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  • Order XXXVII Rule 3(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short CPC)
  • Order XXXVII Rule 3 (5) of the CPC,
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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  • Order XXXVII Rule 3(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short CPC)
  • Order XXXVII Rule 3 (5) of the CPC,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion disposes of an application filed by the Defendant under Order XXXVII Rule 3(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 seeking leave to defend a summary suit. The Plaintiff, conducting business as "APACE rent a car", sued for recovery of liquidated damages of Rs. 9,99,760/-, along with pendente-lite and future interest, alleging the existence of three agreements with the Defendant for supply/hiring of vehicles:

  • Agreement dated 14 June 1995 for hiring of six Maruti Gypsies at Rs. 25,000/- per month for 12 months, with a specified higher rate if returned early.
  • Agreement dated 24 August 1995 for hiring one Tata Sumo/Tata Estate for 24 months at Rs. 29,000/- per month, with a higher rate if returned early.
  • Agreement dated 25 April 1996 for supply of Maruti Esteem at Rs. 28,000/- per month for 24 months, with a higher rate if returned early.

The Plaintiff alleged that vehicles were supplied in July 1996 following a fax from the Defendant, that Defendant ceased hiring services in early 1997, and that Plaintiff invoiced differential/higher charges for early return under the contract terms. The suit was filed under Order XXXVII (summary procedure). Summons in the prescribed form were served, the Defendant appeared and moved for leave to defend under Order XXXVII Rule 3(5) CPC.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Defendant should be granted leave to defend the summary suit under Order XXXVII Rule 3(5) CPC on the basis that the defenses raised are bona fide/triable.
  2. Whether the specific factual/contention-based defenses concerning each of the agreements (timing and validity of the first agreement; non-supply or non-action upon the Tata Sumo agreement; the status of the April 1996 letter/agreement for Maruti Esteem) disclose triable issues or are sham/frivolous.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant's Arguments

  • The contract dated 14.6.1995 had worked itself out and stood concluded on 13.6.1996 (i.e., the period of validity had expired).
  • The contract dated 24.8.1995 (Tata Sumo/Tata Estate) was never acted upon because the Plaintiff did not supply the Tata Sumo; since the contract was not acted upon no damages can be claimed in respect of it.
  • The letter dated 25.4.1996 (referred to by the Plaintiff) was merely an offer and cannot be construed as a concluded agreement because it was not signed by any representative of the Defendant.
  • Overall, the defenses are bona fide and raise triable issues — they are not frivolous or sham.

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The whole set of transactions should be treated as one continuous transaction and not broken into parts; consequently the Defendant's objections would unduly prolong litigation and prevent early decree in a summary suit.
  • The defenses raised by the Defendant are sham and not plausible.
  • With respect to timing of the first agreement (Gypsies), the Plaintiff contended that the contractual period should be deemed to have started from 24th June 1996 (date of fax regarding hiring), so the Defendant's position on expiry is incorrect.
  • The Plaintiff relied on precedent (Rajinder Kumar Khanna v. Oriental Insurance Co. & Anr.) to argue that a letter acted upon should be deemed accepted; i.e., acceptance by conduct.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mechelec Engineers & Manufacturers v. Basic Equipment Corporation, AIR 1977 SC 577 The multi-tiered test for granting leave to defend under summary procedure: (A) good defence entitles unconditional leave; (B) fair/bona fide defence entitles unconditional leave; (C) sufficient facts raising a defence may attract leave with discretionary conditions (not payment into court); (D) sham/frivolous defences ordinarily attract refusal of leave; (E) in exceptional cases court may permit defence subject to security. The Court applied these principles to evaluate whether the Defendant's assertions were bona fide or sham. Using that framework the Court concluded the Defendant's contentions raised triable issues and were not frivolous, and accordingly granted leave to defend.
Rajinder Kumar Khanna v. Oriental Insurance Co. & Anr., 41 (1990) DLT 176 The Plaintiff relied on this decision to support the proposition that a document signed by one party and acted upon may be deemed accepted by the other party (acceptance by conduct). The Court noted the Plaintiff's reliance but observed that the fax relied upon did not mention the April 1996 letter and that evidence would be required to determine whether the letter operated as an agreement by acceptance. Consequently the precedent did not resolve the factual dispute at this stage; the Court treated the matter as a triable issue.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by applying the well-settled tests from Mechelec (as approved by the Supreme Court) for determining whether leave to defend in a summary suit should be granted. The judge examined the factual contentions associated with each agreement and assessed whether the Defendant's defenses were sham/frivolous or raised triable issues:

