Mohd. Shamim, J.— The petitioner through the present petition seeks quashment of the order dated August 2, 1989 passed by respondent No. 2 under Section 19(1)(a) of the Slum Areas (Improvement & Clearance) Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for the sake of convenience) whereby permission was granted to respondent No. 1 to institute eviction proceedings against Dimple (P) Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner for the sake of brevity).
2. Brief facts which gave rise to the present petition are as under: that the petitioner was inducted as a tenant in the year 1957 in the first floor of the property bearing No. 1564. Ishwari Niwas, Bhagirath Place, Chandni Chowk, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the disputed property) by Shri Ishwari Prashad father of respondent No. 1. The said Shri Ishwari Prashad filed a petition bearing petition No.ESN/5043/85 in the court of the Competent Authority (Slum) for grant of permission to initiate eviction proceedings against the petitioner for eviction from the disputed property. The said Shri Ishwari Prashad expired during the pendency of the said proceedings. Consequently on his death, respondent No. 1 herein moved an application for substitution of his name in place of his deceased father, under Order 22 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The said petition for grant of permission to initiate eviction proceedings was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated August 14, 1985 at the instance of the respondent No. 1. While dismissing the said petition no permission was granted to respondent No. 1 to present a fresh petition for the grant of permission. Respondent No. 1 neither applied for nor sought such a permission. Hence the second petition for grant of permission was not maintainable.
3. Shri Ishwari Prashad left for his heavenly abode leaving behind heirs whose names find a mention in para 3 of the petition. Respondent No. 1 however, claiming himself to be the only legal heir of the deceased Ishwari Prashad on the basis of a will, alleged to have been executed by late Ishwari Prashad, filed a second petition on December 12, 1985 under Section 19(1)(a) of the Act for permission to initiate eviction proceedings against the respondent No. 1. The said will Was never placed on record. Respondent No. 1 neither placed on record any relinquishment deed in his favour nor any ‘No Objection Certificate’ by the other legal heirs to bring forward the abovesaid petition for grant of permission. Respondent No. 1 did not implead the other legal heir's/landlords as parties to the abovesaid proceedings under Section 19(1)(a) of the Act. The petition for permission to institute the eviction proceedings was not maintainable for and on behalf of respondent No. 1 as he is not the only owner/landlord of the disputed property. Admittedly there are other legal heirs whose names find a mention in para III of the present petition. No probate was placed on record in respect of the alleged will dated August 26, 1983. The impugned order dated August 2, 1989 passed by the Competent Authority under Section 19(1)(a) of the Act granting permission to the respondent No. 1 to institute eviction proceedings is illegal and invalid.
4. The petitioner company is being run in losses as is manifest from the extract of the balance-sheets filed on record. The petitioner neither have got any income nor capital resources to acquire an alternative accommodation. It is absolutely wrong and false that the petitioner had acquired any alternative accommodation bearing No. K-9, Connaught Circus, New Delhi. The aforementioned premises is in the tenancy of Shri Arun Purie and V.V Purie wherein they are having their offices. The mere fact that the registered office of the petitioner company remained at the abovesaid premises for a short duration from June 26, 1982 to November 30, 1984 in order to enable the petitioner to receive their correspondence at the abovesaid office would not be tantamount to acquisition of alternative accommodation by the petitioner. In any case, the abovesaid fact was prior to the institution of the petition for grant of permission under the Act and as such could not be considered at all. The registered office of the petitioner continues to be at the disputed premises since 1984. The fact is that the petitioner have never been in occupation of the abovesaid premises i.e premises bearing No. K-9, Connaught Circus, New Delhi. The observation of the Competent Authority that the petitioner have the capacity to hire or own alternative accommodation at Connaught Circus is based on no evidence. Respondent No. 1 filed the petition for permission in respect of only a part of the tenanted accommodation. The impugned permission granted by the Competent Authority would as such operate as a permission for part of the tenanted accommodation. The impugned order is thus liable to be set aside.
5. It is wrong and false that the petitioner had acquired an alternative accommodation at village Rajokri, Tehsil Mehrauli. In fact, the said property is owned by M/s Living Media Ltd. The petition for grant of permission is false and frivolous and thus should have been dismissed. Consequently it has been prayed that the impugned order dated August 2, 1989 passed by the Competent Authority be set aside and quashed.
