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Case Number

C.R No. 294 of 1990

Attorney(S)

Tarun John
A.P.Aggarwal
I.S.Mathur
S.PODDAR
R.P.Bansal

Judges

Arun Kumar, J.

Acts

SECTION 14 A DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT
SECTION 14 DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT
Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
SECTION 19 DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT
Order 41 Rule 27, C.P.C

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion by Mr. Arun Kumar, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, claiming to be owner/landlady of premises No. M-134, Greater Kailash‑I, New Delhi, filed an eviction petition under clause (e) to the proviso to Sub‑section (1) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The petition was filed on 14 May 1982. After a protracted trial the Addl. Rent Controller dismissed the eviction petition by judgment dated 22 January 1990. The petitioner challenged that judgment in the present proceedings.

Relevant factual assertions made by the petitioner included: the property was gifted to her by her mother by a registered gift deed dated 29 March 1971 and mutated in her name; the respondents began paying rent to the petitioner from 1971; the premises had been let for residential purposes; the petitioner sought possession bona fide for occupation by herself, her husband and two dependent daughters and claimed she had no other residential accommodation in Delhi. The petitioner stated she was residing temporarily as a guest of her sister at M‑144, Greater Kailash‑I and was shuttling between Delhi and Lucknow.

The respondents' written statement denied many of the petitioner's averments, asserting among other things that the premises were let for residential‑cum‑commercial purposes, that the petitioner and her husband were resident in Lucknow and carried on business there, and relied on entries in the Lucknow voters' list and telephone directory to support that contention.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the petitioner had established a bona fide requirement of the suit premises for occupation as a residence for herself and members of her family dependent upon her.
Whether the petitioner had other reasonably suitable residential accommodation available in Delhi (not in issue before the Court in view of the tenant's admission that the petitioner did not own other property in Delhi).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Appellant / Landlady)

The petitioner relied on a registered gift deed (29 March 1971) and mutation entries to establish ownership; respondents paid rent to the petitioner from 1971.
The suit premises were let for residential purposes since inception.
The petitioner and her family had shifted to Delhi: her husband had "started business" in Delhi and her daughters had commenced education in Delhi; she was temporarily living as a guest of her sister at M‑144, Greater Kailash‑I due to lack of other accommodation.
She produced documentary support including photocopies of a ration card and correspondence with the tenant prior to litigation (including a notice dated 1.12.1981) to show she had shifted to Delhi and had asked for possession.
She asserted she had no other residential accommodation in Delhi and required the premises bona fide for residence of herself and her family.

Respondents' Arguments (Tenants)

The respondents denied many averments, including that the petitioner was the owner/landlady and that the premises were let solely for residential purposes (pleaded residential‑cum‑commercial letting).
They contended the petitioner and her husband were resident in Lucknow, carrying on business there (Hind Shoe Company and Premier Electronics Pvt. Ltd.), supported by entries in the Lucknow voters' list and telephone directory.
They argued the petitioner's claim of shifting to Delhi was not proved and that the husband had not shifted his business to Delhi; the Addl. Rent Controller relied on this to dismiss the petition for lack of bona fide need.
They suggested the eviction petition was mala fide and motivated by an intention to enhance rent; they also suggested an adverse inference from the non‑production of the petitioner's husband as a witness.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Arjan Dass v. Mahbub Rai, XXVI (1984) DLT (SN) 10	Electoral roll entries are weak evidence for determining a person's actual residence; omissions or inclusions in rolls take time and are not determinative.	The Court relied on this principle to reject the tenant's reliance on the Lucknow voters' list and telephone directory entries as conclusive proof that the petitioner was resident in Lucknow at the time of the petition.
Hi‑Bred (India) (P) Ltd. v. Ravi K., 1989 (2) RCR 668	A landlord's desire to live in his/her own house is a legitimate and bona fide ground for eviction; the landlord is entitled to choose where to reside even if other personal circumstances (e.g., immigration status) exist.	The Court cited this authority to support the proposition that a landlord/landlady has the right to make up their mind where to reside and that desire to live in one's own house can be bona fide even in the face of circumstances suggesting residence elsewhere.
Usha Sales Ltd. v. Mohini Nayyer, XXVII (1985) DLT 417	A landlady's desire to reside in her own house (including after retirement or changing personal circumstances) can be bona fide; an eviction petition is not necessarily premature where the desire to occupy exists.	The Court applied this precedent to reject the tenant's argument based on the daughters' education in Lucknow and to show that a landlord's multiple reasons for shifting do not render the petition mala fide if some reasons are unsubstantiated.
S. Kapur v. Om Prakash Sharma, (1980) 17 DLT 256	Where a petitioner may overstate aspects in anxiety to obtain relief, disproving one aspect does not automatically doom the entire case; the Court should not reject the whole claim if some parts are disbelieved.	The Court invoked this principle to support the proposition that even if some reasons given by the petitioner (e.g., particulars of husband's business) are unsubstantiated, the petitioner's overall claim to have shifted and to require the premises may still stand.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court confined the controversy to the question of bona fide need because the respondents' counsel conceded the Addl. Rent Controller's findings on ownership and residential purpose of letting. The Addl. Rent Controller had accepted ownership and residential letting but dismissed the petition primarily because he concluded the petitioner had failed to prove a bona fide requirement — basing that conclusion largely on an expectation that the petitioner's husband should have shown he had "shifted" his business to Delhi rather than merely "started" business there.

