Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J. (Oral)— The respondents filed a petition under Section 14(1)(e) and Section 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) on grounds of bona fide requirement of residence of the landlords. The respondents claim to be the owners and landlords of the premises 3468-70, Gali Bajrang Bali, Chawri Bazar, Delhi-110006. The tenanted accommodation consists of one room and covered tin-shed barsati, common latrine and bath room situated on the second floor as per the site plan annexed to the petition. The rate of rent is stated to be Rs. 55/- per month including other charges.

2. Respondent No. 1 was stated to be residing in the property at the first floor consisting of one room and a kotha and one room and kotha on the second floor with his family consisting of himself, his wife and three children aged about 23, 20 and 13 years respectively. Respondent No. 2 is stated to be occupying the second floor with a tin-shed and kitchen and residing there with his family consisting of himself, his wife and four children aged 17, 14, 11 and 8 years respectively.

3. The petitioner sought leave to defend the eviction proceedings but the Additional Rent Controller in terms of the judgment dated 9.5.2005 found that no triable issue was raised as to disentitle the respondents to claim eviction on the grounds under Section 14(1)(e) of the said Act and passed an eviction order with a direction to the petitioner to vacate the same within six months from the date of the order. The present revision petition has been filed by the petitioner aggrieved by the said order.

4. In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties, the relevant provision of section 14 is re-produced herein as under:

14. Protection of tenant against eviction—

(1) Notwithstanding anything to be contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any Court of Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant:

Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:

(a) ………..

(b) ………..

(c) ………..

(d) ………..

(e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation.

Explanation: For the purposes of this clause, “premises let for residential purposes” include any premises which having been let for use as a residence are, without the consent of the landlord, used incidentally, for commercial or other purposes;

5. A perusal of the impugned order shows that really there is no dispute about the purpose of letting being residential and the absence of any other alternative accommodation with the respondents. The extent of the family of the respondents is also not really denied. The size of the family in fact leaves no manner of doubt that the accommodation available with the landlords is not sufficient. The petitioner did try to make out a case of sufficiency of accommodation on the ground that the respondents are in possession of six rooms in the property. Even if this be assumed to be correct, the accommodation with the respondents cannot be said to be sufficient. Respondent No. 1 would require one room for himself, at least two rooms between three children, out of whom one son is of marriageable age. Thus till the daughter is married and if the son was to be married, the real requirement for the children would be three rooms. A drawing and dining room would also be required. The position is more or less similar for respondent No. 2. The requirement would be at least of four rooms. Thus whatever way the matter is looked into, the accommodation available with the respondents cannot be said to be sufficient. It is this factor which has weighed with the Additional Rent Controller in coming to the conclusion that there is paucity of accommodation.

6. The real controversy raised is in respect of ownership of the property and the consequent landlord-tenant relationship. In fact this is the substratum of the submissions made before this Court and this aspect would have to be dealt with in some depth.

7. One Sh. Bhagwan Dass was the owner and landlord of the premises with Sh. Triveni Prasad being the tenant. The respondents have relied upon a letter dated 18.12.1973 addressed by the tenant to the landlord to establish that there is no dispute about this issue. In the said letter, a reference has been made to the past disputes between the parties and a cheque is stated to have been enclosed. A copy of the cheque is also available.

8. Sh. Bhagwan Dass is stated to have survived by Sh. Shibbo Mal, his elder son, who is stated to have inherited the property in pursuance to the Will dated 18.12.1974 A copy of the Will has been placed on record and there is no dispute in that behalf. Sh. Shibbo Mal had four sons and two daughters and a partition deed was executed. In terms whereof the property in question fell to the share of the two sons Manmohan Verma and Ashok Verma. A copy of this partition deed dated 17.6.1990 substantiating this aspect is already on record. There is also a separate release deed executed by the two sisters on 12.4.1997 in respect of the properties in favour of their brothers.

9. The tenant late Sh. Triveni Prasad was survived by four sons and three of the sons in terms of a surrender dated 1.8.1989 are stated to have surrendered the tenanted premises in favour of Sh. Shibbo Mal. One of the sons Krishan Gopal continued as a tenant and after his demise, his wife, the petitioner herein, is the tenant.

10. The past litigation between the parties includes a Civil Suit No. 32 of 1975 filed by late Sh. Bhagwan Das against late Sh. Triveni Prasad seeking prohibitory injunction pleading that the tenant was making unauthorized construction and should be prohibited from doing so. On the demise of the landlord, application to implead the legal heirs was filed. At that stage, there were some differences between the legal representatives and one of the issues framed was as to which the LR was entitled to substitution in place of the plaintiff. Evidence was led in that behalf and thereafter the application for impleadment by Sh. Shibbo Mal was allowed. The suit was disposed of as withdrawn in view of the statement made by the LRs of the defendants that they would not make any construction in the tenanted premises.

11. There appears to have been even subsequent litigation in Civil Suit No. 522/90 filed by Sh. Shibbo Mal against Ms. Munni Devi again for permanent injunction which is stated to have resulted in a decree dated 7.3.1995 restraining the tenant from making/raising any alteration/construction. The respondents herein in June, 1998 applied for mutation to MCD and are stated to have been paying the house tax. The aforesaid facts have been set out to show that the respondents are not outsiders, but legal heirs of the deceased-landlord.

