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citation codes
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  • 282, Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963
  • Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963
  • Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act
  • Art. 137 of the new Limitation Act
  • Article 137 of the Limitation Act
  • Order 1 Rule 10
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • 282, Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963
  • Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963
  • Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act
  • Art. 137 of the new Limitation Act
  • Article 137 of the Limitation Act
  • Order 1 Rule 10
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion addresses an application under Order 1 Rule 10 filed by S. Gurcharan Singh seeking to be impleaded as a party in ongoing proceedings for the grant of Letters of Administration with the Will attached, concerning the estate of Mrs. Raseel Kohli, the deceased mother of the Petitioner and her deceased brother. The Applicant claims to have acquired rights under a Will dated 1.10.1987 executed by the deceased testatrix in his favor. The application was filed after the Applicant learned of the pendency of these proceedings during a visit to his uncle, S. Raja Singh. The Petitioner objected to this application, and the court considered the timing and substance of the application, including the alleged delay in initiating probate proceedings for the Will dated 1.10.1987.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Applicant is a necessary and proper party to be impleaded in the probate proceedings concerning the Will dated 1.10.1987.
  2. Whether the application for probate of the Will dated 1.10.1987 is barred by limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
  3. The effect of delay in initiating probate proceedings on the genuineness and authenticity of the alleged Will.
  4. The applicability and interpretation of Article 137 of the Limitation Act to probate and Letters of Administration petitions.
  5. The legal principles governing impleadment of parties in probate and administration proceedings.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

  • The Applicant claims a right, title, and interest under the Will dated 1.10.1987 executed by the deceased testatrix in his favor.
  • He seeks to be impleaded as a party to protect his interest and to have the Will judicially recognized.
  • The application was filed promptly upon gaining knowledge of the pendency of the probate proceedings.
  • The Applicant contends he is a necessary and proper party entitled to be heard in the ongoing probate petition.

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The Petitioner raised various objections to the application, including the delay in initiating probate proceedings for the alleged Will dated 1.10.1987.
  • It was argued that the Applicant has no blood relationship with the deceased and was not in possession of the relevant property, undermining the genuineness of the Will.
  • The Petitioner highlighted ongoing disputes involving the estate and alleged trespass and unauthorized sale of property, suggesting the Applicant had constructive knowledge of these litigations but did not act timely.
  • The Petitioner contended that the Applicant is not a necessary party and that the application is vexatious and intended to delay the proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ramanand Thakur v. Permanand Thakur, AIR 1982 Patna 87 Right to apply for probate accrues continuously; no fixed period of limitation for probate applications under old law. Considered but distinguished due to changes in limitation law and later Supreme Court decisions.
Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P Kunhaliumma, AIR 1977 SC 282 Article 137 of the Limitation Act applies to any petition or application filed under any Act to a civil court. Followed to hold that Article 137 applies to probate applications under the Limitation Act, 1963.
Shobha Kshirsagar v. Smt. Janki Kshirsagar, AIR 1987 MP 145 Held that Article 137 does not apply to probate applications (based on old law). Not followed due to conflict with Supreme Court precedent in Kerala State Electricity Board case.
Balwant v. Mainabai, AIR 1991 MP 11 Decision on limitation for probate applications. Not followed for reasons stated above.
Hari Narain v. Subhash Chander, AIR 1985 Punjab & Haryana 211 Article 137 applies to petitions where no other limitation is prescribed, including revocation of probate. Extended ratio mutatis mutandis to probate grant applications where Will is likely disputed.
Razia Begum v. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum & Ors., AIR 1958 SC 886 Only parties with direct interest can be impleaded; commercial interest insufficient. Applied to reject impleadment of Applicant lacking direct interest in probate petition.
K.S Abraham v. Mrs. Chandy Rosamma & Ors., AIR 1989 Kerala 167 Follows the principle that only parties with direct interest should be impleaded. Supported the court's approach on impleadment and locus standi in probate cases.
Ishwardas v. Kanta Devi, ALR 1954 SC 280 Probate court’s primary concern is genuineness and due execution of Will and sound disposing mind of testator. Reiterated the limited scope of probate proceedings as in rem actions.
Dhane Ali v. Sobhan Ali, AIR 1978 Cal 399 Extension of probate principles to Letters of Administration. Supported the court’s understanding of probate and administration petitions.
Elizabeth Antony v. Michel Charles John Chown Lengera, AIR 1990 SC 1576 Grant of probate does not decide title disputes; probate can be revoked under Section 263 of the Succession Act. Used to emphasize that granting probate does not preclude later challenges to Will authenticity.
Raja Ram Adult v. Lakshmi Narain Adult, AIR 1958 Allahabad 149 Considered locus standi for impleadment in probate proceedings. Relied upon to support rejection of Applicant’s impleadment for lack of locus standi.
Inder Chand Nayyar v. Sarvadeshik Arya Pratinidhi Sabha & Anr, AIR 1977 Delhi 34 Considered locus standi and impleadment in probate matters. Supported court’s view on necessary parties in probate proceedings.
Edward Waston Coleston v. Mrs. Theresa Chitty & Ors., AIR 1934 Allahabad 1053 Considerations for impleadment and locus standi. Referred to in support of court’s approach to party impleadment.
Durga Charan v. Sm. Bhudibala Naskar & Ors., AIR 1985 Calcutta 264 Legal principles on party impleadment in probate proceedings. Used to buttress court’s reasoning on locus standi.
Sarat Chandra Banerjee v. Naian Mohan Banerjee, Vol. XXXVI Calcutta Services (1909) 799 Principles of impleadment and locus standi in succession matters. Considered in court’s analysis of necessary parties.
Hari Pada v. Gobinda Chandra, 1948 ILR Calcutta 300 Party impleadment principles in probate cases. Referenced for general principles on locus standi.
Mahatma v. Thakur Prasad, 1950 ILR Calcutta 653 Considerations for impleading parties in probate proceedings. Used in support of court’s view on party impleadment.
Sm. Sulochana Debi v. Mt. Puranjaya, AIR (35) 1948 Patna 419 Legal principles regarding party impleadment. Referred to in court’s discussion on necessary parties.
Hari Bhushan Datta v. Manmatha Nath Datta & Ors., AIR 1919 Calcutta 197 Principles of locus standi and impleadment in succession matters. Considered by court in party impleadment analysis.
Bhupati Charan Basu v. Chandi Charan Basu Mallick, AIR 1935 Calcutta 154 Party impleadment and locus standi principles. Used to support court’s reasoning on party status.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the application under Order 1 Rule 10 seeking impleadment of the Applicant as a party in the probate proceedings. It noted the significant delay by the Applicant in initiating probate proceedings for the Will dated 1.10.1987 despite knowledge of ongoing estate disputes and possession of the relevant property by the Applicant’s uncle. The court expressed skepticism about the genuineness of the Will based on this delay and the lack of blood relationship between the Applicant and the testatrix.

