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Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was appointed as a Constable in Delhi Police on a temporary basis on 2 December 1963. After three years (December 1966) his case for being treated as quasi-permanent was due for consideration, but because he had been given a "censure" on 18 September 1966 the matter was deferred to 3 June 1967. In April 1967 the petitioner was arrested during a general strike in Delhi Police and, while in Tihar Jail, was served with a notice of termination of service under Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules 1965 (served on 13/21 April 1967).

The Government later decided to take a sympathetic view and reappointed 165 temporary persons (including the petitioner) as fresh entrants, and the petitioner received a fresh appointment effective 15 March 1971.

A number of affected policemen filed writ petitions before this Court, including CWP No. 26/1969 (Sh. Raj Singh and others v. Union of India & others) and CWP No. 106/70 (Sh. Bhagwat Prasad v. Union of India & others). In the Raj Singh matter the Court held (judgment/order dated 1 October 1975, affirmed on appeal 20 April 1977) that the terminations were punitive and violative of Article 311(2) because no departmental enquiry had been held; those writ petitioners were therefore deemed to have continued in service and were to be granted pay/allowances for the intervening period subject to FR-53(2) declaration.

The petitioner filed his own writ (CWP No. 47/83) and succeeded on 21 March 1984; the operative part quashed the impugned orders and directed that the petitioners would be deemed to have continued in service. Subsequently, the respondent issued an office order dated 29 June 1984 accepting the judgment and stating that the petitioner would be deemed to have continued in service and that the intervening period would be treated as spent on duty for all intents and purposes.

The petitioner made representations seeking consequential reliefs (confirmation, seniority, promotion and pensionary benefits). By a reply dated 21 June 1991 the respondents refused to antedate confirmation/promotion. Aggrieved, the petitioner approached the Central Administrative Tribunal. The opinion records that the Tribunal dismissed the Original Application on 4 December 1997 (the opinion refers to the Tribunal order as being in O.A. No. 1792/1992 in the opening paragraph; later the text records the petitioner filed O.A. No. 1279/92 which was dismissed on 4 December 1997). The petitioner then filed the present petition under Article 226 challenging the Tribunal's order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, having been judicially declared to have been deemed to have continued in service and with the respondent's acceptance of that result, the petitioner is entitled to quasi-permanency from 3 June 1967 (the date his case was to be considered) and corresponding seniority from his initial appointment on 2 December 1963.
  2. Whether the Tribunal erred in refusing to ante-date the petitioner's confirmation and promotions and in not counting his seniority from the date of initial appointment but instead treating him as a fresh entrant from 1971.
  3. Whether the petitioner is entitled to consequential recomputation of pension and payment of arrears resulting from ante-dating of quasi-permanency, confirmation and promotions (and the limits of any pay arrears entitlement).
  4. Whether the respondents' preliminary objection of delay and laches in approaching the Tribunal/high court barred the petitioner's claim.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The Court had already held in his writ (CWP No. 47/83, 21 March 1984) that his termination was illegal and that he was to be deemed to have continued in service; the respondents accepted that position in their office order dated 29 June 1984.
  • As a necessary consequence of being deemed to have continued in service, the petitioner should have been considered for quasi-permanency when his case was to be taken up on 3 June 1967; therefore quasi-permanency should be treated as from 3 June 1967 and seniority from the initial appointment on 2 December 1963, not from the 1971 reappointment.
  • The petitioner relied on the Supreme Court decision in Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers Association & Others v. State of Maharashtra (cited JT 1990 (2) SC 264 and JT 1989 (2) SC 143) for the principle that seniority is to be counted from the date of appointment and not from the date of confirmation.
  • Because the grievance affects computation of pension, it constitutes a recurring cause of action; he had taken timely action by first instituting a writ petition, repeatedly representing to authorities, and by challenging the respondents' refusal by approaching the Tribunal (and thereafter this Court).

