S.C Jain, J.:— This is a second appeal filed against the judgment of Shri O.P Divedi. Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi dated 29th January, 1990 whereby he confirmed the findings that the respondent herein needs the premises in dispute bonafide for his residence and the members of his family dependent upon him and the appellant, Om Parkash has acquired vacant possession of House No. E-19, Adarsh Nagar, Delhi after 1978.
2. In brief the facts of the case are that Vaid Shyam Sunder-respondent herein alleged in his eviction petition that he being the owner/landlord of the suit premises let out the same to the appellant for residential purposes and that he requires the same bonafide for his residence and for the residence of his family members dependent upon him and that he has no other suitable residental accommodation for his residence and for the residence of the members of his family at Delhi. The other ground of eviction, which the respondent/landlord has taken is that the appellant has constructed a residential house E-19, Adarsh Nagar, Delhi in 1978, after the commencement of the tenancy and that he is also liable to be evicted under the provisions of Section 14-1 (h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
3. The appellant contested the eviction petition taking various pleas. The first objection is regarding the purpose of letting. According to him, the purpose of letting was residential-cum-commercial and that he has been making use of one room for commercial purpose i e. by sailing milk from there within the knowledge of the respondent landlord. No order of eviction can be passed under Section 14(1) (e) of the Act in the present case. The other objection taken by him is that the need of the respondent/landlord is not bonafide and genuine. His daughters are married. The respondent is settled at Kaithal where he is residing, though occasionally visits Delhi and stays in the mezzanine floor in the property in dispute. He, however, admitted regarding the construction of a house by him in the year, 1978. The appellant's case is that no doubt he built a house No. E-19, Adarsh Nagar, which has three rooms on the ground floor and a barsati on the first floor but that house has been let out by him to a tenant and the same is not available to the appellant for occupation and as such no eviction order can be passed under Section 14(1) (h) of the Act.
4. Both the courts below after appreciating the evidence on record came to a concurrent finding of facts that the premises in dispute were let out to the appellant only for a residential purpose and that the need of the respondent/landlord is bonafide. There is also a concurrent finding of facts of both the courts below that the appellant/tenant has built up house No. E-19, Adarsh Nagar, Delhi in 1978 i.e after the creation of the tenancy of the suit premises. It has also been found correct, as a matter of fact, that at least one room is available to the appellant/landlord for occupation in the House No. E-19, Adarsh Nagar, Delhi which has been constructed by him even if his plea that he let out the other portion in that house to a tenant is believed. On account of the concurrent findings of both the courts below, eviction order passed by the Additional Rent Controller under Section 14 (1) (e) and 14(1) (h) of the Delhi Re3t Control Act stands confirmed.
5. The question which arises in this case is whether this second appeal under Section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act is maintainable when there are concurrent findings of facts of both the courts below. An appeal to this Court under Section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act lies only if some substantial question of law is involved. In none of the grounds urged before this Court, I find that any substantial question of law is involved and as such I find myself in difficulty in entertaining this appeal under Section 39 of the Act in view of the concurrent findings of the facts of both the courts below. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant has not appeared as his own witness in support of his case and it involves a substantial question of law does not help the appellant in the present circumstances of the case. It was not essential for the landlord to appear in the witness box when all the necessary facts have come on record. There is sufficient evidence on record for proper adjudication of the case and for non-examining the petitioner as his own witness is not sufficient to non-suit him on that ground. No substantial question of law is involved in it. Now, touching the pleas taken by the learned counsel for the appellant, it is not disputed by the appellant himself that he initially occupied one room of the suit premises for residential use only. But according to him, later on he also took another room on rent and that he used the same for commercial purposes i.e for selling milk. This plea was not accepted by both the courts below on the basis of the evidence on record. Certified copy of the municipal record (Ex A.W 1/5) show the tenanted premises as residential. The appellant is having commercial shop in that very vicinity where he is running a General Provisions Store. His plea that he is using one room for selling milk has not been proved on record. Neither any record from the shop & Establishment Department was produced though opportunity was granted nor any other documentary evidence was produced by the appellant to show that a part of the suit premises is being used for commercial purposes. Both the courts below have rightly upheld that the purpose of letting was residential and I find no ground to interfere with this finding.
6. Regarding the bonafide requirement of the respondent/landlord, it is on the record that his family consists of himself, his wife, three sons and three married daughters. His elder son is married and he has a wife and two children. As per the evidence on record, at present six members of the petitioner's family are residing in a small portion of the said house and this fact has been proved by the Ration Card (Ex. A.W 1/7 and A.W 1/8), This is also on record that the accommodation available with the petitioner consists of one mezzanine which is constructed on W.C bath and store measuring 11 × 7 feet and its height is 5.6″ feet. This fact has not been disputed by the appellant/tenant but he only stated that the petitioner and his family are residing at Kaiibal. This observation made by the appellant/landlord stands belied from the certificate Ex. A.W 1/6 which goes to show that A.W 1, has been posted as a T.GT under Delhi Administration. Ex. A.W 1/7 is the photo copy of the ration card showing that he along with his father and the mother is residing in the disputed property. This need of the respondent and his family members dependent upon him for residence cannot be said to be fanciful or whimsical, Though the daughters of the petitioner are married but married daughters are supposed to be visiting their parents off and on in the Hindu Society. It is settled law that when a person needs his kith and kin to be near him, and therefore, seeks possession of residential accommodation from a tenant, the requirement can be said to be his own requirement and not only that of his family. Thus, requirement for married sons and married daughters whom he needs to be near him are included in the word himself. “Residence for himself” cannot mean residence for landlord living in isolation and that the word himself includes a person with whom landlord is normally accustomed to live. The word dependent is not restricted to persons financially dependent but is comprehensive enough to include persons who are dependent on landlord for residential accommodation. The landlord is entitled to make himself comfortable in his property. The only requirement of law is that the need of the landlord must be bonafide. In this case, there is nothing on record to show and prove that the need of the landlord is not bonafide.
7. The eviction order passed by courts below under Section 14(1) (e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act needs no interference and there is no illegality in it.
8. Regarding the plea of the appellant that an eviction order under Section 14(1) (h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act could not have been passed against him because the entire house constructed by him in the year 1978 being House No. E-19, Adarsh Nagar, Delhi is in occupation of a tenant and is not available for him, it is also not tenable. Even if though not proved by any documentary evidence that the entire house built by the appellant/tenant in 1978, is in possession of the tenant yet from his own showings it is apparent that one room is lying vacant which he can occupy. The said house was constructed by the appellant sometime in the year 1978 when he was living as a tenant in the suit premises. Once it is proved that the tenant has acquired the vacant possession of alternate accommodation, the tenant becomes liable to eviction under Section 14(1) (h) of the Act. In this case, in the year 1982 when he built this house, the same was available to him for immediate occupation but he did not occupy the same rather opted to let out the same. Whether it is vacant or is in possession of a tenant is immaterial for the purposes of passing an eviction order under Section 14(1) (h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act as far as the facts of the present case are concerned. Both the courts below have rightly held it so and I also find no ground to interfere with this concurrent finding. This second appeal deserves no merit and the same is hereby dismissed.