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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion by Mr. R.C. Lahoti, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, an employee of the respondent Delhi Transport Corporation (DTC) holding the post of Driver, filed the present petition on 16.8.1994 seeking quashing of a charge-sheet dated 19.2.1987 (Annexure P-2) and a notice dated 17.8.1987 (Annexure P-1) requiring him to show cause against a proposed penalty in departmental enquiry (D.E.) proceedings.

The charge alleged that the petitioner remained absent frequently, amassing 165 days of leave without pay in the period 1.10.1985 to 30.9.1986, constituting misconduct within para 19(1) of the Standing Orders governing DTC employees.

Instead of answering the show cause notice, the petitioner filed a civil suit in the Court of Sub-Judge, Delhi on 11.9.1987 and obtained an ex-parte ad-interim injunction on 15.9.1987 restraining further departmental proceedings. DTC contested that suit; on 30.7.1994 the Sub-Judge vacated the interim injunction, held the suit not maintainable and dismissed it, concluding that the plaintiff's remedy lay within service rules and departmental remedies and quoting a Division Bench decision (Inder Raj Singh v. DTC).

The Sub-Judge's order was not appealed. On 16.8.1994 the petitioner filed the instant writ petition; on 18.8.1994 he again secured an ex-parte ad-interim writ restraining further steps in connection with the show cause notice.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable to quash a charge-sheet and a show cause notice at the interlocutory stage of departmental enquiry proceedings.
  2. Whether the petitioner’s conduct in seeking injunctive relief and repeatedly approaching courts to restrain departmental enquiry amounts to an abuse of the process of the court.
  3. Whether policy decisions (DTC circulars) or the wording of the charge-sheet (e.g., reference to “availed 165 days leave without pay”) preclude continuation of the departmental enquiry and thus justify quashing the proceedings at this stage.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The phrase “availed 165 days leave without pay” in the charge-sheet implies that leave without pay had been sanctioned, and therefore the petitioner could not have been charged—i.e., sanctioned LWOP would regularize the absence.
  • The charge-sheet is vague because it does not expressly set out that leave had been refused.
  • The petitioner relied on two departmental circulars of the DTC dated 14.12.1988 and 16.8.1993 (Annexures P-3 and P-4) which, he submitted, show a policy to drop enquiries where leave without pay had been sanctioned and to amend charge-sheets in other cases; he argued the DTC had failed to act in accordance with those circulars.

Respondent’s (DTC) Arguments

  • The writ petition is not maintainable and is a gross abuse of the court’s process; the petitioner’s conduct is unbecoming and obstinate.
  • All contentions raised in the writ petition could and should be raised by the petitioner in reply to the impugned show cause notice and before the disciplinary authorities; they are available remedies within the departmental process.
  • The respondents produced tabulated facts (pages 5 to 7) alleging repeated abstentions by the petitioner on pretexts of sickness of family members, his own sickness, and often without seeking leave.
  • The respondents argued they could not implement any internal circulars in respect of the petitioner while court orders (injunctions) were in force restraining the departmental enquiry.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Shri Brahm Datt Sharma, (1987) 2 SCC 179; AIR 1987 SC 943 High Court should not quash a show cause notice at the interlocutory stage; ordinarily the Government servant must show cause to the authority and courts should be reluctant to interfere unless notice is palpably without authority. The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that interference with a show cause notice before the disciplinary authority has considered the response is premature and unjustified.
Chanan Singh v. Registrar, Co-Op. Societies, Punjab, (1976) 3 SCC 361; AIR 1976 SC 1821 Writ petition challenging revival/reopening of disciplinary proceedings is premature where no punitive action has been taken; the outcome is speculative until the disciplinary process concludes. The court invoked this principle to hold that the present petition was premature and that contentions should be raised before the disciplinary authority and appellate remedies if a penalty is imposed.
Sahib Singh v. Delhi Administration, Delhi, 1984 LAB.I.C 1509 (Delhi) Where matters are at the initial stage of a show cause notice, petitioners should pursue departmental remedies before approaching the Court; show cause notices were issued before writs were filed. The court used this decision to reiterate that administrative remedies should be exhausted and initial show cause proceedings should be allowed to proceed.
Inder Raj Singh v. Delhi Transport Corporation, OMP 3346/92 & CW 6214/92 (order dated 15.1.93) When departmental proceedings are initiated, judicial restraint requires that writ courts should not ordinarily interfere at interlocutory stages; factual and legal contentions can be raised before the disciplinary and appellate authorities. The Sub-Judge had followed and quoted this Division Bench authority; this Court relied on the same principle in holding that departmental proceedings should ordinarily be permitted to conclude before court intervention.
Hari Chand v. D.T.C., C.W. 3490/94 (decided 10.2.95); 58 (1995) DLT 751 Notices to show cause issued by competent authority are valid; writ petitions challenging them at interlocutory stage are premature; workmen have remedies (e.g., Labour Court) if punished. The court cited this decision to reinforce that the notices were valid and that premature writs challenging show cause notices should be dismissed; it also noted availability of other remedies for workmen.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

