A.K Sikri, J.— The appellant herein known as ‘Institution of Mechanical Engineers (India)’ has filed this Letters Patent Appeal under Clause (X) of the Letters Patent of Judicature at Lahore as applicable to Delhi against Order dated 9.1.2002 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court. By the said order which has been passed in CM 6240/2001 in CW 3577/2001 the learned Single Judge has dismissed the said application filed by the appellant herein.

2. The facts leading to the filing of the writ petition as well as aforesaid CM are stated in some detail by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. Therefore, it may not be necessary to indulge in this exercise all over again. However, still it would be appropriate to recapitulate some of the salient facts to understand the controversy involved in the matter.

3. As per the appellent Institute, it is in existence for over 85 years and is a renowned and respectable institution which has churned out hundreds and thousands of engineers for the welfare of this country. It has over 75,000 students members and 1,000 corporate members. The appellant Institute conducts examination for award of certificate which is at par with diploma/degree. It is mentioned that the appellant Institute was working satisfactorily. One Mr. R.N Engineer became President of the appellant Institute who held charge till 30.8.1999 when he was voted out at the Annual General Body meeting which was held in Delhi on 30.8.1999 After his ouster he started conducting a campaign against the appellant Institute and this led to administrative enquiry against him by respondent No. 1. However, the enquiry conducted was one sided without giving any opportunity to the appellant Institute. The appellant by its letter dated 1.7.2000 presented its point of view to the respondent No. 1 and welcomed the enquiry into its affairs. On 13.9.2000 respondent No. 1 informed the appellant that a High Powered Committee has been set up to review the functioning of the appellant. However, as the appellant felt that it was not granted any opportunity to explain its stand, it filed CW 2739/2001 in this Court seeking an opportunity of hearing before the respondents before reaching some conclusion. This writ petition was dismissed by order dated 1.5.2001 giving the liberty to the appellant to approach the Bombay High Court. It appears that the appellant did not file any petition in the Bombay High Court. In the meantime on 9.5.2001, the High Level Committee held its meeting at New Delhi and made the following recommendations:

“Summing up the deliberations, the Chairman of the High Level Committee suggested that the recognition granted to IME(I) for their part I and II Technician Engineers Examination and Sections A and B Associate Membership Examination be temporarily suspended for a period of 3 months. In the meanwhile—

(a) The institute should take immediate action to rectify the defects in the system of examination and also remove all shortcomings pointed out by the Expert Committee. The examination should be conducted with utmost fairness and secrecy.

(b) Revise the constitution, to ensure no person becomes an office bearer of the Society for a period of more than 3 years in one post and more than 6 years in all other posts.

(c) A fresh General Meeting be held under the aegis of Registrar of Societies, Maharashtra. The election should be by Secret Ballot and a proper management structure should in place.”

4. Based on the aforesaid recommendations, Notification dated 23.5.2001 was issued by the respondent No. 1 whereby it was decided to temporarily suspend the recognition granted to the examinations being conducted by the appellant Institute for a period of three months and to withdraw the same in case the appellant Institute failed to remove the shortcomings as pointed out by the Committee within the stipulated time. At this stage the appellant filed CWP No. 3577/2001 in this Court challenging the recommendations of the High Level Committee and the proceedings dated 9.5.2001 as well as Notification dated 23.5.2001 Along with this writ petition CM 6240/2001 was filed for ad-interim relief. In this application the learned Single Judge passed order dated 30.5.2001 which is to the following effect:

“Since the examination are to be held on 14th June, 2001 and 25,000 students are said to be candidates the notice is made returnable on 4th June, 2001 before the Vacation Court. The principal grievance of the petitioner is that for an adverse order of suspension of three months passed on 9th May, 2001 the notice was given to the petitioner only on 8th May, 2001 and it had no occasion or opportunity to deal with the adverse comments against the petitioner institution.

Notice.

Ms. Monika Arora accepts notice on behalf of the respondents.

Reply be filed on or before 2nd June, 2001 with advance copy to the Counsel for the respondent. Rejoinder, if any, before the next date of hearing. It is stated by Mr. Rajeev Dutta, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner that the Notification dated 22nd May, 2001 has not yet been gazetted. Until the next date of hearing the Notification dated 22nd May, 2001 shall not be gazetted”.

