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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Order IX Rule 13 CPC and under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
  • IX Rule 13 CPC and under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,2.
  • Order IX Rule 13 CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
  • Section 13B(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
  • Section 13(1) (i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act,
  • Section 13-B(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act,
  • SECTION 5 LIMITATION ACT
  • Order VI Rule 17 CPC
  • VI Rule 17 CPC,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Order IX Rule 13 CPC and under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
  • IX Rule 13 CPC and under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,2.
  • Order IX Rule 13 CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
  • Section 13B(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
  • Section 13(1) (i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act,
  • Section 13-B(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act,
  • SECTION 5 LIMITATION ACT
  • Order VI Rule 17 CPC
  • VI Rule 17 CPC,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (B.N. Chaturvedi, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent-husband filed a petition under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act on 18 April 1996. The appellant-wife contested by filing a written statement. During the pendency of that petition, an application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC accompanied by an amended petition under Section 13-B(1) (i.e., a joint petition for divorce by mutual consent) signed by both parties was filed on 27 August 1998 and listed for consideration on 28 August 1998.

The appellant did not appear on 28 August 1998 and the trial court proceeded ex parte. The respondent withdrew the Order VI Rule 17 application and closed his evidence; his examination-in-chief had been recorded earlier and he was in the course of being cross-examined. An ex parte decree of divorce was passed on 2 December 1998.

The appellant filed an application to set aside the decree on 17 April 2000, and an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay. The applications were served on the respondent by publication and remained uncontested. The Learned Additional District Judge dismissed both the application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC and the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act by order dated 7 June 2002. The present appeal challenges that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant has shown sufficient cause to set aside the ex parte decree passed on 2 December 1998 under Order IX Rule 13 CPC.
  2. Whether the delay in filing the application to set aside the decree was sufficiently explained to allow condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
  3. Whether negligence or misconduct of counsel can relieve the client (the appellant) from the consequence of non-appearance, particularly where the client claims to have been unaware of the proceedings.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant attributed failure to appear and failure to pursue the matter before the Matrimonial Court to negligence and misdemeanour of her counsel, who did not attend hearings on several dates in 1998 (including 28 August, 2 November and 17 November 1998).
  • The appellant claimed she had been kept in the dark about the progress of proceedings by her counsel and only learned of the decree much later; she relied on the principle in Rafiq v. Munshilal that an innocent party should not suffer for counsel’s lapses.
  • The appellant asserted that she had been induced to sign the joint petition for divorce by mutual consent "under duress" (said to have occurred at the hospital where she worked), and that she told her counsel she would be unable to attend on 26 August 1998 because of urgent hospital work.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent relied on the principle in Salil Dutta v. T.M and M.C Private Ltd. that there is no absolute rule allowing a party to disown its advocate at any time and claim relief; Rafiq must be read in its facts and not as an absolute proposition.
  • Implicitly, the respondent contended that the appellant had not shown sufficient cause for non-appearance and that her applications were barred by delay.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rafiq v. Munshilal, (1981) 2 SSC 788 That where an ex-parte decree is passed because the party's counsel fails to appear and the client is kept unaware of the true progress of proceedings, the court may relieve the innocent party from suffering for counsel's lapses. The court noted the appellant relied on this decision but distinguished it on the facts: unlike Rafiq, the appellant was well-educated, had personally attended earlier hearings, and the record did not support a claim that she was kept entirely in the dark or had left everything to her counsel.
Salil Dutta v. T.M and M.C Private Ltd., (1993) 2 Supreme Court Cases 185 That there is no absolute rule allowing a party to disown its advocate at any time and seek relief; Rafiq's observations must be confined to its facts and circumstances. The court treated Salil Dutta as governing the limitation on the doctrine in Rafiq and applied the principle to hold that the appellant could not automatically disown her counsel's conduct; the appellant failed to demonstrate sufficient cause.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court conducted a detailed factual and evidentiary analysis before reaching its conclusion. The key points of reasoning (as set out in the opinion) are:

