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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of the Delhi Land (Restriction on Transfer) Act, 1972
  • COMPANIES ACT 1956
  • Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of the Delhi Land (Restriction on Transfer) Act, 1972
  • COMPANIES ACT 1956
  • Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, a private limited company, obtained perpetual leasehold rights from the Delhi Development Authority (respondent) for an industrial plot at Lawrence Road Industrial Area, New Delhi. The lease deed included a clause prohibiting sale, transfer, or assignment of the plot without prior written consent of the lessor. The petitioner constructed a building and operated its business on the plot. The plot was originally purchased by M/s. Rama Associates, a partnership firm, which later converted into a private limited company with the same partners as directors.

The respondent alleged that there was a transfer of majority shares and control within the company without its consent, threatening termination of the lease. The petitioner was accused of subletting the property to other entities. Respondent demanded information about the company’s directors and shareholders. Due to the threat of lease termination by the respondent, the petitioner filed a suit for permanent injunction and applied for a temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), which was dismissed by the trial court and later affirmed by the First Appellate Court. The present revision petition challenges these orders.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the transfer of shares and change in the company’s directors without the lessor’s prior consent results in automatic termination of the lease deed under the terms of the lease.
  2. Whether the petitioner is entitled to a temporary injunction restraining the respondent from terminating the lease pending disposal of the suit.
  3. Whether conditions in the lease deed restricting transfer or change in company constitution are valid in light of the Companies Act, 1956, and principles of separate legal entity.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The lease deed conditions imposing restrictions on share transfer or changes in company constitution are contrary to the Companies Act, 1956, and public policy.
  • The petitioner, as a separate legal entity distinct from its shareholders and directors, cannot have its lease automatically terminated due to change in shareholding or directorship.
  • The trial and appellate courts failed to properly consider the petitioner’s prima facie case and legal principles governing corporate identity.
  • The petitioner relied on the precedent set in Scindia Poteries & Services Ltd. v. Deputy Land & Development Officer to support its position on the separate legal entity of the company and invalidity of automatic lease termination.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Scindia Poteries & Services Ltd. v. Deputy Land & Development Officer, 41 (1990) DLT 261 Recognition of company as a separate legal entity distinct from shareholders and directors; invalidity of treating sale of shares as sale of land. The court relied on this precedent to affirm that changes in shareholding or directorship do not automatically terminate the lease, emphasizing the legal separation of the company from its members.
Salomon v. Salomon, 1897 AC 22 (HL) Established the principle that a company is a separate legal entity distinct from its shareholders. Reiterated to support the principle that the company remains the lessee regardless of changes in its shareholders or directors.
Commissioner of Income-tax v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., AIR 1966 SC 1393 Shares are movable property, not land; sale of shares does not amount to sale of land. Used to reject respondent’s contention that share transfer equates to transfer of land, thus supporting the petitioner’s argument against lease termination.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the lease deed clauses which prohibit transfer or assignment of the plot without prior consent and provide for automatic termination upon change in company constitution without approval. It acknowledged that while the respondent contended the lease should terminate due to changes in shareholding and directors, the petitioner, as a distinct legal entity, remains the lessee under the lease deed.

The court applied established legal principles recognizing that a company is separate from its shareholders and directors, citing Salomon v. Salomon and the decision in Scindia Poteries. It rejected the argument that sale or transfer of shares amounts to transfer of land, emphasizing that shares are movable property.

Given the petitioner’s prima facie case and the balance of convenience favoring the petitioner—who would suffer irreparable loss if the lease were terminated—the court found the impugned orders dismissing the temporary injunction application to be perverse and contrary to law. The court thus allowed the revision petition and granted the temporary injunction, restraining the respondent from terminating the lease until the suit is finally decided.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision petition is allowed, the impugned orders dismissing the petitioner’s application for temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC are set aside, and the respondent is restrained from terminating or cancelling the petitioner’s lease until final disposal of the suit.

Implications: This decision protects the petitioner’s leasehold rights pending trial, affirming the principle that a company’s lease cannot be automatically terminated merely due to changes in shareholding or directorship without prior consent. The court directed the trial court to expeditiously decide the suit. No new precedent was established beyond the application of existing legal principles.

    Rama Association (P) Ltd. v. Delhi Development Authority .

    S.N Sapra, J.— The present revision petition is directed against the order dated February 15, 1989, whereby the First Appellate Court, affirmed the order dated July 19, 1986, by which the trial Court had dismissed the application of petitioner, under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C, for grant of temporary injunction.

    2. Briefly stated, the facts and circumstances, giving rise to the institution of the present petition, are as under:

    Petitioner, which is a private limited company, obtained perpetual leasehold rights, from the Delhi Development Authority, respondent herein, in respect of plot No. B-10, Lawrence Road Industrial Area, New Delhi, for a consideration of Rs. 3,13,000/-, and a regular perpetual lease deed was executed. Thereafter, the construction was raised on the plot, after getting the necessary permission from the Authority from the Authorities. Petitioner has been running its own business in the premises. Clause 4(a) of the lease deed provides that the lessee shall not sell, transfer, assign or otherwise part with possession of whole or any part of the industrial plot, except with the previous consent, in writing of the Lessor. It may be pointed out that at the auction, the plot was purchased by M/s. Rama Associates, a partnership firm, comprising of Shri Rajinder Singh, Shri Devinder Singh, Tarlochan Singh, Shiv Devi and Rjinder Kaur. The partnership from was converted into a private limited company, with the same partners, becoming the Directors/Subscribers. The firm also requested respondent to execute the lease-deed, in favour of the Company. At that time, affidavits were filed that original purchaser of land would not sell or transfer, their shares, representing value of land, without the prior permission of the Lessor.