The Court's analysis proceeded as follows:

The Court criticized the Addl. Rent Controller for adopting a narrow approach and for conflating "starting business at Delhi" with "shifting business to Delhi." The judge emphasised the difference in meaning and the differing evidentiary expectations those concepts entail: shifting business normally requires more tangible indicia (office, staff, telephone, correspondence), whereas starting business may not.
The Court observed that the pivotal question is whether the petitioner had in fact shifted to Delhi and required the house for residence of herself and family. The reasons given for shifting (husband's business, daughters' education) are secondary to the factual proposition of shifting itself; even if a reason ceases to exist the fact of shifting may remain.
The Court accepted the petitioner's own testimony (AW‑1) and attached weight to documentary evidence filed before litigation: photocopies of ration card entries showing the petitioner, her husband and daughters at the Greater Kailash address and pre‑litigation correspondence (notice dated 1.12.1981 and tenant's reply dated 5.12.1981). The Court found the pre‑litigation correspondence particularly significant because it was exchanged between the parties before lawyers became involved.
The Court rejected the respondents' reliance on entries in the Lucknow voters' list and telephone directory as determinative of residence, citing Arjan Dass and noting that such entries often lag and are not dispositive. The Court noted it was admitted that the petitioner previously resided in Lucknow and that she shuttled between Lucknow and Delhi due to lack of suitable accommodation in Delhi.
On the husband's business the Court reasoned that the petitioner's claim was that the husband had "started business" in Delhi; depending on the nature and stage of such a business, an office or fixed Delhi correspondence may not be necessary. The Court noted the husband was Managing Director of Premier Electronics Pvt. Ltd., that there was evidence of business activity relating to Delhi (for example, a bank certificate showing a bank account in Delhi was placed on record), and that statutory filings and registered office being in Lucknow did not preclude business activity in Delhi.
The Court held that the Addl. Rent Controller's emphasis on the absence of proof of a "shifted business" was an incorrect basis for dismissing the eviction petition because the petitioner's case was premised on having shifted to Delhi (with the husband's starting business there being a reason offered) and a landlord is the best judge of where he/she wishes to reside.
The Court dealt with the respondents' contention about non‑production of the husband and the petitioner's application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC for permission to produce him. The Court found no need to draw an adverse inference or to decide whether the application should be allowed, and disposed of the application as unnecessary in view of its reasoning.
The Court rejected the mala fide rent‑enhancement allegation by the tenant as unsupported on record and observed that pre‑litigation correspondence did not indicate any attempt by the petitioner to raise rent.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

THE PETITION IS ALLOWED. The Court held that the petitioner had established a bona fide requirement to occupy the suit premises for residence of herself and her family. An order of eviction was passed against the respondents and they were directed to hand over vacant possession of the entire tenancy premises No. M‑134, Greater Kailash Part‑I, New Delhi, to the petitioner. The respondents were granted six months' time to vacate in view of the provisions of Section 14(7) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. No costs were awarded. The opinion concludes with "Appeal allowed."

Implications:

Direct effect: The respondents must deliver vacant possession of the disputed premises to the petitioner within the six‑month period allowed by the Court. The eviction petition succeeds.
Broader implications: The Court emphasised established principles (drawn from cited authorities) that a landlord is the best judge of his/her residential requirements and that starting a business in a city need not mean shifting all business operations there; documentary indicia such as pre‑litigation correspondence and ration card entries can be significant, while electoral roll and telephone directory entries are weak evidence of current residence. The opinion did not purport to lay down a novel legal precedent beyond applying and synthesising existing authorities to the facts of the case.

Appeal allowed.

Note: This summary is strictly based on the content of the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond what appears in the opinion text.

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Dipika Arora v. S.N Sehgal & Ors.

