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citation codes
Case Number
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Acts
  • section 155 of the Companies Act, 1956, despite Rule 6 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, questions
  • Provisions of section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • provisions of Rule 6 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959,
  • rule 6, all provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • provisions of section 155(3)(a) of the Companies Act,
  • section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908(a)
  • Companies Act. Rule 6 of the Companies (Court) Rules
  • section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.21.
  • section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • provisions of section 155(3)(a), questions
  • Rule 6 of the Companies (Court) Rules,
  • SECTION 155 COMPANIES ACT
  • provisions of sub-section (1)
  • COMPANIES ACT 1956
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Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • section 155 of the Companies Act, 1956, despite Rule 6 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, questions
  • Provisions of section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • provisions of Rule 6 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959,
  • rule 6, all provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • provisions of section 155(3)(a) of the Companies Act,
  • section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908(a)
  • Companies Act. Rule 6 of the Companies (Court) Rules
  • section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.21.
  • section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • provisions of section 155(3)(a), questions
  • Rule 6 of the Companies (Court) Rules,
  • SECTION 155 COMPANIES ACT
  • provisions of sub-section (1)
  • COMPANIES ACT 1956
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration and injunction concerning shares of respondent No. 20, M/s. J.B.S Builders & Traders Pvt. Ltd. They sought a direction to defendants No. 1, 2, and 3 to deliver duly registered share certificates to plaintiffs No. 1, 2, 3, and 4, and prayed for cancellation of transfer deeds related to 2200 shares in favor of any other person. The relief sought is essentially the remedy provided under section 155 of the Companies Act for rectification of shares.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit filed by the plaintiffs for declaration and injunction regarding shares is maintainable as a civil suit or barred by the provisions of section 155 of the Companies Act and section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  2. Whether questions relating to title of shares should be determined by a civil suit or under the special jurisdiction of the Company Court under section 155 of the Companies Act.
  3. The applicability of the principle that when a statute requires a thing to be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner or not at all, specifically in relation to rectification of the register of members under the Companies Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The suit is maintainable because it raises complicated questions of title to the shares that cannot be dealt with under section 155 of the Companies Act.
  • Relied on a Division Bench judgment (Punjab Distilling Industries Ltd. v. Biermans Paper Coating Mills Ltd.) to support the contention that complicated title issues require a civil suit.
  • Referred to a Bombay High Court judgment (Rao Saheb Manilal Gangaram Sindore v. Western India Theatres Ltd.) which held that an ordinary civil suit is maintainable for disputes relating to shares and that proceedings under section 155 are summary in nature.
  • Relied on a Single Judge judgment (Anil Gupta v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd.) to argue that complicated questions of law and fact should not be decided under section 155 but by civil suit.
  • Relied on a Division Bench judgment (Public Trustees v. Rajeshwar Tyagi) and the Full Bench judgment it relied upon (University of Delhi v. Hafiz Mohd. Said) regarding the meaning of "judgment".