    3. According to respondent, the share were transferred and a majority of the shares were being held by the new Directors and the old Directors, who were the partners, were having nominal shares. In other words, according to respondent, the control of the company had passed into the new Directors and the original partners of M/s. Rama Associates, were having only 50 shares each. Petitioner was served with a letter dated August 1, 1983, by respondent, thereby, pointing out that petitioner had sub let the property to M/s. Lamina Packers and Mouldwel Corporation. In reply, petitioner informed respondent that M/s. Lamina Packers was a sister concern of petitioner and that there was no business of Mouldwel Corporation, that was being done, because, the idea was given up to start any such business. On October 13, 1983, petitioner was asked to furnish the list of the Directors and of the partners of M/s. Lamina Packers and Mouldwel Corporation. The stand, taken by respondent was, that if the Company had changed its Constitution or Subscribers/Shareholders, then the lease was liable to be determined. At the time of the execution of the lease deed, names of Directors of the companies were furnished. As, respondent threatened to terminate the lease of petitioner, so, it became necessary to file a suit for permanent injunction.

    4. Mr. P.N Lekhi, learned Counsel for petitioner, contends that under law, no conditions can be imposed by respondent, in the lease-deed, which is contrary to the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, and also opposed to the public policy. Petitioner is a separate legal entity, which is independent from its shareholders, and Directors. Clause III of the lease deed, thereby, proceeding for automatic termination of the lease-deed, is not legal and constitutional. In fact, petitioner made out a prima facie case, but the Courts below have not applied their mind, in considering these questions. Mr. Lekhi further argued that the case was fully covered by the judgment of this Court in Scindia Poteries & Services Ltd. v. Deputy Land & Development Officer, 41 (1990) Delhi Law Times 261.

    5. Three well known principles govern the grant of temporary injunction. These are; whether, plaintiff has a good prima facie case; in whose favour the balance of convenience lies and whether, plaintiff will suffer an irreparable loss and injury, if the temporary stay is not granted. If, plaintiff is able to raise substantial questions, which require trial, then, the prima facie case is made out by plaintiff. At this stage, it is not for the Courts to indulge into deeper examination of the merits of the case or to scrutinise the documents closely.

    6. In Scindia Poteries & Services Ltd. (supra) it was held:

    “It is well settled that the shareholders of the company are distinct from the company of which they hold shares. It is to well settled since Salomon v. Salomon, 1897, Appeal Cases 22 (HL), that company is separate and distinct legal entity, and this principle has been reiterated and adopted by the Supreme Court in a number of cases.

    I am not able to accept this contention that sale of shares is sale of land. The effect of sale of shares may result in passing of control over the lands to the person to whom the shares are sold, but shares themselves being movable, as contemplated by the sales of goods act and as held by the Supreme Court in AIR (53) 1966 Supreme Court 1393 Commissioner of income-tax v. Standard Vaccum Oil Co., that “a share is an interest measured by a sum of money” cannot be land as such. For this reason, the provisions of the Delhi Land (Restriction on Transfer) Act, 1972 cannot be called in aid for the purpose of seeking modification of the order, and seeking an order restraining sale of shares.”

    7. Clauses 4(a) and 4 (aa) of the lease deed read as under:

    “4(a) The lessee shall not sell, transfer, assign or otherwise part with the possession of the whole or any part of the industrial plot except with the previous consent in writing of the Lessor which he shall be entitled to refuse in his absolute discretion.

    4(aa) A copy of partnership deed/Memorandum of Articles of Association as on the date of execution of this lease deed is annexed herewith as Schedule II of this deed. The names of the persons with their signatures constituting the lessee partnership firm private limited company are also stated on the margin of every page of this deed. This Lease/Sub Lease shall stand automatically terminated if there is any change in the constitution of the partnership firm/Private Limited Company (as on the date of the execution this deed) with the prior approval of the lessor.

    8. In all these clauses, is an embargo not to sub-let, assign or part with possession, except with the previous consent in writing of the lessor and further, that if there is any change in the Constitution of the Company, prior approval shall be taken from the Lessor. Under law, the Company is a legal entity, separate and distinct from its shareholders and Directors. The lease deed is in favour of the Company, which continues to be the lessee. The question, whether, the reduction of the number of shares, in favour of the original Directors/Promoters, and change of few Directors, would result in automatic termination of the lease, cannot be decided at this stage and for this, trial has to be held. But, admittedly the Company is a legal entity and is the lessee, in whose favour the perpetual lease-deed was executed by the President of India. The original shareholders continue to be the shareholders, though number of their shareholdings have been reduced by transfer. The change of some of the Directors, prima facie does not affect the status of a company. In this regard, reference may be made to the case Scindia Poteries & Services Ltd. (supra).

    9. In my view, plaintiff was able to make out a strong prima facie case, and the balance of convenience is also in favour of petitioner, because if the lease is terminated and re-entry is effected, then, it is the petitioner, who will suffer an irreparable loss and injury. After getting the lease, petitioner has raised a building on the plot, for commercial activities. For this, it is the petitioner who will suffer an irreparable loss and injury, if the stay is not granted.

    10. Under the circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the Courts below have acted contrary to the principles of law and, as such, the impugned orders are perverse. The revision petition is allowed and the impugned orders are set aside. The result is that the application, filed by petitioner, under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, is allowed. Respondent is restrained from cancelling or terminating the lease of petitioner/plaintiff, with respect to industrial plot No. B-10, Lawrence Road, Industrial Area, New Delhi, till the disposal of the suit.

    11. The trial Court is directed to decide the suit, as expeditiously as possible.

    Revision allowed.
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    Comments

    Rama Association (P) Ltd. v. Delhi Development Authority .
    (Aug 21, 1991)