Mr. Arun Kumar, J.— The petitioner claiming to be the owner/landlord of premises No. M-134, Greater Kailash-I, New Delhi, filed an eviction petition against the respondents under clause (e) to Proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The petition was filed on 14th May, 1982. After a protracted trial it was dismissed by the Addl. Rent Controller vide judgment dated 22.1.1990 The petitioner has challenged the said judgment of the Addl. Rent Controller in the present proceedings.

2. Briefly stated the facts are that the premises in suit was let out to the respondents by the mother of the petitioner in February 1969 in pursuance of an agreement of lease for 11 months entered into between the parties on 23rd May, 1971. Vide gift deed dated 29th March, 1971 the property in suit was gifted by the mother of the petitioner. The gift deed is a duly registered document. The property has been mutated in the name of the petitioner in the records of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi. The respondents started paying rent to the petitioner from 1971 in view of the said gift deed in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner claims to be the owner of the premises on the basis of the said gift deed. It is further stated by the petitioner that the premises is located in a residential area and was let out for residential purpose to the respondents since the very inception of the tenancy. Respondent No. 1 alongwith family members had been residing in the premises all along. The case of the petitioner is that the premises is required by the petitioner/landlady bona fide for occupation as a residence for herself, her husband and two daughters. The husband and the minor daughters are dependent on the petitioner for purposes of residence. The petitioner has no other residential accommodation available to her in Delhi. The petitioner is a woman of status being assessed to income-tax and wealth-tax. The petitioner is residing with her husband and her two daughters in a small room as a temporary guest of her younger sister in her house at M-144, Greater Kailash-I, New Delhi. The said sister with her family is residing with her in-laws in the said joint family house. The petitioner further claimed that she has shifted to Delhi as her husband has started business at New Delhi and the petitioner's daughters have started their education at Delhi. The petitioner also stated in the eviction petition that she was living in a very awkard position and the respondents were requested to vacate the premises and respondent No. 1 promised to do so at the earliest. But the promises never materialised.

3. In the written statement the respondents denied all the averments of the petitioner including the averment that the petitioner was the owner/landlady of the suit premises and that the premises were let for residential purposes. According to the tenant the premises were let for residential-cum-commercial purposes. The bona fide need of the petitioner for the suit premises was also denied. It was stated that the petitioner was living alone with her husband permanently at Lucknow. The petitioner's husband was stated to be carrying on business at Lucknow under the name and style of Hind Shoe Company. He was filing income-tax returns of his business at Lucknow. The respondent denied that the petitioner's husband was having any business whatsoever at Delhi. The averment that the petitioner was residing at M-144, Greater Kailash-I, New Delhi as a guest of her younger sister was also denied. It was stated that the petitioner and her husband were having their names in the voters' list and telephone directory at Lucknow which showed that they were residents of Lucknow. It was also stated that the mother of the petitioner has a very big house at C-II, N.D.S.E Part II, New Delhi where the petitioner stays whenever she comes to Delhi and, therefore, residence with the sister at M-144, Greater Kailash-I, New Delhi was only a pretence to show scarcity of accommodation. The mother of the petitioner is all alone residing in the house at N.D.S.E, Part-II, New Delhi.

4. The normal requirements to be established by a petitioner in an eviction petition under clause (e) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of Delhi Rent Control Act are:—

(i) petitioner is the owner of the premises in question;

(ii) the premises was let to the tenant for residential purpose;

(iii) premises is required bona fide by the petitioner for occupation as” a residence for herself or for members of her family dependent upon her; and

(iv) she has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation available to her.

5. The Addl. Rent Controller found in favour of the petitioner on the first two requirements stated above. However, the petition was dimissed on the ground that the petitioner had failed to establish her bona fide requirement for the suit premises. In the present proceedings the learned Counsel for the respondents conceded at the Bar that he was not challenging the findings of the Addl. Rent Controller on the question of ownership and purpose of letting of the suit premises. Therefore, the matter before me is confined to the question of bona fide requirement of the premises in suit of the petitioner. The fourth point regarding availability of other reasonably suitable residential accommodation to the petitioner is also not in issue in view of the admission of the tenant that the petitioner does not own any other property in Delhi.

6. On the question of bona fide need of the petitioner having considered the facts on record and rival contentions of the learned Counsel for the parties I am of the view that approach of the learned Addl. Rent Controller in dealing with the matter was not correct. The learned Addl. Rent Controller adopted a narrow and pedantic approach which led to the finding that the petitioner failed to establish her bona fide need for the suit premises for residence for herself and her family members dependent upon her for residence.

