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Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent filed an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 alleging that the petitioner Corporation had sub-let or parted with possession of premises bearing No. XI-4579/15, Darya Ganj, New Delhi. The premises were said to be let to the petitioner by a registered lease deed dated 28.02.1940 at a rent of Rs. 196.44 plus electricity and water charges. The respondent alleged that, after 09.06.1952, the petitioner sub-let part of the premises to a business called "Rajinder Matka Store" run by Rajinder Kumar and Om Parkash.

The petitioner resisted the petition, raising preliminary objections, denying the site-plan, and asserting that the tenanted premises were situated in a slum area and that permission under the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 had not been obtained. The petitioner did not deny its status as tenant nor the rate of rent, and maintained that the premises had been used to run a primary school from the inception of the tenancy and denied sub-letting.

The Additional Rent Controller (ARC) recorded evidence, found that parting of possession to third parties had been proved and that the petitioner had not explained their presence, and allowed the eviction petition. The petitioner Corporation appealed to the Rent Control Tribunal under Section 38 (appeal only on question of law); the Tribunal dismissed the appeal by order dated 04.09.2006. The petitioner then filed the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the respondent had established the landlord-tenant relationship necessary to maintain a proceeding under Section 14(1)(b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
  2. Whether the petitioner Corporation had, on or after 9th June 1952, sub-let, assigned or otherwise parted with possession of the whole or any part of the premises without the landlord's written consent.
  3. Whether the ARC's findings of fact (accepting evidence of third-party occupation and inferring sub-letting/parting with possession) were susceptible to interference on appeal under Section 38 or by this Court under Article 227.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent claimed to be the landlord of the premises and filed the petition under Section 14(1)(b) alleging sub-letting after 09.06.1952.
  • The respondent relied on documentary evidence (lease deed, payment of rent) and inspection/inspection report to show presence of third parties (Rajinder Kumar, Om Parkash and family members, and Smt. Santro Devi) in occupation of part of the premises carrying on business as "Rajinder Matka Store".

Petitioner Corporation's Arguments

  • The petitioner denied sub-letting and contended the premises were used for running a primary school from the inception of the tenancy.
  • The petitioner raised preliminary objections, denied the site-plan, and contended that the area was a slum area and thus subject to the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 (asserting that permission had not been obtained).
  • At the appellate stage the petitioner sought to lead additional evidence to show that Om Parkash was an employee (an application which was rejected as not pleaded in the written statement).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kailash Kumar and Ors v. Dr. R.P. Kapur That determination of sub‑letting or parting with possession depends on the facts of each case; where exclusive possession of a portion is given to a stranger, onus shifts to the tenant to explain the stranger's capacity; failure to explain gives rise to presumption of sub‑letting/parting with possession. The court applied this principle to hold that, because third parties were shown in exclusive occupation of part of the premises and the petitioner did not explain their status, the onus shifted to the petitioner and the presumption of sub‑letting arose.
Hari Ram v. Rukmani Devi and Ors That the landlord can prove circumstances reasonably leading to an inference of sub‑letting or parting with possession; relationship of sub‑lessee and lessee is largely a matter within parties' knowledge. The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that the respondent needed to prove circumstances giving rise to an inference of sub‑letting and did so by adducing evidence of third‑party occupation.
Kishan Chand v. Sri Chand (R.C.S.A No.390 of 1980, decided 18.07.2006) Discussed earlier authorities on proof of sub‑letting/parting with possession (as summarised in the opinion). The court noted that this Court had discussed the cited precedents in that decision and relied on the settled principles as reiterated there when affirming the ARC's findings.
Smt. Shakuntla Gupta v. Sh. Mahendra Kumar and Ors (CM (M) No. 329 of 2004, decided 25.08.2006) Recent decision of this Court that discussed the principles governing sub‑letting/parting with possession and onus of proof. The court observed that the earlier judgments were discussed in this recent decision and treated those discussions as supportive of the ARC's approach to evidence and burden.
Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and Ors (JT 2003 (6) SC 465) The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 is supervisory; it is not an appellate forum to re‑appreciate evidence. The court cited this to explain that it could not re‑appreciate the evidence or act as an appellate body under Article 227 in the present facts and therefore would not interfere with the ARC's factual findings.
Mohd Yunus v. Mohd Mustaqim and Ors That a mere wrong decision, without more, is insufficient to invoke Article 227; supervisory jurisdiction is limited to ensuring inferiors function within authority, not correcting every error apparent on record. The court relied on this principle to conclude that the petitioner's contentions did not fall within the scope of Article 227 and did not justify interference with the tribunal's or ARC's orders.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by first identifying the essential elements required for a successful petition under Section 14(1)(b): proof of landlord‑tenant relationship and proof of sub‑letting or parting with possession on or after 9th June 1952. The court noted that the petitioner had, during interrogatories, admitted payment of rent to the respondent. Applying the statutory definition of "landlord" in Section 2(e) of the Act, the ARC correctly concluded that the landlord‑tenant relationship had been established even though the petitioner was not necessarily the owner.

