:—

    “11. The Court further observed in paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 which run thus: (SCC pp. 127-28)

    “11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.

    12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words ‘sufficient cause’ under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari 5 and State of W.B v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality 1.

    13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses.”(emphasis added)”

    10. In another case reported as Nagina Singh v. Naga Singh, 2002 [7] SCC 113 in para 10 thereof, the Apex Court has condoned the delay in filing the application under Order 22 Rules 2, 4 and 11 CPC for substitution of legal representatives of One of the deceased appellant and taken the view that this application ought to have been allowed and the respondent could have been compensated by award of cost by the High Court in the interest of justice. The Apex Court in para 10 of the said judgment has held as under:—

    “10. Though there is a serious dispute as to the dates of death of Appellants 1(d) and 1(e), we are of the considered view that in the facts and circumstances of this case, the application for substitution of legal representatives of the aforesaid appellants should not have been rejected, having regard to the fact that all the contesting parties were on record and these appellants were brought on record only as legal representatives of Appellant 1 who had died during the pendency of the appeal. Having regard to the facts of the case and the interest of justice, the High Court ought to have condoned the delay, if any, in filing of the application for substitution and could have compensated the respondents by award of cost. This we consider appropriate, having regard to the interest of justice. The parties have litigated since the year 1974 and it is only fair that there should be adjudication on merit.”

    11. Regarding the plea of the plaintiff that in the application under Order XXII Rule 4 and 9 CPC, specific prayer for setting aside abetment was made and therefore, no separate application was filed, I may refer to the case of Devinder Pal Sehgal & Anr. v. Partap Steel Rolling Mills Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.; JT 2001 (10) SC 463, Apex Court clearly laid down the above proposition. An oral prayer for condonation under Section 5 of Limitation Act is sufficient. Formal application in writing is not necessary for granting relief under Section 5 of Limitation Act.

    12. In the case of Devinder Pal Sehgal (supra) the Apex Court clearly laid down in para 7 as follows:—

    “We have perused the restoration application as well as petition filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the same. It appears that in the application for restoration, all relevant facts have been stated not only to show that the plaintiffs had sufficient cause for non appearance on 24th August, 1988 but also to show sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing the restoration application. This is the reason why in the petition for condonation of delay, it has been simply stated that facts stated in the restoration application may be taken into consideration for condonation of delay in filing the restoration application. Therefore, merely because in the order of trial court, specifically, there is no reference to petition for condonation of delay, it cannot be said that it did not consider the same. From a bare perusal of the order, it would appear that the grounds stated in the restoration application for non appearance on 24th August, 1988 as well as delay in filing the restoration application having found favour with the trial court, the suit has been restored, therefore, it cannot be said that the order of restoration has been passed without condoning the delay in filing the restoration application. The submission of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent that application for restoration filed on behalf of the plaintiffs was dismissed earlier for non prosecution cannot be taken to be a ground for throwing out the restoration application as the High Court on the earlier occasion set aside order of the trial Court whereby restoration application was dismissed for non-prosecution and the said order attained finality. In view of these facts, we are of the opinion that trial court had not acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity and accordingly the High Court was not justified in interfering with its order in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction.”

    13. From the bare reading of this judgment, it can not even be implied in law that the power of the court to condone the delay is circumscribed by an application being filed. The power to condone delay can be exercised if the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not filing the application within the period prescribed.

    14. It is not necessary in law that an application must be filed. Of course as a matter of practice the applicant files such an application But the power of the court is not necessarily dependent on a formal application being made by the applicant. If it is made, well and good; but if it is not made and only an oral prayer is made for condonation of delay the court is not powerless if there is material on the record to show facts constituting sufficient cause for condonation of delay.

    15. As regards the filing of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act after more than four and a half years is concerned, since the plaintiff has already made the prayer to set aside the abatement of the suit in the main application in which there was delay of two months, no prejudice would be caused to the defendants if the present application is allowed. It is not in dispute that in another matter i.e in C.S [OS] No. 2243/1993 there was a delay in filing of the similar application and the said delay had been condoned by this court.

    16. In view of the settled law on the subject coupled with the fact that the defendant No. 8 who is one of the legal heirs of deceased defendant No. 1 is already one of the party to the present proceedings and the factum of abatement of the suit is already mentioned in the main application filed by the plaintiff under Order 22 Rules 4 and 9 CPC wherein the specific prayer has been made that the abatement be set aside, the present application, in my considered opinion, should be allowed.

    17. For the reasons stated in the application, I am of the opinion that the plaintiff has shown the sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing of the application under Order 22 Rules 4 and 9 CPG for bringing on record the legal heirs of deceased defendant No. 1 on record. The application is accordingly allowed subject to payment of cost of Rs. 10,000/- to be deposited in the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee within four weeks from today. The legal representatives of deceased defendant No. 1 as mentioned in the application be brought on record. Applications stand disposed of accordingly.

    C.S [OS] No. 1578/1992

    Amended memo of parties filed is taken on record.

    List this matter before the Joint Registrar on 01.07.2009 for further proceedings.

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    Comments

    Arun Batra v. Bimla Devi
    (Apr 9, 2009)