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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Order XXXVII Rule 2(3), C.P.C
  • Order XXXVII Rule 3 of the CPC,
  • Rule 4 of Order XXXVII
  • Order XXXVII Rule 4.4.
  • Order XXXVI Rule 4.10.
  • Order XXXVII Rule 4
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Order XXXVII Rule 2(3), C.P.C
  • Order XXXVII Rule 3 of the CPC,
  • Rule 4 of Order XXXVII
  • Order XXXVII Rule 4.4.
  • Order XXXVI Rule 4.10.
  • Order XXXVII Rule 4
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit was for recovery of Rs. 12,65,532.40 instituted under the summary procedure of Order XXXVI of the Code of Civil Procedure. On 30.7.1998 summons and notice of the application were ordered to issue to the Defendants. On 10.11.1998 the Court, being satisfied that "the Defendants 1 and 2 had been duly starved (sic)" and that Defendant No. 3 was deemed to have been served by operation of Order XXXVII Rule 3 of the CPC, proceeded to pass an ex parte decree, taking into account provisions of Order XXXVII Rule 2(3), C.P.C. Execution proceedings were thereafter initiated by the Plaintiff. The present application was filed under Order XXXVII Rule 4 seeking relief in relation to that ex parte decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the facts of the case fall within the contemplation of Order XXXVII Rule 4 such that the ex parte summary decree can be set aside.
  2. Whether service of summons on the defendants was properly and legally effected.
  3. Whether the decree is void or liable to be set aside because (a) the plaintiff was not a duly registered partnership firm and (b) the special power of attorney authorising the plaintiff's signatory was not notarised.
  4. Whether, in the circumstances, relief should be sought under Order XXXVII Rule 4 rather than under Order IX of the Code.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's (Defendants') Arguments

  • Service had not been properly and legally effected on the Defendants.
  • The decree is liable to be set aside as non est and void because the plaintiff was not a duly registered partnership firm.
  • The special power of attorney authorising the plaintiff's signatory could not be taken into consideration as it was not notarised.
  • It was argued that, given the circumstances, relief should be sought under Rule 4 of Order XXXVII and not under Order IX.
  • Specific objections were raised about the manner of service: defendants living in different States could not plausibly have been served on the same day, the process server could not effect service outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, and the service report referred to a person (Mrs. Rekha Jain) whom one respondent allegedly did not have as a sister.

Plaintiff's Arguments / Response

  • The Plaintiff's counsel accepted notice of the application and waived the right to file a reply but sought leave to file relevant documents, which the Court granted.
  • The Plaintiff filed photocopies establishing that the plaintiff is a duly registered firm.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
P.N Films Ltd. v. Overseas Films Corporation Ltd., AIR 1958 Bombay 10 Cited in support of the argument that, in the circumstances, it was appropriate to resort to Rule 4 of Order XXXVII and not to Order IX of the Code. The Court read the decisions cited (including this one) and, together with a plain construction of Rule 4 of Order XXXVII, derived the principle that an ex parte "summary" decree can be set aside where service was not properly effected or sufficient grounds are shown; the Court applied that principle to the facts and set aside the decree for insufficient service.
Ramachandra v. Vithaldas, AIR 1964 Bombay 251 Cited in support of the argument that Rule 4 of Order XXXVII was the appropriate remedy rather than Order IX. Considered by the Court as part of the body of decisions which support the principle identified above; the Court relied on that general principle in its analysis and conclusion regarding service and setting aside the decree.
L.R Raja v. Shah, 1986 Contract Roger 108 Cited in support of the argument that Rule 4 of Order XXXVII applies in the given circumstances and Order IX does not. Taken together with the other cited decisions to support the Court's view of the circumstances in which a summary ex parte decree may be set aside; the Court applied the resulting principle to find the service insufficient.
M.A Ethirajula Naidu v. T.K.C.K Panikkar, AIR 1957 Madras 752 Cited in support of the argument that Rule 4 of Order XXXVII (and not Order IX) should be resorted to in the circumstances. Considered as part of the cited authorities that, together with Rule 4's plain construction, guided the Court to the two contingencies for setting aside an ex parte summary decree; the Court applied that framework to set aside the decree for defective service.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by first identifying the legal framework: decisions cited by learned counsel and a plain reading of Rule 4 of Order XXXVII indicate that an ex parte "summary" decree may be set aside in two contingencies — (1) if the Court is satisfied that service has not been properly effected on the defendants; or (2) if sufficient grounds are shown to the Court that the decree ought to be set aside.