5. Thereafter, the matter came up before the learned Single Judge from time to time and the aforesaid order was continued and on 18.9.2001 the following order was passed:

“CMs. 9180/2001, 6240/2001 in CW 3577/2001.

The impugned order dated 9th of May, 2001 challenged in the writ petition related to a final report dated 20th of December, 2000 submitted by the Sub-Committee based on the visits of the respondent No. 1's officials to the petitioner Institute. There were certain suggestions, observations and recommendations in the said report which are contained at pages 146-147 of the petition. In the impugned order, three directions are given at page 71 of the petition which are based upon the alleged shortcomings pointed out by the Expert Committee in its report dated 20th of December, 2000.

Mr. Dutta, the learned Senior Counsel, appearing of the petitioner states that without prejudice to its pleas, the petitioner Institute will file a response to the report of the Expert Committee dated 20.12.2000 within two weeks from today and will attend the hearing thereafter before respondent No. 1 as suggested by Ms. Monika Arora, the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1.

Response be filed on or before 3rd of October, 2001. The hearing will be held on 10th of October, 2001 at 2.00 p.m

The hearing of the case before this Court, stated for 10th of October, 2001 with the consent of the parties is now fixed for 17th of October, 2001 instead of 10.10.2001 Accordingly, the case need not be listed on 10.10.2001 before this Court.

Interim orders to continue upto the next date.”

6. As is dear from the aforesaid order the appellant had to file its response to the report of the Expert Committee dated 20.12.2000 by 3.10.2001 and thereafter hearing was fixed before the Committee on 10.10.2001 at 2 p.m The appellant submitted its detailed representation on 3.10.2001 for consideration by the Expert Committee. It also submitted additional representation dated 10.10.2001 On 10.10.2001 the representative of the appellant along with Counsel reached the venue of meeting in time. They were, however, told that due to parliamentary hearing in which concerned officer was involved hearing in their case would be held at 3 p.m or thereafter. According to the appellant's version its Counsel waited up to 2.25 p.m whereafter he left and gave his cell phone number to one of the official there with request that he may be informed on the cell phone as and when the Committee wanted to start the hearing. When the meeting was convened by the Expert Committee, which started at 3 p.m, as nobody was present on behalf of the appellant, ex-parte hearing was held. We shall revert to the version of different parties about the happening on that date. At this stage it would be sufficient to notice that the appellant did not or could not represent itself. This resulted in passing order of rejection dated 5.11.2001 by the respondent No. 1 which reads as under:

“The compliance report submitted by the Institution of Mechanical Engineers (India), Mumbai dated 3.10.2001 and the representation dated 10.10.2001 were considered by the Sub-Committee of High Level Committee for recognition of education qualifications. It has been found that the Institution has not taken any action to remove the short comings or to initiate improvements in the Constitution of the society of Institution of Mechanical Engineers (India), Mumbai”.

7. Thereafter, the matter came up for hearing before the learned Single Judge from time to time. The appellant Institute made a grievance that no proper opportunity was given by the respondent No. 1 before rejecting the representation of the appellant by order dated 5.11.2001 Various affidavits were filed by the appellants and the respondents. Ultimately the learned Single Judge passed the impugned order dated 9.1.2002 vacating the interim order granted on 30.5.2001

8. At this stage it may be mentioned that the respondent No. 3 known as “FORUM FOR FAIRNESS IN EDUCATION” had moved an application for intervention in the writ petition which was allowed and, therefore, this Forum was also heard. The Forum is opposing the writ petition filed by the petitioner as well as grant of any interim order.

9. LPA 49/2002 is also filed challenging the same order dated 9.1.2002 passed by learned Single Judge by some students. Their submission is that they are bona fide students and the impugned order would adversely affect their career.

