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Attorney(S)
  • Mr. P.S Sharma, Advocate for respondent No. 1.
  • Mr. Arun Jaitley, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Trilok Kumar and Mr. Manoj D. Taneja, Advocates for Petitioner.
  • Mr. Madan Lokur with Ms. Nandini Ramchandran, Advocate for Respondent No. 2.
Judges
  • M. Jagannadha Rao, C.J
  • Anil Dev Singh, J.
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
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Attorney(S)
  • Mr. P.S Sharma, Advocate for respondent No. 1.
  • Mr. Arun Jaitley, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Trilok Kumar and Mr. Manoj D. Taneja, Advocates for Petitioner.
  • Mr. Madan Lokur with Ms. Nandini Ramchandran, Advocate for Respondent No. 2.
Judges
  • M. Jagannadha Rao, C.J
  • Anil Dev Singh, J.
Acts
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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Anil Dev Singh, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was detained under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA). On the night of 9-10 December 1993, at Indira Gandhi International Airport, New Delhi, customs officers recovered travellers' cheques and foreign currency from the petitioner and his brother. Both were arrested under Section 104(2) of the Customs Act, 1962 and remanded to judicial custody. The petitioner filed a series of bail applications between December 1993 and March 1994; bail was intermittently refused and then eventually granted subject to conditions on March 11, 1994, which had not been fulfilled when a detention order under COFEPOSA was passed on March 25, 1994 and served the same day.

The grounds of detention were served on the petitioner on March 30, 1994. The petitioner challenged the detention primarily on the basis that the grounds were served after the statutory five-day period prescribed in Section 3(3) of COFEPOSA (arguing that the day of detention must be included in the five-day computation), claiming a violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution. He made several representations (to the detaining authority, Advisory Board, and later to the Central Government), each of which was rejected at various stages. The petitioner then moved this writ petition challenging the legality of his detention and related procedural complaints (timing of service of grounds, forwarding of representations, adequacy and accuracy of translated documents, consideration of alleged irrelevant documents, and alleged delay by the Central Government in disposing of representations).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the computation of the five-day period in Section 3(3) of the COFEPOSA Act for serving grounds of detention must include the day of detention (i.e., is the first day included or excluded)?
  2. Whether Section 9 of the General Clauses Act can be applied to interpret Section 3(3) of COFEPOSA, or whether Article 22(5) (the phrase "as soon as may be") should control and require inclusion of the day of detention.
  3. Whether representations addressed to the Advisory Board (and not expressly to the Central Government) ought to have been transmitted by the State Government to the Central Government for consideration under Section 11 of the COFEPOSA Act and Article 22(5).
  4. Whether deficiencies in the translation/index of documentary material supplied with the grounds of detention prejudiced the petitioner.
  5. Whether the detaining authority relied on irrelevant or extraneous documents in confirming detention.
  6. Whether there was inordinate or unexplained delay by the Central Government in disposing of the petitioner's representation.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The grounds of detention were served on the sixth day (served March 30 when detention was March 25) — the five-day period should be computed inclusive of the day of detention; therefore service was beyond the statutory period and detention unlawful (violation of Article 22(5) and Section 3(3) COFEPOSA).
  • Section 9 of the General Clauses Act should not be applied to Section 3(3) COFEPOSA because Section 3(3) must be interpreted in light of Article 22(5) and the phrase "as soon as may be" — which, the petitioner argued, supports including the day of detention.
  • Representations dated May 6 and May 10 (addressed to the Advisory Board) were not transmitted to the Central Government and thus the petitioner was denied the supervisory consideration contemplated by Article 22(5) read with Section 11 of COFEPOSA.
  • The Punjabi translation/index of documents accompanying the grounds was defective (inconsistent page counts), preventing the petitioner — who did not know English — from verifying completeness.
  • The detaining authority considered extraneous/irrelevant documents (items at S.Nos. 205 and 206 in the index), thereby relying on improper material.
  • The Central Government unduly delayed disposal of the petitioner's representation (made June 20, 1994 and decided July 12, 1994 — a 21-day gap).