On the issue of parties' identities, the applicant contended that Defendants 1 and 2 had not been arraigned as partners of Defendant 3. The Court rejected this as a technical and semantic objection, holding that a holistic reading of the plaint made it clear that Defendants 1 and 2 were partners of Defendant No. 3 and that this position was not contested.

The Court then examined the particulars of service. The applicant raised suspicion because the defendants resided in different States yet were purportedly served on the same day; further, it was contended that the process server could not lawfully effect service outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. The service report allegedly named "Mrs. Rekha Jain" and the applicant suggested that Respondent No. 1 had no sister by that name; the Court noted that the applicant did not clearly state that such a sister does not exist and observed that the omission suggested a possible suppression of material facts.

The Court scrutinised the mode of service and the procedural steps taken. It noted that when notice was first issued the Plaintiff had not been permitted to effect dasti service, but the Plaintiff later used only dasti service; ordered modes of service (including Registered A.D. post and recourse to the appropriate judicial office in the Defendants' territorial jurisdiction) were not followed. The Court analysed the legal status of dasti service, observing that dasti service is supplementary to the modes envisaged under the Civil Procedure Code and may be resorted to only if specifically allowed by the Court. The Court held that dasti service alone, particularly in matters under Order XXXVII, is insufficient.

The Court concluded that the directions in summons/notices concerning presentation to the concerned Court outside the initiating Court's territorial jurisdiction must be meticulously followed; in the present case that would have required the Plaintiff to approach the District Judge in whose jurisdiction the Defendant resided or carried on business. Because these procedural safeguards had not been observed and service was therefore insufficient, the Court allowed the application to set aside the ex parte decree. The Court expressly declined to consider the second question regarding the sufficiency of reasons under Order XXXVI Rule 4, since its conclusion on defective service made further consideration unnecessary.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The application is allowed and the ex parte decree is set aside.

Implications:

  • The direct effect of the decision is that the ex parte summary decree previously passed is vacated on the ground of insufficient service.
  • The Court did not decide the separate contention regarding sufficiency of reasons under Order XXXVI Rule 4, nor did it make any determination on costs (there shall be no order as to costs).
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a new precedent; it applies established principles (as derived from the cited authorities and Rule 4 of Order XXXVII) to the facts before the Court.

    Grafitek International v. K.K. Kaura

    Vikramajit Sen, J.— This application has been filed in a suit for the recovery of Rs. 12,65,532.40 filed under the Summary procedure of Order XXXVI of the Code of Civil Procedure. On 30.7.1998 summons and notice of the application were ordered to issue to the Defendants. On 10.11.1998, being satisfied that the Defendants 1 and 2 had been duly starved (sic), and that Defendant No. 3 was deemed to have been served by operation of Order XXXVII Rule 3 of the CPC, the Court proceeded to pass a decree. This was done taking into regard the provisions of Order XXXVII Rule 2(3), C.P.C Subsequently, execution proceedings were initiated by the Plaintiff. The present application under Order XXXVII Rule 4 is a sequel to these happenings.

    2. It has been submitted by learned Counsel for the applicants that service had not been properly and legally effected on the Defendants. It is also contended that the decree is liable to be set aside as non est and void for the reason that the plaintiff was not a duly registered partnership firm and the special power of attorney authorising the signatory of the Plaint” could not be taken into consideration since it had not been notarised. Learned counsel for the Plaintiff had accepted notice of this application and has waived his right to file reply thereto. He had however sought the leave of the court to file relevant documents. This was granted and he had filed photo copies establishing the fact that the plaintiff is a duly registered firm.