Respondent's / Court's Position

  • The suit is barred under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure as the Companies Act and section 155 provide a special and exclusive remedy for rectification of the register of members.
  • Invoked the principle from Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor that when a statute prescribes a particular mode of remedy, that mode must be followed exclusively.
  • The Company Judge has jurisdiction co-extensive with a civil court to decide questions of title in proceedings under section 155 of the Companies Act.
  • The Division Bench judgment relied upon by the appellant did not consider the principle laid down in Nazir Ahmad's case and related only to proceedings under section 155, not to suits.
  • The Bombay High Court judgment was rendered without considering the principle that statutory remedies are exclusive.
  • The Court emphasized that no civil suit relating to declaration of title to shares was cited or held maintainable contrary to the statutory scheme.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor, AIR 1936 Privy Council 253 When a statute requires a thing to be done in a particular way, it must be done in that manner or not at all; all other methods are forbidden. Foundation for holding that the remedy under section 155 of the Companies Act is exclusive and civil suits for rectification or title to shares are barred.
Sulochna Uppal v. Surinder Sheel Bhakri, 1990(3) Delhi Lawyer 325 Reiterated the principle from Nazir Ahmad's case applying to both criminal and non-criminal matters. Supported the exclusivity of statutory remedy under Companies Act for share title disputes.
Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 Supreme Court 322 Followed the principle in Nazir Ahmad's case. Confirmed applicability of exclusivity principle to non-criminal matters.
Ballabhadas Agarwala v. J.C Chakravarty, AIR 1960 Supreme Court 576 Followed Nazir Ahmad's principle. Reinforced statutory exclusivity in remedy procedures.
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh & others, AIR 1964 Supreme Court 358 Followed Nazir Ahmad's principle. Reaffirmed that statutory procedure must be followed exclusively.
Gujarat Electricity Board v. Girdharlal Motilal and others, AIR 1969 Supreme Court 267 Followed Nazir Ahmad's principle. Supported the exclusivity of statutory remedies.
Ramachandra Keshav Adke by L.Rs v. Govind Joti Chavare & others Followed Nazir Ahmad's principle. Confirmed the principle's applicability to civil matters.
Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania and another, AIR 1981 Supreme Court 1786 Overruled Full Bench judgment in University of Delhi v. Hafiz Mohd. Said on the meaning of "judgment". Dismissed arguments based on overruled precedent cited by appellant.
Punjab Distilling Industries Ltd. v. Biermans Paper Coating Mills Ltd., ILR (1972) 1 Delhi 431 Appellant relied on it for maintainability of civil suit for complicated title issues. Court rejected its applicability as it related to section 155 proceedings and ignored Nazir Ahmad's principle.
Rao Saheb Manilal Gangaram Sindore v. Western India Theatres Ltd., AIR 1963 Bombay 40 Held ordinary civil suit maintainable for share disputes; section 155 proceedings are summary. Court noted it did not consider exclusivity principle and thus was not binding.
Public Trustees v. Rajeshwar Tyagi and others, 1973 Company Cases 371 Discussed meaning of "judgment". Noted as relying on overruled Full Bench judgment and thus not good law.
University of Delhi v. Hafiz Mohd. Said (Full Bench) Interpreted meaning of "judgment". Overruled by Supreme Court and thus not authoritative.
Shri Gulabrai Kalidas Naik v. Shri Laxmidas Lallubhai Patel, 1978 48 Company Cases 438 Interpreted section 155 of Companies Act to include power to decide title questions. Supported the view that Company Court has jurisdiction to decide title questions in rectification applications.
Anil Gupta v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd., 1983 Company Cases 301 Dealt with section 155 of Companies Act and complicated questions of title. Did not hold that civil suit is maintainable despite section 155 and Rule 6 of Companies (Court) Rules.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the exclusive jurisdiction conferred by section 155 of the Companies Act for rectification of the register of members, which includes the power to decide any question relating to the title of persons involved. It emphasized that the Companies Act is a special statute providing a specific and exclusive remedy, and the procedure under it must be followed as per the principle established in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor. The Court noted that the Company Judge's powers under the Companies (Court) Rules and the Code of Civil Procedure are co-extensive with those of a civil court, thus enabling the Company Judge to try and dispose of matters involving title to shares.

The Court rejected the appellant's reliance on judgments that either did not consider the exclusivity principle or were overruled. It held that the suit filed by the plaintiffs was impliedly barred under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure because the remedy under section 155 is exclusive. Consequently, the plaint was liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure for seeking determination of right or title to shares via a civil suit instead of the statutory remedy.

Holding and Implications

The plaint is hereby rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure as the suit relating to title to shares is barred by section 9 of the Code and the exclusive remedy under section 155 of the Companies Act.

The direct effect of this decision is that disputes concerning rectification of the register of members and determination of title to shares must be pursued through the statutory remedy under section 155 of the Companies Act and not through ordinary civil suits. No new precedent was established; rather, the Court reaffirmed existing principles regarding exclusivity of statutory remedies and jurisdiction of the Company Court.

    Harnam Singh v. Bhagwan Singh

    Mahinder Narain, J.:— This is a suit filed by the plaintiffs for declaration and injunction with respect to shares of respondent No. 20, M/s. J.B.S Builders & Traders Pvt. Ltd. One of the reliefs which they seek, is a direction to issue to defendants No. 1, 2 and 3 to deliver duly registered share certificates mentioned in the plaint, to plaintiffs No. 1, 2, 3 and 4. Also prayed for, is a decree for cancelling transfer deeds with respect to the said shares, 2200 in number, in favour of any other person.