After hearing learned counsel, the Court reached its decision through a sequence of factual findings and legal principles strictly as recorded in the opinion:

  1. The petition initiated on 16.8.1994 sought to quash long-pending departmental proceedings and ancillary show cause notices; the Court first analysed the chronology and procedural steps taken by the petitioner — notably the initiation of a civil suit and the securing of ex-parte injunctions in 1987 and again in 1994 which stalled the departmental enquiry for years.
  2. The Sub-Judge had, on 30.7.1994, vacated the civil-court injunction, held the civil suit not maintainable and dismissed it, concluding that the remedy lay within departmental rules and avenues of appeal. That order was not appealed by the petitioner.
  3. The Court examined the contents of the charge-sheet and noted that the charge-sheet alone was incomplete for full reading because the accompanying statement of allegations was not filed by the petitioner; the Court observed that the petitioner had withheld that statement and had filed an incomplete Annexure P-2, impeding a full understanding of the allegations.
  4. On the merits of the petitioner's arguments: the Court found that the two principal contentions (that the charge-sheet wording showed leave had been sanctioned and that the charge-sheet was vague for not stating refusal of leave) did not even prima facie impress the Court. The charge-sheet must be read with its accompanying statement of allegations, which was not before the Court.
  5. The Court addressed the petitioner’s reliance on DTC circulars (Annexures P-3 and P-4) and determined that respondents could not act on such circulars in the petitioner’s case while injunctions were in force; moreover, the petitioner could have raised the circulars before the Disciplinary Authority during the enquiry but chose instead to litigate in civil and writ proceedings.
  6. The Court articulated the general legal principle — supported by cited precedents — that courts should be reluctant to interfere with departmental show cause notices and proceedings at interlocutory stages unless the proceedings are patently without jurisdiction or otherwise infected by illegality or mala fide conduct that would render continuance an abuse of process.
  7. Applying these principles to the facts, the Court concluded that this case did not show inherent lack of jurisdiction in the departmental proceedings; rather it raised questions of propriety or legality that ought to be examined by the disciplinary and appellate authorities in the course of the enquiry.
  8. The Court reasoned that the petitioner’s repeated recourse to courts and the securing of injunctive orders had in effect stalled the departmental enquiry for approximately eight years, caused waste of public time and funds, and amounted to dilatory and frivolous litigation that constituted an abuse of the Court’s process.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court's final decision was to dismiss the petition. The core ruling is stated as:

Petition dismissed.

Additional dispositive directions and immediate consequences explicitly recorded in the opinion:

  • The petition is dismissed with costs quantified at Rs. 5,000/-. The Court indicated that the imposition of costs also served the purpose of discouraging frivolous litigation.
  • The Court made clear that because the petitioner was instrumental in stalling the disciplinary enquiry from 1987 onward, the petitioner cannot avail himself of the plea of delay in conclusion of the departmental enquiry to his own advantage.

Implications beyond the parties: The opinion reiterates established principles discouraging interlocutory judicial intervention in departmental proceedings and admonishes litigants against using courts to delay administrative enquiries. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel legal principle or new precedent beyond applying and following earlier decisions.

