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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (M.K. Chawla, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is the registered owner of a freehold immovable property (plot A of property no. 101, Friends Colony, New Delhi) which she acquired by sale deed dated 11-10-72. The Competent Authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act had, by order dated 4-10-80, recognised her as absolute owner of plot A and declared there was no excess vacant land in that plot.

By an agreement dated 9-10-89 the petitioner agreed to sell plot A to M/s J. K. Industries Ltd. for Rs. 3,00,75,000. A statement in Form 37-I under Section 269-UC of the Income-tax Act was filed with the appropriate authority. On the same day the petitioner's son, Shri Pradeep Narang, filed a separate statement in Form 37-I for transfer of an adjoining plot (plot B) to M/s Hidrive Finance Ltd., and disclosed an adverse order of the Competent Authority in his case under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act.

The appropriate authority considered the statements and, by order dated 15-12-89, treated plots A and B as a composite property, held the subdivision irregular and illegal, and concluded that the statement in respect of plot A was invalid and refused to grant permission (i.e., refused to issue a no-objection certificate). The petitioner challenged that order under the relevant jurisdictional provisions of Chapter XXC of the Income-tax Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the jurisdiction of the appropriate authority under Chapter XXC of the Income-tax Act is limited to (a) passing an order within the specified period for purchase of property by the Central Government for the consideration recorded in the agreement, or (b) issuing a no-objection certificate for transfer at that consideration.
  2. Whether the appropriate authority must take the transfer document on its face value, or whether it can determine the document's validity and legality by examining other enactments (e.g., Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, Wealth Tax Act, Delhi Municipal Corporation Act) and related matters.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner asserted she is the absolute and independent owner of plot A with full right, title and interest; plot A is distinct from other subdivided plots and had been recognised as such by the Competent Authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act.
  • The petitioner argued that the agreement for plot B executed by her son is unrelated to the petitioner's agreement for plot A and that the two Form 37-I statements for separate properties owned by different persons should be considered separately and on their own merits within the limits of the jurisdiction conferred by the Income-tax Act.
  • She challenged the appropriate authority's order dated 15-12-89 as based on irrelevant and extraneous considerations and as acting without or in excess of jurisdiction.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The appropriate authority contended that on the facts it legitimately concluded plot B is appurtenant to the petitioner's residential house (plot A): the two plots are contiguous with no clear demarcation and functionally linked (plot B described as lawn for plot A), so they must be considered together.
  • The appropriate authority asserted that subdivision was not permissible or recognised by the M.C.D., construction on plot B had been refused, and that these facts meant the agreement for plot A could not be acted upon.
  • The respondent argued that the jurisdiction of the appropriate authority is not confined to either ordering purchase or issuing a no-objection certificate: before acting on Form 37-I the authority may examine the property, scrutinise documents legally, and determine whether the proposed sale suffers any legal impediment, relying on Section 269-UI read with section 131 of the Income-tax Act.
  • The respondent sought, if the impugned order was set aside, an opportunity to reconsider the petitioner's statement to decide whether the Central Government would purchase the property on the apparent consideration.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
M/s. Tanvi Trading and Credits (P) Ltd and others v. Appropriate Authority and others (C.W. No. 2576 of 1990), decided 28-11-90 That Chapter XXC contains no provision permitting the appropriate authority to create a situation where neither the Government decides to purchase nor does the authority issue a certificate under Section 269-UL(3). The court relied on this decision to support the conclusion that the appropriate authority cannot frustrate both outcomes (purchase or issuance of certificate) and therefore cannot take actions that effectively prevent either result.
Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board and others, AIR 1967 SC 295 Orders under a statute, while not challengeable for mere propriety, are subject to being quashed if passed mala fide, beyond statutory limits, on extraneous grounds, or without any reasonable grounds—i.e., that the authority must act within the limits of legislation and apply its mind to relevant facts. The court invoked this principle to hold that where the appropriate authority acts beyond the limits of Chapter XXC or on extraneous considerations, its order is liable to be quashed; this supported setting aside the impugned order.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the text and scheme of Chapter XXC of the Income-tax Act (including sections 269-UC, 269-UD, 269-UE, 269-UG, 269-UH and 269-UL) and described the statutory mechanism: a statement in Form 37-I must be furnished, the appropriate authority has two months (from the end of the month in which the statement is received) to order purchase by the Central Government at the apparent consideration, failing which the authority must issue a no-objection certificate permitting registration at the consideration stated in the agreement.