  1. First agreement (14 June 1995: Maruti Gypsies) — Clause 5 provided that the agreement was valid for 12 months. The Plaintiff argued the contractual period began only when Gypsies were supplied (referring to a fax of 24 June 1996). The Court observed that the fax did not refer to that agreement and, on prima facie consideration, the Plaintiff's timing argument did not appear clearly correct. Therefore the Defendant's contention about expiry could not be treated as false or frivolous and did raise a triable issue.
  2. Letter dated 25 April 1996 (Maruti Esteem) — The Court observed this letter was not signed by any representative of the Defendant and that mere receipt by the Defendant's office did not automatically convert it into a binding agreement. Evidence would be required to determine whether supply occurred under the terms of that letter. The Plaintiff's reliance on acceptance-by-conduct authority was noted, but the factual matrix (e.g., the contents of the fax) did not support immediate resolution. As such the Defendant's denial created a triable issue.
  3. Agreement dated 24 August 1995 (Tata Sumo/Tata Estate) — The Defendant contended the contract was never acted upon (no supply). The Plaintiff urged that the documents and subsequent communications should be read as one transaction. The Court concluded that resolving whether the transaction should be treated as a single integrated transaction or whether the Tata Sumo agreement was acted upon required evidence and therefore presented a triable issue.
  4. On the totality of issues, and applying the Mechelec framework, the Court found that the Defendant's defenses could not be characterized as illusory, sham, or frivolous on the face of the leave application. Rather, they disclosed triable issues warranting a contested trial on the merits.

Consequently, the Court exercised its discretion to grant leave to defend and directed the parties to follow a short procedural timetable for written statements, replication and document production.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Application for leave to defend granted.

Implications / Direct consequences ordered by the Court (as stated):

  • The Defendant is permitted to file the written statement within six weeks from the date of the order.
  • The Plaintiff may file a replication, if any, within two weeks after the written statement is filed.
  • Parties are directed to file original documents within two weeks thereafter.
  • Parties shall appear before the Joint Registrar for admission/denial of documents and further proceedings on 20th July, 2000.
  • The interim application (IA) stands disposed of.

The Court applied established precedent rather than announcing any new legal principle. The decision's immediate effect is procedural: it preserves the Defendant's right to contest the Plaintiff's summary claim at trial by granting leave to defend; no new precedent was set beyond applying the Mechelec tests to the facts before the Court.

    Delhi Travels & Tours v. Motorola India Ltd.

    S.K Agarwal, J.— This order shall dispose of the application filed by the Defendant under Order XXXVII Rule 3(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short CPC) for obtaining leave to defend the suit filed by the Plaintiff for recovery of liquidated damages of a sum of Rs. 9,99,760/- along with pendente-lite and future interest.

    The Plaintiff filed the suit alleging therein that it is engaged in the business of travel and tour under the name and style of ‘APACE rent a car’ it has been regularly supplying luxury vehicles to the various clients in Delhi as well as in other cities, that the Plaintiff entered into three agreements with the Defendant, namely (i) Agreement on 14th June, 1995 for hiring of six Maruti Gypsy vehicles which were to be supplied at a monthly rental of Rs. 25,000/- this agreement was valid for a period of 12 months, and it further provided that in case the vehicle was returned before the said period then the Plaintiff shall be entitled to charge at the rate of Rs. 31,000/- per month, for the period for which the vehicle had been used by the Defendant, (ii) Agreement dated 24th August, 1995 for hiring of one Tata Sumo/Tata Estate for a period of 24 months at a monthly rental of Rs. 29000/- it was also stipulated that in case the car was to be returned by the Defendant before the completion of the agreement period then the Plaintiff will be entitled to charge at the rate of Rs. 42,000 per month for the total period for which the car had been used by the Defendant, (iii) Agreement dated 25th April, 1996 for the supply of Maruti Esteem at the hiring rate of Rs. 28,000/- per month provided each car remains with the Defendant for a period of 24 months and in case the said vehicle was returned earlier than under the agreement the Plaintiff would be entitled to charge at the rate of Rs. 35,000 for the total period the car has been used.