7. The case of the petitioner as set up in the eviction petition is that the petitioner requires the premises in suit bona fide for occupation as residence for herself and her husband and two daughters who are dependent on her for purposes of residence being members of her family. The petitioner stated that she has shifted to Delhi as her husband has started business at New Delhi and the petitioner's daughters have started their education at New Delhi. She was residing with her husband and two daughters in a small room as a temporary guest of her younger sister in her sister's house at New Delhi. The said sister was herself living with her in-laws in a joint family house and it was quite awkward for the petitioner to stay with her sister in these circumstances. The learned Addl. Rent Controller mainly proceeded on the basis that the petitioner had failed to establish that the husband had shifted his business to Delhi. Further she had admitted that her daughters are studying at Lucknow. Therefore, the plea that the husband had shifted business to Delhi and daughters had started education were found to be unsubstantiated and false. It appeared improbable to the learned Addl. Rent Controller that the petitioner would continue to live as a guest of her sister for such a long time without making her arrangement to live in proper accommodation instead of living with the sister in small room as a temporary guest. Reliance was placed on some documents like voters' list and telephone directory of Lucknow etc. to hold that the petitioner was still residing at Lucknow alongwith her husband and, therefore, her case that she had shifted to Delhi was not believed.

8. The learned Addl. Controller failed to appreciate the distinction between starting business at Delhi and shifting business to Delhi. Starting and shifting are different words having different meaning and connotation. The learned Addl. Rent Controller considered the issue on the basis of shifting business at Delhi which naturally required higher standard of proof. When an established business is shifted, one may need office, telephone, staff etc. There may be correspondence also at that address. The learned Addl. Rent Controller applied these tests to find out the truthfulness of the plea of the petitioner landlady regarding her husband's business at Delhi. He goes on to say that that was the sole ground for the petitioner to shift to Delhi. The petition was dismissed on the finding that the landlady failed to show that her husband had shifted his business to Delhi. Failure to appreciate the distinction between the shifting business and starting business was the basic flaw in the approach of the Addl. Rent Controller. The case of the landlady was that her husband had started business at Delhi. When this is the case one need not establish its truthfulness by showing all that which the Addl. Rent Controller felt that the landlady should have shown in the present case.

9. The Addl. Rent Controller ought to have approached the problem in a practical manner. First he had to address himself to the question what should a landlord in the situation in which the petitioner was placed do? Must the landlord rent another accommodation before instituting the eviction petition and continue to stay in rented accommodation for years till the final outcome of the eviction petition. Unmindful of the notorious fact about time consumed in the process of Court before such petitions are decided, the petitioner appears to have shifted to Delhi. Whether the petitioner on shifting to Delhi stays with her mother or her sister does not make any difference so far as the legal position in this behalf is concerned. Admittedly when the property in suit is the only property which the petitioner owns in Delhi she is entitled to stay in her own house rather than stay with her mother as a guest or with her sister as a guest. What is important is that the landlady wants to live in her own house in Delhi. It is neither established from the evidence on record nor this has been disputed before me that in Lucknow the petitioner was residing in a joint family in a premises which is rented by the joint family and not owned by it. Why a landlady who does not own any property in Lucknow and owns only the property in suit in Delhi cannot choose to reside in her own property alongwith her family? Desire to live in one's own house has been accepted as a good ground for purposes of Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. When that is so, a landlady living outside Delhi in a rented accommodation can also desire to live in Delhi in her own house.

10. The petitioner's case that she has shifted to Delhi as her husband has started business at Delhi and her daughters have started education at Delhi, has to be considered primarily on the basis that the petitioner claims that she has shifted to Delhi. Rest is only her reason for shifting to Delhi. In a given case the reason even if originally there may cease to exist. Still the factum of shifting to Delhi may not disappear. Shifting to Delhi may still hold good even if the reason given for doing so may not survive or is disbelieved. To test this it has to be seen—could the petitioner not say that “I have shifted to Delhi and I require my property for my residence and residence of my family”, without more? Nobody can insist that she must live in Lucknow. The choice is of the landlady where ever she wants to reside. In context of landlord's owning more than one properties in the same city it has been judicially well recognised that the choice is left to the landlord to decide in which property he wants to reside. The issue has to be thus approached with a broad mind and not in a narrow technical manner. The enquiry, therefore, really has to be whether the petitioner had shifted to Delhi.