From a bare perusal of these provisions, the court concluded that the appropriate authority's jurisdiction is confined to deciding (a) whether to make an order for purchase by the Central Government within the statutorily prescribed period, or (b) where no purchase order is made, to issue a no-objection certificate for the transfer at the consideration stated. The court held the authority's remit is essentially to examine adequacy of consideration and decide between those two statutory outcomes.

The court found that the appropriate authority in the present case had gone beyond those limits by entertaining and deciding upon collateral questions of legality and validity of the subdivision and by "clubbing" plot A with plot B to find the petitioner's transaction illegal. The court noted that the Competent Authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act had already recognised the petitioner's individual ownership of plot A and held there was no excess vacant land; that finding was final and binding and could not be reopened by the appropriate authority under the Income-tax Act.

The court also observed that the respondent had not produced any document to show a prohibition under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act or other law against subdivision and sale of subdivided freehold plots in Delhi, and the MCD had not disputed the petitioner's ownership or title to plot A. The court reasoned that at best the MCD's refusal to sanction construction on plot B might affect the value of plot B, but it could not render the petitioner's transfer illegal.

The court applied the principles from the cited precedents (Tanvi Trading and Barium Chemicals) to hold that an authority must act within the statute and not on extraneous considerations; where it does otherwise its order is liable to be quashed. The court rejected the respondents' submission that they should be permitted to re-open the matter and decide afresh, reasoning that the statute prescribes a tight, non-extendable time schedule which the respondents missed and that allowing reconsideration would amount to unjust enrichment in the absence of statutory power to extend time.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Petition accepted; the impugned order of the appropriate authority dated 15-12-89 is set aside. The respondents are directed to issue a no-objection certificate under Section 269-UL of the Income-tax Act for registration of the sale deed of plot no. A-101, Friends Colony, New Delhi.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the petitioner is entitled to registration of the sale deed for plot A and the appropriate authority must issue the statutory no-objection certificate under Section 269-UL.
  • The court declined to permit the appropriate authority to reopen or extend the statutory time for deciding purchase by the Central Government; the authority had "missed the bus" and cannot be given another opportunity in the absence of statutory power to extend time.
  • No broader new precedent is articulated in the opinion beyond applying existing statutory construction and established principles (the opinion relies on prior decisions and statutory interpretation). The order also records that there will be no order as to costs.

Disposition: The petition stands disposed of; petition accepted; no order as to costs.

    Mrs. Satwant Narang Petitioner v. Appropriate Authority, I.T Deptt., New Delhi

    M.K Chawla, J.:— In this petition, a very short but interesting question of law has arisen. The question posed is whether the jurisdiction of the appropriate authority under Chapter XXC of the Income Tax Act, (hereinafter called the Act) is only limited to either pass an order within the specified period for purchase of property by the Central Government for consideration recorded in the agreement, or issuing a no objection certificate for transfer at that consideration,