6. Respondent No. 1 has opposed the above petition, inter alia, on the following grounds: that the impugned order passed by the Competent Authority under Section 19(1) (a) of the Act is perfectly legal and valid as the petitioner have acquired an alternative accommodation at Rajokri, Tehsil Mehrauli. with a telephone bearing No. 393849. As per the balance sheet of the petitioner for the year ending March 31, 1986 their profit is stated to be Rs. 1747/- and after meeting the statutory liabilities it is to the tune of Rs. 747/- only. This goes to show that the petitioner have hardly any business. The petitioner are admittedly a private limited company and, as such, a juristic person and thus not a natural person. The object of the Act is that poor tenants should not be evicted from their places in case they have got no means to hire or own an alternative accommodation as they would create slums at other places. However, the provisions of the Act would not be applicable to a juristic person like the petitioner company inasmuch as a juristic person has got no right to exist and is liable to be wound up if it has got no means to carry its business or is unable to take any other alternative accommodation on rent.
7. Respondent No. 1 has already filed a petition for eviction against the petitioner on the ground of sub-letting assignment or parting with possession over the disputed property to M/s (1) Thomson Press India Ltd. (2) All India Film Distributors and (3) Movies Private Limited. Thus if this is found to be correct in the abovesaid proceedings in that eventuality the petitioner have got no right to claim protection under Section 19(1)(a) of the Act. The telephone bearing No. 230741 installed at the disputed premises is in the name of All India Film Distributors. Admittedly the telephone in the name of the petitioner company has been shifted to village Rajokri, Tehsil Mehrauli. The existence of the above telephone belonging to All India Film Distributors at the disputed property goes to show that the petitioner have transferred the disputed property to All India Film Distributors and have acquired another accommodation at village Rajokri.
8. Respondent No. 1 is the owner and landlord of the disputed property inasmuch as Shri Ishwari Prashad Aggarwal left a will dated August 26, 1983. by which he bequeathed the disputed property to the respondent No. 1 alone. The petitioner company attorned to respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 1 was receiving rent and issuing receipts in token thereof to the petitioner as the sole landlord. Ever otherwise a co-owner is the owner of the entire property and the petitioner having attorned to respondent No. 1 cannot now deny the title of respondent No. 1. The petition is false and frivolous. It is liable to be dismissed.
9. Learned lower court after hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after scrutinising the relevant material on record came to the conclusion that the present case was a fit case for grant of permission under Section 19(1)(a) of the Act to institute eviction proceedings against the petitioner as according to the learned lower court the disputed property was not at all needed by the petitioner and they were in a position to acquire an alternative accommodation. Consequently, the above petition was allowed vide the impugned order dated August 2, 1989.
10. Aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the said judgment and order the petitioner have approached this Court.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently contended that the father of the respondent No. 1 Shri Ishwari Prashad initially brought forward a petition under Section 19(1)(a) of the Act for permission to initiate eviction proceedings against the petitioner. Shri Ishwari Prashad breathed his last during the pendency of the said proceedings. Respondent No. 1 thereafter moved an application for substitution and his name was substituted in place of his deceased father. Later on the withdrew the said petition and the same was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated August 14, 1985, however, without granting any permission to respondent No. 1 to institute a fresh petition. Thus the present petition which was filed on December 12, 1985 was not maintainable and should have been dismissed as such by the learned lower court.
12. Learned counsel for the petitioner has then argued that the respondent No. 1 is not the only owner and landlord. There are quite a good number of other owners and landlords of the disputed property whose names find a mention in para III of the present petition. However, they were not impleaded as petitioners in the petition under Section 19(1)(a) of the Act. Thus the petition under Section 19(1)(a) of the Act was not maintainable and was liable to be dismissed. The other contention put forward by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that admittedly the petitioner are running in losses. Their annual income is just Rs. 747/-. Hence in case the eviction order is passed against the petitioner they would not be in a position to acquire an alternative accommodation and thus will create slum. Consequently, the learned counsel, in view of the above, wants this Court to quash the impugned order.
13. Learned counsel for respondent No. 1 Mr. Ishwar Sahai, Senior Advocate, has urged to the contrary.
14. I have heard the learned counsel for both the parties at sufficient length and have very carefully examined their rival contentions and have given my anxious thoughts thereto.
15. The first and the foremost point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is with regard to the maintainability of the petition for grant of permission moved by respondent No. 1 on December 12, 1985. According to the learned counsel the said petition was not at all maintainable in the absence of any permission to move such petition after the dismissal of the earlier petition on August 14, 1985 for grant of permission on to initiate eviction proceedings against the petitioner. Learned counsel in support of his argument has drawn my attention to the provisions of Order 23 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is in the following words:—
“Withdrawal of suit of abandonment of part of claim.