12. The petitioner has claimed that the forefathers of her husband had been tenants since 1892 and sought to place on record electricity and water bills in the name of Sh. Krishan Gopal. The Additional Rent Controller rightly noted that these established only the possession of the husband of the petitioner but at no stage of time was hostile possession claimed in respect of the suit property which is a mandatory requirement for establishing the claim or adverse possession which the petitioner sought before the Additional Rent Controller.

13. The Trial Court has taken note of the material on record and the judgments cited to come to the conclusion that the proceedings under the said Act are not title proceedings. In this behalf, the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Ram Chander v. Ram Pyari, 2004 Raj.L.R 188, was referred where a similar plea of adverse possession has been rejected. The plea of the petitioner to challenge the Will of late territorial jurisdiction was also similarly rejected on the ground that it was not the domain of the tenant to challenge the Will of the landlord. In this behalf, the judgment of this Court in Plastichemicals Company v. Ashit Chadha, 114 (2004) DLT 408, has been relied upon for proposition that if a landlord is able to show that there is a testament in his favour, landlord is deemed to have discharged his burden of ownership vis-a-vis the Rent Control Act and such a testament can at best be challenged by the heirs of the owner and not by the tenant.

14. The Trial Court has also found that the Will executed by the grand father dated 18.12.1974 is more than 30 years old document and a registered one and there is thus a presumption regarding its genuineness under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The registered relinquishment deed executed by the sisters in favour of the brothers have also been placed on record as also the registered partition deed.

15. In my considered view the approach of the Additional Rent Controller can hardly be faulted. The proceedings under the said Act cannot be converted and utilized by a tenant to prevent eviction merely on the ground that he seeks to cast doubt on the title of the property which has been inherited when there is really no one else claiming right to the property. In any case this is matter between the legal heirs of the owner.

16. It must be kept in mind that the context in which the word ‘owner’ has been used in Section 14(1)(e) of the said Act has been succinctly set out in the judgment of the Supreme Court Smt. Shanti Sharma v. Smt. Ved Prabha, (1987) 4 SCC 193 : AIR 1987 SC 2028. This Court in a recent judgment in CRP No. 153/2001, Gayties Manufacturing Company v. Sh. Kanwaljit Singh, decided on 3.8.2006 had the occasion to refer to the said judgment of the Supreme Court. The relevant portion of the judgment in Smt. Shanti Sharma case (supra), is reproduced as under:

‘The word ‘owner’ has not been defined in this Act and the word ‘owner’ has also not been defined in the Transfer of Property Act. The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant appears to be that ownership means absolute ownership in the land as well as of the structure standing thereupon. Ordinarily, the concept of ownership may be what is contended by the Counsel for the appellant but in the modern context where it is more or less admitted that all lands belong to the State, the persons who hold properties will only be lessees or the persons holding the land on some term from the Government or the authorities constituted by the State and in this view of the matter it could not be thought of that the Legislature when it used the term ‘owner’ in the provision of Section 14(1)(e) it thought of ownership as absolute ownership. It must be presumed that the concept of ownership only will be as it is understood at present. It could not be doubted that the term ‘owner’ has to be understood in the context of the background of the law and what is contemplated in the scheme of the Act. This Act has been enacted for protection of the tenants. But at the same time it has provided that the landlord under certain circumstances will be entitled to eviction and bona fide requirement is one of such grounds on the basis of which landlords have been permitted to have eviction of a tenant. In this context, the phrase ‘owner’ thereof has to be understood, and it is clear that what is contemplated is that where the person builds up his property and lets out to the tenant and subsequently needs it for his own use, he should be entitled to an order or decree for eviction, the only thing necessary for him to prove is bona fide requirement and that he is the owner thereof. In this context, what appears to be the meaning of the term ‘owner’ is vis-a-vis the tenant i.e the owner should be something more than the tenant. Admittedly in these cases where the plot of land is taken on lease the structure is built by the landlord and admittedly he is the owner of the structure. So far as the land is concerned he holds a long lease and in this view of the matter as against the tenant it could not be doubted that he will fall within the ambit of the meaning of the term ‘owner’ as is contemplated under this section. This term came up for consideration before the Delhi High Court and it was also in reference to Section 14(1)(e) and it was held by the Delhi High Court in T.C Rekhi v. Smt. Usha Gujaral, 1971 Ren CJ 322 at p. 326 as under—

