AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • 39 Rule 2-A CPC,
  • Order 39, Rule 3
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • 39 Rule 2-A CPC,
  • Order 39, Rule 3
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion addresses an application by the plaintiff under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) alleging disobedience of an injunction granted on 22-6-1994. The plaintiff had originally filed a suit seeking a decree of declaration that the suit property, Khosla Hospital, was public trust property. The plaint was rejected after leave under Section 92 CPC was refused. The plaintiff alleges that respondents Nos. 1 and 2, defendants in the suit, violated the injunction by transferring or alienating the property to respondents Nos. 3, 4, and 5, who were impleaded in the present application. The plaintiff contends that this transfer or creation of third party interest was in violation of the restraint order that prohibited transferring or disposing of the property.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether respondent Nos. 1 and 2 willfully disobeyed the injunction order dated 22-6-1994 by transferring or alienating the trust property.
  2. Whether respondent Nos. 3, 4, and 5, having knowledge of the injunction, aided and abetted the alleged contempt.
  3. Whether the induction of respondents Nos. 3 to 5 as members of the society and governing body amounts to a transfer or creation of a third party interest in the trust property.
  4. Whether the principle of lifting the corporate veil applies to determine the true nature of the transaction and the interest of respondents Nos. 3 to 5.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 transferred the hospital property to respondents Nos. 3, 4, and 5 along with control of the society, violating the injunction.
  • Respondents Nos. 3, 4, and 5, though not original parties, had knowledge of the injunction and thus are liable for aiding and abetting contempt.
  • The transfer included induction of new members into the General Body and Governing Body, effectively transferring control.
  • Respondent No. 3 paid Rs. 2.5 crores to a creditor on behalf of the society, evidencing acquisition of interest.
  • Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 gave indemnity to respondent Nos. 3 to 5, indicating a transfer for consideration of Rs. 4.5 crores.
  • The Delhi Development Authority cancelled the lease and the Income Tax authorities cancelled charitable registration due to the transfer.
  • Evidence includes affidavits from a property broker and Mr. V.S. Anand confirming control by respondents Nos. 3 to 5.
  • Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 advertised the sale of the property and allegedly manipulated society records to show the transaction predated the injunction.
  • The plaintiff urged the court to lift the corporate veil, relying on the Supreme Court decision in DDA v. Skipper Construction Pvt. Ltd., to reveal the true nature of the transaction and impose punishment for contempt.

Respondent Nos. 1 and 2's Arguments

  • The dispute is part of ongoing acrimonious litigation within the Khosla family, with multiple related suits and complaints.
  • There was no contravention of the society's Rules and Regulations and no transfer of society assets for any consideration.
  • The society was in financial crisis; respondents Nos. 3 to 5 were inducted as members to provide necessary funds and strengthen management.
  • The society continues to own the property; no third party interest was created.
  • Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 remain Chairman and Director of the society respectively.
  • The cancellation of the lease by the Delhi Development Authority has been stayed by the court, and knowledge of Income Tax deregistration is disclaimed.

Respondent Nos. 3 to 5's Arguments

  • They were inducted as members prior to the injunction order in April 1996.
  • The court need not delve into alleged manipulation of records.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Vidya Charan Shukal v. Tamil Nadu Olympic Association, AIR 1991 Madras 323 Third party or stranger with notice or knowledge of injunction aiding or abetting contempt is liable for civil contempt. Referenced by plaintiff's counsel to argue respondents Nos. 3 to 5 could be held liable for aiding contempt.
DDA v. Skipper Construction Pvt. Ltd., J.T (1996) 4 S.C.C 679 Principle of lifting the corporate veil to look beyond the corporate entity where it is a facade for illegal or improper purposes. Rejected by the court as distinguishable; court held the facts did not justify lifting the corporate veil in this case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined whether the respondents willfully disobeyed the injunction order by transferring or alienating the trust property or creating a third party interest. The plaintiff conceded that the property continued to be owned and run by the society. The court found that the induction of respondents Nos. 3 to 5 as members of the society and governing body did not amount to a transfer of any asset or creation of a third party interest. Although respondents Nos. 3 to 5 may have gained control of the management, respondents Nos. 1 and 2 remained Chairman and Director respectively, and the society retained ownership of the property.

The court also considered the plaintiff's request to lift the corporate veil, relying on the cited Supreme Court precedent. It held that the principle of lifting the corporate veil applies only where the corporate entity is a facade for illegal or improper purposes and where public interest demands it. The court found this case to be an extension of a family dispute and declined to apply the principle to settle personal scores.

Consequently, the court concluded there was no willful disobedience of the injunction order, and respondents Nos. 3 to 5 did not aid or abet any contempt.