Respondents' Arguments

  • The judgment in W.P. (C) No. 47/1983 (21 March 1984) did not direct the respondents to grant the benefit of ante-dating confirmation or promotion; those directions were limited to treating the petitioner as in service during the intervening period between dismissal and reinstatement.
  • The Tribunal's reasoning that a specific order of confirmation is necessary and that probationary appointment does not automatically lead to confirmation is correct.
  • The petitioner is guilty of delay and laches: the impugned Tribunal order was passed in December 1997 but the petition to this Court was filed in September 1998; further, the petitioner ought to have raised the grievance earlier (in 1966) when his peers were confirmed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sh. Raj Singh and others v. Union of India & others (CWP No. 26/1969) The opinion records that this Court held the terminations were punitive and a camouflage for dismissal and violative of Article 311(2) because no departmental enquiry was conducted; affected petitioners were to be deemed to have continued in service and granted pay and allowances for the intervening period subject to FR-53(2) declaration. The court relied on the effect of that judgment as establishing that those similarly situated were to be treated as having continued in service and as a precedent for treating the petitioner's intervening period as spent on duty. The petitioner relied on that outcome as a basis for claiming ante-dating of quasi-permanency and seniority.
Sh. Bhagwat Prasad v. Union of India & others (CWP No. 106/70) The opinion mentions this writ petition among those filed challenging termination; the specific rule or principle from this case is not detailed in the provided opinion. The opinion references this petition as one of the related writ petitions but does not describe how any specific holding from it was applied in the present decision.
Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers Association & Others v. State of Maharashtra (JT 1990 (2) SC 264; JT 1989 (2) SC 143) The court quotes para 47: "Once an incumbant is appointed to a post according to rule, his seniority has to be counted from the date of his appointment and not according to the date of his confirmation." The court applied this principle to hold that, since the petitioner is deemed to have been in continuous service from his initial appointment in 1963, his seniority must be counted from 2 December 1963 and not from the 1971 reappointment date.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Tribunal's stated basis for dismissal was that initial appointment was on probation and that completion of probation did not automatically confer confirmation; a specific order of confirmation was necessary. The Tribunal also proceeded on an assumed factual basis that the petitioner had been considered with his peers for confirmation in 1966 but had not been confirmed because his performance was unsatisfactory.

The High Court found those assumptions incorrect on the facts as recorded in the opinion. At the relevant time the petitioner's confirmation decision had been deferred to 3 June 1967; before that date his services were terminated in April 1967. Therefore, the petitioner was never actually considered for confirmation in 1966 or 1967. Because the petitioner had successfully challenged his termination in CWP No. 47/83 and was deemed to have continued in service — a position accepted by the respondents' office order dated 29 June 1984 — one necessary consequence is that he should have been considered for quasi-permanency at the relevant time (June 1967).

The court accepted the petitioner's reliance on the Direct Recruit decision for the legal proposition that seniority is to be counted from the date of appointment rather than the date of confirmation. Applying that principle, the court concluded that the petitioner’s seniority must be counted from his initial appointment on 2 December 1963 and not from his 1971 reappointment.

On the respondents' defence of delay and laches, the court analysed the chronology of the petitioner's actions: he first instituted a writ petition, obtained relief, made repeated representations to authorities, and challenged the respondents' refusal by approaching the Tribunal after receiving the 21 June 1991 reply. The court treated the pension computation issue as a recurring cause of action and held that the petitioner had not been guilty of unexplained delay or laches in approaching the Tribunal and the court.

The court therefore found in favour of the petitioner on the core factual and legal points: (a) the petitioner was never considered for confirmation because his case was deferred and termination intervened; (b) the petitioner's deemed continuation in service must be given the full consequences of quasi-permanency and seniority as of the dates appropriate to his initial appointment; and (c) the petitioner was entitled to consequential pensionary revision and arrears subject to specified limits in relation to pay arrears for posts not actually served.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The writ petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 4 December 1997 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal in O.A. No. 1792/1992 is quashed.

Directives and immediate consequences ordered by the Court (as recorded in the opinion):

  • The respondents are directed to treat the petitioner as being in continuous uninterrupted service since the date of his initial appointment on 2 December 1963.
  • The respondents are directed to grant the petitioner the status of quasi-permanency from 3 June 1967 and to give time-bound confirmation and promotions by calculating his seniority from 2 December 1963.
  • The respondents are directed to recompute the petitioner's pension accordingly and to pay any arrears of pension within two months from the date of the judgment; the enhanced pension is to be paid from 1 January 2007 onwards.
  • The petitioner is not entitled to claim any arrears of pay on account of preponement of dates of notional promotions for which he did not actually render service; however, the notionally revised higher pay is to be taken into account for recomputing pensionary benefits.
  • The petitioner is entitled to costs of Rs. 5,000/-.

Implications beyond the parties: The opinion implements established principles (including the Direct Recruit principle on seniority) to grant remedial relief to the petitioner and orders specific pension recomputation and arrears. The opinion does not purport to announce a novel legal principle beyond applying existing authorities and the consequences of the Court's prior judgment in the petitioner's writ; it confines its effect to the direct relief ordered for the petitioner (i.e., adjustment of quasi-permanency date, seniority, promotions and pension computation).