    3. Mr. I.C Kumar, the learned counsel for the applicant, has relied on the following judgments viz. P.N Films Ltd. v. Overseas Films Corporation Ltd., AIR 1958 Bombay 10, Ramachandra v. Vithaldas, AIR 1964 Bombay 251, L.R Raja v. Shah, 1986 Contract Roger 108. and M.A Ethirajula Naidu v. T.K.C.K Panikkar, AIR 1957 Madras 752 in support of his argument that in the circumstances of the case it was only possible to resort to Rule 4 of Order XXXVII and not to Order IX of the Code. On this question there is no controversy. What has to be decided is whether the facts of this case fall within the contemplation of Order XXXVII Rule 4.

    4. From reading of the decisions cited by Learned Counsel for the applicant as well as from a plain construction of Rule 4 of Order XXXVII it is evident that an ex parte “Summary” decree can be set aside by the Court in two contingencies; either if it is satisfied that service has not been properly effected on the defendants or if sufficient grounds are shown to the Court that the decree ought to be set aside.

    5. On the first point it was contended that Defendants 1 and 2 have not been arrayed as partners of Defendant 3. This is too technical and semantic an objection to be accepted. A complete and holistic reading of the plaint makes it clear that Defendants 1 and 2 are partners of Defendant No. 3. The correctness of this position has not been contested.

    6. It has further been contended that the service is extremely suspicious and mysterious since these Defendants live in different States and that it is therefore not possible that they could have been served on the same day. It was also vehemently submitted that the process server of this Court could not effect service outside its territorial jurisdiction. Learned counsel for the Applicant submitted that the service report appears to indicate that service had been effected on Mrs. Rekha Jain and that Respondent No. 1 had no sister by that name. It has however not been clearly stated that this respondent does not have any sister, or any sister named Rekha. In my view there should have been a clear statement to this effect and having failed to do so it would be fair to assume that there was an intention towards suppression of material facts.

    7. It is usually a difficult and delicate task to render a decision on application for setting aside ex parte decrees. The competing interests of the Plaintiff and Defendant are broodingly omnipresent. Having obtained a decree the Plaintiff ought not to be denied the enjoyment of its delectable fruits on flimsy grounds. There is always the lingering likelihood that service of summons were effected and that the Defendant had not appeared in order to delay proceedings. On the other hand, a judicial decision taken without giving the parties adequate opportunity to present its version of the facts and the law, in my opinion, is a forensic abomination. The Court must fully satisfy itself that parties have been served. Otherwise it would tantamount to dereliction of duty. I have perused the records of the case in order to ascertain the details of the service. When notice was issued on the first occasion, understandably, the Plaintiff was not permitted to carry out Dasti service. For reasons which would be best known to the Plaintiff, it was only this mode of service which was adopted. Process was not initiated in the ordinary manner and/or by Registered A.D post as was specifically ordered. Furthermore, and this substantiates the arguments made by Learned Counsel for Defendant/applicant, resort was not made to the office of the District Judge, Gaziabad or Administrative Sub Judge, DELHI. Service was instead allegedly carried out directly.

    8. Dasti service is supplementary to the modes envisaged under the Civil Procedure Code. It can be resorted to only if specifically allowed by the Court. Even where dasti summons alone have been effected, there is always a likelihood of suspicion surrounding the situation. The present case will demonstrate so. On summons/notice having issued in the ordinary manner as well as by Registered A.D post, the Defendants would have been hard pressed to create a doubt regarding the service. As presently advised, I am compelled to unequivocally hold that only dasti service is insufficient service, and cannot be acted upon. This is especially so in these cases falling under the purview of Order XXXVII of the Code. I further hold that even if a process server is accompanied by the interested party, the directions contained in the summons/notices viz-a-viz. Presentation to the concerned Court outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, must be meticulously and scrupulously followed. In the context of the present case this would require the Plaintiff to have approached the District Judge within whose jurisdiction the Defendant resided or carried on business.

    9. In these circumstances, the application is allowed and the ex parte decree is set aside. In the view that I have taken, I do not consider it necessary to go into the second question, i.e sufficiency of reasons for acting under Order XXXVI Rule 4.

    10. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.

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    Comments

    Grafitek International v. K.K. Kaura
    (Feb 23, 2000)