Holding and Implications

The contempt application is dismissed and the contempt notice discharged.

Parties are directed to bear their own costs. The decision directly affects the parties by rejecting the plaintiff's claim of contempt and refusing to lift the corporate veil. No new precedent was established by this ruling.

    J.C Khosla v. Khosla Medical Institute And Research Society Etc.

    Manmohan Sarin, J. (ORAL)— This is plaintiff's application under order 39 Rule 2-A CPC, for proceedings against respondents Nos. 1 and 2, who were defendant Nos. 2 and 4 in the suit, and against respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5, who have been impleaded in the present application, for disobedience of the injunction granted on 22-6-1994.

    2. The plaintiff had filed a suit for decree of declaration, claiming that the suit property was a public trust property. In the event, leave under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure had been refused and the plaint was rejected. However, the plaintiff alleges violation of the restraint order passed on 22.6.94 The said order reads as under:—

    I.A.6386/94

    Notice.

    In the meantime, the respondents are restrained from transferring or alienating or disposing of or creating any third party interest in Khosla Hospital, Shalimar Bagh, West Delhi. Order 39, Rule 3 be complied with. DASTI.

    3. The plaintiff's case may be briefly stated. The plaintiff claims that the respondent/contemnor Nos. 1 and 2 have, after the passing of the order and its communication, transferred the “Khosla Hospital” i.e property in suit, to contemnor Nos. 3, 4 and 5 along with the management of Defendant society. The respondent/contemnors 3,4 and 5, who were not parties to the suit are claimed to have been informed of the order passed by the Court on 25.6.94 Learned counsel submits that respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5 would be equally liable for the contempt inasmuch as having been informed of the order, they have aided and abetted the contempt. Learned counsel relies on Vidya Charan Shukal v. Tamil Nadu Olympic Association reported at AIR 1991 Madras 323, wherein it was held that if a third party or a stranger aids or abets the violation with notice or knowledge of the order of injunction, he could be guilty of civil contempt.

    4. The plaintiff's allegation against respondent Nos. 1 and 2 is that they have transferred the trust property by induction of new members in the society. Alternatively counsel urged that if for some reason the Court was to hold that there was no transfer of the properties of the trust or of the hospital, this was a case of creation of a third party interest. The plaintiff/applicant has placed on record details of the alleged resolutions by which 34 new members were added to the General Body of the society and 6 new members were added to the existing 5 members of the governing body, who are also referred to as Board of Directors, making a total of 11 members of the governing body.

    Learned counsel argued that the contemnors/respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had in fact transferred the property of the hospital to contemnor Nos. 3, 4 and 5 for a consideration of Rs. 4.50 crores. He submits as a result of this transaction, the respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5 have taken over the hospital and the society and are controlling the same. It is urged by him that Respondent No. 3 contemnor, in fact, has paid to a creditor of the society, namely, Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India a sum of Rs. 2.5 crores on behalf of the society from his own funds. This respondent No. 3 would not have so done, had he not acquired interest in the properties of the society. Learned counsel states that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have also given an indemnity agreeing to indemnify the respondent contemnors Nos. 3 to 5 against any threatened legal action by the plaintiff. There would have been no occasion for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to give this indemnity, if there was no transfer. The indemnity has been given because respondent Nos. 1 and 2, received consideration for the transfer.

    5. Learned counsel for the plaintiff further argued that the Delhi Development Authority was in these circumstances constrained to cancel the ‘lease’ of the trust property on the ground that there has been a transfer in favour of “Maharishi Ayurveda.” the name under which respondent Nos. 3 to 5 were running the hospital. Learned counsel for the plaintiff also submitted that the Income tax authorities have been constrained to cancel the registration granted to the society as a charitable institution making donations to it exigible to tax.

    6. Learned counsel for the plaintiff also relics on an affidavit of a property broker filed by the plaintiff to the effect that the transfer was on a consideration of Rs. 4.5 crores. He further relies on another affidavit by one Mr. V.S Anand wherein it is stated that the Respondent Nos. 3-5 are running and controlling the administration of the hospital.

    Mr. Gambhir further submits that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had even taken out advertisements for sale of the property. The said advertisements have been filed alongwith the plaint. The present transaction was just a culmination of that effort. Mr. Gambhir submitted that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have manipulated and tempered with the records of defendant's society in an attempt to show that the transaction had taken place prior to restraint order. He argued that the resolution dated 15-4-1995 appears at pages 40 to 41 of the Minute Book while a later resolution of 2-5-1994 appears at pages 38 to 39 of the Minute Book.