1. (1) At any time after the institution of a suit the plaintiff may as against all or any of the defendants abandon his suit or abandon a part of his claim;
……………..
2……………..
3. Where the Court is satisfied:—
(a) that a suit must fail by reason of some formal defect, or
(b) that there are sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit for the subject-matter of a suit or part of a claim.
It may, on such terms as it thinks fit, grant the plaintiff permission to withdraw from such suit or such part of the claim with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject-matter of such suit or such part of the claim.
(4) Where the plaintiff:—
(a) abandons any suit or part of claim under sub-rule (1), or
(b) withdraws from a suit or part of a claim without the permission referred to in sub-rule (3).
he shall be liable for such costs as the Court may award and shall be precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such subject-matter or such part of the claim”.
16. Learned counsel for the petitioner has thus argued that since no permission was granted to respondent No. 1 at the time of the withdrawal of the first petition for grant of permission to institute eviction proceedings against the respondent No. 1 consequently the second petition was obviously barred by Order 23 Rule (4)(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure and the said petition should have been dismissed by the learned lower court on this preliminary ground alone.
17. The contention of the learned counsel at the first blush appears to be quite valid and legal in the circumstances of the present case, however, on a deeper scrutiny we find that it has got no force.
18. Proceedings under Section 19 of the Act for grant of permission are of a summary nature. Thus the time-consuming provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are not to be invoked in such proceedings. In case the provisions of the Code are made applicable to such proceedings, in that eventuality it would not be possible to dispose of such petitions at an early date. The underlying idea behind the enactment of the Slum Areas (Improvement & Clearance) Act, 1956 is to provide for the improvement and clearance of slum areas in certain Union Territories and for the protection of poor tenants in such areas from eviction. The civil courts have been debarred from taking cognizance in respect of any matter which the Competent Authority or any other person is empowered under this Act to determine and no injunction shall be granted by any Court or other Authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act (vide Section 37 A of the Act).
19. It is manifest from above that while enacting the said Act an effort was made to streamline the procedure which is to be adopted in matters with regard to slum areas and with the said end in view the abovesaid Act was passed. A matter very much akin to the matter in hand came up before a Division Bench of this court as reported in Ashoka Marketing Ltd. v. B.D Gupta, 1976 Rajdhani Law Reporter 217. It was observed while disposing of the said matter (vide para 6).
The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is meant to provide for adjudication of labour disputes in a simple manner free from legal technicalities. In Guest Keen Williams Private Limited v. P.J Sterling. (1960 1 S.C.R 348) the Supreme Court observed that in industrial disputes legal technicalities should be avoided as far as it was reasonably possible to do so and industrial tribunals should be cautious in applying even such otherwise solitary principles such as estoppel and acquiescence in proceedings before them. The same reason may operate against the application of the principle underlying Order XXIII rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure to such proceedings as also to the proceedings under the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956”.
20. It was further observed in para 12(C) of the said judgment. “The order “dismissed as withdrawn” cannot be regarded as final for the simple reason that the dismissal was only because the petition was withdrawn obviously because the petitioner did not wish the merits to be decided and wanted to file a fresh petition on the same cause of action. As the court or the tribunal did not choose to bar, the filing of a fresh petition, no such power can be implied. The court or the tribunal contemplated the possibility of a fresh suit or petition being filed when it allowed the withdrawal of the earlier suit or petition. It was not necessary for the court or the tribunal to expressly grant permission to file a fresh suit or petition………………..”.
21. Thus it can be safely inferred from above that the second petition was not barred.
22. The next contenti on raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the pe-. titioner is not the only owner and landlord of the disputed. There are other owners and landlord besides the petitioner whose names find a mention in para III of the present petition. The contention of the learned counsel does not hold any water.
23. Admittedly respondent No. 1 is one of the owners and landlords of the disputed property. The petitioner have not disputed this fact inasmuch as their contention is simply this much that the respondent No. 1 is not the only owner and landlord (as stated by them vide para 1 of the affidavit sworn by Shri Sat Pal Sood Director of the petitioner company dated January 31, 1988). Thus the respondent No. 1 could have brought forward the petition for grant of permission as one of the co-owners and landlords of the disputed property. It is a well settled principle of law that so long as there is no partition amongst the co-owners of a particular property each one of them is the owner of the whole besides the owner of the portion which may fall to his share after the division of the propqrty. Thus the respondent No. 1 could have very well filed the petition for grant of permission under Section 19 of the Act.