Turning to limitation, the court considered precedent including Ramanand Thakur and the Supreme Court’s decision in Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P Kunhaliumma, concluding that Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to probate applications. This article prescribes a three-year limitation period starting from when the right to apply accrues, which the court interpreted as the date when the legatee becomes aware that the Will is likely to be disputed. The Applicant’s right to apply accrued on the testatrix’s death in 1987, but probate was not initiated for over a decade, leading to dismissal of the application on limitation grounds.

The court further reasoned that the Applicant is not a Class I heir and lacks a direct interest in the estate, citing precedents that restrict impleadment to parties with direct interest rather than mere commercial or indirect interest. The court emphasized the in rem nature of probate proceedings, distinguishing them from civil suits and underscoring that probate is primarily concerned with the authenticity and due execution of the Will.

Even if the Applicant’s Will were genuine, the court stated that the ongoing petition by the Petitioner need not be rejected automatically. The appropriate remedy would be to grant probate if the Will is genuine and allow challenges or revocation under Section 263 of the Succession Act if good cause is shown later.

Finally, the court observed that the Applicant failed to produce the original Will despite multiple opportunities, further undermining the application and justifying dismissal with exemplary costs.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED the application filed by S. Gurcharan Singh to be impleaded as a party in the probate proceedings concerning the Will dated 1.10.1987.

The dismissal was grounded on the Applicant’s inordinate delay in initiating probate proceedings, the applicability of Article 137 of the Limitation Act prescribing a three-year limitation period, and the Applicant’s lack of direct interest as a necessary party in the proceedings. The court imposed exemplary costs of Rs. 5000/- on the Applicant due to the vexatious nature of the application.

This decision does not set a new precedent but reinforces existing principles regarding limitation in probate proceedings, the nature of necessary parties, and the procedural approach to disputed Wills. The direct effect is that the Applicant cannot participate in the ongoing probate petition, and the petition may proceed without his impleadment.