    It is further alleged that consequent upon the fax message dated 24th June, 1996 from the Defendant the Plaintiff supplied 5 Gypsies w.e.f 1.7.96 and 7 Maruti Esteem w.e.f 1.7.96 under the said agreements, however vide communication dated 23.9.96 the Defendants decided to discontinue with the service of car hiring from the Plaintiff because of operational and business reasons with effect from 8th January, 1997; however on 17th January, 1997 on Defendant extended this period upto 27th February, 1997 on this date the Defendant actually stoped the use of these cars and on 30.1.1997 Defendant also withdrew the use of Tata Estate.

    It is further alleged that the Plaintiff vide letter dated 5th February, 1997 informed the Defendant about the clauses, in the said agreements where under the Defendant was obliged to pay the difference in the rates of hiring charges because of the return of the vehicles before expiry of stipulated period. The Plaintiff also raised the bills at the differential rates for the 18 months i.e for use of the Tata Estate vehicle Rs. 2,34,000/-, for use of seven Maruti Esteem Rs. 3,92,000/- and for use of five Maruti gypsy Rs. 2,40,000/- as the Defendant failed to pay the amount due, therefore, the suit under Order XXXVII of the CPC under the summary procedure for recovery of Rs. 8,66,000 towards principal amount and Rs. 3,33,760/- towards interest upto 30.9.98 was filed.

    Suit was registered and summons in the prescribed form under Order XXXVII CPC were served on the Defendant; they entered appearance and subsequently moved an application for leave to defend under Order XXXVII Rule 3 (5) of the CPC, on the grounds which read as under:

    (1) the contract dated 14.6.1995 had worked itself out and stood concluded on 13.6.1996, (2) the contract dated 24.8.1995, as produced by the Plaintiff with the list of documents, the Plaintiff was to provide one Tata Sumo vehicle for 24 months. However, the Plaintiff did not supply the said Tata Sumo vehicle and contract was never acted upon by the parties. It is pleaded that in the body of the suit no claim has been made in the respect of Tata Sumo. since the vehicle was not supplied and the contract was not acted upon, the question of claimingany damages does not arise; and (3) letter dated 26.4.1996 shows that the Plaintiff had offered for rent Maruti Esteem vehicles. This letter can at best be termed an offer and cannot be construed to be an agreement between the parties. Contesting the said application, the Plaintiff has Filed reply repudiating the contentions raised in the application and also stating that the contract dated 14th June, 1995 was for a period of one year which means that as and when the Gypsies were taken by the Defendant for their use, the terms of the agreement would apply.

    I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have been taken through the record. Learned counsel for the Defendant in support of the application argued that the defense is bona fide and raises a tribal issue. Learned counsel for the Plaintiff argued that the whole transaction is one and cannot be broken in parts and that objections raised by the Defendant would unnecessarily prolong the litigation and prevent the Plaintiff from obtaining an early decree. It was argued that the defenses raised are sham and not plausible.

    Law with regard to the grounds on which leave to defend can be granted is now well settled. Supreme Court in Mechelec Engineers & Manufacturers v. Basic Equipment Corporation, AIR 1977 SC 577 approved the following principles:

    “A. If the Defendant satisfies the court that he has a good defence to the claim on its merits the Plaintiff is not entitled to leave to sign judgement and the Defendant is entitled to unconditional leave to Defend.