Respondent's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • Section 3(3) of COFEPOSA must be read with established rules of computation of time: where a time period is fixed "from" a given date, the first day is excluded. The Court should apply the rule (as in Haru Das Gupta and authorities) and exclude the day of detention; therefore grounds served on March 30 were within five days.
  • Section 9 of the General Clauses Act and relevant case law apply to interpret the word "from" in Section 3(3) and to exclude the first day; Article 22(5)'s phrase "as soon as may be" does not require inclusion of the first day where the statute specifies a period "from" the date of detention.
  • The representations addressed to the Advisory Board were not required to be sent to the Central Government; Article 22(5) does not impose such a duty on the State Government and Section 11 confers a supervisory power on the Central Government but does not obligate automatic transmission of every representation to it. The petitioner later made an independent representation to the Central Government (June 20, 1994) which was considered and rejected on July 12, 1994.
  • No discrepancy or prejudice was shown from the translation/index; counsel for the petitioner did not point out any missing or mismatching documents even when both English and Punjabi sets were available.
  • Documents at S.Nos. 205 and 206 contained material that was relevant (even if parts were not), and so could not be characterized as wholly extraneous.
  • The Central Government processed the petitioner's representation promptly once received; any delay principally arose because comments were sought from the sponsoring authority (Collector of Customs/Additional Collector) whose response arrived on July 5 and was received July 6, after which the Joint Secretary disposed the matter on July 12 — five days after receiving the sponsoring authority's comments. The sponsoring authority's delay required an explanation; the Court ordered it to file an affidavit explaining the delay.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Haru Das Gupta v. State Of West Bengal, AIR 1972 SC 1293 Where a period is given "from" a certain date within which an act must be done, the first day is to be excluded in computation (interpretation of a statutory period in detention context). The Court relied on this decision to hold that the day of detention is excluded when computing the five-day period under Section 3(3) COFEPOSA; thus grounds served within that computation were timely.
Goldsmiths' Company v. West Metropolitan Railway Company, (1904) 1 KB 1 Illustrative authority for the principle that when a time is fixed "from" a date, the first day is excluded. Cited as antecedent authority supporting the Haru Das Gupta principle and the exclusion of the first day in time computation.
Cartwright v. Mac Cormack, (1963) 1 All E.R. 11 Where an expression like "fifteen days from the date of commencement" excludes the commencement date for computation. Used as supporting authority for excluding the first day when a statute fixes time "from" a date.
Marren v. Dawson Bentley & Co. Ltd., (1961) 2 QB 135 Authority on excluding the date of an event (cause of action) when computing a statutory period. Referenced among authorities establishing the rule of excluding the first day in computation.
Stewart v. Chapman, (1951) 2 KB 792 English authority cited as part of the body of law on computation of time. Cited to show consistent application of the exclusion rule in English decisions relied upon by Indian courts.
In re North Ex parte Lasluck, (1895) 2 QB 264 Another English authority on computation of time excluding the first day. Referred to as supporting precedent for the exclusion principle.
In re Court Fees, AIR 1924 Madras 257 Principle that where there is a terminus a quo and terminus ad quem, the first day is excluded in computation. Cited in support of excluding the date of commencement (the day of detention) in calculating statutory periods.
Srinivasa Silk Mills v. State of Mysore, AIR 1962 Mysore 117 Held that the word "from" is akin to "after" and prima facie excludes the referenced date in computation of time. Used to support the proposition that "from the date of detention" excludes the date of detention itself when computing periods under Section 3(3).
Jitender Tyagi v. Delhi Administration and another, 1989 (3) Crimes 727 Interpretation of Section 3(4) of the National Security Act — the word "forthwith" does not affect computation; the prescribed period is to be computed after the order (excluding the date of the order). The Court relied on the reasoning to reject the petitioner's submission that words like "as soon as may be" should override a clear statutory formula ("from ... not later than five days"); accordingly, "as soon as may be" cannot control the computation of the five-day period.
C. Krishna Reddy v. Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad, 1982 Crl. L.J. 592 (A.P. High Court) Held (by Division Bench) that in computing five days for serving grounds of detention the day of arrest/detention must be included. The Court expressly declined to follow this decision, indicating a respectful departure and preferring the exclusion rule derived from Haru Das Gupta and other authorities.
Gulam Sarwar v. The State of Bihar, 1974 Crl. L.J. 109 (Patna High Court) Held (by Division Bench) that the day of detention must be included in computing the five-day period. The Court disapproved this view and did not follow it, favouring exclusion of the first day instead.
Smt. Gracy v. State of Kerala and another, 1991 (1) Crimes 552 Clarified obligations under Article 22(4) and (5): the detenu's representation must be considered by the detaining authority independently of the Advisory Board; the Government cannot depend solely on the Board's opinion. The Court extracted principles from this decision but distinguished it: in Gracy the detention was by the Central Government and representations were addressed to the Advisory Board; here the petitioner had recourse to separate representation to the Central Government which was considered, and there was no duty on the State to forward Advisory Board-addressed representations to the Central Government absent an express request.
Amir Shad Khan v. L. Hmingliana and others, (1991) 4 SCC 39 Addresses circumstances in which failure to forward a detenu's representation (when there was a specific request for forwarding) vitiated detention. The Court noted the distinction: Amir Shad Khan involved a specific request for transmission to the Central Government which was not complied with; in the present case there was no such request, so the principle did not assist the petitioner.
Jai Parkash v. District Magistrate, Bulandshahr, U.P. and others, 1993 SCC (Cr.) 121 Fact-specific holding that the detenu's representation should have been forwarded to the Central Government where facts indicated that was required. The Court held the case factually distinguishable and therefore not helpful to the petitioner; it emphasized that forwarding is required only in particular factual circumstances.
Sabir Ahmed v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 295 Section 11 power of revocation under COFEPOSA is supervisory; Central Government may act on its own sources and Section 3(2) report but is not required to receive the detenu's representation as part of that report. Applied to support the proposition that the State Government was not under an obligation to transmit representations addressed to the Advisory Board to the Central Government.
Phillippa Anne Duke v. State of Tamil Nadu and others, (1982) 2 SCC 389 Representations from various sources and to various officers cannot be treated automatically as representations to the Government of India under COFEPOSA. Relied upon to show that not every communication (even if sent to officials) is to be treated as a representation to Central Government requiring action under Section 11.
Smt. Pushpa v. Union of India and others, 1980 (Supp.) SCC 391 Confirms that a detenu may make representations under Section 11, but ordinarily the initial representation lies to the detaining authority; no scheme requires the Central Government to consider every representation unless addressed to it. Used to support the view that there is no general obligation on the State to transmit representations not addressed to the Central Government.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by construing Section 3(3) of COFEPOSA in the context of Article 22(5) of the Constitution. It observed that Section 3(3) embodies Article 22(5)'s requirement that grounds of detention be communicated "as soon as may be" but adds a specific time prescription: "ordinarily not later than five days" and, in exceptional circumstances, "not later than fifteen days" from the date of detention.

The Court placed decisive interpretive weight on the statutory wording "from the date of detention." Relying on established jurisprudence (notably Haru Das Gupta and other cited English and Indian authorities), the Court applied the rule that where a period is defined "from" a particular date, the day on that date (the terminus a quo) is to be excluded from computation. Consequently, the five-day period for serving grounds under Section 3(3) commences after (and not including) the date of detention.

The petitioner had argued that the constitutional phrase "as soon as may be" in Article 22(5) required inclusion of the day of detention in the five-day calculation. The Court rejected this, referring to Jitender Tyagi (interpreting a statutory timeline under the National Security Act) for the proposition that adverbs or phrases such as "forthwith" or "as soon as may be" do not control a clear statutory scheme that prescribes computation "from" a given date. The Court held the statutory prescription of "not later than five days from the date of detention" is explicit and should not be overridden by an interpretative device favouring the detenu when the statutory language points clearly to exclusion of the day of detention.

With respect to Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, the Court accepted its application as interpretive guidance: the use of the word "from" in a Central Act ordinarily suffices to exclude the first day of a prescribed period. The Court rejected the petitioner's submission that Section 9 should not be applied in a preventive detention context, noting that Haru Das Gupta itself was a detention case applying the same principle.