10. It may be mentioned at the outset that Mr. G.L Sanghi, leaned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant Institute made a submission to the effect that the main grievance of the appellant was non-grant of sufficient and proper opportunity by the respondent No. 1 even after agreed order dated 18.9.2001 was passed. This, according to him, has resulted in violation of principles of natural justice. His submission was that the learned Single Judge doesnot appreciate or looked into the matter from this angle and vacated the intered order granted on 30.5.2001 by impugned order on irrelevant grounds. He submitted that the impugned order would show that the learned Single Judge was influenced by following considerations in passing the order:

A. On 10.10.2001 when the hearing was fixed by the Committee, even if it did not start at 2 p.m there was no reason for the representative of the appellant Institute and his Counsel to leave the place at 2.25 p.m and they ought to have waited at least till 3 p.m when they were told that hearing would be started at 3 p.m or thereafter.

B. The conduct of the appellant Institute was not totally above Board as the appellant Institute had filed a suit for declaration claiming reliefs overlapping with those claimed in the writ petition without disclosing in the said suit about the pendency of the writ petition in this Court.

C. The three suggestions given by the Expert Committee and the Government in the impugned order were ameliorative in nature which suggest serious deficiency in the academic conduct of the appellant Institute and, therefore, it was necessary for the appellant to take these steps.

11. The learned Counsel submitted that the aforesaid reasons for vacating the earlier interim order were not cogent or based upon records. Referring to first ground, his submission was that the learned Single Judge although accepted the plea of the appellant Institute that its Counsel Mr. A.V Bajaj who had represented the appellant Institute on 10.10.2001 was not well and also accepted that it is the respondents who were remiss by not conducting the hearing at the time ordered by the Court but at the same time put the blame on the appellant from departing the venue of hearing at 2.25 p.m

12. Adverting to the second ground the submission of learned Counsel was that the suit which has filed by the appellant Institute was primarily against AICTE challenging the jurisdiction of AICTE to interfere with the affairs of the appellant Institute and, therefore, that was altogether a different matter and there was no necessity to mention the pendency of the writ petition in that suit. In any case, it was submitted, if there was some concealment of facts made in the suit filed by the appellant Institute that could have adverse affect on the grant of interim injunction in the suit and it had no bearing on the outcome of the interim-application filed in the writ petition as there was no such concealment insofar as writ petition is concerned.

13. With regard to third ground the submission of learned Senior Counsel was that so far as alleged deficiencies pointed out by respondents are concerned they are clearly misconceived and the appellant had challenged the same in the writ petition. In fact it was the grievance of the appellant Institute that it was not given proper opportunity and the material produced by it were not considered by the respondents which led to the passing of the impugned order and, therefore, alleged deficiency should not have been taken into consideration while passing the impugned order. His further submission was that since the appellant was not given proper opportunity, the learned Single Judge should have directed the respondent No. 1 to give his opportunity and in the meantime continue the interim order dated 30.5.2001

14. Before dealing with the aforesaid submissions of the appellant, it would be appropriate to reproduce the relevant portion of the impugned order whereby on the three grounds mentioned above, the application for interim relief of the appellant was dismissed. The relevant discussion is contained in paras 15 to 17 which read as under:

“Para 15: The conduct of the petitioner-Institute, however, leaves much to be desired. The following instance of the petitioner's conducted need to be noticed and in my view would have a vital bearing on the continuance of the interim order. The fact that the petitioner-Institute chose to walk out from the hearing specifically fixed by this Court at a particular time on the plea that the concerned officers did not sit at the stipulated time is significant. The learned Counsel for respondent No. 1-UOI sought to rebut this plea by submitting that the hearing was delayed due to a Parliamentary Committee hearing in which the concerned officer was involved but the petitioner was given adequate notice of the postponement of the meeting. In particular the hand-written notation made by the Counsel for the petitioner, Sh. A.V Bajaj, on the typed representation prepared by the petitioner dated 10th October, 2001, is significant. It notes that at 2.20 p.m the Counsel for the petitioner was told that the hearing was at 3.00 p.m or thereafter. The petitioner's Counsel has given reasons for his early departure from the hearing and the departure from Delhi by a late night flight. Various grounds including grounds of ill-health of the Counsel, appearing for the petitioner in the hearing, fixed on 10th of October, 2001 at 2.00 p.m pursuant to this Court's order dated 18th of September, 2001. Without going into the veracity of the affidavit of the Counsel for the petitioner, prima facie it does appear that the petitioner was not over anxious to go on with the hearing fixed by this Court on 10th of October, 2001 at 2.00 p.m so as to grant the petitioner an opportunity to being heard which was the principal plea in the present suit petition. While I do not for a moment doubt the medical condition of the Counsel for the petitioner as per his affidavit. There is no satisfactory explanation of the departure of the petitioner and his Counsel from the hearing at 2.25 p.m While the Senior Counsel for the petitioner has pointed out with some vehemence that it is the respondents who were remiss by not conducting the hearing at the precise time ordered by this Court and this plea is not entirely lacking in merit, nevertheless the petitioner's conduct does show that even the petitioner was not anxious in the least to go with the hearing. The departure from the site of hearing at 2.25 p.m by leaving a cell phone number is not sufficient demonstration of the bona-fides of the petitioner. While the respondents may not have been entirely right in not commencing the hearing at the precise time prescribed by this Court but since the petitioner enjoyed an interim order in its favor it ought to have at least waited till 3.00 p.m The time when the hearing was to take place as per the postponement by respondent No. 1 before departing from the place of hearing. Presumably this was because an interim order had been operating in favour of the petitioner.

