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citation codes
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  • section 309 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short, Code). This Section
  • provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950.
  • Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Customs Act, 1962, (in short, the Act)
  • Section 111 read with Section 24
  • Provision of sub-section (1)
  • COMPANIES ACT 1956
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • section 309 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short, Code). This Section
  • provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950.
  • Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Customs Act, 1962, (in short, the Act)
  • Section 111 read with Section 24
  • Provision of sub-section (1)
  • COMPANIES ACT 1956
Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion (Arijit Pasayat, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Five writ petitions raising identical issues were taken up together. The petitioners include Seagram Manufacturing Limited (a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956) and four company officers: Sunil Mehdiratta (Head of Management System), Param Uberoi (Chief Executive Officer), Harvinder Singh Bhatia (Controller-Finance) and Akram Fahami (Chairman). Each petition seeks quashing of a criminal complaint instituted by Shri Kamal Kumar, Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) in the court of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (ACMM), Delhi on 22.12.2000, following cognizance and issuance of process; in some petitions non-bailable warrants were issued for non-appearance.

Petitioners' factual stance is that prior show-cause notices under the Customs Act, 1962 (including notices issued on 19.12.2000 and earlier notices under Sections 28 and 111) gave rise to adjudication proceedings, and that the criminal complaint substantially repeats the content of the show-cause notice (59 of 63 pages identical). One related writ (Crl. Writ No. 1348/2001) was disposed on 27.8.2001 after the Solicitor General submitted that a notice was to be treated as for finalisation of assessment under Section 18(2) and that, if thought proper, notice under Section 111 read with Section 24 might be issued; the earlier petitioner in that matter was observed to have liberty to approach the appropriate forum if such notices were issued.

At the hearing in these petitions, petitioners primarily sought that the criminal proceedings be kept in abeyance because adjudication proceedings were pending and their outcome would be relevant to the criminal cases; petitioners also alleged mala fides due to the close temporal proximity between the adjudicatory show-cause notice (19.12.2000) and the criminal complaint (22.12.2000). Respondents contested staying the criminal proceedings and argued there is no legal bar to lodging criminal complaints while adjudication is pending, and that the facts relevant to both proceedings are similar.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether criminal proceedings instituted by DRI in the ACMM court should be quashed or kept in abeyance because adjudication proceedings under the Customs Act, 1962 are pending and may have bearing on the criminal case.
  2. Whether the proximity in time between issuance of a show-cause notice in adjudication proceedings (19.12.2000) and institution of a criminal complaint (22.12.2000), and substantial textual similarity between the documents, establishes mala fides invalidating the criminal prosecution.
  3. How the trial court should exercise its discretionary power under Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 when an application seeks adjournment/stay on account of related adjudication proceedings.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The criminal complaint should be quashed or stayed because adjudication proceedings under the Customs Act were initiated earlier (show-cause notice dated 19.12.2000) and their outcome will bear upon the criminal case.
  • There is alleged mala fides: the criminal complaint was filed three days after the show-cause notice and the complaint largely copies the show-cause notice (59 out of 63 pages identical), suggesting improper conduct.
  • Petitioners sought early finalisation of adjudication proceedings to avoid prejudice but allege no response was given.

