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  • provisions of Order 9, Rule 9
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  • provisions of Order 9, Rule 9
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit was dismissed in default. The very next day after the dismissal order, an application was filed for restoration of the suit on the ground that the counsel was busy in the High Court and the trial Judge refused to adjourn the case based on the clerk's request, holding that the clerk had no authority to appear. The trial Judge recorded evidence and concluded that the clerk had not put in appearance and the counsel’s absence did not constitute “sufficient cause” under Order 9 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Consequently, the dismissal order was upheld on August 20, 1974. The present appeal against that order was admitted on February 4, 1975.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the absence of a lawyer due to professional engagement elsewhere constitutes “sufficient cause” for non-appearance under Order 9 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure to justify restoration of a suit dismissed in default.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mukta Devi Panda v. Harish Chundra Panda, AIR 1964 Orisa 104 Absence of counsel due to professional engagement may not by itself amount to sufficient cause. Supported the view that absence of counsel for professional reasons is not necessarily sufficient cause for non-appearance.
Tulsiram Bhagwandas v. Sitaram Srigopal, AIR 1959 Calcutta 389 Such absence “may not always be a sufficient cause”. Reinforced the principle that absence of counsel due to other engagements is not automatically sufficient cause.
Ananta Pondu Porobo Desai & Ors v. Smt. Lalita Poi, AIR 1975 Goa, Daman & Diu 30 Absence for no fault of the party is not necessarily sufficient cause for non-appearance. Adopted the view that absence without fault is not always sufficient cause for restoration.
Aung Gyi v. Govt. of Burma, AIR 1940 Rangoon 162 Advocates must take reasonable precautions to appear; Order 9 Rule 9 is meaningless if casual absence can justify restoration. Emphasized the duty of advocates to attend hearings and that casual absence should not justify reinstatement.
Deshbundhu Gupta & Co. v. K.B Malik & Co., 1972 Rajdhani Law Reporter 18 Going to court late is no justification for restoration; requests for accommodation must be made early. Supported the principle that late appearance does not justify restoration of suit dismissed for default.
Hari Chand v. Mohinder Nath and another, 1969 All India Rent Control Journal 925 Counsel with multiple cases must arrange for colleagues to appear in their absence. Highlighted counsel’s duty to manage multiple cases responsibly to avoid non-appearance.
Shamdasani v. Central Bank of India, AIR 1938 Bombay 199 Dismissal of suit without hearing is serious; restoration should be refused only in cases of gross negligence or carelessness. Guided the court to be cautious in dismissing suits and to favour restoration unless there is gross negligence.
Collector Land Acquisition, Anantanag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 “Sufficient cause” is elastic and must be applied to serve the ends of justice. Supported a flexible interpretation of “sufficient cause” to ensure justice is served.
Savithri Amma Seethamma v. Arotha Karthy & Ors, (1983) 1 SCC 401 Absence of lawyer due to being busy in another court constitutes sufficient cause. Formed the basis for the court’s conclusion that counsel’s professional engagement elsewhere is sufficient cause for restoration.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court acknowledged the well-established principle that absence of a lawyer due to professional commitments elsewhere does not automatically constitute sufficient cause for restoration of a suit dismissed in default. The court reviewed multiple precedents illustrating that counsel must take reasonable precautions, such as arranging for colleagues to appear, and that the courts should not lightly restore suits without sufficient cause. However, the court also emphasized the elasticity of the term “sufficient cause” and the need to apply it in a manner that furthers the ends of justice rather than as a rigid technicality.

On the facts, the court found that the trial judge rightly held that the plaintiff’s counsel’s clerk had not appeared. Yet, the trial judge erred in rejecting the counsel’s explanation that his absence was due to professional engagement in the High Court. Citing the Supreme Court precedent in Savithri Amma Seethamma v. Arotha Karthy & Ors, the court held that such absence constitutes sufficient cause. The court clarified that sufficient cause requires an honest intention to appear and reasonable efforts to do so, and if these are established, restoration should be granted.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is allowed and the suit dismissed in default is restored.

No order as to costs was made. The decision directly affects the parties by reinstating the suit, but no new precedent was established beyond the application of existing principles regarding sufficient cause for restoration under Order 9 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    Bank Of Baroda. v. Sansar Chand Kapur & Anr..

    Jaspal Singh, J.— Delay, it is said, defeats justice. Surely. I have noticed something else too. It sometimes wears down even the Advocates with the result that when exposition is expected at some length, the arguments end in a whimper. I could easily discern such weariness in this appeal of 1975. The fire was amiss and so also a lawyers's most effective weapon, the precedent.

    2. The question raised is as old as the hills. However, let us first hurry through the facts. The suit was dismissed in default. The very next day of that order an application was moved for its restoration and the plea taken was that whereas the counsel was busy in the High Court the trial Judge refused to adjourn the case on the request of his clerk on the ground that he had no authority to appear. The trial Judge recorded the evidence and held that the clerk had not put in appearance and as far as the counsel was concerned his absence constituted no, “sufficient cause”. The application thus invited the order of dismissal. This was on August 20, 1974. The present appeal against that order was admitted on February 4, 1975.