    or
    Whether the appropriate authority is to take the document on its face value, or can also determine its validity and legality by looking into the various other enactments like the Wealth Tax Act, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, etc.
    2. The case of the petitioner in brief is that she is the owner of a freehold immovable property measuring 2521.5 sq. yds. being plot no. A of property no. 101, Friends Colony, New Delhi. The said plot has a dwelling house servant quarters and a garage on it. She purchased the said dwelling house from one Smt. Malti Singh vide sale deed dated 11-10-72, duly registered in the office of the Sub Registrar, New Delhi, Plot no. 101, Friends Colony, New Delhi, was a large plot of land which was sub-divided into lour portions by the previous owner. Smt. Malti Singh sold the other three plots in the same property to different persons for different considerations. The petitioner since then has been in occupation of the dwelling house on plot A as an absolute owner with full right title and interest therein as distinct from the right, title or interest of the other owners of plots B, C and D. The petitioner has also accepted as full owner of her property by the Wealth Tax department in her wealth tax returns. By an order dated 4-10-80, the Competent Authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, has recognised her as the absolute owner of the property, by declaring that there was no excess vacant land in the said plot.
    3. By an agreement dated 9-10-89, the petitioner agreed to sell the said plot A in property no. 101. Friends Colony, New Delhi to M/s. J. K. Industries Ltd., for a consideration of Rs. 3 crores and seventyfive thousand only. Immediately thereafter as required by Section 269-UC of the Income-tax Act, the statement in prescribed form no. 37-I was filed with the appropriate authority. On the same day, Shri Pradeep Narang son of the petitioner also agreed to sell his adjoining plot ‘B’ measuring 2005 sq. yds. to M/s. Hidrive Finance Ltd. for a consideration of Rs. 85,00,000. He also filed a statement in the prescribed form no. 37-I for purposes of the said transfer. In the said statement Pardeep Narang specifically mentioned that the Competent Authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act had by order dated 18-9-79 held in his case that there was excess vacant land to the extent of 1176 44 sq. mtrs. This order of the competent authority is stated to be under challenge in this Court where an order of day of acquisition of the excess land has been passed. Further more, the Municipal Corporation of Delhi has refuted to sanction for building plans submitted by him (Pradeep Narang) for construction on the said plot.
    4. The case set up by the petitioner before the appropriate authority was that the agreement of transfer of plot B between Shri Pradeep Narang and M/s. Hidrive Finance Ltd. has nothing whatsoever to do with the petitioner's plot of land ‘A’ or her/agreement with M/s. J. K. Industries Ltd. The petitioner and Shri Pradeep Narang though being mother and son were and are independent owners of their respective plots and have distinct and independent right over the respective portions owned by them. Further more, there is a marked difference between the two plots inasmuch as the Competent Authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act has held that there is no excess vacant land in plot A. The said two statements in the prescribed form, in respect of two different agreements for different properties owned by different persons, had to be considered by the appropriate authority separately on their own respective merits and within the limits and parameters of the jurisdiction conferred by the Act.
    5. The appropriate authority, however, on consideration of the material placed before it and after hearing the concerned parties passed the impugned order dated 15-12-89 holding that plot no. A owned by the petitioner and plot no. B owned by Shri Pardeep Narang being contiguous to each other, are necessarily to be considered together and not separately. In fact plots A and B form a composite property and the division as indicated is irregular, illegal being violative of the provisions of Municipal by-laws. The plots cannot be considered separable in view of the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, as applicable to plot B. The statement in form no. 37-I for plot A thus is invalid and cannot be acted upon. The appropriate authority further came to the conclusion that on account of the refusal of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi to permit construction on plot B owned by Shri Pardeep Narang, the sub-division of land in four plots is illegal and the agreement of the petitioner with M/s. J. K. Industries for plot A is thus unlawful, particularly when the purchasers of the two portions are also inter connected. The appropriate authority ultimately held that in this case unless the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act 1976, has run its course, all actions under provision of Chapter XXC of Income Tax Act will necessarily, have to remain dormant till the proceedings under the other Act run to their logical conclusion. Also in the meantime, as the law stands transfer of such lands being null and void are unlawful. For that matter the agreement for the unlawful deeds will have to be treated as unlawful and the permission sought could not be granted.
    6. By this petition, the petitioner has challenged the impugned order of the appropriate authority passed u/s 269-UB of the Act by contending that it is based on wholly irrelevant and extraneous considerations. It is also contended that the appropriate authority has acted without jurisdiction and or in excess of jurisdiction conferred upon it by the Act in discharging its statutory obligations.