11. About her shifting to Delhi apart from the statement of the petitioner as AW-1, learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied on a Ration card, photostat copy is Ex. AW1.R-1. He has also relied on the correspondence between the parties preceding the filing of the eviction petition. Ex. AW1.R-1, photocopy of the Ration-card shows that the names of the petitioner, her husband and her two daughters are shown alongwith the names of the sister of the petitioner and her family at M-134, Greater Kailash Part-I, New Delhi address. The photocopy further shows that the ration card was renewed on 1.1.1983 A photocopy of the Ration-card issued earlier showing the same position has also been placed on record by the petitioner. This document was filed by the petitioner alongwith the list of document dated 14th May, 1982. Therefore, this must be of a period prior to that. I have to say this because the date on this photocopy of Ration-card is not available. A Ration-card is an official document which is issued after due verification. The respondents knew that the petitioner was relying on a Ration-card since its photocopy was filed by the petitioner on record on 14th May, 1982. If the petitioner had any doubt about the same he could have taken steps by lodging a complaint to the department which would have necessitated fresh verification and if the document was false necessary consequences would have followed.

12. The correspondence preceding the institution of the present petition has to be considered. I attach more weight to this correspondence because this is prior to litigation and also because the same is admitted by the parties. After the parties start litigation or they are in the hands of lawyers they may try to give legalistic answers in order to anticipate certain consequences and to ward off the same. The correspondence between the parties as laymen deserves greater weightage. AW1/7 dated 1.12.1981 is the most material document. This is a notice by the petitioner to the respondent in which the petitioner has categorically stated that “it is becoming extremely difficult for me to stay as a guest with relations. Therefore, I request you to give possession of my house at an early date as it is embarrassing for me to stay with my sister and her in-laws family for such a long time”. This notice has been sent from M-144, Greater Kailash-I, New Delhi, i.e the sister's house. Tenant's reply to this notice is Ex. AW1/18 dated 5.12.81 First the respondent denies the contents of the notice in general. Then he goes on to say “it is further wrong to suggest that you are staying as a guest with the relations. You have been fully inhabitated and reasonably suitable accommodation is available at your disposal. It is further wrong to suggest that there is any embarrassment to you in staying with your sister and her in-laws as alleged. For a number of years you are fully inhabited and all possible convenience of residence are available at your disposal”. Thus the tenant does not deny the shifting of the petitioner to Delhi nor does he say in so many words that the petitioner was not residing with her sister in Delhi. The respondent tenant could have straightaway said that she was not living in Delhi and she was staying at Lucknow and, therefore, her averment that she was staying with her sister in New Delhi was false. In view of this documentary evidence coupled with the statement of the petitioner as her own witness it cannot be said that at the time of institution of the eviction petition and in fact before the institution of the petition, the petitioner had not shifted to Delhi.

13. The petitioner who appeared as AW-1 categorically stated that she does not own any other house in Delhi and that she requires the premises in dispute for her residence and residence of her family consisting of her husband and two daughters who are dependent on her for purposes of residence. She further stated that she was staying with her sister as a temporary guest. She has also shown that it is not convenient for her to stay in the house of her mother because her mother is a religious lady and always there are Poojas and religious discourses in the said house. In cross examination the petitioner again categorically stated that her present address is M-144, Greater Kailash-I, New Delhi. She adds that she was residing with her sister at M-144, Greater Kailash-I, New Delhi at the time of filing of the eviction petition. In fact the next sentence in her statement is very significant where she says “I am shuttling between Delhi and Lucknow since then. There is no other address of residing in Delhi”. About her husband she said he is basically staying in Delhi since then though he is travelling a lot. Rest of the cross examination was mainly directed to demonstrate that her husband had no business at Delhi.

14. On behalf of the respondent the effort is to show that the petitioner was in fact residing at Lucknow. They have tried to show this from copy of voters' list of Lucknow as also from entries in the Telephone Directory relating to Lucknow. Entries in the voters' list and in the Telephone Directory cannot be determinative of the fact about the petitioner's residence at Lucknow. There is no dispute that earlier the petitioner alongwith her husband was residing at Lucknow in a joint family with the brother of the husband in a tenanted premises. They have a joint business in the name of Hind Shoe Company in Lucknow. The tenant has not disputed and therefore it is an established fact on record that the husband and the brother have set up an electrical business in the name of Premier Electric Pvt. Ltd. having its registered office at Lucknow and factory in Sahadat Ganj, Lucknow. It is a matter of common knowledge that the entries in the voters' list and Telephone Directory take years before they are corrected. In fact the telephone department does not even bother about deleting the names of dead persons for years. Apart from this the petitioner has denied that she or her husband had any telephone in Lucknow in the name of either of them and she has disputed those entries on the ground that the address in the entries is incorrect. Without going into this controversy I am of confirmed view that such entries cannot be made a basis for a finding of residence of a person at a particular place. There has to be something more. In the facts of the present case it will be all the more reasonable to say that such entries cannot be relied upon. As stated earlier it is admitted that petitioner was residing at Lucknow alongwith her husband before shifting to Delhi. The petitioner has further stated that she keeps on shuttling between Delhi and Lucknow. This is so because the petitioner has no proper accommodation to stay at Delhi and the premises in dispute is the only place where she would like to permanently settle down. When the petitioner is shuttling between Lucknow and Delhi the continued appearance of entries qua her and her husband in the voters' list at Lucknow and the Telephone Directory of that city are of no significance.