Respondents' Arguments

  • There is no invariable principle requiring a criminal case to be stayed because adjudication proceedings are pending; criminal proceedings may proceed independently.
  • The alleged temporal proximity (three days) between show-cause notice and criminal complaint does not render the complaint invalid; there is no legal bar to lodging a criminal complaint during pendency of adjudication.
  • Serious allegations of massive defrauding of revenue were made; petitioners have not cooperated with the adjudicating authority and have not responded to the show-cause notice, undermining their plea for adjournment.
  • Similarity between complaint and show-cause notice is explained by the fact situation being common to both proceedings and therefore not inherently infirm.
  • Some petitioners had not appeared before the ACMM and had not filed applications seeking exemption from appearance; the petitioners therefore rushed to the High Court without exhausting available remedies before the trial court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Uttam Chand & Ors. v. Income-tax Officer, Central Circle Amritsar, (1982) 133 ITR 909 The opinion groups this case among authorities indicating the proper course when adjudicatory proceedings may bear on criminal proceedings; not to be read as requiring automatic stay of criminal cases. The Court treated this decision as part of the body of authorities showing that adjournment/stay is a discretionary matter for the trial court and not a per se bar to prosecution; used as background authority for the discretion analysis.
P. Jayappan v. S.K. Perumal, First Income Tax Officer, Tuticorin, AIR 1984 SC 1693 (also cited as 1984 Supp SCC 437) Holds that a criminal court may adjourn or postpone proceedings under its discretionary power (Section 309 CrPC) when an adjudicatory order which would bear on the criminal proceedings is imminent, but that such discretion must be exercised judicially; pendency of reassessment does not bar institution of prosecution and prosecution is not to be quashed as premature solely on that ground. The Court relied explicitly on para 6 of P. Jayappan as guidance for the ACMM while deciding applications under Section 309; it directed that the ACMM should keep the guidelines in para 6 in mind when fixing dates and considering adjournments.
D.L. Didwania v. ITO and Anr., 1995 SCC Supp (2) 724 Referenced among authorities dealing with relation between adjudication proceedings and criminal trials, reinforcing that the appropriate course is discretionary and fact-sensitive rather than an automatic stay rule. Used as supportive authority in the Court's account of established practice that adjudicatory pendency is a relevant factor but not a bar to criminal proceedings; relied on as part of the jurisprudential backdrop for discretionary exercise under Section 309.
Commissioner of Income-tax Mumbai v. Bhupen Champak Lal Dalai & Anr., (2001) 3 SCC 459 Confirms independence of criminal prosecution and proceedings under the relevant Act; nonetheless recognises that when conclusions of one authority have definite bearing on the other, one authority may await the outcome of the other; reiterates P. Jayappan position that pendency of reassessment does not bar criminal proceedings. The Court cited this decision to underscore that criminal and adjudicatory proceedings are independent but that, in appropriate circumstances, one authority may await the outcome of the other — supporting the trial court's discretion to adjourn in proper cases.
Tukaram Annaba Chavan v. Machindra Yeshwant Patil, (2001) 3 SCC 33 Illustrates a circumstance where the Supreme Court ordered suspension of criminal proceedings in the interest of justice and for a fair trial until disposal of an administrative proceeding (Assistant Charity Commissioner) that was likely to determine issues relevant to the criminal case. The Court treated this decision as an example where staying criminal proceedings was appropriate because the administrative authority's decision was likely to be dispositive of issues in the criminal trial; used to show that stay may be warranted in appropriate fact situations.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by examining the interplay between adjudication proceedings under the Customs Act and criminal proceedings in the ACMM. It emphasised that there is no rigid rule mandating stay of criminal proceedings merely because an adjudication is pending; rather, the pendency of adjudication is a relevant factor to be considered by the criminal court when exercising its discretion under Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

The Court analysed the statutory scheme and policy:

  • Section 309 CrPC confers discretionary power on the criminal court to adjourn/postpone hearings for reasonable causes; that discretion must be used judicially and with reasons, consistent with the policy that criminal proceedings should be expeditious so accused may be brought to justice promptly or acquitted if innocent.
  • Section 205 CrPC permits the Magistrate to dispense with personal attendance of the accused in certain cases; Section 273 reaffirms the principle that trial of indictable offences is to be conducted in the presence of the accused, subject to statutory discretion.
  • The Court emphasised the statutory words "reasonable cause" when considering adjournments and that discretion must be exercised in accordance with law, guided by relevant considerations and not arbitrarily.