24. The above view was given vent to by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as reported in Shri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath and others AIR 1976 Supreme Court 2335, (vide para 29)……..” Jurisprudentially it is not correct to say that a co-owner of a property is not its owner. He owns every part of the composite property- along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part-owner or a fractional owner of the property. The position will change only when partition takes place. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the submission that the plaintiff who is admittedly the landlord and co-owner of the premises is not the owner of the premises within the meaning of Section 13(1)(f). It is not necessary to establish that the plaintiff is” the only owner of the property for the purpose of Section 13(1)(f) as long as he is a co-owner of the property being at the same time the acknowledged landlord of the defendants”.
25. To the same effect are the observations of a Single Judge of this Court as reported in Khurshid Haider etc. v. Zubeda Begum, 1979 Rajdhani Law Reporter 161. (paras 12 & 13).
26. There is another side of the picture. It has been stated vide paras III & IV of the reply by respondent No. 1 to the show cause notice dated May 2, 1990 that the disputed property was bequeathed to respondent No. 1 through a will dated August 26, 1983. The petitioner were duly apprised of the said fact after the death of Shri Ishwari Prashad Aggarwal. The petitioner thereupon attorned to respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 1 was collecting rent and issuing rent receipt to the petitioner as the sole landlord. This fact has been admitted by the petitioner through an affidavit sworn by Mr. Sat Pal Sood, Director of the petitioner company, (vide para 3 of the affidavit dated May 29, 1989). I am tempted to reproduce the said words. “I say that the respondent (petitioner) has paid the rent to Shri Ish Kumar Aggarwal without prejudice to its rights and contentions that he is not the only landlord and on his undertaking that he would indemnify the respondent (petitioner herein) against any claims”. Thus it is abundantly clear from above that the petitioner have been paying rent in respect of the disputed property to respondent No. 1 and he has been issuing the rent receipts to the petitioner in token thereof. Ergo, the-petitioner cannot now be permitted to urge to the contrary and to say that respondent No. 1 is not their landlord and they are no the tenant under respondent No. 1 in the disputed property.
27. It has then been urged for and on behalf of respondent No. 1 that the petitioner have acquired another property at Corinaught Circus bearing K-9, where they have shifted their registered office. They have one more property at village Rajokri, Tehsil Mehrauli, New Delhi, where they are running their office and have got installed their own telephone. In fact they have shifted their office over there learned Counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, has urged to the contrary. According to him, this is not correct. ‘
28. The Competent Authority in the instant case on the presentation of a petition under Section 19 of the Act for grant of permission to initiate eviction proceedings against the petitioner issued a notice for service on the petitioner at the address 1564, Bhagirath Place, Chandni Chowk, Delhi, i.e, the disputed property. The process server in connection therewith visited the disputed property and found that the petitioner were no more there as they had shifted to K-9, Connaught Circus, New Delhi (vide report of the process server dated February 3, 1986 on the back of the notice-Annexure R-4). This fact further becomes crystal clear from the notice placed on the file of this Court by the petitioner themselves that the office of the petitioner company was situated No. 9, K Block, Connaught Circus, New Delhi during the period from June 26, 1982 to November 30, 1984. Mr. Sat Pal Sood, Director of the petitioner company, has also admitted this fact (vide para 5 of his affidavit dated January 13, 1988). According to him one of the Directors of the petitioner company is also a Director of other companies who have got their office at K-9, Connaught Circus, New Delhi. Hence at times the mail addressed to the petitioner Company or to their Director is received at K-9, Connaught Circus, New Delhi. The same thing has been reiterated in para 4 of the written statement filed before the Competent Authority dated August 5, 1986. Thus, it can be safely concluded from above that the petitioner Company have acquired another premises bearing No. K-9, Connaught Circus, New Delhi.
29. It brings me to the acquisition of the premises at Rajokri, Tehsil Mehrauli Respondent No. 1 has placed on record a photocopy of the extract from the telephone directory which shows that the telephone bearing No. 393849 is in the name of the petitioner and is installed at village Rajokri, Tehsil Mehrauli, New Delhi-110030. The petitioner have not challenged the fact that the telephone bearing No. 393849 has been installed at Rajokri, Tehsil Mehrauli, New Delhi. In fact the petitioner have tried to explain the shifting of the said telephone number to Rajokri by saying that the said telephone number had been lent to M/s Living Media Ltd. The mere lending of the said telephone to the said company would not make any difference and would not create any interest of the petitioner in the disputed property (vide para 6 of the reply affidavit filed by Mr. Sat Pal Sood before the Competent Authority on January 29, 1989).