Disposition summary: Petition dismissed; costs Rs. 5,000; petitioner cannot rely on delay caused by his own conduct.

    Jagmal Singh v. Delhi Transport Corporation .

    Mr. R.C Lahoti, J.— This petition filed on 16.8.94 by an employee of the respondent-Delhi Transport Corporation, holding post of a Driver, seeks quashing of the charge-sheet dated 19.2.87 (Annexure P-2) and notice dated 17.8.87 (Annexure P-1) requiring him to show cause against the proposed penalty in a departmental enquiry proceedings.

    2. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the present petition is not only not maintainable, but is also a gross abuse of the process of the Court and hence must be dismissed.

    3. The charge against the petitioner was for his remaining absent frequently on 165 days leave without pay from the period from 1.10.85 to 30.9.86 amounting to misconduct within the meaning of para 19(1) of the Standing Orders governing the DTC employees.

    4. Instead of answering the show cause notice, the petitioner chose to try his luck before a Civil Court. On 11.9.1987 he filed a civil suit in the Court of Sub-Judge, Delhi and therein on 15.9.87 he succeeded in securing an ex-parte ad-interim injunction restraining further proceedings in the D.E The DTC contensted the civil Suit. On 30.7.94, the learned Sub-Judge directed not only the interim injunction to be vacated but also held the suit not maintainable and dismissed the same. The copy of the judgment was not filed on the record before us by either party but on our asking it was made available for our perusal by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. The learned Sub-Judge has held that in view of the Standing Order No. 17 the plaintiff was not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of Civil Court; his remedy under the service rules and regulations was to face the departmental enquiry and if the result may go against him then to file an appeal. The learned Sub-Judge also quoted and followed the following statement of law from a Division Bench decision of this Court Inder Raj Singh v. Delhi Transport Corporation, OMP 3346/92 and CW 6214/92, (order dated 15.1.93):—

    “If an order is passed by the Disciplinary Authority imposing punishment the petitioner has a right of appeal before the Appellate Authority. Once again all the legal and factual contentions can be raised by the petitioner and, therefore, as a matter of judicial restraint a writ Court under Article 226 should not interfere at this stage.”

    5. The order of the learned Sub-Judge was neither appealed against nor the advise tendered therein appealed to the petitioner. On 16.8.94 he filed the present petition. Once again on 18.8.94 he succeeded in securing an ex-parte ad-interim writ—“meanwhile no further steps in connection with the show cause notice dated 19.2.87 be taken.”

    6. The respondents have vehmently opposed the maintainability of the petition with emphasis on the unbecoming conduct and obstinate attitude of the petitioner. It is submitted that all the contentions which are raised in the writ petition are available to be raised by the petitioner in reply to the impugned show cause notice. On pages 5 to 7 facts have been stated in a tabulised form showing how the petitioner had been abstaining himself on the pretext of the sickness of one or the other member of his family, at times of his own sickness and certainly without seeking leave.

    7. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the use of the words “availed 165 days leave without pay” used in the charge sheet go to show that leave without pay was sanctioned to the petitioner and therefore he could not have been charge sheeted at all because the leave on being sanctioned though without pay would be deemed to be a regularised leave. Secondly, it is submitted that the charge sheet is vague as it does not set out the fact of the leave having been refused to the petitioner.

    8. Both the contentions have impressed us not even prima facie. The petitioner cannot make much capital out of the use of the words “availed 165 days leave without pay” occurring in the charge-sheet the charge-sheet has to be read in the light of the statement of allegations accompanying it. The petitioner has filed the charge-sheet with the writ petition but not the statement of allegations accompanying the same. It is an incomplete document. Apparently the statement of allegations accompanying the charge-sheet has been withheld from the Court in an attempt to conceal the facts. Otherwise there is no reasons why the petitioner should have filed an incomplete document Annexure P-2 when on its face it shows that it would not provide a complete reading without the statement of allegations forming part thereof being available.