15. It has been held by this Court in Arjan Dass v. Mahbub Rai, XXVI (1984) DLT (SN) 10, that Electoral Roll entries are very weak type of evidence. Quite often some of the voters are not registered though living in a particular house. The omissions in the electoral roll of a particular member of family was, therefore, not sufficient to disbelieve the landlord. Likewise converse will also be true. Existence of entries in electoral roll by itself cannot be made the basis of a finding of residence of a person at a particular place. Deletion and addition of names in electoral rolls take their own time. Very often people do not bother about this.

16. In fact it appears that the daughters of the petitioner who were very young at the time when the petitioner shifted to Delhi had to return to Lucknow for their formal education because of lack of proper residential accommodation at Delhi. When the daughters of the petitioner came to Delhi alongwith their mother they were very young being land 5 years old, therefore, any formal schooling was not as such required. If the petitioner had a regular place for residence of her family, she would have preferred to start the formal education of her daughters at Delhi. Since she was not getting the accommodation what could she do? While staying as a guest of somebody cramped in one room she could not afford to keep her daughters in Delhi when they reached the stage of starting their formal education. It appears that the daughters had to ultimately return to Lucknow to continue their formal education and that is why the petitioner has to shuttle between Delhi and Lucknow. She could not wait indefinitely for proper residence at Delhi and allow the education of her daughters to suffer. The petitioner has said that her daughters also keep on coming to Delhi on holidays otherwise they are staying with their aunt and uncle at Lucknow since they are studying at Lucknow. Without appreciating this problem the learned Addl. Rent Controller has drawn an adverse inference from the admission of the petitioner that her daughters were studying in Lucknow. What else the petitioner could do about the education of her daughters in the facts and circumstances of the case when she is unable to get proper accommodation for stay in Delhi. She had to send her daughters back to Lucknow in the interests of their education.

17. The husband of the petitioner is also admittedly having his joint business with his brother at Lucknow. His brother is settled at Lucknow where the husband of the petitioner was also settled. They had their family business of Hind Shoe Company. They started a new business under the name of Premier Electronic Pvt. Ltd. meaning thereby they are expanding their horizons. In the process of expansion of their business the husband started exploring the Delhi market. This is what the petitioner means when she says that her husband has started business in Delhi. By this she does not mean that he has set up any factory or office in Delhi. As per the suggestions thrown to RW-1, i.e, respondent No. 1 in cross examination the husband of the petitioner is apparently doing liaison work for his factory at Lucknow. The other brother may be looking after the factory while the husband of the petitioner is looking after the interest of the said business at Delhi in the shape of finding customers for its products and pruchasing raw material for manufacturing the articles. The business at Delhi by the husband does not mean that it has to be a very extensive and broad based business. It must be recalled that the case of the petitioner is that husband has started business at Delhi. Admittedly the husband of the petitioner is the Managing Director of M/s. Premier Electronic Pvt. Ltd. At this stage of the business having a regular office at Delhi is not a must. The husband makes purchases of raw material at Delhi and he is contacting parties for purposes of sales of the products of the factory for which he must be required to make personal visits to the parties. Having an office at Delhi or correspondence at Delhi is not a must. The petitioner has placed on record bank certificate showing that the business has a bank account in Delhi. Having a bank account may be enough for the purpose of conducting the type of business mentioned above. Ultimately depending on the nature and extent of business the petitioner's husband may have to decide whether to have a regular office in Delhi. The decision has to be his. But converse does not follow. Without having office in Delhi it cannot be said that he cannot have business in Delhi or that if he has no office in Delhi that means that he has no business in Delhi. In this process of reasoning the argument that the returns of the business are filed in Lucknow as also the statutory returns required to be filed with the office of Registrar of Companies are filed at Kanpur does not cut any ice. If the registered office of the company is at Lucknow the statutory returns have got to be filed with the Registrar of Companies of the area. Similarly the factory is at Lucknow. Registered office is at Lucknow. Assessments for income-tax and sales-tax, if any, have to be at Lucknow.