On the question whether the State was obliged to transmit representations addressed to the Advisory Board to the Central Government, the Court analyzed Article 22(5) and Section 11 of COFEPOSA. It concluded that Article 22(5) requires the detaining authority to consider the detenu's representation, but it does not by implication impose a duty on the State to forward every representation not expressly or impliedly addressed to the Central Government. Section 11 confers supervisory power on the Central Government and authorizes it to act on information from its own sources, including, but not requiring, the representation of the detenu sent along with the report under Section 3(2). The Court distinguished decisions cited by the petitioner (e.g., Smt. Gracy, Amir Shad Khan, Jai Parkash) on their facts, and found no violation where (a) there was no request by the petitioner to forward the representations to the Central Government, and (b) the petitioner later made an independent representation to the Central Government which was considered and rejected.

Regarding the alleged translation/index discrepancy, the Court required demonstrable discrepancy or prejudice; noting that petitioner's counsel did not point out specific mismatches between English and Punjabi sets even when both were available, the Court treated the contention as an afterthought and rejected it.

Concerning the claim that the detaining authority considered extraneous documents (S.Nos. 205 and 206), the Court observed that portions of those documents contained relevant material; therefore, they could not be characterized as wholly extraneous and the objection failed.

On the alleged delay by the Central Government in disposing of the petitioner's representation, the Court reviewed the administrative chronology (representation received in the COFEPOSA unit on June 22, 1994; sponsoring authority's comments dated July 5, received July 6; case placed before Joint Secretary on July 7; rejected July 12). The Court found the Joint Secretary took only five days to dispose of the representation after receiving sponsoring authority comments and therefore there was no delay at that level. However, because the sponsoring authority (Collector of Customs/Additional Collector) had taken time (June 23 to July 5) to send comments and no affidavit explanation from it was before the Court, the Court ordered the sponsoring authority to file an affidavit explaining the time taken. The Court directed the second respondent to ensure service of this order on the sponsoring authority and fixed a five-day period for filing that affidavit.

Holding and Implications

Holding: All substantive challenges to the detention failed except the Court required an explanation from the sponsoring authority for the time taken to send its comments to the Central Government; the Court directed the sponsoring authority (Collector of Customs/Additional Collector of Customs, New Customs House, IGI Airport) to file an affidavit within five days and listed the matter for further consideration on February 10, 1995.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petition did not result in immediate quashing of the detention order on the grounds advanced in the petition; the Court upheld the computation method excluding the day of detention under Section 3(3) COFEPOSA and rejected related procedural objections (except that it sought an explanation from the sponsoring authority regarding the time taken to forward comments to the Central Government).
  • No broad new precedent was laid down by the Court; the Court applied and followed established authorities (notably Haru Das Gupta and related authorities on computation of time) and distinguished other decisions cited by the petitioner. The Court's conclusions reinforced existing interpretive principles about time computation and the limits of obligations to forward representations to other governmental authorities.

Note: This summary is strictly based on the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or legal propositions beyond those expressly contained in that opinion.

Show full summary ...

    Jasbir Singh. v. Union Of India & Ors

    Anil Dev Singh, J.— This is a writ petition challenging the detention of the petitioner under the provisions of conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (for short “COFEPOSA ACT”). The detention order came to be passed and the challenge thereto has been made in the following; circumstances:

    2. On the right intervening 9th and 10th of December, 1993, the petitioner alongwith his brother Bhupinderjit Singh Ghuman, arrived at I.G.I Airport, New Delhi for boarding Malaysian Airlines flight No. MH-191. After immigration clearance, the petitioner reported at the customs counter of the IGI Airport. He was asked by the Customs Officers whether he was carrying any unauthorised foreign currency or any other contraband goods in his baggage or on his person. But, the petitioner denied carrying any of them. The baggage of the petitioner was then subjected to search as a result whereof travellers cheques amounting to US dollars 9500 were recovered. Out of these travellers cheques 5000 US dollars issued in his name were returned to him and travellers cheques worth 4500 US dollars issued in the name.of one Sunder Lal bearing the signatures for full encashment were seized under Section 110 of the Customs Act as the petitioner was not able to offer any evidence for their lawful exportation. Consequent to the seizure, a Panchanama was prepared on the spot on December 10, 1993. The air ticket of the petitioner for Delhi Kulalampur—Singapore—Calcutta—Delhi Sector and boarding card were also taken into possession by the customs officer alongwith his passport. The brother of the petitioner who was to travel alongwith him was also intercepted. He voluntarily ejected two bundles of foreign currencies from his rectum in the departure hall toilet, in the presence of two witnesses. These bundles contained foreign currencies equivalent to Rs. 5,34,290/-. The statements of the petitioner and his brother were re corded under Section 108 of the Customs Act in which the recovery and seizure was admitted in the manner stated above. Bhupinder Jit Singh also confessed that the currency recovered from him was given to him by the petitioner. The petitioner endorsed the statement of his brother that the recovered currency was given to the latter by him. Besides, the petitioner stated that the currency was handed over to him by one Jagtar Singh of Patiala and was to be delivered to one Niranjan Singh. The petitioner also admitted having an account with OCB bank, Singapore, in which he had a credit balance of 65,026.87 Singapore dollars. He even confessed having two other accounts in Hongkong Bank jointly with his mother for which no permission of the Reserve Bank of India was taken. In connection with these offences, the petitioner and his brother were arrested under Section 104(2) of the Customs Act, 1962 on the same day and produced before the duty Magistrate, who remanded them to judicial custody which was subsequently extended till January 7, 1994. The petitioner in order to secure his release, filed a bail application on December 14, 1993 in which it was stated that he was falsely implicated, that nothing incriminating was recovered from him and that he had made the statement under Section 108 of the Customs Act under coercion, threat and duress. The bail application, however, was rejected by the ACMM on December 24, 1993. Thereafter the petitioner moved another bail application on January 5, 1994 before the ACMM Delhi which also came to be rejected on January 7, 1994. The petitioner filed yet another application for bail on January 19, 1994 which resulted in grant of an interim bail for a period of one month by the ACMM vide his order dated January 22, 1994. The petitioner then moved a fourth bail application on February 11, 1994 which was granted by the ACCM on March 11, 1994 subject to the petitioner furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rupees one lac with one surety in the like amount.