16. The other ground why the petitioner's conduct has been said to be not totally above board as per the respondents contentions is the fact that while this writ petition was pending in this Court the petitioner chose to file a suit for declaration claiming reliefs overlapping with those claimed in the writ petition without disclosing the pendency of writ petition in this Court. An explanation is sought to be given for this omission but at this stage I am not going into the correctness of these pleas. In so far as the intervenors-students’ pleas are concerned, the mere fate of students cannot justify the continuance of an interim order which impedes the academic functioning of the institution. Furthermore the students of the petitioner institute are part time students are mostly employed gainfully and no serious prejudice would be caused to them by the vacation of the interim order. In fact if the functioning of the petitioner institute improves, it will only benefit the students.

17. In any case, I am of the view that even on merits the impugned order giving three ameliorative suggestions as noted earlier. In the light of the facts of the case which suggests prima facie serious deficiencies in the academic conduct of the petitioner institution, are such types, interdiction of which is not required at the interim stage in the present writ petition. The steps indicated merely suggest, (a) the improvement of the system of the examination as recommended by the Expert Committee; (b) the revision of the constitution to prevent monopoly of office bearers; and (c) the holding of fresh Annual General Meeting. I am of the view that the impugned directions are not such so as to require an interim stay by this Court and accordingly, the interim order dated 30th of May, 2001 stands vacated with effect from 16th of January, 2002.”

15. It may be mentioned that we are dealing with the validity of the impugned order, which is an interim order in this appeal. Therefore, we would address ourselves keeping in view the limited scope of this appeal viz. whether the learned Single Judge was right in dismissing the application for interim stay.

16. The first question that needs to be determined as to whether the appellant Institute was given proper opportunity on 10.10.2001 It is significant to note here that on 18.9.2001 an order, almost on agreed terms, was passed whereby and whereunder appellant Institute was granted another opportunity to represent its case before the Expert Committee. In fact the order clearly indicates that it was the suggestion of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 which was accepted by the learned Counsel for the appellant which led to passing of that order. In compliance of this order the appellant Institute had submitted its response to the report of the Committee. It was to be given oral hearing for which date of 10.10.2001 was fixed and time and venue was also fixed. Hearing was to start at 2 p.m as per the order. It is not in dispute that the appellant's official along with Counsel reached the venue of hearing before 2 p.m It is also not disputed that hearing did not start at 2 p.m and the appellant was told that the same would start at “3 p.m or thereafter”. It is not necessary to go into the reasons as to why the hearing did not start at 2 p.m although the allegations of the appellant is that the reason given, namely, pre-occupation of one of the officers in the Parliamentary Committee hearing was false. Fact remains that no definite time was given to the appellant as to when the hearing would start and they were told that the hearing would start at “3 p.m or thereafter”. There is also a dispute about the circumstances under which the appellant and his Counsel left at 2.25 p.m The appellant has filed as many as five affidavits seeking to explain its position on the basis of which it was argued by the respondents that the version given by the appellant is clearly false and the appellant has tried to improve upon its version. However, it is also not necessary to go in all these allegations. Inasmuch as one of the grounds for leaving early was that Mr. A.V Bajaj, Counsel for the appellant was not feeling well and the learned Single Judge has accepted the medical condition of the Counsel of the appellant as per his affidavit. It is also accepted by learned Single Judge that the respondents were remiss by not conducting the hearing at the precise time ordered by the Court by observing that this plea is not entirely lacking in merit. However, the learned Single Judge has doubted the conduct of the appellant in leaving the venue of hearing at 2.25 p.m on the basis of which it is inferred that the appellant was not anxious in the least to go with the hearing. At the same time it is also accepted by the learned Single Judge that while leaving the venue of hearing at 2.25 p.m the appellant had given his cell phone number but it is not treated as sufficient demonstration of the bona fides of the appellant, observing that the appellant ought to have at least waited till 3 p.m