18. The learned Counsel for the respondent has tried to show from the statutory returns of M/s. Premier Electronics Pvt. Ltd. filed with the Registrar of Companies that the residential address of the husband of the petitioner is shown in those returns as that of Lucknow. To my mind nothing turns on this for the reason that the returns are normally filed by the Chartered Accountants who keep on repeating the information on such points as are under reference in this case on the basis of previous years' returns. Secondly, this point is immaterial for the reason that it is apparent from the record that the petitioner or her husband have not totally effaced themselves from Lucknow.

19. The petitioner has not sought the possession of the premises for purposes of business of her husband. She has sought the possession for purposes for her residence and the residence of her family. Therefore, the question of business of her husband is secondary. The primary question is about the residence of the petitioner in Delhi.

20. This also knocks off the argument of the Counsel for the respondent regarding non-production of the husband of the petitioner in the witness box and adverse inference to be drawn from that fact. Firstly it was not a must that if the petitioner should shift to Delhi her husband must have business at Delhi. Secondly, the statement of the petitioner that her husband has started business at Delhi cannot be said to be false merely because no business address or no evidence of business activity could be produced. In the nature of the business of the husband referred to hereinbefore these things were not a sine qua non and, therefore, this argument cannot be taken to non-suit the petitioner.

21. The conclusion of the learned Addl. Rent Controller for dismissing the eviction petition is mainly based on his finding that the petitioner failed to prove that her husband had shifted his business to Delhi. As already observed this was not a correct approach. The case of the petitioner is that her husband has started business to Delhi. Looking at it from another angle if the husband of the petitioner had not started his business at Delhi, could the petitioner not decide to stay in Delhi in her own house? The petitioner herself stated that before shifting to Delhi her family was settled at Lucknow. Thereafter the petitioner has shifted to Delhi but till she is able to get proper accommodation for her stay in Delhi she has to shuttle between Lucknow and Delhi. Therefore, it is because of non-availability of proper residential accommodation in Delhi that the petitioner has been subjected to the plight of shuttling between Delhi and Lucknow. For the same reason the petitioner had to send back her daughters for education at Lucknow and she could not fulfil her wish to start the formal education of her daughters in Delhi in the absence of proper residential accommodation. The petitioner has suffered in various ways.

22. The respondent appearing as RW-2 has after admitting that the husband of the petitioner is the Managing Director of Premier Electronics Pvt. Ltd., denied all the suggestions about the business of the petitioner at Delhi on account of lack of knowledge. Suggestions were put to him that the said firm Premier Electronics Pvt. Ltd. was supplying its product to Cement Corporation of India, Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking, Delhi College of Engg. Com. Research Institute of Delhi, I.I.T, Delhi etc. He denied the same on ground of absence of knowledge. Similarly he denied the suggestion on ground of lack of knowledge that the husband of the petitioner looks after the Delhi business of the said firm. He also denied the suggestions on the same ground to the effect that the company makes its purchases in Delhi and also sells its goods in Delhi. It was suggested to him that it is for purposes of the said business that the husband of the petitioner lives in Delhi which was of course denied by him.

23. The point regarding failure to prove the business of the husband of the petitioner at Delhi can be examined from another angle. The petitioner says in the eviction petition that she has shifted to Delhi as her husband has started his business at New Delhi. Suppose the husband who started the business at Delhi could not establish himself in Delhi or did not find it viable to continue business in Delhi thereby stopping the business at Delhi altogether. Will it still be said that for this reason alone it should be found that petitioner had not shifted to Delhi. What about her actual shifting to Delhi? If there is no business of her husband at Delhi can she still not chose to live in Delhi in her own house? The answer has to be in the affirmative.

24. It is judiciously well recognised that the landlord is the best Judge about his requirements for residence for himself and his family and as to where he wants to reside. If a landlord is resident off a city other than the city in which the premises regarding which eviction is sought is situated, he can chose the city where he wants to reside. Likewise if he has more than one properties in the city it is ultimately his choice as to which property he wants to occupy for his and his family's residence.

25. In Hi-Bred (India) (P) Ltd. v. Ravi K., 1989 (2) RCR 668 it was observed that after all it was for the landlords to make up their minds as to where they would like to live. The landlords in the said case were Green Card holders from the United State. The Immigration Authorities as per the United States Immigration Laws entitle them to permanently stay in the United States. The landlord's case was that they want to reside in their own house which was under the tenancy of the petitioner company. Eviction petition was allowed by the Addl. Rent Controller. This Court dismissed the revision petition of the tenant holding that inspite of the fact that the landlords were Green Cardholders there was nothing wrong in their desire to settle in their house in Delhi. The requirement of the landlord to stay in their house in Delhi was held to be bona fide.