    Pamela Manmohan Singh. v. State & Ors.

    Vikramajit Sen, J.— This application under Order 1 Rule 10 has been filed by S. Gurcharan Singh, son of late S. Patwant Singh, through his counsel Shri Kailash Chand Dewan. It is prayed that he should be impleaded as a party in the present proceedings which are for the grant of Letters of Administration with the Will attached, relating to the estate of Mrs. Raseel Kohli, the deceased mother of the Petitioner and her deceased brother, the original Respondent No. It has been pleaded that when the Applicant came to meet his uncle, S. Raja Singh he came to learn, in the course of conversation, of the pendency of these proceedings. He was then informed by his counsel that “he should move an application for becoming a party so that the Will dated 1.10.1987 executed by the testatrix Dr. (Mrs.) Raseel Kohli, now deceased in respect of properties mentioned as 7/29, Darya Ganj, New Delhi, and property No. 6-B, Mathura Road, New Delhi that the Applicant is moving the present application before this Hon'ble Court for the purpose of determination of the right, title and interest which the Applicant has acquired by virtue of a Will dated 1.10.1987 executed in his favour by the testatrix Dr. Mrs. Raseel Kohli, now deceased”. It has been further pleaded that the application is being moved from the date that he gained knowledge of the pendency of these proceedings. The legal submission that the Applicant is a necessary and proper party and has a right to be heard in the pending probate petition is thereafter made.

    Various objections have been raised by the Petitioner but in my opinion these do not call to be dealt with in specific and separate detail. Admittedly, the alleged Will dated 1.10.1987 has not seen the light of day heretofore. Considering the fact that there was no blood relationship between late Dr. (Mrs.) Raseel Kohli and the Applicant and also because the Applicant is not in possession of property bearing No. 6-B, Jangpura Extension, Mathura Road, New Delhi, probate proceedings, for giving judicial imprimatur to the Will dated 1.10.87 ought to have been initiated much earlier. It would be reasonable to assume that any prudent person would immediately initiate probate proceeding of the alleged Will dated 1.10.1987 It would also be further reasonable to presume against the genuineness of this Will since no proceedings have heilhertofore been started by the present applicant. 1 am fully mindful of the fact that it is not mandatory that a probate be obtained in respect of Wills executed in and dealing with properties in Delhi, but this cannot be stretched to the extremity that even where there is a overwhelming probability of the Will being disputed there is still no obligation for initiating these legal steps. In the present case, numerous proceedings are pending between the petitioner, who is the daughter of late Dr. (Mrs.) Raseel Kohli and her late brother. Disputes are also pending between her and Smt. Harnam Kaur & Ors. since it is alleged that Mrs. Harnam Kaur, Mrs. Mahinder Kaur and Shri Jagjit Singh, all partners of M/s. Texla Service Centre, 6-B, Jangpura Extension, Mathura Road, New Delhi have trespassed into this property and have admitted to purchase titular rights thereof contrary to injunctions passed by this Court. The uncle of the Applicant, S. Raja Singh is a resident of this very property and it would, therefore, be fair to assume that the Applicant had full knowledge of the pendency of these conflagatory litigations. Yet no action has been taken by the Applicant, and no reason has been given why this action has not been taken.

    I have taken this view after considering the decision in Ramanand Thakur v. Permanand Thakur, AIR 1982 Patna 87, where it was observed that the “right to apply for a probate accrues from day to day so long as the will remains unprobated. In other words, the right to apply accrues every day and the cause of action for an application for probate arises every moment so long as the will remains unprobated and, therefore, for such an application there is no period of limitation and for taking this view we find full support from the Calcutta case which also finds support from the view taken by the Madras High Court in the case of Gnanamuthu Upadesi v. Vana Koipillai Nadan, (1894) ILR 17 Mad 379). Therefore, while holding that the Art. 137 of the new Limitation Act applies to any petition or application filed under any Act, we do not feel any difficulty to come to the conclusion that so far as the application for grant of a Probate or Letters of Administration is concerned, they are not governed by any article of the limitation act. The application accordingly fails and, is hereby dismissed but in the circumstances, we shall leave the parties to bear their own costs”.

    It appears to me, with due deference to the Learned Judges, that while correctly appreciating in paragraph 4, that the Apex Court had overruled its earlier view that Article 137 of the Limitation Act applied only to applications made under the Civil Procedure Code, they were influenced by decision rendered on the basis of the old Limitation Act.