    9. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has invited our attention to two departmental circulars of the DTC which are dated 14.12.88 and 16.8.93 (Annexures P-3 and P-4) which show the DTC having taken certain policy decisions in the matter of holding departmental enquiries on the charge of employees having remained on leave without pay, with sanction and without sanction. The circular orders contemplate enquiries being dropped in cases of leave without pay having been sanctioned and amending charge-sheets in other cases. It is submitted that the DTC has failed to act in accordance with its own circulars.

    10. The question is who is to be blamed for the inaction, if any, of the respondent-DTC. Petitioner had himself secured an injunction order on 15.9.87 from the Court of Sub-Judge and again on 18.8.94 from this Court restraining any further progress in the D.E proceedings. The respondents could not have by acting on their circulars in the case of the petitioner afforded to run the risk of committing a breach of order of the Court. All the problems would have been solved if the petitioner would have permitted the departmental enquiry proceedings to proceed. He could have at any time invited the attention of the Disciplinary Authority to the DTC circulars Annexures P-3 and P-4 and raised all such contentions as he has rushed to raise before the Court, which if done, there is no reason to apprehend why the Discplinary Authority would not have acted in accordance with law. This tendency of rushing post-haste to the Courts even at the drop of a hat during the course of departmental proceedings must be discouraged. The present one is not a case of D.E proceedings suffering from inherent lack of jurisdiction where a writ petition to quash the proceedings might be entertained. It is only a question of propriety of the proceedings, legality of the proceedings at the worst, which should ordinarily be left to be examined by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority, expecting the delinquent employee to cooperate with the proceedings, placing all his contentions before the authorities concerned.

    11. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Shri Brahm Datt Sharma, (1987) 2 SCC 179 : AIR 1987 Supreme Court 943 a notice was issued to a Government servant under a statutory provision calling upon him to show cause as to why order for forfeiture of his pension and gratuity be not issued in accordance with Article 470B of Civil Service Regulations as his services have not been wholly satisfactory. A reply was submitted but before the same could be examined or a decision could be taken by the Government he filed a writ petition. A learned Judge of the High Court quashed the notice on the sole ground that the show cause notice could not have been issued in view of the earlier proceedings. Their Lordships held:—

    “The High Court was not justified in quashing the show cause notice. When a show cause notice is issued to a Government servant under a statutory provision calling upon him to show cause, ordinarily the Government servant must place his case before the authority concerned by showing cause and the Courts should be reluctant to interfere with the notice at that stage unless the notice is shown to have been issued palpably without any authority of law. The purpose of issuing show cause notice is to afford oppotunity of hearing to the Government servant and once cause is shown it is open to Government servant’ and only thereafter a final decision in the matter could be taken. Interference by the Court before that stage would be premature. The High Court in our opinion ought not to have interfered with the show cause notice.”

    12. In Chanan Singh v. Registrar, Co-Op. Societies, Punjab, (1976) 3 SCC 361 : AIR 1976 SC 1821 the disciplinary proceedings against an employee were dropped by an enquiry officer who was not competent to impose the punishment. The proceedings were revived by the Competent Officer issuing a fresh show cause notice against dismissal. A writ petition challenging the revival of proceedings was filed on the ground that the same was illegal and opposed to natural justice. Their Lordships held:—

    “The writ petition was in any case premature. No punitive action has yet been taken. It is difficult to state, apart from speculation, what the outcome of the proceedings will be. In case the appellant is punished, it is certainly open to him either to file an appeal as provided in the relevant rules or to take other action that he may be advised to resort to. It is not for us, at the moment, to consider whether a writ petition will lie or whether an industrial dispute should be raised or whether an appeal to the Competent Authority under the rules is the proper remedy, although these are issues which merit serious consideration.

    Even the question of jurisdiction to re-open what is claimed to be a closed enquiry will, and must, be considered by the Managing Director.”

    13. In Sahib Singh v. Delhi Administration, Delhi, 1984 LAB.I.C 1509 (Delhi) notices to show cause against order of forfeiture of seniority and for reversion in one case and for the removal of the name of the employee from the promotion list in the other list were issued. Writ petition was filed challenging the show cause notices. This Court has held:—

    “The matter was only at the initial stage of a show cause and the petitioners should have pursued the administrative remedies before the Department first but they have not done so. The show cause notices were issued to the petitioners before the writ petition was filed. Before rushing to the Court of law they ought to have shown cause to the authorities why the actions proposed in the show cause notice were not justified.”