26. In Usha Sales Ltd. v. Mohini Nayyer, XXVII (1985) DLT 417 this Court again upheld the desire of a landlady to reside in her own house in Delhi after her retirement as a teacher in United Kingdom. The landlady filed the eviction petition in the year 1980 when she was due to retire in 1982. It was also stated on behalf of the tenant that the petition was premature. This objection of the tenant was also turned down with the observation that it is not necessary that after retirement she must come to Delhi and start staying in rented accommodation or at the mercy of relations. In the case in hand in fact the petitioner started residing in Delhi at the mercy of her relations. Still the requirement of the landlady was held to be not bona fide. The ratio of this judgment is also a complete answer to the argument on behalf of the respondent tenant that the daughters of the petitioner are staying at Lucknow. The ration card entries show that the daughters had also come to Delhi when the petitioner shifted to Delhi so as to start their education in Delhi. Undoubtedly as compared to Lucknow the education facilities in Delhi are better and landlord's desire that her daughters should get education at Delhi cannot be said to be mala fide. Parents wish that their children should get best education. Further in this connection it is to be noted that if a petitioner gives more than one reason for shifting to Delhi and one of those reasons is found to be unsubstantiated or false, it does not mean that the entire case must fall. In his anxiety to get the relief a petitioner may overstate him/her case. If the case is disbelieved on one aspect it does not mean that it should fail altogether. (S. Kapur v. Om Prakash Sharma, (1980) 17 DLT 256).

27. Starting business at Delhi cannot be taken to mean that the entire business has to shift to Delhi which may require proper business office, telephone, staff etc. For starting a business it need not even have an office in Delhi. These things come alongwith the progress of the business and disappear if the business does not thrive. Further these things have to be considered in the background of the nature of the business. As already seen for sales and purchases and that too in the beginning, a proper office, telephone, staff etc. were not essential.

28. To meet the arguments of the respondent that adverse inference should be drawn from the fact of non-production of the husband of the petitioner in the witness box, the petitioner has filed an application in these proceedings under Order 41 Rule 27, C.P.C (C.M No. 2303/94) for permission to produce her husband as a witness. The view I have taken on this aspect of the case does not leave any scope for the argument regarding adverse inference to be drawn on account of non-production of husband as a witness. For the same reason I do not consider it necessary to go into the controversy as to whether application under Order 41, Rule 27, CPC should be allowed or not. The application is not necessary and is disposed of as such.

29. The case of the respondent was also that the eviction petition was mala fide because the petitioner wants to enhances rent since rents in the locality have gone up. Except his word of mouth there is nothing on record in support of this plea whcih is usually taken by all the tenants. The falsity of the plea is demonstrated from the fact that correspondence between parties preceded filing of the eviction petition. The correspondence nowhere shows any attempt for increase of rent on the part of the petitioner. The rent has remained the same throughout.

30. In the facts and circumstances of the case it cannot be said that the petitioner was setting up a false case in order to throw out the tenant and get possession of the premises in suit. To alley any apprehension on the part of the tenant against the landlady in this behalf reference to Section 19 of the Delhi Rent Control Act is enough. The said provision takes care of such mala fide attempts on the part of owners/landlords. Therefore, law has not left the matter to the choice of the owner/landlord nor the tenant has been left at the mercy of the owner/landlord in such matters.

31. The conclusion of the learned Addl. Rent Controller that the sole ground for the bona fide need of the petitioner for the premises in dispute is the shifting of business by her husband at Delhi is totally incorrect. This is the result of the wrong approach to the problem. Shifting of business to Delhi is not the landlady's case. The case of the petitioner is that she had shifted to Delhi and she requires the premises in suit for her residence and the residence of her family members dependent upon her for that purpose. Her husband has started business at Delhi. The result of the above discussion is that the requirement of the petitioner to reside in the premises in suit alongwith members of her family cannot be doubted nor can it be said that it is not bona fide. The petition is allowed. An order of eviction is passed against the respondents and they are directed to hand over vacant possession of the entire tenancy premises being No. M-134, Greater Kailash Part-I, New Delhi, to the petitioner. The respondents are allowed six months' time in view of provisions of Section 14(7) of the Act. No costs.

Appeal allowed.

Dipika Arora v. S.N Sehgal & Ors.

Structured Summary of the Opinion by Mr. Arun Kumar, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Appellant / Landlady)

Respondents' Arguments (Tenants)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Dipika Arora v. S.N Sehgal & Ors.

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