The opinion surveyed precedents (including P. Jayappan, Bhupen Dalal and Tukaram) and concluded they establish that: (i) criminal and adjudication proceedings are ordinarily independent; (ii) a criminal court may, in an appropriate case, adjourn proceedings if the outcome of adjudication is likely to have bearing on the criminal trial; and (iii) this discretion must be exercised judicially and not as a matter of course.

Applying these principles to the petitions before it, the Court did not record any finding on whether the adjudication proceedings have relevance to the criminal trial; instead, it left that determination to the trial court (ACMM) exercising its discretion under Section 309. The Court imposed procedural directions to ensure petitioners attend the ACMM and to enable the ACMM to consider any application for adjournment or dispensation of personal appearance in a structured manner.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

DISPOSED OF

The petitions were disposed of with specific directions to the trial court and the petitioners rather than by quashing the criminal complaint.

Direct consequences and practical implications:

  • The petitioners are directed to appear before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (ACMM) on 18.10.2001 and to file an appropriate application under Section 205 CrPC; the ACMM is to pass necessary orders directing their presence through counsel on such terms and conditions as the ACMM considers proper.
  • If an application under Section 309 CrPC is filed, the ACMM shall consider and, if appropriate, adjourn the case to such date as deemed proper having regard to all relevant aspects, including the pendency of adjudication proceedings and their relevance to the criminal trial. The ACMM is to be guided by the para 6 guidelines of P. Jayappan's case when fixing dates and considering adjournments.
  • The question whether the adjudication proceedings have any relevance or bearing on the criminal trial is to be judged by the trial court dealing with the Section 309 application; this Court declined to make any finding on that factual/legal question.

The opinion does not purport to lay down any new general legal principle beyond applying established authorities; it resolves the present petitions by directing the trial court how to proceed and by requiring petitioners to appear and follow the available procedural avenues. No broader precedent was announced beyond the application of established discretionary principles and the directions given in the order.

Disposition

The petitions are disposed of in accordance with the directions stated above.

    Sunil Mehdiratta & Others. v. Union Of India.

    Arijit Pasayat, C.J— All these five cases involve identical issues and are, therefore, taken up for disposal together. Seagram Manufacturing Limited, the petitioner in Crl. Writ Petition No. 58/2001, is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. Sunil Mehdiratta, petitioner in Crl. Writ No. 870/2001 is the Head of the Management System of the Companies. Param Uberoi, petitioner in Crl Writ No. 57/2001 is the Chief Executive Officer of the Company. Harvinder Singh Bhatia, petitioner in Crl. Writ No. 58/2001 is the Controller-Finance of the Company. Akram Fahami, petitioner in Crl. Writ No. 870/2001 is the Chairman of the company.

    2. In each of the writ petitions, prayer is made to quash the criminal complaint instituted by Shri Kamal Kumar, Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) in the court of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (ACMM), Delhi on 22.12.2000 Process has been directed to be issued after cognizance was taken of several offences. In some cases non-bailable warrants have been issued against the concerned petitioner for non-appearance before the learned ACMM on the date fixed. Petitioners' stand in essence is that on 19.12.2000, show cause notice was issued by the authorities under the Customs Act, 1962, (in short, the Act) Earlier notices were issued under Sections 28 and 111 of the Act. Same was subject matter of challenge in Crl. Writ No. 1348/2001. The said writ petition was disposed of on 27.8.2001 taking note of the submission of learned Solicitor General that the notice was to be treated as one for finalisation of the assessment in terms of Section 18 (2) of the Act. It was further stated that if it was so thought proper notice in terms of Section 111 read with Section 24 may be issued. Petitioner in that case had taken the stand that stage had not arrived for such action. It was observed by this Court that petitioner had the liberty to approach the appropriate forum in case any notice in terms of Sections 111 and 24 of the Act was issued.