    B. If the Defendant raises a triable issue indicating that he has a fair or bona fide or reasonable defence although not a positively good defense the Plaintiff is not entitled to sign judgement and the Defendant is entitled to unconditional leave to defend.

    C. If the Defendant discloses such facts as may be deemed sufficient to entitle him to Defend that is to say, although the affidavit does not positively and immediately make it clear that he had a defence, yet, shews such a state of facts as leads to the inference that at the trial of the action he may be able to establish a defence to the Plaintiff claim the Plaintiff is not entitled to judgment and the Defendant is entitled to leave to Defend but in such a case the Court may in its discretion impose conditions as to the time or mode of trial but not as to payment into court or furnishing security.

    D. If the Defendant has no defence or the defence set up is illusory or sham or practically moonshine then ordinarily the Plaintiff is entitled to leave to sign judgment and the Defendant is not entitled to leave to defend.

    E. If the Defendant has no defence or the defence is illusory or sham or practically moonshine then although ordinarily the Plaintiff is entitled to leave to sign judgment, the Court may protect the Plaintiff by only allowing the defence to proceed if the amount claimed is paid into Court or otherwise secured and give leave to the Defendant on such condition, and thereby show mercy to the defendant by enabling him to try to prove a defence.

    In this case clause 5 of the first agreement dated 14th June, 1995 provides ‘this agreement shall be valid for a period of 12 months.’ As per the Plaintiffs own showing Maruti Gypsies were not supplied within the period of one year from the date of execution of this agreement. The argument of the learned counsel for the Plaintiff that the period of limitation under clause 5 of the agreement should be deemed to have been started with effect from 24th June, 1996 the date when the fax message regarding hiring Gypsies was received, prima facie it does not appear to be so. The fax message does not refer to this agreement at all, At this stage, it cannot therefore be said that the defence raised by the Defendant is false, frivolous or sham or not plausible. It does raise a triable issue.

    Further the letter dated 25th April, 1996 (second agreement) regarding the supply of Maruti Esteem Chauffeur driven on rental basis for a period of 24 months is not signed by any of the representative of the Defendant. Merely because this letter was received in the office of the Defendant, would not automatically convert this letter into an agreement. Evidence would be needed to determine the supply of the Maruti Esteem cars was as per the terms and conditions of this letter, which is being denied by the Defendant. Terms of the letter are disputed. Learned counsel for the Plaintiff argued that this letter though signed by one party should be deemed to have been accepted on account of its having been acted upon. Learned counsel for the Plaintiff placed reliance on decision of this Court in Rajinder Kumar Khanna v. Oriental Insurance Co. & Anr. 41 (1990) DLT 176. Perusal of the fax message dated 24th June, ‘1996 which has been relied by the Plaintiff does not mention about the letter dated 24.4.1996, on the contrary it refers to a meeting on that day itself. It was subsequent to that meeting and discussion the order for supply of Maruti Esteem cars was placed. The issue raised by the Defendant in the leave application stating that the said letter dated 25th April, 1996 cannot be termed as an agreement because it was not signed by any of the representatives again, cannot be said to be frivolous or sham or not plausible. It does raise a triable issue.

    With regard to the third agreement, dated 24th August, 1995 for hiring of one Tata Sumo on self drive basis with Chauffeur and fuel for a period of 12 months. It was argued that this agreement was never acted upon. Learned counsel for the Plaintiff on the other hand argued that the agreements dated 14th June, 1995, fax message dated 24th June, 1996, and the letter dated 23rd September, 1996 through which the services of the car hired from APACE were terminated, should be read as one transaction which again would require evidence therefore, it raises a triable issue and cannot be said sham or frivolous.

    In view of the above, the application for leave to defend is granted. The Defendant is allowed to The written statement within a period of six weeks from today. The Plaintiff may file replication, if any within a period of two weeks thereafter. Parties will file original documents within two weeks thereafter and appear before the Joint Registrar for admission/denial of documents and further proceedings on 20th July, 2000. IA stands disposed of.

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    Comments

    Delhi Travels & Tours v. Motorola India Ltd.
    (Feb 23, 2000)