    7. Mr. Gambhir argued that this was a fit case where the Court should lift the corporate veil and look at the real nature of the transaction. He submitted that this was a case where the respondents/contemnors have acquired the property by becoming member of the General Body as well as the Governing Body of the society. Learned counsel relied on the observations made by the Apex Court in DDA v. Skipper Construction Pvt. Ltd. reported at J.T (1996) 4 S.C.C 679. He, therefore, prayed that the respondents/contemnors should be punished for the disobedience of the injunction order.

    8. Learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 and 2, Mr. Sanjay Karol, refuted the allegations made. He submitted that the instant case is really an off-shoot of acrimonious litigation that had been going on between the members of the Khosla family. Respondent No. 2 happens to be the elder brother of the plaintiff. Apart from the present litigation, it is stated that there are six civil suits, two criminal complaints filed by the plaintiff. The present litigation is only a sequel to the same. Mr. Karol submitted that it is not the case of the plaintiff that there has been any contravention of the Rules and Regulations governing the Society. The plaintiff has simply alleged that there has been a transfer of the assets of the society for a surreptitious consideration, which is non existent.

    Mr. Karol submits that the factual position was that the society had not been functioning well and had reached a stage of acute financial crisis. More funds were needed to be pumped into the society and the hospital to prevent complete attrition of the investment already made. It was in these circumstances, that Respondent Nos. 3-5, who displayed interest in contributing to this philanthropic venture, were inducted as members of the society and also made members of the governing body. Mr. Karol submits that there has been no transfer or sale in favour of the respondent Nos. 3-5. There is no creation of a third party interest. The society continues to own its property. As a result of the induction of Respondent No. 3-5 and their group, badly needed funds for the society were made available. A sum of Rs. 2.5 crores was paid to the Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India. The hospital has become functional. Further the system of “Ayurveda” has been introduced in a wing of the hospital to provide cheap and speedy treatment, to the masses.

    9. Mr Karol submits that Respondent No. 1 continues to be the Chairman of the society and Respondent No. 2 continues to be the Director of the society. As for the cancellation of the lease deed by the Delhi Development Authority, the same has been stayed by this Court. Mr. Karol disclaimed any knowledge about the deregistration by the Income tax authorities.

    10. Learned counsel for respondent Nos. 3-5 submits that the respondent Nos. 3 to 5 had been inducted as members prior to the passing of the order in April, 1996 itself. It is not necessary to go into the controversy regarding manipulation of records.

    11. The short question that arises for my consideration is whether there has been any willful disobedience of the order dated 22-6-1994, by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and whether respondent Nos. 2 to 5 have aided and abetted the same? The plaintiff does not dispute that the property and hospital continues to be owned and run by the society. The plaintiff's case is that by induction of respondent Nos. 3 to 5 and their associates, the control of the society has been taken over by them which amounts to a transfer or creation of a third party interest. I am unable to accept this contention of the plaintiff. The net result of the transaction complained is that of the respondent Nos. 3 to 5 have become members of the society and member of the Governing Body. There is no transfer of any asset of the society or of the Hospital in favour of the respondents or their associated individually or in favour of any third party. The assets continue to be owned by the society. It is a different matter that respondent Nos. 3 to 5 have been inducted to provide funds or give strength to the management of the Society or for that matter they may have even taken control of the management. It would be pertinent to notice here that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 continue to be the Chairman and director of the hospital. Similarly, there would be no transfer of interest in favour of third party by additional members being inducted in the Governing Body. I am accordingly, not persuaded to hold that this is a case of transfer or alienation of property or creation of third party or interest. Respondent Nos. 3 to 5 do not claim any ownership or interest in the property dehors their capacity as members of the society.

    12. As regards the submission of Mr. Gambhir that on principle analogous to the lifting of corporate veil, the transaction should be viewed and the interest of respondent Nos. 3 to 5 determined. The case cited by the counsel for plaintiff at the bar DDA v. Skipper Construction Pvt. Ltd.—Supra is completely distinguishable on facts. I am afraid that the present case is not one where the principle applicable for lifting of the corporate veil, can be applied. The principle for lifting of corporate veil are well settled. It is in cases where the Court finds that corporate entity is really a facade for an illegal or improper purpose and it is in public interest to do so the Court moves in to lift the corporate veil. The present litigation appears to be a extension of a family feud. The principle of lifting of corporate veil cannot be allowed to be used to enable parties to settle personal scores.

    In view of the foregoing discussion, I am of the view that there has been no wilful disobedience of the order dated 22-6-1994. The contempt notice is discharged and the application is dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    J.C Khosla v. Khosla Medical Institute And Research Society Etc.
    (May 15, 1996)