    In Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum v. T.P Kunhaliumma, AIR 1977 SC 282, Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was held to “apply to any petition:

    “The conclusion we read is that Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act will apply to any petition or application filed under any Act to a civil court. With respect we differ from the view taken by the two Judge Bench of this Court in Athani Municipal Counsel case (AIR 1969 SC 1335) (supra) and hold that Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act is not confined to applications contemplated by or under the Code of Civil Procedure. The petition in the present case was to the District Judge as a court. The petition was one contemplated by the Telegraph Act for judicial decision. The petition is an application failing within the scope of Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act”.

    The decision in Shobha Kshirsagar v. Smt. Janki Kshirsagar & Anr., AIR 1987 MP 145, in which a Learned Single Judge held that Art. 137 cannot apply to an application for probate, with respect, cannot be reconciled with the decision of the Apex Court in the Kerala State Electricity Board's case (supra). The Learned Judge proceeded on the foundation of the decisions rendered by some High Court, which decisions were predicated on the old Limitation Act. Therefore, reliance on precedents prior to the rendering of the decision in the Kerala State Electricity Board's case (supra) would be inappropriate. For these very reasons I feel constrained not to follow the ratio in Balwant v. Mainabai, AIR 1991 MP 11.

    In a decision of a Division Bench rendered in Hari Narain v. Subhash Chander, AIR 1985 Punjab & Haryana 211, the argument that no limitation had been prescribed in filing of an application for revocation of a probate granted under the Succession Act was referred to as an “astounding proposition of law put forth by the learned counsel for the Applicant”. After discussing the law as enunciated by the Supreme Court, it was held by the learned Division Bench that Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to any petition or application filed in a Court where no other period of limitation had been prescribed. After careful consideration I would extend the ratio of this decision mutatis mutandis to also cover cases pertaining to the grant of probate, where it can be fairly assumed that the Petitioner had knowledge that the Will was likely to be disputed. Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under:

    Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run

    137. Any other application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Division three years When the right to apply accrues.

    The period of three years would surely commence atleast from the date on which a legatee under a Will could be justifiably ascribed with the knowledge that the Will on which his claim is founded is likely to be disputed by other persons especially the natural heirs of the Testatrix. By way of adumbration, hypothetically, a Will may have been executed in Delhi in 1950. The bequests made and dealt with therein may not have come into any dispute for several decades. It could be that some legatees were in possession of the properties with the tacit permission or approval of the other legatees, which approval was subsequently withdrawn. So long as the rights of any particular legatee are to emanate and flow from the Will, probate proceedings ought to be filed atleast within three years from this conjectured withdrawal of permission. That would then be the latest date on which “the right to apply accrues”. This would be the most appropriate and meaningful interpretation given to the words “when the right to apply occurs” The applicant in the present case must surely have been well aware that the Will would be indefaticably contested. His right to apply surely accrued on the death of the alleged Testatrix Dr. Raseel Kohli on 11.10.1987 Yet he chose not to initiate probate proceedings, and over a decade has passed thereafter.

    There are other considerations which have weighed in my mind for rejecting the application. As has been mentioned, the present petition is for the grant of probate of a Will dated 23.9.1987 stated to have been executed by the mother of the petitioner. The Applicant is not a Class I heir of the deceased late Dr. (Mrs.) Raseel Kohli and would not be a necessary party to these proceedings. Even if the case of the Applicant is presumed to be correct, this does not necessarily mean that the present petition would be automatically rejected since the Will on which the petition is founded may well be held to be genuine. The only question would be whether it is a last Will and Testament of the deceased.

    It would, however, be of advantage of refer to the cases of Razia Begum v. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum & Ors., AIR 1958 SC 886 and K.S Abraham v. Mrs. Chandy Rosamma & Ors., AIR 1989 Kerala 167. In the former case it was established that only if a party had a direct interest in the litigation, in contradistinction to a commercial interest, would it be justified to implead it, thereby transgress the universally accepted legal concept of the Petitioner/Plaintiff being dominus litis. The latter case is one amongst many others where the distinction laid down by the Apex Court has been followed. Whether a person propounding another Will should be considered to have a direct interest in the probate and administration petitions is a question which needs to be answered. Various courts have no doubt accepted that these actions relating to the succession to an Estate are on a different footing to a civil suit. The rationale must substantially be because of these proceedings having an efficacy in rem rather than in persona. Third party interests may not be in jeopardy because, inter alia, because of the application of the principles of res judicata in the latter category. Public citation, for this among other reasons is therefore carried out in probate/administrative/succession petitions. It must be borne in mind, as enunciated by the Apex Court in Ishwardas v. Kanta Devi, ALR 1954 SC 280, that “the Court of Probate is primarily concerned with the question as to whether the document put forward as the last Will and Testament of a deceased person was duly executed and attested in accordance with law and whether at the time of such execution the testator had sound disposing mind”. This principle was also extended to Letters of Administration by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Dhane Ali v. Sobhan Ali, AIR 1978 Cal 399.

