J.D Kapoor, J.— This is an application under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, seeking interim decree for possession on the basis of admitted facts.
2. There is no dispute as to the relationship of the landlord and tenant between the parties. The only dispute is with regard to the nature of tenancy and the service of notice determining the tenancy.
3. The application is being resisted mainly on the ground that as per own understanding of the plaintiff the tenancy created by way of registered lease deed ended on 31.8.99 but was orally extended upto 29.2.2000 for a period of six months and, therefore, the possession of the defendant was by way of a month to month tenancy which was terminable in terms of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and since in the instant case the service of notice of termination of tenancy has not been proved no decree under Order 12 Rule 6, CPC can be passed as such a decree can be passed only on the premise of admitted facts.
4. According to the plaintiff the notice of termination of tenancy was duly served upon the defendants at both the addresses including the demised premises. The certificate obtained by the plaintiff from the Postal Authorities with regard to the service of registered notice dated 8th June, 2000 shows that the notice addressed to Mr. O.P Bhartia, defendant No. 2 was duly received and served at the demised premises. He was referred as a Chairman of defendant No. 1 company in whose favour the tenancy was created.
5. In support of the contention that the occupation of the lessee after the expiry of the lease period amounts to holding over as a tenant on month to month basis as contemplated under Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act, Mr. Nayyar, learned senior counsel for the defendants has placed reliance upon Satish Chand Makhan and others v. Govardhan Das Byas and Others, AIR 1984 SC 143 wherein a view was taken that in a case where a tenant continues to be in occupation after the expiry of the lease period, he holds over as tenant from month to month under Section 106 of the Act.
6. The averment of the plaintiff that he at first instance had verbally terminated the tenancy on 1.9.99, but allowed the request of the defendant to extend the tenancy for another six months on compassionate grounds was met with the plea of bald denial as to either verbal termination of tenancy or verbal extension of tenancy period for another six months.
7. In order to appreciate the rival contentions the relevant paras of the pleadings viz. plaint and written statement need to be reproduced. These are:—
Plaint
Written statement
3. That the plaintiff verbally terminated the tenancy of the defendants on 1.9.1999 and called upon him to deliver the vacant and peaceful possession of the aforesaid property bearing No. 89-A, Sainik Farm, New Delhi-110062. The defendants made a request to the plaintiff for extending the tenancy for another six months. On this verbal request and on compassionate grounds, the lease period was extended with effect from 1.9.1999 to 29.2.2000 for a period of six months. The tenancy of the defendant stood terminated with effect from 29.9.2000”
3. Para 3 of the plaint, as stated, is wrong and denied. It is denied that the tenancy of the defendant No. 1 was terminated, as alleged, or in any manner and on the dates stated in the paragraph under reply. It is denied that there were oral requests made as stated in the paragraph under reply. On the contrary, it is submitted that the defendant No. 1 had, action upon the license and consent granted by the plaintiff, made various structural changes in the suit property and executed works of permanent character after incurring expenses in the execution thereof. Without prejudice to what has been stated hereinabove, it is submitted that the licence granted by the plaintiff in this regard to execute works of permanent character has now become irrevocable and the plaintiff is not entitled to the possession of the suit property from the defendant No. 1. The defendant craves leave to place the complete particulars relating to the execution of such works and the expenses thereof before this Hon'ble Court during the trial of the suit.”
“5. That the plaintiff did not want to retain the defendants as his tenant in the premises in question. The lease period had also expired by means of notice dated 8.6.2000 The plaintiff terminated the tenancy of the defendants. The notice of termination of tenancy was duly served upon the defendants at both the addresses. No reply to the aforesaid notice has been received by the plaintiff.”
“4 to 6 - Paragraphs 4 to 6 of the plaint, as stated, are wrong and denied. It is denied that the lease period expired by means of an alleged notice dated 8.6.2000 or that the tenancy of the defendant was terminated by the aforesaid notice or that the alleged notice of termination was duly served on the defendant. It is denied that the possession of the defendant No. 1 in the premises in question after such alleged termination of tenancy is illegal or unauthorised or that the defendants reliable to pay damages for use and occupation at the rate of Rs. 2 lakhs per months.”
8. That the defendants have been sending the cheques but the same have not been got encashed by the plaintiff with effect from 1.3.2000 after the tenancy came to an end.”
“8. In reply to paragraph 8 of the plaint, it is submitted that the defendant had been sending cheques which were not encashed by the plaintiff. However, the sending of such cheques was without prejudice to the rights of the parties as stated herein.”
8. As is apparent from the denials made in the written statement, these are unspecific and evasive and, therefore, no denials in the eyes of law. Order 8 Rule 5 of Code of Civil Procedure lays down that every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the defendant, shall be taken to be admitted except as against a person under disability provided that the Court may in its discretion require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise that by such admission.
9. The observations of the Supreme Court in this regard made in Badat and Company, Bombay v. East India Trading Company, AIR 1964 SC 538 need to be quoted and are as under:—
“Rules 3, 4 & 5 of Order 8 of CPC form an integrated code dealing with the manner in which allegations of fact in the plaint should be traversed and the legal consequences flowing from its non-compliance. The written statement must deal specifically with each allegation of fact in the plaint and when a defendant denies any such fact, he must not do so evasively but answer the point of substance. If his denial of a fact is not specific but evasive, the said fact shall be taken to be admitted. In such an event, the admission itself being proof, no other proof is necessary.”