    Suraj Bhan v. Union Of India & Others .

    Vipin Sanghi, J.— This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order dated 4th December, 1997 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi (the Tribunal) in O. A. No. 1792/1992 whereby the original application filed by the petitioner has been dismissed.

    2. Petitioner was appointed as a Constable in Delhi Police on 2nd December, 1963 on temporary basis. Upon completion of three years of service in December, 1966 his case came up for consideration to treat him as quasi permanent. However, on account of the petitioner having been given a “censure” on 18th September, 1966, his case was deferred for reconsideration to 3rd June, 1967.

    3. It appears that in the intervening period, in April 1967, there was a general strike in Delhi Police and the petitioner was amongst a large number of policemen arrested during the strike. While the petitioner was in Central Jail, Tihar, he along with others, was served with a notice of termination of his services under Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules 1965 on 13th/21st April, 1967.

    4. As over a thousand policemen were involved in the general strike, the Government decided to take a sympathetic view. It decided that 165 temporary persons whose services were terminated would be taken back in employment as fresh entrants. Petitioner was given a fresh appointment with effect from 15th March, 1971. A number of policemen like the petitioner filed writ petitions in this Court few of them being CWP No. 26/1969, “Sh. Raj Singh and others v. Union of India & others” and CWP No. 106/70, “Sh. Bhagwat Prasad v. Union of India & others,” challenging their termination from service. The writ petition filed by Sh. Raj Singh and others was allowed by this Court vide judgment order dated 1st October, 1975 whereby it was held that the order of termination of services of the writ petitioners was punitive and a camouflage for penalty of dismissal from services and was violative of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. Since no departmental enquiry was conducted, the orders of the termination were held to be illegal. The judgment of the learned single Judge was affirmed in appeal with the dismissal of LPA No. 24/1975, on 20th April, 1977. The writ petitioners in those writ petitions were deemed to have continued in service. They were granted full pay and allowances admissible to them under the rules for the period from the date of termination to the date of fresh appointment in Delhi Police, subject to the production of declaration under FR-53(2), that they were not engaged in any employment during this period. The intervening period was directed to be treated as spent on duty for all intents and purposes.

    5. The present petitioner also preferred writ petition being CWP No. 47/83 claiming the same relief that had been granted to Sh. Raj Singh and others. CWP No. 47/83 was allowed by this Court on 21st March, 1984. The operative part of the said judgment, in so far as it is relevant, reads as follows:

    “Considering the facts and circumstances of this case which are identical to the aforesaid writ petitions, I also quash the impugned orders and direct that the petitioners would be deemed to have continued in service and would be treated as such but without prejudice to such action as the parties may be advised to take in accordance with law.”

    Following the decision in CWP No. 270/78, certain other directions were given in the petitioners case also, which are not relevant for the present case.

    6. After the passing of the aforesaid judgment in the petitioner's case, the respondent issued an office order bearing No. 6239-80.Estt. Int Bn. DAP dated 29th June, 1984 wherein the respondent recorded the acceptance by it of the judgment in the case of, inter alia, the petitioner and further stated that the petitioner will be deemed to have continued in service from the date of his initial appointment in Delhi Police. It further stated that the intervening period will be treated as spent on duty for all intents and purposes.

    7. The petitioner made various representations to the respondent to treat him in continuous service, without a break and to grant him consequential reliefs of confirmation, seniority, promotion and pensionary benefits. The representations of the petitioner eventually evoked a reply dated 21st June, 1991, whereby the respondents stated that the request of the petitioner for antedating confirmation/promotion has been considered in the headquarters, but the same could not be acceded to.

    8. Aggrieved by the aforesaid response of the respondent, the petitioner approached the Tribunal by filing an O.A No. 1279/92 which was dismissed by the Tribunal on 4th December, 1997.

    9. The relief claimed by the petitioner before the Tribunal was for advancement of the date of his confirmation as constable in Delhi Police. The petitioner's grievance was that his case for being treated as quasi permanent was to be taken up by the respondent in June, 1967. However, the same could not be done since the service of the petitioner was terminated, in the meantime, in April, 1967. He was given fresh appointment in 1971 and only after he had put in three years from 1971, that is in 1974, he was treated as quasi permanent. The Tribunal proceeded to dismiss the Original Application on the reasoning that the initial appointment of the petitioner was on probation, and on completion of the probationary period, there is no automatic confirmation. A specific order in this regard is necessary.