  1. The court examined contemporaneous records of proceedings in August 1998. It found that on 19 August 1998 the respondent's statement was partly recorded and the matter adjourned to 25 and 26 August 1998 for further evidence. On 25 August the matter was adjourned at the request of the appellant's counsel on health grounds; on 26 August it was adjourned because counsel for both parties asked for time, indicating potential talks for divorce by mutual consent. The matter was then adjourned to 27 and 28 August 1998.
  2. The court noted that the appellant had jointly engaged in obtaining adjournments (her counsel joined the opposite counsel in requests), which suggests the appellant was not completely unaware or uninvolved in the conduct of proceedings at that stage. The record showed the joint petition for divorce by mutual consent was filed on 27 August 1998 (and signed by the appellant on that date according to the record), undermining the appellant's assertion that she first was approached on 25 August and signed under duress on 26 August.
  3. The court considered the appellant's later alternative explanation—that she had been away caring for her ill mother—as a ground for absence but found the medical papers submitted did not coincide with the dates on which she or her counsel were absent (28 August, 2 November, 17 November 1998). Moreover, that ground had not been pleaded in the original application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC and Section 5 Limitation Act and thus could not be a basis for overturning the trial court's decision.
  4. The court addressed the contention that the counsel's negligence caused the decree. It observed that the appellant was well educated, was employed as a doctor, had personally attended hearings on many earlier dates, and had not entirely left conduct of the case to counsel. The court concluded that the record did not support a finding of negligence or misdemeanour of the counsel that would justify relief; instead, the appellant's conduct suggested she had acquiesced or was indifferent to the consequences of non-appearance after she appears to have decided on divorce.
  5. The trial court had carefully examined the grounds advanced by the appellant and rejected them as insufficient. The appellate court found no error in the trial court's reasoning and considered the findings to be based on sound reasoning, leaving no scope for interference.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Implications (direct effect on the parties):

  • The trial court's dismissal of the appellant's application to set aside the ex parte decree (dated 2 December 1998) and the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is upheld. The ex parte decree of divorce remains in place as against the appellant.
  • The court found no sufficient cause to set aside the decree and did not condone the delay; the appellant's contentions regarding counsel's negligence and duress were not accepted on the facts presented.

The opinion does not discuss any broader precedential changes; it treats existing authorities (notably Rafiq and Salil Dutta) as guiding principles and distinguishes or applies them on the facts of this case. No new legal principle beyond the fact-based application of those authorities is stated.

    Shipra Chatterjee v. Siddharth Chatterjee .

    B.N Chaturvedi, J.— Instant appeal arises out of an order dated 7th June;, 2002 of the Learned Additional District Judge, Delhi, dismissing the appellant's applications under Order IX Rule 13 CPC and under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,

    2. A petition, under Section 13(1) (i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, was filed by the respondent-husband against the appellant wife on 18th April, 1996. On being served with notice, the appellant filed her Written Statement and contested the petition. During, the pendency of the petition, an application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC, accompanied by an amended petition under Section 13-B(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, signed by both the parties, came to be filed on 27th August, 1998 which was slated for consideration on 28th August, 1998. On 28th August, 1998, however, there was no appearance from the side of the appellant and she was thus proceeded ex-parte. The petitioner husband withdrew the application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC and made a statement closing his evidence as prior thereto, his statement in examination in chief had already been recorded and he was only in the process of being cross-examined on behalf of the appellant. Based on the evidence, produced by the respondent husband, an ex-parte decree of divorce was eventually passed against the appellant on 2nd December, 1998.

    3. The appellant filed an application for setting aside the decree dated 2nd December, 1998 on 17th April, 2000 stating therein that after recording respondent's statement partly on 19th August, 1998, the matter was adjourned to 25th August, 1998 for further evidence. On 25th August, 1998, however, the appellant was approached by the respondent for seeking divorce by mutual consent when the appellant told that she required some time to think over it. However, on the very next day, i.e, 26th August, 1998, the respondent sent to her an application for divorce by mutual consent, at the hospital where she was working, which she was asked to sign. According to the appellant, she did not want to spoil her reputation being a respected doctor there hence she signed that application ‘under duress’. She claims to have had informed her lawyer that she would not be in a position to attend the proceedings on that day, i.e, 26th August, 1998 since she had some urgent work at the hospital. She, on 26th August, 1998 called her lawyer to find out the outcome of the proceedings when she was told that the matter had been adjourned and that she would keep her posted about the hearing. Thereafter, states the appellant, she had been calling her lawyer on regular basis, but she was told that as and when her presence would be required before the Court, she would inform her in that regard.