    3. On March 25, 1994, the Deputy Secretary to the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi (Home Department) acting on behalf of the Lt. Governor of National Capital Territory of Delhi passed an order of detention against the petitioner which was served on him on the same day while he was still in custody as by that time he had not fulfilled the conditions of bail. Thereafter on March 30, 1994 the grounds of detention were also served on the petitioner. On April 11, 1994 the petitioner made a representation (Annexure D to the petition) to the first respondent, the Lt. Governor of Delhi, seeking revocation of detention order passsed against him on the ground that the grounds of detention were served on him on the 6th day of the service of the detention order i.e beyond the statutory period of five days as provided by section 3(3) of the cofeposa act rendering the detention illegal and violative of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution and Section 3(3) of the COFEPOSA ACT. This representation was rejected by the detaining authority on April 22, 1994. Thereafter the petitioner submitted an independent and separate representation to the Advisory Board dated May 6, 1994 which was followed by another representation dated May 10, 1994. Both the representations again raised a question of interpretation of section 3(3) of the cofeposa act. These representations were ultimately rejected by the Delhi Administration and the detention was confirmed on June 1, 1994 by the order of the Lt. Governor, National Capital, Territory of Delhi

    4. In the meantime, however, on May 30, 1994, the petitioner made a fresh representation to the Lt. Governor, National Capital, Territory of Delhi. This representation was considered by the Government and the same was rejected on June 7, 1994. Then the petitioner submitted his representation to the Central Government on June 20, 1994 which was rejected on July 12, 1994. Thereafter the petitioner moved the present writ petition challenging his detention.

    5. Mr. Arun Jaitley, learned Senior counsel and Mr. Trilok Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the detention order stood vitiated as the petitioner was served with the grounds of detention on the sixth day i.e one day after the period of five days prescribed by section 3(3) of the cofeposa act within which grounds of detention are required to be served after detention. According to the learned counsel five days have to be computed by including the day when the detention order was served. Learned counsel also submitted that Section 9 of the General Clauses Act will have no application for interpreting, Section 3(3) of the Act and for calculating the period of five days from the detention of the detenu. It was contended that resort to section 9 for interpreting Section 3(3) of the Act cannot be had for the reason that the latter provision has to be interpreted in the light of Article 22(5) of the Constitution which requires the grounds of detention to be served on the detenu as soon as may be after his detention.

    6. section 3(3) of the cofeposa act which requires interpretation may be quoted:

    “3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons:—

    (1)…………………………..

    (2)…………………………..

    (3) For the purposes of clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution, the communication to a person detained in pursuance of a detention order of the grounds on which the order has been made shall be made as soon as may be after the detention, but ordinarily not later than five days, and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than fifteen days, from the date of detention.”

    7. It is clear from the reading of section 3(3) of the cofeposa act that it subserves the purpose of Article 22(5) of the Constitution from which springs the requirement to serve the grounds of detention on a detenu. According to Article 22(5) when any person is detained under any law providing for preventive detention grounds of detention must be communicated to him by the detaining authority, as soon as may be in order to furnish him an earliest opportunity of making a representation against the detention. Section 3(3) following Article 22(5), reiterates that the grounds of detention shall be conveyed to the detenu as soon as may be after the detention. While repeating the mandate of Article 22(5), it requires that ordinarily the grounds of detention be conveyed to the detenu not later than five days and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing not later than 15 days from the date of detention. Specific prescription of time has been laid down in Section 3(3) as the expression “as soon as may be” occurring in Article 22(5) does not connote the precise and definite time within which grounds of detention are required to be conveyed to a detenu. The expression “as soon as may be” merely indicates that the act must be done without avoidable or unreasonable delay. On reading Section 3(3) it is clear that the words “not later than five days from the date of detention are used for laying down a definite time limit within which grounds of detention must be communicated to the detenu. Then word “from” occurring therein is very significant and holds the key to the interpretation of the provision, cannot be lost sight of. It is well settled that where a particular time is given from a certain date within which an act is required to be performed, the day on that date is to be excluded.

    8. This rule has been followed in Haru Das Gupta v. State Of West Bengal AIR 1972 SC 1293. This case involved the interpretation of Section 12 of the West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, 1970 under which the State Government was required to confirm the order of detention within a period of three months from the date of detention. The petitioner in that case was detained on February 5, 1971 and the order of confirmation was made on May 5, 1971. The contention raised by the detenu was that confirmation was made one day after the expiration of the period of three months from the date of detention. This calculation was made on the basis that the first day of detention was to be counted for computing the period of three months laid down for confirmation of the order of detention. Negating the contention the Supreme Court held as follows:

    “4…………When a period of time running from a given day or event to another day or event is prescribed by law or fixed by contract and the question arises whether the computation is to be made inclusively or exclusively of the first mentioned or of the last mentioned day, regard must be had to the context and to the purpose for which tohe computation has to be made (Halsabury's Laws of England, (3rd Ed.) Vol.37 p.92). There is, however, a volume of authority in England showing that where a certain thing has to be done within a specified period, the day on which the cause of action arose is to be excluded from computation……….

    5. These decisions show that courts have drawn a distinction between a term created within which an act may be done and a time limited for doing of an act. The rule is well established that where a particular time is given from a certain date within which an act is to be done, the date on that date is to be excluded. (See Goldsmiths' Company v. West Metropolitan Railway Company, (1904) 1 KB 1). This rule was followed in Cartwright v. Mac Cormack (1963) 1 All EWR 11 at p.13, where the expression “fifteen days from the date of commencement of the policy” in a cover note issued by an insurance companay was construedss as excluding the first date and the cover note to commence at midnight of that day, and also in Marren v. Dawson Bentley & Co. Ltd. (1961) 2 QB 135, a case for compensation for injuries received in the course of employment, where for purposes of computing the period of limitation the date of the accident, being the date of the cause of action was excluded. (See also Stewart v. Chapman, (1951) 2 KB 792 and inre. North Ex parte Lasluck, (1895) 2 QB 264). Thus, as a general rule the effect of defining a period from such a day until such a day within which an act is to be done is to exclude the first day and to include the last day. (See Halsbury's Laws of England, (3rd Edition) Vol.37 pp.92 and 95). There is no reason why tdhe aforesaid rule of construction followed consistently and for so long should not also be applied here.