    10. Before us, the petitioner's case is that since it had been ordered by this Court in the writ petition filed by him, on 21st March, 1984, that his termination was illegal and he was deemed to have continued in service, which decision had been accepted by the respondent vide their order dated 29th June, 1984, there was no justification in denying quasi permanency to the petitioner on the basis of his initial appointment on 2nd December, 1963. The petitioner claims that he ought to have been granted quasi permanency from 2nd June, 1967, since the effect of a censure which was inflicted upon him on 18th September, 1966 ceased to have effect on the expiry of six months from the said date. The petitioner states that his quasi permanency has wrongly been deferred to 1974 by treating him as a fresh appointee in the year 1971 and that this act of the respondent is not in consonance with the judgment passed in his favour in CWP No. 47/83 as also the order dated 29th June, 1984 passed by the respondent itself. The petitioner states that on account of his being given quasi permanency only in 1974, he suffered loss of seniority, deferment of his promotions and consequent loss in computation of his pension. We may note that the petitioner has since superannuated and the issue is relevant for the purpose of computation of his pension only. The Petitioner has relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in “Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers Association & Others v. State of Maharashtra”, JT 1990 (2) SC 264 and JT 1989 (2) SC 143.

    11. The respondents have on the other hand supported the reasonsing of the Tribunal and urged that vide its judgement and order dated 21.3.1984 in W.P (C) No. 47/1983 this Court had not directed the respondents to give benefit of ante-dating confirmation and promotion etc., and the directions passed therein were limited to the extent of treating the petitioner to be in service during the said intervening period between his dismissal from service on 21-4-67 and his reinstatement on 15-3-1971.

    12. The respondents have also raised a preliminary objection that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches as. this petition had been filed in Sept 1998, whereas the impugned order was passed in December 1997. The respondents have further contended that the petitioner ought to have agitated his grievance qua his non-confirmation in 1966 itself before a court of competent jurisdiction when other constables who were appointed along with him were confirmed.

    13. The Tribunal, as it appears from the impugned order, has proceeded on the assumption that the petitioner was also considered for confirmation in the year 1966 along with his peers but was not confirmed, on a presumed basis that his performance was not found satisfactory. However, the Tribunal failed to appreciate that at the relevant time in 1966 when his peers were confirmed, the decision qua the petitioner was postponed to 3rd June, 1967 and before the said date arrived his services were terminated i.e, in April 1967. Thus, in fact the petitioner was never considered for confirmation in 1966 or in 1967. The petitioner had resorted to a legal remedy and even succeeded therein, and one of the necessary consequences of his being deemed to have continued in service would have been to consider him for quasi-permanancy as in June, 1967. Consequently, his being declared quasi-permanent in 1974 would relate back to June, 1967 and his further time bound consideration for confirmation and promotion would also have to be accordingly pushed back in point of time. The petitioner had taken timely action in first instituting a writ petition and thereafter repeatedly represented to the respondent authorities. The rejection of his representations on 21st June, 1991 gave him cause of action to approach the Tribunal. Moreover, the claim essentially pertains to computation of his pensionary benefits, which is a recurring cause of action. We, therefore, reject the contention that there was any unexplained delay or laches on the part of the petitioner in approaching the Tribunal.

    14. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the Direct Recruit case (supra), which in para 47, inter alia, lays down the following principle:

    “Once an incumbant is appointed to a post according to rule, his seniority has to be counted from the date of his appointment and not according to the date of his confirmation.”

    Since the petitioner is deemed to have been in continous service from the time of his initial appointment in 1963, his seniority has to be counted from the date of his initial appointment and not from 1971, when he was reappointed.

    15. Accordingly, we allow this writ petition and quash the impugned order dated 4th December, 1997 passed by the Tribunal in OA No. 1792/1992 and direct the respondents:—

    (i) to treat the petitioner in continous uninterrupted service since the date of his initial appointment on 2nd December, 1963;

    (ii) to grant him the status of quasi permanency from 3rd June, 1967 and time bound confirmatgion and promotions by calculating his seniority from the date of his initial appointment i.e 2nd December, 1963;

    (iii) to recompute the pension of the petitioner accordingly, and pay the arrears of pension, if any, within two months from today, and the enhanced pension from 1.1.2007 onwards. The petitioner would, however, not be entitled to claim any arrears of pay on account of preponement of his date of notional promotions for which he had not rendered service in the promoted post. However, the notionally revised higher pay shall be taken into account for the purpose of recomputing his pensionary benefits. The petitioner shall be entitled to costs of Rs. 5,000/-.

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    Comments

    Suraj Bhan v. Union Of India & Others .
    (Oct 16, 2006)