    4. In November, 1999, the appellant came to know from one of her relatives that the respondent had communicated to him that he had been granted a decree of divorce against her. Thereupon, she immediately contacted her lawyer, who informed her that the matter was fixed for 3rd December, 1999. On 3rd December, 1999 on being contacted, the lawyer again told her that the matter was in fact posted for 3rd January, 2000 and that he had earlier communicated a wrong date due to oversight. On 3rd January, 2000, the appellant herself, inspite of being informed by her counsel that the Courts would be closed on that day, went to the Courts and found that the Courts were functioning, but her case was not on Board. Thereafter, she repeatedly contacted her lawyer and also met her several times, but she got only evasive reply. She, thereafter, changed her lawyer. The lawyer, newly engaged, on inspection of the file found that an ex-parte decree had been passed as early as in December, 1998. The appellant, thereafter, applied for a certified copy of the decree and proceedings, which were made available to her on 8th March, 2000, whereafter, an application for setting aside the decree was filed along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

    5. Notice of the applications was served on the respondent-husband by publication. There was no appearance on his behalf and thus the applications remained uncontested.

    6. Learned Additional District Judge on hearing the learned counsel for the appellant and examining the matter concluded that the appellant had failed to show sufficient cause which prevented her from appearing before the Court on 28th August, 1998. She rather observed that her non-appearance on 28th August, 1998 was ‘preplanned to delay the proceedings of the Court or to harass the non-applicant/husband in one way or the other’. She also found the application for setting aside ex-parte decree being barred by time. She accordingly proceeded to dismiss both the applications.

    7. I have heard arguments on either side.

    8. Negligence and misdemeanour of her counsel is stated to be the reason for appellant failing to pursue the matter before the Matrimonial Court on 28th August, 2nd November and 17th November, 1998 when the case came up for hearing before that Court and consequently, remained unaware of ex-parte decree of divorce which was eventually passed against her on 2nd December, 1998.

    9. Learned counsel for the appellant argued with reference to a decision of the Supreme Court in Rafiq v. Munshilal, (1981) 2 SSC 788 that in a case where an ex-parte decree is passed on account of failure on the part of a party's counsel to appear before the Court on the dates of hearing and the client is kept in dark regarding correct position relating to progress of the proceedings, it is only the party concerned who suffers the consequences and in such a situation the Court would not allow an innocent party suffering injustice merely for the lapses on the part of his counsel.

    10. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, countered the argument so advanced on behalf of the appellant by citing another decision of the Supreme Court in Salil Dutta v. T.M and M.C Private Ltd., (1993) 2 Supreme Court Cases 185. Noticing the decision in Rafiq (supra), in Salil Dutta (supra), it was laid down:

    “Though in certain situations, the Court may, in the interest of justice, set aside a dismissal order or an ex-parte decree notwithstanding the negligence and/or misdemeanour of the advocate where it finds that the client was an innocent litigant but there is no such absolute rule that a party can disown its advocate at any time and seek relief. No such absolute immunity can be recognized. Such an absolute rule would make the working of the system extremely difficult. The observations made in Rafiq case must be understood in the facts and circumstances of that case and cannot be understood as an absolute proposition……..”

    11. Unlike in Rafiq's case (supra), in the present case, the appellant happens to be a well educated lady, serving as a doctor in a hospital, who, inspite of having engaged a counsel to represent her, had been defending the divorce case by attending the Court personally on different dates {vide para 2 (vii) of her grounds of appeal). Thus, it was not a case where she had left it entirely to her counsel to defend the proceedings before the Trial Court. From the record, it is gathered that ever since the respondent caused her appearance on being served with notice of the petition, she continued to be represented by her counsel on all the dates of hearing from 10th September, 1996 to 27th August, 1998, barring on two dates when the advocates were On strike. It was only on 28th August, 2nd November, and 17th November, 1998 that her counsel omitted to turn up and she went unrepresented. Strangely, in contrast to the reason set forth in her application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, she seeks to offer an altogether different explanation for her non-appearance on the aforesaid dates, in her grounds of appeal. She states that during the pendency of divorce petition, since her mother, who was residing at Bhilai, was taken ill she was compelled to proceed to Bhilai to attend her and being away from Delhi, she could not personally attend the Court on the dates of hearing and had thus to depend on her lawyer only to keep herself apprised of the status of the case. She placed on record photocopies of relevant medical papers showing that on the dates indicated therein, her mother had to be admitted in the hospital for treatment of her ailment. It is, however, noticed vide Annexure A-6 (Colly) that the periods of illness and hospitalization of appellant's mother did not coincide with dates of hearing, i.e, 28th August, 2nd November, and 17th November, 1998 when she had gone unrepresented. Thus the illness of her mother could not be a ground to explain her absence or that of her counsel on the aforesaid dates. Moreover, since the ground of illness of her mother was never pleaded in the application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC and under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the learned Trial Court, in no way, could have adverted thereto.