17. The impugned order of the learned Single Judge would itself amply demonstrate that the explanation offered by the appellant to leave at 2.25 p.m is virtually accepted. It is also accepted that it is the respondents who should have conducted the hearing at the time ordered by the Court, namely, at 2 p.m It is also accepted that no definite time was mentioned by the respondents as to when hearing would start. In such a situation when the respondent No. 1 is also at fault, taking such a strict view by the learned Single Judge simply because appellant left the venue of hearing at 2.25 p.m may not be appropriate. It could have been better had appellant waited up to 3 p.m However, keeping in view the medical condition of the Counsel for the appellant coupled with the fact that no definite time as to when hearing was to start was given by the Expert Committee and that the appellant had in any case left its cell phone number to enable the respondents to inform the appellant about the scheduled time of hearing, would indicate that the appellant was not to be blamed entirely and, therefore, it could not be concluded that the appellant was not anxious in the least to go ahead with the hearing. After all the appellant's representative and its Counsel had come to Delhi from Bombay and reached the venue at appointed time. Therefore, we feel that when the Expert Committee was to start the hearing, the least that was expected was to inform the appellant on cell phone number given by the appellant. In view of this lapse on the part of the respondents as well as other circumstances favoring in favour of the appellant Institute pointed out by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order itself, we are of the opinion that the appellant are not dealt with fairly in the conduct of proceedings on 10.10.2001

18. When the respondents had agreed to give hearing to the appellant, it should have been an effective opportunity. May be both the parties are to be blamed. However, still we feel that ends of justice demand that the appellants be given another opportunity by the Expert Committee.

19. There is yet another reason to arrive at this conclusion. The Committee which had earlier deliberated, consisted of 14 members. However, on 10.10.2001 it is the Sub-Committee which allegedly conducted the proceedings. Therefore, even the hearing is not by the Expert Committee with all its members. The intention behind passing order dated 18.9.2001 was to accord the hearing to the appellant by the Expert Committee and not its Sub-Committee.

20. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the opinion that the appellants should be given another hearing. Order dated 5.11.2001 passed by respondent No. 1 is accordingly set-aside. The Committee would fix date and venue, as expeditiously as possible and in any case within 15 days from the date and after hearing the matter, respondent No. 1 would pass appropriate orders.

21. This brings us to the next question, namely; what should be interim arrangement. Even if we agree with the appellant Institute that they deserve another opportunity, it would not necessarily follow that order dated 30.5.2001 needs to be restored or, for that matter, earlier order dated 23.5.2001 passed by the respondent No. 1 needs to be stayed. In order to succeed in getting such a stay order the appellant has to make out a case for grant of such an order on merits. Interim order dated 30.5.2001 was passed keeping in view the fact that examinations were going to be held on 14.6.2001 However, at that stage the merits of the matter for grant of interim order had not gone into. This exercise for the first time is done in the impugned order dated 9.1.2001 Third ground on which stay application is dismissed by the learned Single Judge deals with this aspect. It is observed by learned Single Judge that even on merits the appellant was not entitled to stay taking into consideration the three ameliorative suggestions given by the High Level Committee which made recommendations on 9.5.2001 These are already referred to in the opening paras of this judgment. It is further observed by learned Single Judge that the steps indicated merely suggest:

(1) improvement of the system of the examination as recommended by the Expert Committee;

(2) the revision of the constitution of appellant Institute to prevent monopoly of office bearer;

(3) holding of fresh annual general meeting.