“The word ‘owner’ as used in this clause has to be construed in the background of the purpose and object of enacting it. The use of the word ‘owner’ in this clause seems to me to have been inspired by the definition of the word ‘landlord’ as contained in Section 2(e) of the Act which is wide enough to include a person receiving or entitled to receive the rent of any premises on account of or on behalf of or for the benefit of any other person. Construed in the context in which the word ‘owner’ is used in Clause (e), it seems to me to include all persons in the position of Smt. Usha Gujaral who have taken a long lease of sites from the Government for the purpose of building houses thereon. The concept of ownership seems now to be eclipsed by its social and political significance and the idea of ownership in the case like the present is one of the better rights to be in possession and to obtain it. To accede to the contention raised by Sh. Kapur would virtually nullify the effect of Clause (e) and would render all such landlords remediless against tenants however badly they may need the premises for their own personal residence. I do not think such a result was intended by the Legislature and I repeal the appellant's contention. I consider it proper before passing on to the next challenge to point out that the word owner as used in Clause (e) in Section 14(1) does not postulate absolute ownership in the sense that he has an absolutely unrestricted right to deal with the property as he likes. To describe some one as owner, and perhaps even as an absolute owner of property is to say two things; it is to assert that his title to the property is indisputable and that he has all the rights of ownership allowed by the legal system in question. Rights of ownership may, therefore, be limited by special provisions of law and include in those provisions as such are in force in New Delhi according to which citizens are granted long leases of sites for constructing buildings thereon. Now, the words of a statute, though normally construed in their ordinary meaning, may contain inherent restrictions due to their subject matter and object and the occasion on which and the circumstances with reference to which they are used. They call for construction in the light of their context rather than in what may be either their strict etymological sense or their popular meaning apart from the context (see Halsbury's laws of England Third Edition Vol. 36 para 893, p. 394). The meaning of the word ‘owner’ in Clause (e) is influenced and controlled by its context and the appellant's construction is unacceptable because it seems to be quite, clearly contrary to the reasonable operation of the statutory provision’.” (Emphasis supplied)

17. Thus on a consideration of the matter, it was observed in Gayties Manufacturing Company's case (supra), as under:

“A perusal of the aforesaid shows that the word ‘owner’ is not used by the Legislature in the context of an absolute owner. The Act is a protection for tenants and landlords are entitled to eviction in certain circumstances including for bona fide requirement. The Supreme Court thus observed that the phrase ‘owner’ appears to be used vis-a-vis a tenant and this would imply that the owner should be something more than the tenant. Once this test is satisfied a person claiming eviction has to only show his bona fide requirement. The Supreme Court has referred with approval to the observations of this Court in T.C Rekhi v. Smt. Usha Gujaral (supra), where it had been observed that the word ‘owner’ in the clause seems to have been inspired by the definition of the word ‘landlord’ as contained in Section 2(e) of the said Act which is wide enough to include a person receiving or entitled to receive the rent of any premises on account of or on behalf of or for the benefit of any other person. Thus the idea of ownership was held to be one of better right to be in possession than the tenant and to obtain it. The definition of landlord as given in Section 2(e) of the said Act is as under:

2. Definitions—

In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires—

(a) ……….

(b) ……….

(c) ……….

(d) ……….

(e) ‘landlord’ means a person who for the time being is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of any premises whether on his own account or on account of or on behalf of or for the benefit of any person or as a trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the premises were let to a tenant.”

18. In view of the aforesaid legal position, there is no doubt that the respondents have satisfied the test to succeed in the present petition so far as the establishment of the ownership of the property is concerned. Insofar as the aspect of landlord and tenant relationship is concerned, the Trial Court has relied upon the letter dated 18.12.1973 which established that not only did Sh. Triveni Prasad, the original tenant, write to Sh. Bhagwan Dass, the original landlord, but even submitted arrears of rent as per cheque enclosed. This letter has not been denied by filing any rejoinder.

19. One further aspect in this behalf which has to be examined arises from the application filed by the petitioner CM No. 11780/2005 seeking permission of this Court to file the Will of late Sh. Lakhmi Chand on record. Firstly this document did not form part of the leave to defend application, secondly, the Will dated 5.11.1912 is one executed by Sh. Lakhmi Chand in favour of his brother Jawahar Lal, his brother's son Sh. Bhagwan Dass and also his daughter and her son. Even if this Will is perused, one can't appreciate as to what the petitioner seeks from this Court. It is not as if this Court has to go into a complete history of title of property for centuries. The fact remains that really there is no dispute insofar as the ownership is concerned or the landlord-tenant relationship is concerned.

20. The petitioner in order to defeat the present proceedings seeks to go into an inquiry into title as if the petitioner is a legal heir. This is not permissible. I am also unable to accept the plea of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that in any case a complete trial should be held on this issue. As observed above, this is not the jurisdiction of this Court and thus there cannot be said to be any requirement on this aspect.

21. I am unable to accept the plea of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the petition filed by the petitioner tenant satisfies the test of prima facie disclosure of such facts which would disentitle the respondents from eviction order or that the application for leave to defend meets the criteria set out by the Supreme Court in Precision Steel and Engineering Works v. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal, 22 (1982) DLT 458.

22. I find no patent error or erroneous exercise of jurisdiction by the Trial Court.

23. At this stage, learned Counsel for the petitioner was asked as to whether the petitioner is willing to vacate the premises on grant of some time or would like to take recourse to further legal remedy. Learned Counsel, on instructions, stated that the petitioner would like to exercise the second option.

24. Dismissed.

R.C dismissed.