    3. Though a prayer has been made for quashing the proceedings in these cases, at the time of hearing of the writ petitions, it was submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that proceedings before learned ACMM may be kept in abeyance because of the pendency of proceedings before the adjudicating authority. According to him, decision in the adjudication proceedings will have relevance and bearing on the criminal cases and therefore the said proceedings deserve to be stayed. A case of mala fides is also sought to be proved by making a reference to the fact that show cause notice was issued in the adjudication proceedings on 19.12.2000 and the criminal complaint was filed on 22.12.2000, and overwhelming portions of the complaint are almost identical to overwhelming portion of the show-cause notices. Out of 63 pages 59 pages are identical. It is also submitted that in order to prove bona fides, petitioners have made request for early finalisation of the adjudication proceedings, but to no avail.

    4. In reply, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that there is no principle of invariable nature that in every case where adjudication proceedings are pending, the criminal case has to be stayed. With reference to the show cause notice it was highlighted that there has been massive defrauding of revenue and this is not a case where discretionary jurisdiction has to be exercised in favour of the petitioners. It is pointed out that though there is no legal bar in lodging criminal complaint while adjudication proceeding is pending and merely because the criminal complaint was lodged three days after the issue of show cause notice in the adjudication proceedings, that cannot be said to be in any manner invalid. It is also submitted that though a long period has elapsed, there is no response to the show cause notice. The adjudicating authority is ready and willing to dispose of the proceedings early but it is possible only, if the petitioners co-operate. It is alleged that on the one hand, the petitioners have not responded to the show cause notice and on the other hand, they make a grievance that criminal complaint was lodged three days after the show cause notice was issued. As regards, similarity in major portion of the complaint and the show cause notice it was submitted that the fact situation relevant for both the proceedings was almost similar and therefore there is no infirmity in major portion of the complaint and the show cause notice being similar. It is submitted that as some of the petitioners have not so far appeared before the learned ACMM, and if they do so and satisfy the Court that there is a justification for keeping the proceedings in abeyance for some time, it can be considered by the trial court in its proper perspective. It is pointed out that there is also no application before the concerned court seeking exemption from appearance. In this background, it is submitted, the petitioners are not entitled to relief, having rushed to this Court without availing the remedies.

    5. We may take note of some of the decisions referred to by the parties in support of their respective stands about the desirability of keeping the criminal proceedings in hold during pendency of adjudication proceedings. The decisions are: Uttam Chand & Ors. v. Income-tax Officer, Central Circle Amritsar, (1982) 133 ITR 909 P. Jayappan v. S.K Perumal, First Income Tax Officer, Tuticorin , AIR 1984 SC 1693, D.L Didwania v. ITO and Anr. 1995 SCC Supp (2) 724, Commissioner of Income-tax Mumbai v. Bhupen Champak Lal Dalai & Anr, (2001) 3 SCC 459 and Tukaram Annaba Chavan v. Machindra Yeshwant Patil, (2001) 3 SCC 33. It is to be noted that in almost all these decisions what has been indicated is the proper course to be adopted in case it is brought to the notice of the Court that a decision in any adjudicating proceedings would have relevance and bearing on the pending issues involved in the criminal case. It is not the view expressed in any of the cases that whenever there is an adjudicating proceeding, pending a criminal case per force has to be stayed. Some of the observations in this regard are as follows:

    In P. Jayappan's case (supra) the Apex Court held as under:

    “6. It may be that in an appropriate case the criminal Court may adjourn or postpone the hearing of a criminal case in exercise of its discretionary power under Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if the dis posal of any proceeding under the Act which has a bearing on the proceedings before it is imminent so that it may take also into consideration the order to be passed therein. Even here the discretion should be exercised judicially and in such a way as not to frustrate the object of the criminal proceedings. There is no rigid rule which makes it necessary for a criminal Court to adjourn or postpone the hearing of a case before it indefinitely or for an unduly long period only because some proceedings which may have some bearing on it is pending elsewhere. But this, however, has no relevance to the question of maintainability of the prosecution. The prosecution in those circumstances cannot be quashed on the ground that it is a premature one.”