The court observed that the respondent proved the site‑plan (Exhibit PW‑1/35) and that the petitioner's assertion that the premises were in a slum was negatived by a letter dated 27.08.2003 from the Director (Town Planning) stating the premises were not included in the slum area. These items of evidence remained unrebutted.

On the central factual question of parting with possession, the ARC found, based on inspection evidence (Exhibit PW‑1/40), telephone connections and witness testimony, that third parties (Rajinder Kumar, Om Parkash and family members, and Smt. Santro Devi) occupied about 2–3 rooms and were carrying on business as "Rajinder Matka Store." Once third‑party occupation was established, the court applied the settled legal principle (as stated in Kailash Kumar and Hari Ram) that the onus shifts to the tenant to explain the capacity in which those third parties were in occupation. The petitioner failed to discharge that onus: the petitioner's witnesses (RW‑1 to RW‑3) showed lack of knowledge, and no satisfactory explanation was offered.

The ARC therefore legitimately drew an inference of sub‑letting/parting with possession. The ARC also imposed exemplary costs under Section 37(3) for a false plea denying the landlord‑tenant relationship, which had been refuted by admissions in interrogatories; the court found this exercise of discretion unobjectionable.

Procedurally, the court emphasized the limited nature of the Tribunal's jurisdiction under Section 38 (appeal only on questions of law) and concluded that the petitioner had not raised any question of law. The Tribunal was therefore correct in refusing to re‑appreciate evidence. The court reiterated that this Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 is supervisory and not appellate; it will not re‑examine the evidence or correct mere errors of judgment, relying on Surya Dev Rai and Mohd Yunus.

The court noted an attempt by the petitioner at the appellate stage to lead additional evidence claiming Om Parkash was an employee; that attempt failed because it was not part of the pleaded case. The court also considered, in a compassionate vein, granting time for the academic session given the premises housed a school, but recorded counsel's instructions that the petitioner wished to continue contesting the matter on merits.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition under Article 227 is DISMISSED. The court upheld the ARC's factual findings and the Tribunal's refusal to interfere on the ground that no question of law had been raised.

Direct consequences and implications:

  • The ARC's eviction order (which had been allowed) was effectively sustained by the dismissal of the appellate and supervisory challenges — the eviction proceedings in favour of the respondent remain upheld by the sequence of orders described in the opinion.
  • The petitioner Corporation was ordered to bear its own costs; exemplary costs had already been awarded by the ARC under Section 37(3) for the false plea denying the landlord‑tenant relationship.
  • CM No. 13866/2006 was dismissed.

Broader legal impact: The opinion does not announce any new precedent. It applies settled principles concerning (a) the shifting of onus where exclusive occupation by strangers is proved, and (b) the limited supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227. No broader or novel legal rule was laid down beyond these applications to the facts at hand.

Decision date / procedural markers appearing in the opinion: lease dated 28.02.1940; critical statutory date 9th June 1952; Tribunal order dated 04.09.2006; slum‑area letter dated 27.08.2003. (All information above is reproduced from the provided opinion.)

Show full summary ...

    Municipal Corporation Of Delhi v. Sanjay Goel

    1. The respondent filed a petition under Section 14(1)(b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter to be referred to as, 'the said Act') against the petitioner Corporation on grounds of sub-letting. The respondent claimed to be the landlord of property bearing No. XI-4579/15, Darya Ganj, New Delhi, which was stated to be let out to the petitioner by a registered Lease Deed dated 28.02.1940. The rate of rent was stated to be Rs.196.44 besides electricity and water charges. The petitioner was alleged to have sub-let and parted with possession of the premises after 09.06.1952 without prior consent of the respondent. Such sub-letting was alleged in favor of Rajinder Matka Store stated to be run by S/Shri Rajinder Kumar and Om Parkash. The petition was resisted by the petitioner Corporation and various preliminary objections were taken. The site-plan was also denied and it was alleged that the tenanted premises were situated in slum area and no permission had been obtained under the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 ( for short, 'the Slum Areas Act' ). The status of the petitioner as tenant was not denied nor the rate of rent. The premises were being used for running a primary school from the inception of the tenancy and sub-tenancy or sub-letting was denied.