    2. In effect, what the plaintiffs seek is the remedy which is postulated by section 155 of the Companies Act for rectification of shares.
    3. The Companies Act, 1956 provides in its section 155 as under:—
    155. (1) If—
    (a) the name of any person—
    (i) is without sufficient cause, entered in the register of members of a company; or
    (ii) after having been entered in the register, is, without sufficient cause, omitted therefrom; or
    (b) default is made, or unnecessary delay takes place, in entering on the register the fact of any person having become, or ceased to be, a member;
    the person aggrieved, or any member of the company, or the company, may apply to the Court for rectification of the register.
    (2) The Court may either reject the application or other rectification of the register; and in the latter case, may direct the company to pay the damages, if any, sustained by any party aggrieved.
    In either case, the Court in its discretion may make such order as to costs as it thinks fit.
    (3) On an application under this section, the Court—
    (a) may decide any question relating to the title of any person who is a party to the application to have his name entered in or omitted from the register, whether the question arises between members or alleged members, or between members or alleged members on the one hand and the company on the other hand; and
    (b) generally, may decide any question which it is necessary or expedient to decide in connection with the application for rectification.
    (4) From any order passed by the Court on the application, or on any issue raised therein and tried separately, an appeal shall lie on the grounds mentioned in section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908—
    (a) if the order be passed by a District Court, to the High Court;
    (b) if the order be passed by a single Judge of a High Court consisting of three or more Judges, to a Bench of that High Court
    (5) The provisions of sub-section (1) to (4) shall apply in relation to the rectification of the register of debenture holders as they apply in relation to the rectification of the register of members.
    4. By virtue of the provisions of section 155(3)(a) of the Companies Act, the Court, meaning the Company Judge dealing with a section 155 petition, is enabled to determine any question relating to title of any person who is a party to the application, to have his name entered in or omitted from register of members.
    5. By virtue of the provisions of Rule 6 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, framed by the Supreme Court, the practice and procedure of the Court, and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to proceedings taken under the Companies Act. Rule 6 of the Companies (Court) Rules reads as under:—
    6. Practice and Procedure of the Court and provisions of the Code to apply.—Save as provided by the Act or by these rules the practice and procedure of the court and the provisions of the Code so far as applicable, shall apply to all proceedings under the Act and these rules. The Registrar may decline to accept any document which is presented otherwise than in accordance with these rules or the practice and procedure of the Court.
    6. By virtue of the aforesaid rule 6, all provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure which could apply to matters before the Company Court, and the powers given by the Code and its provisions could be exercised by the Company Judge. Provisions of section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, also need to be referred to. Section 9 reads as under:—
    9. The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.
    [Exception I].—A suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely on the decision of questions as to religious rites or ceremonies.
    [Explanation II].—For the purposes of this section, it is immaterial whether or not any fees are attached to the office referred to in Explanation I or whether or not such office is attached to a particular place].
    7. The words in section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure are very clear. All suits which are of civil nature excepting suits, cognizance of which is expressly or impliedly barred, are maintainable under section 9. To my mind, the cognizance of a suit of the kind which has been filed by the plaintiffs, is barred in view of the principle enunciated in Nazir Ahmad's case, and reiterated by the Supreme Court.
    8. It is contended by Mr. P.C Khanna that the instant suits is maintainable, as it raises some complicated questions of title to the said shares, and according to him, inasmuch as the suit raises complicated questions of title, the same could not be dealt with under section 155 of the Companies Act. Mr. Khanna refers to a judgment of Division Bench of this Court in ILR (1972) 1 Delhi 431 (The Punjab Distilling Industries Ltd. v. Biermans Paper Coating Mills Ltd. 7 another) to support his contention. In my view, however, that judgment does not help the contention of Mr. Khanna for the reason that the same related to proceedings under section 155 of the Companies Act itself. That judgment was not delivered in a suit.
    9. Mr. Khanna also refers to a judgment of single Judge of the Bombay High Court in AIR 1963 Bombay 40 (Rao Saheb Manilal Gangaram Sindore and another v. Messrs. Western India Theatres Ltd. and others), wherein Justice S.M Shah held that an ordinary civil suit is maintainable with respect to disputes relating to shares. He also expressed the view that the proceedings under section 155 of the Companies Act are of a summary nature.
    10. Before Justice Shah, it was not contended that the provisions of section 155 are part of the Companies Act, which is a special statute. It was also not contended before Justice Shah in that suit that it is a well established principle of law that when statute requires a particular thing to be done in a particular manner, it can be in that manner, or not at all; that all other methods are forbidden. This was so stated by the Privy Council in AIR 1936 Privy Council 253 (Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor). This principle was reiterated by me in the case Sulochna Uppal v. Surinder Sheel Bhakri, 1990(3) Delhi Lawyer 325, in which I referred to a number of Supreme Court judgments also. I had said as follows:—