    14. In CW 3346/92 titled as Inder Raj Singh v. Delhi Transport Corporation, decided on 15.1.93, a Division Bench of this Court has held:—

    “When departmental proceedings have been initiated, it is desirable that they should be allowed to be continued and the proceedings must culminate in an order before recourse is taken to a Court of law. It is open to an officer who is being proceeded with to raise all contentions not been initiated validly and any contention raised by the employee concerned will have to be considered and decided by the Enquiry Officer and/or by the Disciplinary Authority in any case. The grievance of the petitioner can only be if and when an adverse order imposing a penalty is passed against him. It is not proper that departmental proceedings should be interfered with prior to an order being passed by the Disciplinary Authority.”

    15. In Hari Chand v. D.T.C (C.W 3490/94), decided on 10.2.95 : 58 (1995) DLT 751 also a number of writ petitions challenging the notices to show cause against the proposed punishment were dismissed by another Division Bench of this Court observing:—

    “If ultimately petitioners happened to meet with the punishment as anticipated by them they have the efficacious remedy to approach the Labour Court for improper and wrongful dismissal as claimed by them as they are workers. The question of punishment could be adequately raised in those proceedings. It is not possible for us to say at this stage whether the proposed punishment is proper or not.

    Thus we have come to the conclusion that Depot Manager is a Competent Authority on account of delegation of powers to him to take disciplinary action. Therefore, the notices issued by him are quite valid and legal and therefore we do not like to interfere with the same by exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Thus all these petitions are premature as there is no final decision regarding the disciplinary action taken against the present petitioners. It must be also further mentioned here that the petitioners are workmen and therefore even in case there happened to be unfortunate orders against them they will have to take the remedy under the Industrial Dispute Act before a Labour Court. Thus we hold that all these petitions are liable to be dismissed.”

    16. The Courts are averse to the idea of intercepting legal and departmental proceedings way between and at interlocutory stages. This is for several reasons. An efficacious alternative remedy is available to the petitioner by taking all the pleas during the proceedings themselves and there is no reason to apprehend why the authorities vested by law with the jurisdiction to conduct the proceedings and take decisions therein would not act in accordance with law. Interference by the Courts stalls the progress of the proceedings and by the time the petition comes to be decided, may be against the petitioner, the proceedings would have been unreasonably and irreparably delayed. May be that much of the evidence is already lost by the time the hearing in the proceedings would come to be resumed. Several officers associated with the case may have left the place on account of transfers or promotions or may not even be available as having retired. It is only in those rare cases where the impugned proceedings are patently incompetent or without jurisdiction and where the Court is convinced that continuance of such proceedings would amount to an illegality or art abuse of the process of law by itself, that the Court may show indulgence in exercise of its writ jurisdiction at interlocutory stage of departmental proceedings.

    17. For the foregoing reasons, we hold the present petition not only misconceived but an abuse of the process of the Court. We are firmly of the view that petitioner has resorted to the dilatory tactics thereby crippling the progress of the departmental enquiry pending against him for the last about eight long years. It is not only unfortunate but matter of concern to all of us, being the members of the society, that the petitioner by indulging in this type of frivolous litigation has not only wasted his time and money but has also wasted the time of the Court and other public functionaries thereby causing unnecessary drain on the resources of public exchequer whose coffers are filled in by poor people's money. In such a case with a view to discourage frivolous litigation it becomes our duty not only to see that the petitioner is saddled with exemplary costs but also to ensure that he gets no benefit on account of the delay caused by him in the departmental enquiry pending against him.

    18. The petition is dismissed with costs quantified at Rs. 5,000/-. We also make it clear that as the petitioner has himself been instrumental in stalling the DE proceedings from 1987 to the present day, the plea of delay in conclusion of DE proceedings shall not be available to be raised by the petitioner to his own advantage.

    Petition dismissed.
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    Comments

    Jagmal Singh v. Delhi Transport Corporation .
    (Jul 31, 1995)