    3. Does the absence of a lawyer on the ground that he had some professional work elsewhere, constitute a “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Order 9 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure? This then is the question. In Mukta Devi Panda v. Harish Chundra Panda AIR 1964 Orisa 104, the answer was that it may not by itself amount to sufficient cause. In Tulsiram Bhagwandas v. Sitaram Srigopal AIR 1959 Calcutta 389, the court opined that such absence “may not always be a sufficient cause”. And, relying upon the said two judgments the Judicial Commissioner of Goa, Daman and Diu opined that such absence for no fault of the party is not “necessarily sufficient cause for non-appearance of the party” (see Ananta Pondu Porobo Desai & Ors v. Smt. Lalita Poi AIR 1975 Goa, Daman & Diu 30). One may also recall the Full Bench decision reported in Aung Gyi v. Govt. of Burma AIR 1940 Rangoon 162 where in their Lordships observed that advocates who were engaged in cases which were fixed for hearing at a given time and place cannot be allowed to treat the court before which the hearing is to take place with contumely or indifference, and then apply casually for reinstatement of a suit dismissed in their absence merely because they hoped or believed that they might attend the hearing. They must take reasonable precaution, and the provisions of Order 9, Rule 9 become meaningless if it can afterwards to urged that although none were taken and then was no sufficient cause for their non-attendance, the suit can still be restored to the file, because the litigant would otherwise suffer.

    4. Two judgments have been noticed by the learned Additional District Judge also and both come from this court. The first is Deshbundhu Gupta & Co. v. K.B Malik & Co. 1972 Rajdhani Law Reporter page 18 wherein the learned single Judge observed:

    “Going to the court at 11.45 a.m by itself was no justification for asking for the restoration of the suit. Whenever and wherever a court is seized of a matter and the same is running in the daily list, if the counsel or the party wants to be accommodated, the request is to be made to the court at the earliest that the case may be taken at a particular part of the day. A party cannot make the choice of leisurely absenting itself and then saying that at a particular time the counsel for the party or the party itself walked into the court room and, therefore, for that reason the court should have felt satisfied and should have restored a suit or a matter which may have been otherwise dismissed in exercise of appropriate jurisdiction.”

    The second comes from the pen of I.D Dua, C.J (as His Lordship then was) in Hari Chand v. Mohinder Nath and another 1969 All India Rent Control Journal page 925 where in it was observed:

    “It must clearly be understood to be the duty of the counsel who have more cases more than one fixed in one day before different Judges of the same court, to see that they make suitable arrangement with some colleague of theirs to appear for them in their cases which called for hearing during their occupation elsewhere.”

    5.I need to pause here. For a short while only. And in this interregnum I may notice what the courts have said on dismissal of suits for default in appearance. Says the Special Bench in Shamdasani v. Central Bank of India AIR 1938 Bombay 199.

    “It is a very serious matter to dismiss a man's suit or summons, or whatever it may be, without hearing it, and that course ought not to adopted unless the court is really satisfied that justice so requires. The a Court should refuse to restore a matter, only if there is gross negligence or gross carelessness.”

    6. Can we afford to ignore those words of sagacity? Surely not! And keeping them in mind, should one be so harsh on the suitor so as to dismiss his cause in default because the lawyer engaged to represent him found it not possible despite effort, to appear on account of some other professional commitment? Due regard has to be had to the nature of the duties of the counsel to wards his other clients and the other courts. The expression “sufficient cause” is not a catchword. It is adequately elastic to enable the court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which, subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose of the existence of the institution of Courts (See: Collector Land Acquisition, Anantanag v. Mst. Katiji AIR 1987 SC 1353).

    7. And, it is in the light seen above that the court is required to approach the subject.

    8. The learned Additional District judge, on appreciation of evidence came to the conclusion that the Clerk of plaintiff's counsel had not put in appearance. He rightly held so. The Court record does not support the clerk. Two witnesses examined by the other side falsify him. So far, so good. However, he ignored even the statement of Mr. F.C Bedi, Advocate for the appellant to the effect that his nonappearance was on account of his having remained busy in the High Court. And, it is here that the learned Additional District judge, despite his vast experience and insight, faltered and lost the grip, for, the absence of the lawyer on account of his having remained busy in another court constitutes a “sufficient cause” is no more in doubt (See: Savithri Amma Seethamma v. Arotha Karthy & Ors (1983) 1 SCC 401.

    9. “Sufficient Cause” has to be given a meaning to embrace all relevant circumstances having bearing on the point in issue and since a Judge has to adjudicate on the particular facts of each case, it may become very risky in such cases to act on precedents. It is, however, not every absence of a lawyer which may provide a sufficient cause. The question would be whether he honestly intended to be in court and did his best to get there in time and once the court feels satisfied that he did try to get there and that he would have even got there in time but for the intervention of some inevitable cause for which he could in no way be responsible, there would be the “sufficient cause” inviting an order of restoration.

    10. The appeal is allowed with the result that the suit dismissed in default shall stand restored. However, no order is made as to costs.

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    Comments

    Bank Of Baroda. v. Sansar Chand Kapur & Anr..
    (Jul 28, 1994)