    In Bhupen Champak Lal Dalal's case (supra) the Apex Court held as under

    “3. The prosecution in criminal law and proceedings arising under the Act are, undoubtedly, independent proceedings and therefore, there is no impediment in law for the criminal proceedings to proceed even during the pendency of the proceedings under the Act. However, a wholesome rule will have to be adopted in matters of this nature where courts have taken the view that when the conclusions arrived at by the appellate authorities have a relevance and bearing upon the conclusions to be reached in the case necessarily one authority will have to await the outcome of the other.

    4…..In P. Jayappan v. S.K Perumal, First Income Tax Officer, Tuticorin , First ITO, 1984 Supp SCC 437, this Court observed that the pendency of the reassessment proceedings under the Act cannot act as a bar to the institution of the criminal proceedings and postponement or adjournment of a proceedings for unduly long period on the ground that another proceedings have a bearing on the decision was not proper.”

    5. In the present case, there is no claim of quashing of the proceedings. When ultimately the result to come out of the proceedings before the Appellate Authorities have a definite bearing on the cases alleged against the respondents, we find that the High Court is justified in granting the interim order it did and we do not think that such an interim order calls for interference at out hands. The learned counsel on either side relfed on several decisions, but in the view we have taken it is unnecessary to refer to those decisions.”

    In Tukaram Annaba Chavan's case, it was held:

    “10. The controversy raised in the case relates to the election of the Board of Directors of the Modern Education Society, Atpadi which is registered under the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. We were informed by the learned counsel for the parties that the matter is pending before the Assistant Charity Commissioner, Sangli, who is to determine the validity or otherwise of the change report submitted by the appellants. On a perusal of the record we find that a contention that in the proceeding relating to the confirmation or otherwise of the change report a contention has been raised that the documents on the bass of which the report has been submitted have been forged and fabricated by the appellants. In all probability that question will also arise for consideration by the authority.

    11. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is our considered view that in the interest of justice and for a fair trial the proceedings in the criminal case should remain suspended till the proceeding pending before the Assistant Charity Commissioner. Sangli, is disposed of by him. Accordingly, it is ordered that further proceedings in regular Criminal case No. 82 of 1994 pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Atpadi shall remain stayed till disposal of the proceeding in CR (changed report) No. 385 of 1991 by the Assistant Charity Commissioner, Sangli, The appeal is disposed of on the terms aforesaid.”

    6. As noted above, there is not rigid rule which makes it necessary for a criminal case to be adjourned indefinitely or for unduly long period only because some proceedings which may have some bearing on it is pending elsewhere, but this certainly is a relevant factor while considering the motion for adjournment of a criminal case in exercise of a discretionary power under section 309 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short, Code). This Section provides that it from a short absence of a witness or any other reasonable cause it becomes necessary to postpone the commencement or to adjourn any enquiry or trial the court may if it think fit, by an order in writing stating reasons therefore from time to time postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks fit. The terms must be those which are relevant to the question of postponement or adjournment. The policy of criminal law is to bring the accused persons to justice as speedily as possible so that if they are found guilty they may be punished or if they are found innocent they may be acquitted or discharged. It is, therefore, of utmost importance that criminal proceedings should be brought to speedy termination. Provision of sub-section (1) gives statutory recognition of the avowed policy of criminal law i.e to bring the accused to justice as expeditiously as possible. This Section does not in terms provide for staying the proceedings indefinitely but it is open to a party for stay of the criminal case pending adjudication of the adjudication proceedings or suit on related issue between the same parties. The discretionary power is to be exercised keeping in view that Legislature has used the expression reasonable cause. Though the expression has not been defined in the statute and is also not subjected to specific definition. The nature of criminal proceedings, policy of criminal law and spirit of the Section must be kept in view in Judging the circumstances of the case. Section 205 deals with the power of the Magistrate to dispense with the personal attendance of the accused. It is an essential principle of criminal law that trial of indictable offence has to be conducted in the presence of the accused. This principle is laid down in section 273 of the code. Power is given to the Magistrate when issuing summons for appearance to the accused whether the accused to appear before him either in person or through a pleader. This Section in term refers to power of the Magistrate to issue summons. He under sub-section (1) may dispense with the personal appearance of the accused and permit him to appear through his pleader. Sub-section (2) empowers the Magistrate enquiring into and trying the case to direct personal attendance of the accused when an exemption has been granted by him. The manner in which such attendance is to be enforced is also indicated. The discretion in the Section has to be exercised in a judicial manner and keeping in view the circumstances of the case.