30. The said contention of the learned Counsel is without any merit inasmuch as rule 429 of the rules for Indian Telephone provides that no subscriber shall be entitled to transfer the telephone withouts the permission of the Telephone Authority. Furthermore, it is amply clear from the telephone directory that the said telephone number is in the name of the petitioner at village Rajokri, Tehsil Mehrauli, New Delhi.
31. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has then argued that the disputed property is no more in the possession and occupation of the petitioner company inasmuch as the same has been transferred to All India Film Distributors who have got their telephone installed at the disputed property. Learned counsel in support of his contention has placed reliance on a photocopy of an extract from the telephone directory. The petitioner while dealing with the said plea through the affidavit of Mr. Sat Pal Sood, have not disputed the installation of the said telephone number at the disputed property. According to them, the said telephone number is being used by the petitioner for their own business purposes (vide para 6 of the affidavit sworn by Mr. Sat Pal Sood” dated May 29, 1989). The said factor again lends assurance to the fact that the petitioner are no more in occupation of the disputed property and they have moved to the abovementioned places.
32. The next point raised for and on behalf of the petitioner is that the petitioner are a very poor company. The same is running in losses. The total income of the petitioner company for the year ending March 31, 1986 was only Rs. 1747/- and after meeting the statutory liabilities it was to the tune of Rs. 747/- and the same was also adjusted against the carry forward losses (vide para 4 of the affidavit filed by Mr. Sat Pal Sood before the Competent Authority dated January 13, 1988). The learned counsel in view of the above has contended that in case an eviction order is passed against the petitioner company they would not be in a position to hire or own an alternative accommodation and, thus, they will create slum.
33. Learned counsel for respondent No. 1 Mr. Ishwar Sahai, on the other hand has argued that the petitioner company are a juristic person. They are not a natural person. Thus, the protection meant for the eviction of poor tenants from their respective accommodations cannot be made available to the petitioner. I find myself in perfect agreement with the learned counsel for respondent No. 1
34. Admittedly the petitioner are a company. Thus, they are a juristic person. A company is formed when certain persons join hands with a view to carrying some commercial or industrial undertaking. Thus, it can naturally be formed by those persons who have got sufficient funds to carry on their business. A company cannot be run by poor persons with no financial means to run the same. The object and the purpose for the enactment of the Slum Areas (Improvement & Clearance) Act, 1956 was to clear the slums and to provide protection to poor tenants against harassment at the hands of landlords who bring forward and initiate proceedings for their eviction. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court while anim-advertising on the said object, of the Act opined in Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi and others, AIR 1961 Supreme Court 1602, (para 15)……”. It is after this that we have Chapter VI whose terms we have already set out. This Chapter is headed “Protection of tenants in Slum Areas from eviction.” Obviously if the protection that is afforded is read in the context of the rest of the Act it is clear that it is to enable the poor who have no other place to go out would necessarily create other slums in the process and live perhaps in less commodious and more unhealthy surroundings then those from which they were evicted to remain in their dwellings until provision is made for a better life for them elsewhere……”
35. I am also tempted to cite the observations of a Single Judge of this Court as reported in Bismilla Jan v. Jain Tractors & Auto Spare, 1985 Rajdhani Law Reporter 477, (para 13)…….”. The Slum Act was enacted for giving protection to poor individual tenants who have small means and cannot afford to get alternate accommodation outside the slum area or within the slum if evicted. If a couple of persons with substantial means float a company which goes into losses, even if they are evicted from the premises, they cannot create slums, particularly when the same persons own other concerns which also have offices at different places”.
36. Learned counsel for the petitioner during the course of his arguments cited some authorities. I have gone through the same very carefully. Yet I find they are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
37. In the abovestated circumstances I do not see any force in the present petition.. The same is hereby dismissed with costs assessed at Rs. 15,0000/-. Any observation made by this Court in the body of this judgment is confined only to the facts and circumstances of the present case for the disposal of the present case and would not be deemed to be an expression of opinion to have any bearing on the proceedings pending against the petitioner before the Rent Controller, Delhi.
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