    Shri Mahinder Rana, Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff, has relied on a number of judgments in support of his contention that the applicant is not a proper or necessary party to the present proceedings. In most of the cases, the Court had to consider the applicants being impleaded as the Petitioners, and from this stand-point, the relevant Concern was whether they had the requisite locus standi. The answer given by the Court was in the negative. This ratio would not apply where the applicant wishes to be impleaded in the petition as a Respondent or Objector in order to resist the grant of probate to the Will. The cases relied upon are as follows:—

    (i) Raja Ram Adult v. Lakshmi Narain Adult, AIR 1958 Allahabad 149; (ii) Inder Chand Nayyar v. Sarvadeshik Arya Pratinidhi Sabha & Anr. AIR 1977 Delhi 34; (iii) Edward Waston Coleston v. Mrs. Theresa Chitty & Ors., AIR 1934 Allahabad 1053; (iv) Durga Charan v. Sm. Bhudibala Naskar & Ors., AIR 1985 Calcutta 264; (iv) Sarat Chandra Banerjee v. Naian Mohan Banerjee Vol. XXXVI Calcutta Services (1909) 799; (vi) Hari Pada v. Gobinda Chandra 1948, ILR Calcutta 300; (vii) Mahatma v. Thakur Prasad 1950 ILR Calcutta 653; (viii) Sm. Sulochana Debi v. Mt. Puranjaya, AIR (35) 1948 Patna 419; (ix) Hari Bhushan Datta v. Manmatha Nath Datta & Ors., AIR 1919 Calcutta 197; (x) Bhupati Charan Basu v. Chandi Charan Basu Mallick, AIR 1935 Calcutta 154. I also do not consider it necessary to refer to the numerous precedents cited before me by Learned Counsel for the Petitioner on the general considerations for impleading parties under Order I Rule 10. These decisions are so many and manifold that it would meaninglessly multiply the discussion.

    The Applicant has no direct interest in the present controversy. Till date no petition has been filed for the grant of probate of the Will dated 1.10.1987 propounded by the Applicant. In the present case, at the very least, an adverse inference as to the authenticity and genuineness of the Will dated 1.10.1987 should be drawn. There would be no justification, therefore, to permit an interpolar, who has not even bothered to take requisite steps for obtaining judicial approval for the Will propounded by him to be permitted in proceedings between siblings, pertaining to the estate of their mother. The correct approach, in consonance with justice, fair play and good conscience, would be to grant probate, if the Will is found to be genuine. Otherwise a grave miscarriage of justice would occur directly resulting in inordinate delay being caused. Thereafter if good cause is shown to the Court to stay the judgment if a subsequent Will has been put in for approval in the judicial pipeline. The following observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Elizabeth Antony v. Michel Charles John Chown Lengera, AIR 1990 SC 1576 is relevant in this regard:

    “The learned Counsel, however, lastly submitted that the petitioner in spite of having substantial interest in the estate is losing her right to prove that the alleged Will by Miss Zoe Enid Browne (sic) is not a genuine one an that it is a fictitious one. We must point out that by granting a probate, the Court is not deciding the disputes to the title. Even with regard to a probate granted, it can be revoked as provided under Section 263 of the Act in any one of the cases mentioned therein. But the learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that the findings of the Sub-Court and the High Court regarding the caveatable interest will come in the petitioner's way in seeking revocation of the grant of probate. It is needless to say that the findings regarding the caveatable interest of the petitioner have a limited effect and are relevant only to the extent of granting of probate. But they cannot deprive his right, if he has any, to invoke Section 263 of the Act it is up to the petitioner to satisfy the Court.”

    It will also be relevant to mention that despite several opportunities granted for the filing of the original Will dated 1.10.1987, this document has not seen the light of day. The application is, therefore, dismissed and since it is vexatious and calculated to cause delay it is dismissed with exemplary cost of Rs. 5000/-.

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    Comments

    Pamela Manmohan Singh. v. State & Ors.
    (Dec 22, 1999)