22. Insofar as this aspect of the case is concerned, we are one with the opinion expressed by learned Single Judge. We are of the considered opinion that no interim stay need be granted. We say so far various reasons. These are:

(i) The alleged irregularities which are pointed out by the Committee cannot be lightly brushed aside. No doubt the Expert Committee would not take final view after hearing the appellant which opportunity was given by order dated 18.9.2001 without prejudice to the contention of the parties. However, while taking prima facie view of the matter, this fact cannot be lost sight of that respondent No. 1 had constituted High Level Committee which had visited the appellant Institute and based on their visit and study and after conducting the deliberations into the affairs of the appellant Institute, report dated 9.5.2001 was submitted. The order dated 23.5.2001 is passed whereby the recognition is suspended by respondent No. 1 for a period of three months.

(ii) It may also be noted at this stage, as vehemently contended by Mr. P.V Kapoor, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Forum that the High Level Committee was constituted by respondent No. 1 pursuant to directions given by the Bombay High Court in a writ petition which was a petition filed by way of Public Interest Litigation.

(iii) If the stay of the impugned order dated 23.5.2001 is given the effect of that would be to allow the students to take exams and if ultimately the impugned order passed by the respondent No. 1 is sustained and the writ petition is dismissed, the students who are now permitted to take exams would claim equities and such a situation would give rise to multiplicity of litigation. The Apex Court had dealt with this kind of situation number of times and it has been emphasised that interim/interlocutory orders of this nature permitting the students to make examinations when the recognition is suspended/withdrawn should not be passed. One such case is Baba Mungipa Medical College and Research Centre Students Guardian Forums v. Government of Tripura, JT 1997 (8) SC 688. We may also refer to the case of K. John Koshy v. Tarakeshwar Prasad Shaw (Dr.), (1998) 8 SCC 624 as also case of C.B.S.E v. P. Sunil Kumar, JT 1998 (4) SC 105, and case of Central Board of Secondary Education v. Nikhil Gulati, (1998) 3 SCC 5. Reference in this connection can also be made to two more judgments relied upon by Mr. P.V Kapoor, learned Counsel for the Forum. The first case is Dental Council of India v. Harpreet Kaur Bal, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 304, wherein the Apex Court inter alia observed as under:

“There are many pronouncements of this Court cautioning against exercise of jurisdiction characterised more by benevolence than on settled legal principles. A relief must be such as could be considered permissible in law and worked out by the application of legally recognised principles. The decision must have legitimacy of legal reasoning and should not incur the criticism of lacking objectivity of purpose and rational and legal justification. Where an educational institution embarks upon granting admissions without the requisite affiliation and recognition and the students join the institution with their eyes wide open as to the lack of legitimacy in the admission, it would be preposterous to direct the University to hold examinations for the benefit of such students. We cannot sufficiently deplore this attitude and approach. The High Court has, by its order, simply bolstered the hopes and aspirations of these students without any means of gratifying these expectations in a manner known to law. We have, therefore, no hesitation in setting aside the order under appeal as totally unjustified”.

The second case is Chander Chinar Bada Akhara Udasin Society v. State of J. and K. etc., (1996) 5 SCC 732 : AIR 1997 SC 399, expressing the same sentiments. These cases afford answer to the arguments put forth by Mr. Ravinder Sethi, Senior Advocate on behalf of students.

(iv) Having regard to the orders passed by Gujarat High Court in a petition relating to the appellant Institute, to which detailed reference is made hereinafter.

23. Before parting we may also note another aspect of the matter. AICTE is respondent No. 2 in the present petition. Mr. Ravi Gupta, learned Counsel appearing for the AICTE submitted that after the enactment of All India Council of Technical Education (AICTE) Act by the Parliament, recognition of such an Institute can be only by AICTE and when the appellant Institute is not recognised by the AICTE, it cannot continue its affairs. In this connection, learned Counsel referred to various provisions of the AICTE Act and also the judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of State of Tamil Nadu v. Adhiyaman Educational and Research Institute, etc., JT 1995 (3) Supreme Court 136 and Jaya Gokul Educational Trust v. Commissioner and Secretary to Government, Higher Education Department, Kerala, (2000) 5 SCC 231.