    6. In computing the period of three months from the date of detention, which was February 5, 1971, before the expiration of which the order or decision for confirming the detention order and continuation of the detention thereunder had to be made, the date of the commencement of detention, namely, February 5, 1971 has to be excluded. So done, the order of confirmation was made before the expiration of the period of three months from the date of detention.”

    9. Thus the Supreme Court excluded the first day of detention from the computation of three months within which the decision for confirming the detention had to be made by the State Government and held that the order of confirmation passed on May 5, 1971 was not beyond time. The upshot of the decision is that where a particular time is given from a certain date within which an act is to be done, the day on that date is to be excluded. The reasoning of this case squarely applies to the case in hand. In the present case the petitioner was detained on March 25, 1994 and the grounds of detention were furnished to him on March 30, 1994. According to section 3(3) of the cofeposa act grounds of detention are required to be communicated to the detenu as soon as may be after the detention but ordinarily not later than five days and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing not later than 15 days from the date of detention. Therefore, if the first day, that is the day of detention is excluded, the grounds of detention served on the petitioner are within the period of five days prescribed by section 3(3) of the cofeposa act.

    10. The principle which has stood the test of time is that where there is a terminus ad quem as well as a terminus a quo, the first day is to be excluded in computing the time within which an act has to be performed. (See: In re Court Fees, AIR 1924 madras 257 (f.b). similarly Section 9 of the General Clauses Act also affords valuable guidance in determining when the time commences to run and when it terminates, where statutory period is fixed for the performance of an act. It provides that in any Central Act or regulation made after the commencement of this Act, it shall be sufficient for the purpose of excluding the first day in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word “from” and for the purpose of including the last day in a series of day or any other period of time to use the word “to”. Therefore, according to Section 9 if for defining a period of time the word “from” is used in the statute the first day is to be excluded. section 3(3) of the cofeposa act uses the word “from” for the purpose of indicating terminus ad quem for computing the period of five days within which the grounds of detention are required to be served on the detenu. As noted above, it was argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that as section 3(3) of the cofeposa act is a part of a preventive detention law, Section 9 of the General Clauses Act should not be used for interpreting the same. This argument losses sight of the decision in Haru Das Gupta's case (Supra), which was also a case under the preventive detention. The Supreme Court while interpreting Section 12 of the West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, 1970, invoked the principle which is mirrored in Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, namely, where a particular time is given from a certain date within which an act is to be done, the day on that date is to be excluded. As already pointed out in section 3(3) of the cofeposa act the word “from” has been used for the purpose of signifying the day when the time given for the purpose of serving the grounds of detention would start running. There is ample authority for the proposition that the word “from” is similar to the word “after”. In Srinivasa Silk Mills, Seshadripuram and others v. State of Mysore and others AIR 1962 Mysore 117 it was held that the word “from” is akin to “after” and if the word “from” is used for the purpose of and in reference to the computation of time, as for example, from a certain date, that date is prima facie excluded from computation.

    11. Learned counsel for the petitioner then submitted that sub section 3 of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act should be interpreted in the light of clause 5 of Article 22 of the Constitution which requires the detaining authority to serve the grounds of detention on the detenu as soon as may be after the detention and the expression “as soon as may be” should be the guiding factor in computing the period of five days prescribed for serving the grounds of detention on the detenu and that period would be inclusive of the day of detention. This interpretation of the learned counsel runs counter to the decision of the Supreme Court in Jitender Tyagi v. Delhi Administration and another 1989 (3) Crimes 727. That case involved the interpretation of Section 3(4) of the National Security Act, 1980. According to the said provision when any order of detention is made by an officer mentioned in Sub section 3, he is required to forthwith report the fact to the State Government to which he is subordinate together with grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as, in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in force for more than 12 days after the making thereof unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the State Government. The question that arose before the Supreme Court for consideration related to the computation of the aforesaid period of 12 days. The Supreme Court while noticing that under sub-section (4) the officer making the detention order shall forthwith report the factum of detention of the detenu to the State Government, held that the word “forthwith” was not to be taken into consideration for the purpose of computing 12 days as there was a clear indication that the said period shall be computed after the order is made, which itself excludes the date on which the order is made. The Supreme Court in this regard observed as follows:

    “8. In our opinion, sub-section (4) has given a clear indication as to the computation of twelve days. The period of twelve days has to be calculated ‘after’ the making of the order of detention. Thus, it is apparent that the period of twelve days comes after the making of the order of detention. It is true that in sub section (4), the officer making the order of detention shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government, but the word forthwith' will not be taken into consideration for the purpose of computing the period of twelve days inasmuch as there is a clear indication that the said period shall be computed after the order is made. In other words, sub section(4) itself excludes the day on which the order is made. Computation of twelve days including the day on which the detention order is made will be ignoring the direction of the legislature, as given in sub section (4) itself, that the said period of twelve days will commence after the making of the detention order. It is, however, submitted that when two interpretations are possible, that which enures to the benefit of the detenu should be accepted. In our opinion, sub-section (4) admits of only one interpretation regarding the computation of twelve days and accordingly, the question as to the adoption of the interpretation which enures to the benefit of the detenu does not arise”.

    12. Therefore, on the same reasoning, the words “as soon as may be” cannot control the computation of 5 days as in section 3(3) of the cofeposa act there is a clear indication that the period has to be computed from and after the date of detention. The legislature has given clear five days having regard to the fact that many formalities may have to be complied with by the detaining authority before serving the grounds of detention on the detenu. For example there may be several documents which would be required to be translated in the language which the detenu understands and the knowledge of the fact that detenu only understands a particular language may be available to the detaining authority only on his detention. Therefore grant of a short time of five days for serving the order from the date of detention has been thought to be just and reasonable by the legislature. This period cannot be curtailed by an interpretative device when the provisions are explicit and clearly point out that the period of five days for serving the grounds of detention is to be computed from and after the date of detention. In any event as earlier pointed out the expression “as soon as may be” is not indicative of any precise time within which an act is to be performed. These words are for cutting down avoidable delay.