    12. A perusal of Trial Court record shows that on 19th August, 1998 when the respondent's statement was partly recorded, the matter was adjourned to 25th and 26th August, 1998 for further recording of his statement. On 25th August, 1998, no proceedings could take place as the matter had to be adjourned at the request of appellant's counsel on her health ground. On 26th August, 1998 again further examination of the respondent could not take place as the parties’ counsel requested for an adjournment on the ground that the parties could move for divorce by mutual consent. The case was thus adjourned to 27th August, 1998 and then to 28th August, 1998. Unlike on the previous dates of hearing, neither the appellant nor her counsel turned either on 28th August, 1998 or thereafter until passing of an ex-parte decree on 2nd December, 1998. The fact that the appellant's counsel had joined the opposite counsel to seek adjournments, as aforesaid, stating that there was a possibility of the parties moving for divorce by mutual consent indicates that talks for divorce by mutual consent between the parties would have started sometime after the case was adjourned to 25th and 26th August, 1998 after respondent's statement being partly recorded. According to the appellant, however, the respondent had approached her for the first time only on 25th August, 1998 for seeking divorce by mutual consent when she had told him that she required some time to think over the matter. On-26th August, 1998 the appellant's counsel joining the opposite counsel in making a request for adjourning the case to 27th August, 1998 could not have been there without instructions from the appellant. Though according to the appellant she had signed the joint petition for divorce by mutual consent on 26th August, 1998, the record shows that it was actually signed by her on 27th August, 1998 and filed before the Court on that very date with an application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC for converting the divorce petition into one under Section 13B(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Whether joint petition, accompanying the amendment application, was signed by the appellant on 26th August, 1998 or 27th August, 1998, it really appears to make not much of a difference as the case was got adjourned on 26th August and again on 27th August, 1998 at joint request of parties’ counsel. The fact that the appellant had to sign the joint petition for divorce by mutual consent “under duress” appears to have been pleaded in the applications simply to escape an inference that it was not on account of any compelling reason rather owing to having agreed to divorce by mutual consent that the appellant's counsel under instructions from her client stopped appearing in the case on 28th August, 1998 and thereafter. In normal course, if the appellant would have really been forced to sign the joint petition for divorce by mutual consent, as stated by her, she would have certainly informed her lawyer in that regard or she herself would have made it a point to appear in person before, the Court to resist the respondent's move to get his petition converted into a petition under Section 13B(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act for divorce by mutual consent. She, however, neither informed her counsel in that regard nor took any steps whatsoever to ensure that the joint petition for divorce by mutual consent which was got signed by her “under duress” could not be used by the respondent to her disadvantage. On the other hand, her counsel, joining the opposite counsel to make a request for adjourning the matter on 26th August, 1998 and then on 27th August, 1998 on the ground that parties were likely to move for divorce by mutual consent, shows that the plea of signing the application “under duress” does not reflect correct position.

    13. The learned Trial Judge has extensively dealt with the ground set out by the appellant to justify her absence or that of her counsel on 28th August, 1998 and thereafter before finding the same as unacceptable. The finding of the learned Trial Court in dismissing the appellant's applications turns out to be based on sound reasoning leaving no scope for any interference therewith. It was a case where the absence of the appellant or her counsel could not be attributed to any sufficient cause. It appears that having decided for a divorce, the appellant remained least bothered about the consequences that were likely to follow on account of her absence or of her counsel on 28th August, 1998 and thereafter. It does not appear to be a case of any negligence or misdemeanour on the part of appellant's counsel and the plea in that regard appears to have been raised simply with a view to derive an undue advantage on that account.

    14. Finding no merit, the appeal is dismissed.

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    Shipra Chatterjee v. Siddharth Chatterjee .
    (Feb 2, 2007)