    2. The Additional Rent Controller (hereinafter referred to as 'ARC') after recording evidence of the parties and hearing submissions found that the parting of possession to third-parties was proved and the presence of such third-parties had not been explained by the petitioner Corporation. The eviction petition was allowed. The petitioner Corporation thereafter preferred an appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal ( hereinafter to be referred to as, 'The Tribunal' ) under Section 38 of the said Act, which provides for an appeal only on a question of law. The appeal was dismissed by the impugned order dated 04.09.2006. The petitioner Corporation has now filed the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

    3. In order to appreciate the contours of the controversy, the relevant provisions are being reproduced hereunder:

    14. Protection of tenant against eviction ? 1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court or Controller in favor of the landlord against a tenant:

    Provided that the Controller may on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:

    ...

    (b) that the tenant has, on or after the 9th day of June, 1952, sublet, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord;

    16. Restrictions on sub letting

    1) where at any time before the 9th day of June, 1952, a tenant has sublet the whole or any part of the premises and the sub tenant is, at the commencement of this Act, in occupation of such premises, then notwithstanding that the consent of the landlord was not obtained for sub sub-letting, the premises shall be deemed to have been lawfully sub let.

    2) No premises which have been sub let either in whole or in part on or after the 9th day of June, 1952, without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord, shall be deemed to have been lawfully sub let.

    3) After the commencement of this Act, no tenant shall, without the previous consent in writing of the landlord -

    a) sub-let the whole or any part of the premises held by him as a tenant; or

    b) transfer or assign his rights in the tenancy or in any part thereof.

    4) No landlord shall claim or receive the payment of any sum as premium or pugree or claim or receive any consideration whatsoever in cash or in kind for giving his consent to the sub-letting of the whole or any part of the premises held by the tenant.

    4. The petitioner Corporation sought to raise a dispute even about the respondent being a landlord or owner of the tenanted premises. Since the relationship of landlord and tenant is a basic premise on which the petition has to be filed, the respondent served interrogatories on the petitioner and at that stage the petitioner admitted making payment of rent to the respondent. It is in view thereof that the ARC came to the conclusion that the relationship of landlord and tenant was established taking into consideration the definition of a landlord as provided in Section 2(e) of the said Act, which reads as under:

    2. Definitions In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires:

    ...

    (e) "landlord" means a person who, for the time being is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of any premises, whether on his own account or on account of or on behalf of or for the benefit of any other person or as a trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the premises were let to a tenant;

    5. The basic requirement of initiation of a proceeding under Section 14(1)(b) of the said Act was, thus, established as the petitioner need not be an owner as long as he/she is the landlord. This relationship was also established by the evidence on record including letters of the petitioner issued to the respondent including Exhibit PW ? 1/37. The site-plan was also proved by PW ? 1 as Exhibit PW ? 1/35 and the testimony remained unrebutted. The petitioner never filed any other site-plan or proved the same. The ARC has also rejected the plea of the petitioner Corporation that the area in question was located in a slum in view of a letter dated 27.08.2003 issued by the Director (Town Planning) from the office of the competent authority under the Slum Areas Act, which stood proved. The letter specifically records that the suit premises is not included in the slum area and nothing came out of the cross-examination of the relevant witness in this behalf.

    6. The principal question, which thus arose, is of parting with possession and the presence of S/Shri Rajinder Kumar and Om Parkash was established in part of the suit premises with potteries which did not belong to the petitioner Corporation. The family of these two persons and one Smt. Santro Devi was stated to be in possession of about 2-3 rooms with a courtyard, bathroom and latrine and were carrying on the business under the name and style of Rajinder Matka Store. In this behalf, the inspection report of the petitioner Corporation, was proved as Exhibit PW?1/40, which went unrebutted. Telephone connections of Smt. Santro Devi were also found in the suit property and there was no cross- examination in that behalf.