    13. Learned counsel for the petitioner however relied upon the Division Bench decisions of Andhra Pradesh and Patna High Courts in C. Krishna Reddy and another v. Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad and others 1982 Crl. L.J 592 and Gulam Sarwar v. The State of Bihar and others 1974 Crl. L.J 109 wherein it was held that for computation of five days for serving the grounds of detention, the day on the date of arrest or detention will have to be included or reckoned. These were cases under the National Security Act, 1980 and Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 respectively. For the reasons mentioned above, we have to strike a discordant note and express our inability to follow the views of their Lordships. The Supreme Court in Haru Das Gupta (Supra) has in a detention matter interpreted the word “from” as akin to the word “after” and this being the position we have to make a respectful departure from the views expressed by the Andhra Pradesh and Patna High Courts.

    14. Learned counsel for the petitioner then contended that the representations dated May 6, 1994 and May 10, 1994 both addressed to the Advisory Board should also have been sent to the Central Government and since these representations were not sent to the Central Government there has been an infringement of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution read with Section 11 of the Act in as much as the petitioner had been denied the benefit of section 11 of the cofeposa act which inter alia, confers supervisory power on the Central Government. In support of this proposition learned counsel for the petitioner heavily relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Smt. Gracy v. State of Kerala and another 1991 (1) Crimes 552, Amir Shad Khan v. L. Hmingliana and others (1991) 4 SCC 39 and Jai Parkash v. District Magistrate, Bulandshahr, U.P and others 1993 SCC (Cr.) 121.

    15. It is not denied by the learned counsel for the respondent that the representations Annexure G and G-1 to the petition (pages 41 to 44 of the petition) were not sent to the Central Government. As alrerady seen these representations were addressed to the Chairman Advisory Board and members thereof. The point taken in the representations is regarding the interpretation of Section 3(3) of the Act, i.e how the time prescribed for communicating the grounds of detention is to be counted. It is not the case of the petitioner that Advisory Board failed to consider the representation or the State Government while confirming the detention order, did not consider the representations made by him. The only grievance appears to be that these representations which were addressed to the Advisory Board were not transmitted to the Central Government.

    16. Under Article 22(5) of the Constitution, a duty has been cast on the detaining authority to consider the representation of a detenu. Article 22(5) of the Constitution, however, neither expressly nor by implication casts a duty on the Central Government to consider the representation of a detenu when it does not happen to be the detaining authority and the same is not addressed to it. However, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the duty is cast on the Central Government to consider the representation of the petitioner under Section 11 of the Act. This submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner requires an examination of Section 11 of the Act. Section 11 of the Act deals with revocation of detention orders. It reads as follows:

    “11. Revocation of detention orders -

    1) Without prejudice to the provisions of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) a detention order may, at any time, be revoked or modified -

    a) notwithstanding that the order has been made by an officer of a State Government, by that State Government or by the Central Government;

    b) notwithstanding that the order has been made by an officer of the Central Government or by a State Government by the Central Government.

    2) The revocation of a detention order shall not bar the making of another detention order under Section 3 against the same person.”

    17. Under the above provisions, even when a detention order is made by an officer of the State Government or by the State Government itself or by the officer of the Central Government the detention can be revoked or modified by the Central Government at any time.

    18. The power under Section 11 is supervisory in nature and can be exercised on information received by the Central Government from its own sources including the report by the State Government under Section 3(2) of the COFEPOSA Act or on the repesentation made by the detenu, if any. It may be pointed out that the representations dated May 6, 1994 and May 10, 1994 were made by the petitioner after the time prescribed for sending the report about the detention of the petitioner under Section 3(2) of the Act by the State Government to the Central Government had expired. Therefore these representations could not have accompanied the report sent by the State Governmment to the Central Government. In any event Section 3(2) requires a report to be sent to the Central Government about the detenu's detention but it does not talk of the representation of a detenu being sent alongwith the same. In none of the cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner nor have we come across any decision, in which it has been held that Article 22(5) of the Constitution imposes a duty on the State Government to transmit the representation of a detenu to the Central Government when the same has been addressed to an authority other than the Central Government and when the Central Government does not happen to be the detaining authority. In case the petitioner wanted revocation of the detention order by the Central Government, he could have made a representation to the Central Government or he could have requested the State Government to transmit the representations, Annexures G and G-1, to the Central Government. At this juncture it may be relevant to point out that subsequently on June 26, 1994 the petitioner made a representation to the Central Government (Annexure O, page 62 of the writ petition) which was duly considered and rejected by it on July 12, 1994 (Annexure P page 65 of the writ petition). Therefore, in any event, no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner by failure of the State Government to transmit the aforesaid representations to the Central Government, which were only addressed to the Advisory Board, as subsequently an independent representation of the petitioner addressed to the Central Government was rejected.

    19. Reliance by the learned counsel for the petitioer on the decision in Smt. Gracy (Supra) does not advance his case. In that case the detenu was detained under Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 and his detention was confirmed by the Central Government which also directed his detention for a period of two years w.e.f January 30, 1990. In the grounds of detention the petitioner was specifically informed that he had a right to represent to the detaining authority, Central Government and the Central Advisory Board against the detention order. It was admitted that the representation was addressed to the Advisory Board and no representation addressed to the Central Government was made by the detenu.

    20. The precise question before the Supreme Court in Smt. Gracy case (supra) was whether there had been any infraction of the guarantee under Article 22(5) of the Constitution as a result of the Central Government's failure to consider detenu's representation independent of its consideration by the Advisory Board, when the representation was only addressed to the Advisory Board. Besides that was a case of detention by the Central Government and not by the State Government and hence no question arose whether the representation addressed to the Advisory Board was to be forwarded by the State Government to the Central Government.

    21. From the decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. Gracy's case the following principles noticed and laid down therein can be culled out:

    1. It is beyond the pale of controversy that the right to make a representation under clause 5 of Article 22 by necessary implication guarantees the constitutional right of a proper consideration of the representation.

    2. The obligation of the Government to afford to the detenu an opportunity to make representation is distinct from the Government's obligation to refer the case of the detenu alongwith representation to the Advisory Board to enable it to form its opinion.

    3. It is implicit in Article 22(4) and (5) that the Government while discharging its duty to consider the representation cannnot depend upon the views of the Advisory Board on such representation. It has to consider the representation on its own without being influenced by any such view of the board. The right of the detenu to have his representation considered by the Government is safeguarded by Article 22(5) and is independent of consideration by the Advisory Board under Article 22(4).