    7. Discretion means use of private and independent thought. When anything is left to be done according to one's discretion, the law intends it to be done with sound discretion and according to law. Discretion is discerning between right and wrong and one who has power to act at discretion is bound by rule or reason. Discretion must not be arbitrary. Discretion must be exercised honestly and in the spirit of the statute. It is the power given by a statute to make choice among competing considerations. It implies power to choose between alternative courses of action. It is not unconfined and vagrant. It is canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing.

    8. Distrection is a science of understanding to discern between falsity and truth, between right and wrong, between shadows and substance, between equity and colourable glosses and pretences, and not to act according to one's will and private affections. Discretion necessarily implies good faith in discharging public duty. There is always a perspective within which a statute is intended to separate, and any clear departure from its lines or objects is just as objectionable as fraud or corruption. Several principles can conveniently be grouped in two main categories: (i) failure to exercise discretion, and (ii) excess or abuse of discretion power. The two classes are not, however, mutually exclusive. Thus, discretion may be improperly fettered, because irrelevant considerations have been taken into account. Discretion of a statutory body is never unfettered. It is discretion which is to be exercised according to law. That means at least this that the statutory body must be guided by relevant considerations. Discretion means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by homour, it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful (Per Lord Mansfield in John Wilkes (1770) 4, Burr 2528). In the words of Lord Cairns L.C in Julius v. Bishop of Oxford: (1880) 5 AC 214 “there may be something in the nature of the thing empowered to be done, something in the object for which it is done, something in the condition under which it is to be done, something in the title of person or persons for whose benefit the power is to be exercised which may couple the power with a duty and make it the duty of the person in whom the power is reposed to exercise that power when called upon to do so.” In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, Vol 1, it has been observed:

    “A statutory discretion is not, however, necessarily or indeed usually absolute, it may be qualified by express and implied legal duties to comply with substantive and procedural requirements before a decision is taken whether to act and how to act. Moreover, there may be a discretion whether to exercise a power but no discretion as to the mode of its exercise, or a duty to act when some conditions are present, but a discretion how to act. Discretion may thus be coupled with duties.”

    In view of what has been noted above we dispose of the petition with the following directions/observations:—

    (a) The petitioners shall appear before the ACMM on 18.10.2001 without further notice and on filing appropriate application in terms of section 205 of the code. Learned ACMM will pass necessary orders directing their presence through counsel on such terms and conditions as he may consider proper.

    (b) On an application in terms of section 309 of the code being filed, learned ACMM shall adjourn the case to such date, as deemed proper and expedient taking into account all relevant aspects, like pendency of the adjudication proceedings, its relevance, if any, to the criminal trial.

    While fixing the date, the ACMM shall keep in mind the guidelines indicated in para 6 of decision in P. Jayappan's case (supra). We make it clear that question whethe the adjudication proceedings have any relevance or bearing has to be judged by the trial Court dealing with the application under section 309 of the code. We do not think it proper to record any finding on that aspect.

    10. The petitions are disposed of.

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    Comments

    Sunil Mehdiratta & Others. v. Union Of India.
    (Sep 26, 2001)