    I had put to Mr. R.K Makhija that in view of the judgment of the Privy Council in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor, AIR 1936 Privy Council 253(2), the suit was not maintainable, as the Privy Council had stated that “when a statute requires a thing to be done in a particular way, it must be done in that manner, or not at all. Every other method is forbidden. This proposition laid down by the Privy Council in a criminal case; has not been held to be confined to only criminal matters by the Supreme Court, which has followed this proposition in a large number of cases, both criminal and non-criminal”. (See Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and another v. State of Vindh-P, AIR 1954 Supreme Court 322; Ballabhadas Agarwala v. J.C Chakravarty AIR 1960 Supreme Court 576; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh & others, AIR 1964 Supreme Court 358; Gujarat Electricity Board v. Girdharlal Motilal and others AIR 1969 Supreme Court 267; and Ramachandra Keshav Adke [dead] by L.Rs v. Govind Joti Chavare & others). In fact in 1975 Supreme Court 915, the Supreme Court stated that the aforesaid principle had been stated much earlier than AIR 1936 Privy Council 253, in Taylor v. Taylor reported as (1875) 1 Ch.D 426.
    11. From what is stated above, it is apparent that the principle which was enunciated by the Privy Council in Nazir Ahmad's case, had been around since much earlier, as was noted by the Supreme Court in 1975 Supreme Court 915. It is also clear that the principle enunciated by the Privy Council which has been approved by the Supreme Court in all the aforesaid judgments, is applicable to both criminal and non-criminal matters.
    12. Mr. Khanna also refers to 1973 Company Cases 371 (Public Trustees v. Rajeshwar Tyagi and others), a judgment of Division Bench of this Court. In that case, the Division Bench relied upon the judgment and order of a Full Bench of this Court in University of Delhi v. Hafiz Mohd. Said, as to what the meaning of the word “judgment” was. The views expressed in the Tyagi's case are primarily based upon the view of the Full Bench of this Court in Hafiz Mohd. Said's case. The judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Hafiz Mohd. Said's case was over-ruled by the Supreme Court. In any event it is not good law in view of AIR 1981 Supreme Court 1786 (Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania and another).
    13. In any event, in my view, the Companies Act is a special statute, which provides for special and specific remedies, and in view of the principle enunciated in Nazir Ahmad's case, and reiterated by the Supreme Court in the cases referred to above, keeping in view the fact that the powers of the Company Judge to try and dispose of the matters, are co-extensive with that of the civil court in view of Rule 6 of the Companies (Court) Rules, it would not be right for the civil court to entertain matters which relate to rectification of register of members, or which involve determination of title to shares in companies, when specifically under the provisions of section 155(3)(a), questions of title can be determined by Company Court.
    14. Mr. Khanna also refers and relied upon judgment of single Judge of this Court, reported as 1983 Company Cases 301 (Anil Gupta v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd.). In that case, the court was dealing with a question which arose under section 155 of the Companies Act. Here the position is otherwise. Mr. Khanna wishes to file a suit, and wishes to rely upon the observations to the effect that in case complicated questions of law and fact arises in a case, matter should not be decided under section 155 of the Companies Act. The Hon'ble Judge (B.N Kirpal, J.) did not refer to any case which held that despite section 155 of the Companies Act, 1956, despite Rule 6 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, questions of title in shares have to be tried by a civil suit alone.
    15. The learned Single Judge noted the judgment of the Gujarat High Court reported as (1978) 48 Company Cases 438 (Shri Gulabrai Kalidas Naik v. Shri Laxmidas Lallubhai Patel), wherein it was observed as under:—
    A bare perusal of section 155 on its own language does not indicate that the jurisdiction conferred by the section is one hedged in with a condition that it can only be exercised when relief can be granted in a summary manner. There is nothing in the language of section 155 which excludes decision of questions of title to shares that may arise in an application for rectification of register. On the contrary, the language of sub-section (3) makes it abundantly clear that in such application, court has power to decide any question relating to the title of any person who is a party to the application to have his name entered in or omitted from the register and the court would have further jurisdiction to decide the question of title even when it arises between members or alleged members, or between members or alleged members on the one hand and the company on the other. Sub-clause (b) of sub-section (3) further widens the jurisdiction of the court under section 155 when it permits or enables the court generally to decide any question which it is necessary or expedient to decide in connection with the application for rectification.
    16. The Hon'ble Single Judge noted the conflict between the Gujarat High Court and a Division Bench of this Court in Punjab Distilling Industries's case (supra).
    17. As I have noted above, that case was a proceeding under section 155, and in that case, the Division Bench did not consider the observations of Nazir Ahmad's case, or the judgments of the Supreme Court referred by me above.
    18. Inasmuch as there is no distinction between the power of a Judge of the High Court on the original side to try the matter as civil suit, and as a Judge of the High Court of Delhi, sitting as a Company Judge to investigate questions of title, it would be appropriate that the proceedings relating to questions of title are also determined by the Company Judge.
    19. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs has not cited any single case which was filed as an original civil suit which relates to declaration of title to shares, and which was held to be maintainable.
    20. In this view of the matter, in my view, the cognizance of suit relating to title to shares, is impliedly barred by section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
    21. In view of Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, on reading of the plaint, since same relates to determination or right or title to shares in a limited company, the plaint is liable to be rejected, and the same is hereby rejected.
    I.K Order Accordingly.
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    Comments

    Harnam Singh v. Bhagwan Singh
    (Feb 6, 1991)