    4. The Government considers the representation to see whether the order is inconformity with power under the law and the board considers it to ascertain whether there is sufficient case for detention.

    5. If there be only one representation by the detenu addressed to the detaining authority the obligation arises under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of its consideration by the detaining authority independent of the opinion of Advisory Board in addition to its consideration by the Advisory Board. In other words one representation of the detenu to the Government does not dispense with the requirement of its consideration also by the Advisory Board. There is dual obligation of consideration of the detenu's representation by the Advisory Board and independently by the detaining authority, the Government, irrespective of the fact whether the representation is addressed to the detaining authority/Government or the Advisory Board, mode of address being only a matter of form.

    22. On the basis of the abovenoted fifth principle, learned counsel for the petitioner wants us to hold that when representation is made by the detenu, whether to the Advisory Board or authorised officer of the State, who made the detention order, Or to the State Government or to the Government of India, it must be considered by all of them.

    23. It may be noted that the Supreme Court in the above case only referred to the duty and obligation of the Adviosry Board and the detaining/confirming authority to consider the detenu's representation, even when the representation is addressed to only one of the authorities. This is as per the mandate of Article 22(4) and (5) of the constitution, implied in Article 22(4) in so far as the Advisory Board is concerned and express in Article 22(5) in regard to the detaining authority. But apart from the dual responsibility of the detaining authority and the Advisory Board to consider the representation of the detenu, which may be addressed to any of the authorities, there is no further obligation on the part of the State to transmit the representation to the Central Government, when the representation is not expressly or impliedly addressed to the latter.

    24. Therefore Smt. Gracy's case (Supra) is no authority for the proposition that the representation of the detenu which is not addressed to the Central Government must be transmitted for consideration of the Central Government. In Sabir Ahmed v. Union Of India. (1980) 3 SCC 295, while considering the scope of section 11 of the cofeposa act, the Supreme Court held that the power under this Section was supervisory and could be exercised on information received from the Central Government from its own source including the report sent by the State Government under Section 3(2) thereof, which however, did not require that the representation, any, made by the detenu should also be sent alongwith thee report to the Central Government.

    25. In Phillippa Anne Duke v. State of Tamil Nadu and others (1982) 2 SCC 389 the Supreme Court was considering whether Bout de Papier handed over to the Prime Minister of India during her visit to Britain and the subsequent reminder addressed to the External Affairs Ministry by the British High Commission could be considered as representations to the Central Government under section 11 of the cofeposa act. The Supreme Court held that it was not possible to treat representations from whatever source addressed to whomsoever officer of one or other department of the Government as representations to the Government of India requiring the appropriate authority under COFEPOSA Act to consider the matter under section 11 of the cofeposa act.

    26. In Smt. Pushpa v. Union of India and others 1980 (Supp.) SCC 391 it was held that undoubtedly it would be open to the detenu to make representation under section 11 of the cofeposa act requiring either the State Government or the Central Government as the case may be, to revoke the order of detention. But the initial representation under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution would ordinarily lie to the detaining authority as it is that authority which takes the decision to detain the petitioner. It was noted by the Supreme Court that there is nothing in the scheme of Article 22(5) of the Constituion or provision of the COFEPOSA Act requiring the representation to be considered by the Central Government or the State Government notwithstanding that the order of detention is made by an officer specially empowered in that behalf.

    27. The power of the Central Government under section 11 of the cofeposa act to revoke the order of detention implies that the detenu has a right to make a representation to it for exercise of that power. If the detenu addresses the representation to the Central Government to exercise its right under Section 11, the same must be transmitted to the Central Government. But in case the detenu does not address a representation to the Central Government expressly or by necessary implication the same need not be sent to it.

    28. The decision in Jai Parkash case (Supra) does not help the petitioner as in that case the detenu had submitted nine copies of the representation addressed to the Home Secretary without indicating whether the representation was to be forwarded to the Home Secretary, Government of India or Home Secretary to the State. In the grounds of detention it was specifically mentioned that the detenu had a right to make a representation against his detention to the Central Government as well as the State Government. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case, the Supreme Court held that the representation of the detenu should have been sent to the Home Secretary to the Government of India and failure to do so, vitiated the detention.

    29. Again decision in Amir Shad Khan (Supra) is of no avail.to the petitioner. In that case the detenus was apprised of their right to make representation to the State Government, Central Government and Advisory Board. However, the representation was addressed only to the detaining authority and request was made to it for transmitting a copy thereof to the Central Government for considering the revocation of the detention orders. The State Government which was the detaining authority rejected the representation of the detenus and did not forward the same to the Central Government. The Supreme Court having regard to the fact that the detenus had made a specific request for transmission of a copy of the representation to the Central Governmment and the State Government having failed to comply with the request held that the orders of detention stood vitiated. The facts of the present case are different from the facts of Amir Shad Khan's case (Supra). In the present case there was no request of the detenu for forwarding the representations dated May 6, 1994 and May 10, 1994 to the Central Government. Accordingly, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the non-consideration of the petitioner's representation dated May 6, 1994 and May 10, 1994 by the Central Government has resulted in violation of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution and Section 11 of the COFEPOSA Act, is not tenable.

    30. Since in the present case there was no communication whatsoever from the detenu requiring the State Government to send the representations dated May 6, 1994 and May 10, 1994 to the Central Government, we are of the opinion that the State Government was under no obligation to have the representations of the petitioner dated May 6, and May 10 of 1994 transmitted to the Central Government.

    31. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the petitioner received a set of grounds of detention with documents in Punjabi language but he was not furnished with a proper index with correct page numbers, thereby making it impossible for him to verify whether or not he had received all the documents. He explained that the detenu was supplied with an index of documents accompanying the grounds of detention in Punjabi script which was a translation of the index in English. It was also pointed out that the index in English shows that there were 210 pages of documents accompanying the grounds of detention, while the documents in Punjabi script consisted of 250 pages. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that since the petitioner did not know English language he could not cross check the documents with the list which was supplied to him in Punjabi.

