Pradeep Nandrajog, J.:— The recitals bring out the fact that it is only the re-scheduling of the arrears of licence fee which was in the contemplation of the parties as also what interest should be paid for default. The terms of the agreement as extracted by us also show that the schedule for payment of the licence fee which had fallen in arrears was being agreed too. We find force in the submissions made by learned senior counsel for the respondent that such an important issue of variations in the licence fee could not have been left to be gathered from surrounding circumstances, and if there was any modification of the original contract on this account, the document would have made express provision thereof. (Para 31)
We have noted above, the stand of the respondent that when the agreement was entered into, the audit reports were not given to the respondent and it was thus not in the knowledge of what was the gross annual turnover of the appellant and when documents i.e the annual audit reports came into its possession in the year 1992 it immediately wrote that the licence fee be paid at the agreed percentage of 21%. We may also note that in Clause-7 of the agreement dated 11.3.1991 there is no reference to reduction of the percentage of the annual gross turnover to be paid as licence fee. What is recorded is that the respondent would consider on merits, request if any made by the appellant pertaining to the issue of licence fee. At best it would be an agreement to consider a request as and when made and not an agreement to vary the terms of a written document. Thus, as we read Clause-7 of the agreement, it prima facie, supports the stand of the respondent and not the appellant. Further, if it was the intention of the parties that pending redetermination of the licence fee operation of the clause in the original agreement was to remain suspended, nothing presented the parties to so record. The omission to so record is prima facie indicative of the fact that clause in the licence deed dated 14.7.1982 was not to be treated as suspended. (Para 34)
Before concluding on this issue, we may observe that the licence in the present case is a contract pure and simple between the parties. The appellant has voluntarily accepted the contract. The appellant has exploited to its advantage the benefit under the contract. It is not open to the appellant to resile from the terms of the licence on the ground that the upper limit c?f licence fee is an onerous condition. The appellant cannot contend that other parties have been given sites on better terms. The appellant took the land under licence by excluding other competitors. Appellant cannot avoid the licence, or any term thereof, on ground of inconvenience of terms or harshness of terms. The Appellant took calculated risk. May be, it was not wise in offering the bid. Surely, those in management of the appellant are experienced businessmen. Profit and loss is an incidence of a business. In every business there is an element of risk. Many unexpected development occur. They are all routine business hazzards. (Para 58)
Having failed to find any prima facie case in favour of the appellant we need not go into the issues of irreparable loss and injury, except to record that being a money claim, prima facie justified as per the licence deed, no injury would be caused if the appellant pays. It can be restituted. On balance of convenience, respondent being a statutory body engaged in providing civic amenities in N.D.M.C area needs the funds to meet its budgetary obligations in each financial year and hence balance of convenience lies in its favour. (Para 62)