    7. The case of the respondent as disclosed in the affidavit of Shri I. N. Sahu, Member, appropriate authority, in brief is that the appropriate authority has applied its mind to the peculiar facts of the case and had come to a definite conclusion that the plot of Shri Pradeep Narang is appurtenant to the residential house of the petitioner. Their location is such that one is contiguous to the other and in fact no clear demarcation exists between, the two. Plot B is lawn for the plot A. Both these plots cannot be independently enjoyed by unconnected owners. The appropriate authority acted bona fide holding that the sub division of such a plot is neither permissible not recognised by the M.C.D and further the construction on this sub-divided plot was not allowed as per the Master Plan of Delhi and the Zonal Plan drawn by the DDA. The question or acting upon an invalid agreement, therefore, does not arise.
    8. The further case of the respondent is that where a pre-emptive right of the Government is not exercised to purchase the property u/s 269 UD, the appropriate authority is not bound to issue a no objection certificate u/s 269-UL of the Act. The deponent denied the suggestion that the jurisdiction of the appropriate authority is only limited to either pass an order of purchase within the prescribed period u/s 269-UD or to issue no objection certificate u/s 269-UL of the Act. Therefore, before acting upon the statement for transfer of property, the appropriate authority is required to apply its mind from all angles which include inter alia, examination of the property as it is, the scrutiny of documents from its legal angles and various other factors. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 269 UI read with section 131 of the Income Tax Act, the appropriate authority is entitled to go into the question that the proposed sale does not suffer from any impediment in law and is not offending any provision of law prohibiting such a transfer.
    9. It is not disputed that the appropriate authority has not found the consideration mentioned by the petitioner in the agreement of the petitioner with M/s. J. K. Industries to be inadequate. The appropriate authority has also not disputed the ownership of the petitioner of the plot no. A. Her case has also been cleared by the Competent Authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, declaring that there is no excess vacant land in the said plot. She says that she has nothing to do with plot B, owned by her son Shri Pradeep Narang which has a separate entity. At this stage we may note that by order dated 16-4-90, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal has held the value of plot ‘B’ at the time of its purchase at Rs. 4,25,000 as fair valuation. Merely because plot no. A of the petitioner is contiguous to plot no. B of Shri Pradeep Narang, it cannot make them a single unit to warrant their being considered together.
    10. It is a known fact that proliferation of black money is evidence in the transfer of immovable properties. One way of tackling the problem of tax evasion is to confer on the Government the pre-emptive right to acquire any immovable property undergoing a transfer for consideration. For this, the Finance Act has inserted a new Chanter XXC in the Income-tax Act. The Registering Officer under the Registration Act has been barred from registering any document purporting to transfer any immovable property exceeding the value prescribed unless the appropriate authority certifies that it has no objection to such a transfer.
    11. The appropriate authority is a creature of the Statute and can function within the four corners of Chapter XXC of the Income Tax Act. Under this Chapter, the appropriate authority has been confuted by the Central Government u/s 269-UB of the Act. Section 269-UC, places restrictions on the transfer of any immovable property of the value exceeding Rs. 10 lakhs, unless and until an agreement for transfer is entered into between the person who intends transferring the immovable property and the person to whom it is proposed to be transferred in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2), at least 3 months before the intended date of transfer, and every statement shall be furnished to the appropriate authority. U/s 269-UD, the appropriate authority has been empowered to pass an order for the purchase of the said immovable property covered by the agreement at an amount equal to the amount of apparent consideration by the Central Government. The said order for purchase has to be passed within two months from the end of the month in which the statement in Form 37-I is received by the appropriate authority. When such an order is made by the appropriate authority, the said property shall on the date of the order vest in the Central Government free from all encumbrances by virtue of section 269-UE. Us/269-UG, the Central Government is obliged to tender to the person or persons entitled thereto the amount of consideration within a period of one month in which case the immovable property concerned becomes vested in the Central Government. If the Central Government fails to tender or deposit the whole or any part of the amount of consideration, required to be tendered thereunder within the specified period, the order of purchase shall stand abrogated and the immovable property shall stand revested in the transferor by virtue of the provisions of Section 269-UH. It comes to this in case the appropriate authority does not make an order for the purchase of the property by the Central Government or where the order stands abrogated, the appropriate authority is obliged u/s 269-UL to issue a certificate that it has no objection to the transfer of immovable property for the consideration stated in the agreement.