10. Since the denial by the defendant to the specific averment of oral extension of the tenancy by the period of six months is not in accordance with Order 8 Rule 5, CPC being unspecific and evasive, the averment of the plaintiff in this regard has to be taken to be admitted.
11. Though the tenancy was otherwise terminated by the efflux of time but by way of abundant precaution the plaintiff also served a notice of termination as provided under Section 106 of the Act dated 8.6.2000 before filing of the suit and moreover the defendant has no where taken the plea that before the expiry of the contractual lease he had become a tenant on month to month basis by virtue of holding over and, therefore, in the given facts and circumstances there was even otherwise no need for giving notice of termination of tenancy.
12. As regards the contention of Mr. Nayar that in the absence of notice under Section 106 the instant suit was not maintainable nor is the plaintiff entitled to seek decree for possession and since in the instant case the plaintiff has prima facie failed to prove the service of notice no such relief can be granted to be plaintiff, Mr. Vijay Kishan, learned counsel for the plaintiff has relied upon the postal receipts vide which the said notice was despatched at as many as three different addresses and the certificate of the Postal Authorities to the effect that the registered notice dated 8.6.2000 was duly served upon defendant No. 2. Certificate is as under:—
Mrs. Kochar,
117, Supreme Court,
New Delhi.
No. CR/05/02
Dtd. 10.01.2002
Sub: D/o AD No. 7834 of dt. 8.6.00 at Sh. O.P Bhatia 89.A/119 Sainik Farms, N. Delhi-62.
Madam,
W.R.T your letter dated 10.1.02 it is to inform you that as per records the AD R.L U/R stands delivered to the addresses at this and on 10.6.2001 pl.
Yours faithfully,
Sub-Post Master
13. Though the question whether the service upon defendant No. 2 amounts to service upon defendant No. 1 need not be gone into at this stage still the fact remains that defendant No. 2 is noneless but the Chairman of defendant No. 1. As per Section 106 of the Act service of notice must be in writing, signed by or on behalf of the person giving it and amounts to having been served if it is received by one of his family members or servants at his residence or affixed at a conspicuous place of the property. Defendant No. 2 is not only the Chairman of the defendant No. 1 but was the occupant of the premises. There can be no better case of service of notice upon defendant No. 1 - Company when it is served upon its Chairman.
14. Thus the notice which has been delivered to defendant No. 2 in his capacity as Chairman of defendant No. 1 is the sufficient service upon defendant No. 1 for the purpose of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC. Even otherwise the notices were also served at the commercial premises of the defendants 1 & 2. Original postal receipts filed by the plaintiff are prima facie proof of despatch. Bonafideness of the plaintiff in serving the notice upon the defendant is projected from the certificate obtained by him from the postal authorities after great efforts and that too after an year.
15. Almost in an identical case Smt Shanti Devi v. Amal Kumar Banerjee , AIR 1981 SC 1550 wherein the landlord filed a suit for ejectment and also pleaded that he had sent a notice to the defendant under Section 106 determining the tenancy with the expiry of the month of April, 1970 and the defendant contested the claim of the plaintiff on various grounds, the main ground of contest being that no valid notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was served upon him and therefore the suit was not maintainable, it was held that before deciding the validity of the notice the Court should first decide whether Section 106 is applicable or not.
16. Though in the instant case the service of notice under Section 106 of the Act was not at all necessary because the tenancy had expired by efflux of time by virtue of Section 111-A of the T.P Act but to be on the safer side the plaintiff served notice under Section 106. Mere denial of receipt of such notice cannot come to the rescue of defendant No. 2. Denial is far outweighed by not only postal receipts proving the despatch at all the address of the defendant but also through a certificate from the postal authorities as to the receipt of the notice by the defendants at the suit premises.
17. I have taken a view in Rama Ghai v. UP State Handloom Corporation, 2001 IV AD (Delhi) 471 that in order to invoke the provisions of Order 12 Rule 6, CPC the Court has to scrutinise the pleadings in their totality and ignore the evasive and unspecific denials either as to the relationship or as to tne service of notice or as to the nature of tenancy.
18. If the landlord either under the legal advice or by way of abundant precaution sends notice for termination of tenancy under Section 106 of the T.P Act after the expiry of tenancy by way of efflux of time his intention is not to terminate the tenancy but to insist and impress upon the tenant to hand over the possession after the expiry of agreed period of tenancy.
19. In the instant case the evasive denial by the defendants to the creation or a tenancy for six months has the effect of termination of tenancy but efflux of time. Whenever the period of lease was extended for a year, the plaintiff got the lease deed registered. It is unscrupulous on the part of the defendant to deny the extension of lease orally for a period of six months on compassionate ground as the petitioner did not feel the need of getting the lease registered and rightly so as such on extension of tenancy could have been agreed orally and even without unregistered lease deed under the provisions of Section 116 of the T.P Act. Even on the premise of its own defence that the tenancy became monthly tenancy after the expiry of the registered lease period, the defendants stand on sticky wicket as even the said tenancy was validly terminated by the notice under Section 106 of the Act and, therefore, the occupation of the defendant after that period was unauthorised.
20. The aforesaid reasons pursued me to allow the application and pass decree for possession which will be executable after two months from today.