    32. This submission of the learned counsel is a submission of despair and does not carry conviction. Learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Trilok Kumar even at this stage, when he had the facility of both set of documents, Punjabi and English as well, has not been able to point out any discrepancy between the two sets. If any document was missing from the Punjabi set of documents, the petitioner would have certainly pointed out the discrepancy in the representations which were filed by him on behalf of the detenu. Even during the course of arguments no such discrepancy was brought to our notice. The plea is merely an after thought. Moreover the petitioner had to be supplied with translation of the documents including index which was in English. Therefore the translation of the index from English to Punjabi had to reflect what was contained in the former as it had to be a true and correct translation of it. Therefore, this plea of the petitioner also fails.

    33. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the detaining authority considered two irrelevant and extraneous documents which fact is evident from the list/index of documents. These documents figure at S.Nos 205 and 206 thereof. Document mentioned at S.No 205 is a copy of the application filed by the petitioner before Shri R.K Sharma, ACMM, New Delhi wherein it is stated that the petitioner was arrested under Sections 453, 324 and 506 IPC on February 17, 1993 and detained in Tihar Jail. It is further averred that he was released on parole in the customs case in which he was required to be present in the court on February 21, 1994. In the end the petitioner prayed that production warrants should be sent to the Jail for his presence in the court. The other document is also a copy of the application filed in the court of ACMM, New Delhi seeking return of the unused air tickets of the petitioner and his brother which had been seized by the Customs Officer. In this application the petitioner stated that he was arrested by the Customs Officer at the IGI Airport, New Delhi and at that time the unused air tickets, were seized alongwith boarding card by him. The petitioner prayed that the air tickets and boarding card be returned to him. From a perusal of the documents it appears some portions thereof pertaining to his arrest and release on parole in connection with the customs case are relevant. As long as the documents contain some material, which is relevant it cannot be said that the detaining authority considered extraneous and irrelevant material Thus the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is without force and the same is rejected.

    34. Lastly it was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there was inordinate delay on the part of the Central Government in disposing of the representation of the petitioner. He pointed out that the representation to the Central Government was made on June 20, 1994 but was disposed of only on July 12, 1994 i.e after a gap of 21 days.

    35. It is a settled principle of law that the representation of the detenu must be dealt with expeditiously at every level and each stage through which it passes during the process of its disposal by the authority to whom it is addressed. It is the right of the detenu to have his representation considered and disposed of promptly and without unreasonable delay. This right of the detenu has the sanction of Article 22(5) of the Constitution and must be zealously guarded because if the right is to have real meaning it cannot be allowed to be breached or infringed. The safeguards under Article 22(5) are the soul of liberty. At the same time, it must be pointed out that the question whether the representation submitted by a detenu has been dealt with promptly and diligently is to be decided not by the application of invariable absolutes or any rigid or inflexible rule or set formula but on a careful scrutiny of the facts of each case. The observations of the courts that each day's delay in dealing with the representation must be explained are only meant to emphasise the expedition with which the representation must be considered.

    36. Reverting back to the present case, learned counsel for the respondent invited our attention in regard to the aforesaid question to the explanation given in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the second respondent. The explanation is set out in para VII of the affidavit which reads as follows:

    “VII. With regard to Ground VII, it is denied that there was inordinate delay on the part of the answering respondent in considering the representation made by the petitioner. It is submitted that the petitioner made a representation to the Answering Respondent only on 20.6.94, which was forwarded by Superintendent, Tihar Jail, New Delhi vide his letter dated 20.6.94 and the same was received in the Cofeposa Unit of the Ministry on 22.6.94 The same was placed before the considering authority who directed to call for the comments of the sponsoring authority. On 22.6.94 itself, the answering respondents requested the sponsoring authority to send all relevant facts and parawise comments on the representation made. The sponsoring authority furnished their comments vide their letter dated 5.7.94 and the same were received in the Cofeposa Unit on 6.7.94 (25th, 26th June, 1994 were Saturday and Sund and 2nd and 3rd July, 1994 were also Saturday and Sunday respectively). The case was processed and submitted to the Joint Secretary (Cofeposa) on 7.7.94, who after due application of mind, rejected the representation on 12.7.94(9th and 10th July, 94 were Saturday and Sunday). A memo.intimating the detenu about rejection of his representation by the Central Government was also issued on 12.7.94”

    37. Reading of the aforesaid para of the counter affidavit reveals that the Superintendent, Tihar Jail, Delhi forwarded the representation of the petitioner to the second respondent on June 20, 1994 itself. The representation was received in the Cofeposa unit of the Ministry of Finance on June 22, 1994. The same was placed before the concerned authority on the same date. On June 22, 1994 itself, the authority called for the parawise comments of the sponsoring authority on the representation of the petitioner. The sponsoring authority despatched its comments on the 13th day by its letter dated July 5, 1994 which was received in the Cofeposa unit on July 6, 1994. Thereafter, on July 7, 1994 the case was placed before the Joint Secretary, Cofeposa who disposed of the representation of the petitioner on July 12, 1994. Thus it is clear that the Joint Secretary took just five days in disposing of the representation. Therefore at the level of the Joint Secretary there was no delay in dealing with the representation of the petitioner.

    38. The only other grievance of the petitioner is with regard to the time taken by the sponsoring authority from June 23, 1994 to July 5, 1994 for sending its comments to the second respondent (See para VII of the rejoinder to the counter-affidavit of the second respondent). However, we find that the sponsoring authority is not a party to the writ petition and no affidavit seems to have been filed by it. Therefore an opportunity is required to be given to the sponsoring authority to furnish its explanation with regard to the time taken by it in sending its comments to the second respondent. Accordingly, we direct the sponsoring authority, Collector of Customs/Additional Collector of Customs, New Customs House, IGI Airport, New Delhi to submit its explanation with regard to the time taken by it in sending its comments on the representation of the detenu. An affidavit in this regard will be filed by the sponsoring authority within five days. The sponsoring authority will be informed of this order by the second respondent, who will ensure the filing of the affidavit within the stipulated time. It is clarified that no further opportunity will be given in this regard.

    39. All points except the last submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner fail. The matter will be listed on February 10, 1995 for considering the explanation of the sponsoring authority and for disposal of the writ petition.

    40. Office will send the extract of the penultimate paragraph of this order to the sponsoring authority, Collector of Customs/Additional Collector of Customs, New Delhi Customs House, IGI Airport, New Delhi and also give a copy of the same to the second respondent today itself for doing the needful.

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