    7. Once the presence of third-parties is found in the tenanted premises, there can be no doubt that it is for the tenant to show in what capacity such third- parties are in occupation of the premises and the onus, thus, shifted on the petitioner Corporation.

    8. In Kailash Kumar and Ors v. Dr. R.P. Kapur , it has been held that the question of subletting or parting with possession would depend on the peculiar facts of each case and the basic principle enunciated even by the Supreme Court is that once it is proved that a particular portion of the demised premises has been given in exclusive possession to a stranger, then the onus shifts on the tenant to show in what capacity the stranger is in exclusive possession of that portion and on the failure of the tenant to explain presence of such person in exclusive possession of that said portion of the demised premises, presumption would arise that the portion was sublet or parted with possession in favor of the stranger by the tenant. The observations in Hari Ram v. Rukmani Devi and Ors. are also relevant. On the plea of the tenant that the onus was on the landlord to prove subletting, it was observed that the relationship of sub-lessees and lessee is a matter of knowledge, which is confined to the parties alone and thus all that the landlord can do in such circumstances is to prove the circumstances which would reasonably lead to an inference of subletting or parting with possession or assigning the premises or any part thereof. The aforesaid judgments have been discussed in recent judgments of this Court in R.C.S.A No.390 of 1980 titled 'Sh. Kishan Chand v. Sh. Sri Chand' decided on 18.07.2006 and CM (M) No. 329 of 2004 titled 'Smt. Shakuntla Gupta v. Sh. Mahendra Kumar and Ors.' decided on 25.08.2006.

    9. In view of the aforesaid settled legal principles, the ARC examined the evidence produced by the petitioner Corporation. The lack of any material evidence on the part of the petitioner is quite apparent from para 29 of the impugned judgment of the ARC. Both RW-1 and RW-2 expressed lack of any knowledge about the suit premises. The position was no different for RW-3. The result is that the petitioner Corporation produced witnesses, who had practically no real knowledge about the controversy in question. Thus, the findings arrived at by the ARC can hardly be faulted. The ARC has also deemed it appropriate to impose exemplary costs on the petitioner Corporation in view of a false plea raised in the pleadings denying the landlord-tenant relationship, which came out in the interrogatories. The salutary principle of parties being penalised for false statements and deposition can hardly be doubted. The ARC, thus, exercised powers under Section 37(3) of the said Act to award costs in view of the palpably false stand of the petitioner Corporation.

    10. It has already been noticed above that jurisdiction of the Tribunal is restricted to a question of law and the impugned order of the Tribunal begins by referring to the question raised in the appeal, ?Whether the respondent had not been able to prove the sub-letting?? In my considered view, really no question of law was even raised by the petitioner. The appellate court has, thus, rightly considered the appreciation of evidence by the ARC as not something to be interfered with even though the same has been examined on merits. In order to succeed, it is not necessary for the landlord to show that the tenant has parted with possession of the whole of the premises. Parting with even part of the premises would entitle the landlord to succeed in the eviction proceedings. This factum of parting with possession of part of the premises was established by the respondent by showing the presence of third-parties whose status has not been satisfactorily explained by the petitioner Corporation. It may also be noticed that it is at the stage of hearing of the appeal that the petitioner Corporation faced with the absence of any cogent evidence even sought to lead additional evidence to show that Shri Om Parkash was an employee which application was rightly rejected since this was not even a plea taken in the written statement.

    11. It may also be noticed that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is not as an appellate court or to re-appreciate the evidence as held in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and Ors. JT 2003 (6) SC 465. In fact, in the earlier judgment of the Apex Court in Mohd Yunus v. Mohd Mustaqim and Ors. , it has been held that a mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under the said Article was held to be limited to seeing that an inferior court or tribunal functions within the limits of its authority and not to correct any error apparent on the face of the record much less an error of law. If these parameters are applied to the present case, it can hardly be said that any of the pleas of the petitioner fall within the said domain.

    12. In the end, it must be observed that taking into consideration that a school was functioning from the premises, this Court was inclined to grant time to the petitioner for the academic session in question in order to enable the petitioner Corporation to adjust the students in the nearby schools subject to furnishing of usual undertaking. learnde Counsel for the petitioner, however, states that she had obtained instructions and the petitioner Corporation wanted to further contest the matter on merits.

    13. The petition being without any merit is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

    CM No. 13866/2006 Dismissed.

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    Comments

    Municipal Corporation Of Delhi v. Sanjay Goel
    (Nov 1, 2006)