24. In State of Tamil Nadu v. Adhiyaman Educational and Research Institute, etc. (supra), it was held that the provisions of the AICTE Act including its preamble make it abundantly clear that the Council was established for coordinated and integrated development of the technical education system at all levels throughout the country and is enjoined to promote qualitative improvement of such education in relation to planned quantitative growth. The Council is also required to regulate and ensure proper maintenance of norms and standards in the technical education system. It is also required to provide guidelines for admission of students and has power to with-hold or discontinue grants and to derecognise the institutions where norms and standards laid down by it and directions given by it from time to time are not followed. It was held by the Supreme Court that the Council has on its Board, representatives not only of the States but also of the State Universities who have a say in the matter of laying down the norms and standards which may be prescribed by the Council for such education from time to time. The Council has further the regional committees and the constitution and functions of the committees are to be prescribed by the regulations of the Council. It was further held that the subject covered by this statute is fairly within the scope of Entry 66 of List I and Entry 25 of List III. These regulations along with other regulations made by the Council and the rules to be made by the Central Government under the Act are laid before the Parliament. Hence, on the subjects covered by this Statute, the State could not make a law under Entry 11 of List II prior to Forty-second Amendment nor can it make a law under Entry 25 of List III after the Forty-second Amendment. It was held be the Court that if there was any such existing law immediately before the commencement of the Constitution within the meaning of Article 372 of the Constitution, as the Madras University Act, 1923, on the enactment of the present Central Act, the provisions of the said law if repugnant to the provisions of the central act would stand impliedly repealed to the extent of repugnance. It was further held that under Section 10 of the Central Act (AICTE Act) it is the Council which is entrusted with the power, particularly, to allocate and disburse grants, to evolve suitable performance appraisal systems incorporating norms and mechanisms for maintaining accountability of the technical institutions, laying down norms and standards for courses, curricula, staff pattern, staff qualifications, assessment and examinations, fixing norms and guidelines for charging tuition fee and other fees, granting approval for starting new technical institutions or introducing new courses or programmes, to lay down norms for granting autonomy to technical institutions, providing guidelines for admission of students, inspecting or causing to inspect colleges, for with holding or discontinuing of grants in respect of courses and programmes, etc.

25. He also referred to the writ petition being Special Civil Application No. 3883 of 2001 filed in High Court of Gujarat and order dated 9.10.2001 passed in the said writ petition wherein the Gujarat High Court passed the following observations in the writ petition relating to appellant Institute:

“Further, it is not disputed that the courses conducted by the said Institution are not approved by the All India Council for Technical Education, a statutory body. I am, therefore, of the view that pending this petition, the respondent No. 3-Institution shall not be permitted to admit students to its courses or to give them examination or award the degree/diploma; as the case may be, until such courses are brought at par with that of the other institutions and the courses conducted by the said Institution, the examination given to the students and the manner in which the project reports and the answer papers are examined are approved by the All India Council for Technical Education.

In above view of the matter, pending this petition, the respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are directed not to advertise its courses in the State of Gujarat nor they shall admit any student who has passed qualifying examination from the State of Gujarat to their courses; either directly or through any agency, nor they shall conduct any examination within the territories of the State of Gujarat. It is clarified that the said respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5 shall be at liberty to move this Court for vacation of the above injunction after its courses and examinations are approved by the All India Council for Technical Education.”

26. No doubt this order is applicable for the State of Gujarat, but it is persuasive enough for us not to grant any indulgence by way of interim relief to the appellant Institute when respondent No. 1 has itself taken steps to pass impugned order to similiar effect.

27. However, we may observe that a suit has been filed by the appellant Institute challenging the jurisdiction of AICTE which inspecting on the Original Side of this Court and the appellant Institute as well as AICTE would be free to argue their respective points of view in those proceedings. As pointed out earlier, keeping in view the limited scope of these appeals, matter is considered taking prima facie view only.

28. In view of the foregoing discussion, subject to direction relating to giving another opportunity to the appellant, these appeals are dismissed.

Appeals dismissed.