    12. A bare persual of the abovesaid provisions of the Act indicates that the jurisdiction of the appropriate authority is only limited to either passing an order within the specified period for purchase of property by the Central Government for consideration recorded in the agreement or issue of a no objection certificate for transfer at that consideration. While considering the statement in form 37-I, the appropriate authority is only to examine the adequacy of the consideration and to decide whether to order purchase or to grant a no objection certificate. It certainly has no jurisdiction to go into the object or the purpose of the transaction, or its legality and validity. Furthermore, the appropriate authority has no jurisdiction to club one property with another with a view to find faults in the validity of the transaction, which otherwise has been cleared by the Competent Authorities under the Urban Land (Ceiling & Restriction) Act.
    13. Learned counsel for the respondent has also not been able to place any document on record to show that there exists any prohibition under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act or in any other law for the sub-division and sale of subdivided freehold plots in Delhi. Moreover, in this case even the MCD has never disputed or questioned the ownership right or title of the petitioner to plot A, or the building standing thereon as she had purchased the property after the plans had been duly sanctioned. Merely because the Municipal Corporation of Delhi has not allowed the construction on plot B owned by Shri Pradeep Narang it cannot make the sub-division of plots illegal or violative of any provisions of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act. At best, it may mean that the value of Mr. Pradeep Narang's plot will go done. In any event, the petitioner has nothing whatever to do with plot B, and any decision of the Corporation in respect of plot B cannot have any relevance or bearing on the plot of the petitioner or make the transaction illegal or unlawful. Prima facie, the agreement of the petitioner with M/s. J. K. Industries is in no way unlawful nor does it defeat any provisions of law more particularly section 23 of the Indian Contract Act.
    14. As already referred to above, the Competent Authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act has recognised and accepted the individual ownership of the petitioner of plot A and has further held that there is no excess vacant laud in the said plot. This finding of his become conclusive, final and binding on all concerned. The appropriate authority under the Income-tax Act cannot question or reopen the same. It may be that the appropriate authority on examination of the statement in form 37-I in the case of Shri Pradeep Narang concluded that it is invalid on account of the orders of the competent authority, but the same plea will not hold good to the case of the petitioner. Prima facie, the appropriate authority acted in excess of its jurisdiction in this behalf.
    15. In view of these facts, we are constrained to hold that the appropriate authority was required to function within the four corners of Chapter XXC, has travelled beyond these limits while holding the petitioner's transaction of sale as illegal.
    16. In a similar situation, the Division Bench of this court in C.W No. 2576 of 1990 re: M/s. Tanvi Trading and Credits (P) Ltd and others v. Appropriate Authority and others, (1) decided on 28-11-90, held, “We do not find any provision in this chapter which can enable the appropriate authority to create a situation whereby neither the Government decides to purchase nor does it issue a certificate under Section 269-UL (3) “.
    17. This conclusion finds support from the Judgement reported as Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board and others, AIR 1967 SC 295 (2), wherein it was held,
    “Though an order passed in exercise of power under a statute cannot be challenged on the ground of propriety or sufficiency, it is liable to be quashed on the ground of mala fides, dishonesty or corrupt purpose. Even if it is passed in good faith and with the best of intentions to further the purpose of the legislation which confers the powers, since the Authority has to act in accordance with and within the limits of that legislation, its order can also be challenged if it is beyond those limits or is passed on grounds extraneous to the legislation or if there are no grounds at all for passing it or if the grounds are such that no one can reasonably arrive at the opinion or satisfaction requisite under the legislation. In any one of these situations it can well be said that the authority did not honestly form its opinion or that in forming it, it did not apply its mind to the relevant facts.”
    18. Now the question that further requires going into is as to what relief the petitioner is entitled to. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent is that in case it is held that the impugned order of the appropriate authority is not on sound footing, then the respondent be given an opportunity to reconsider the statement of the petitioner filed in form 37-I of the Act and to make up their mind, if the Central Government would like to purchase the property on the apparent consideration mentioned in the agreement, or not. According to the learned counsel, the petitioner will not suffer any injury inasmuch as she has agreed to sell the property on the consideration mentioned in the agreement whether it goes to the purchaser or the Central Government that will not make any difference to the petitioner.
    19. We are not impressed by this submission. This agreement under reference is dated 9th October, 1989. The petitioner moved the appropriate authority by filing the statement in form 37-I on 20-10-89. Thereafter, the Act lays down a very tight schedule for the appropriate authority to make up its mind to purchase or not to purchase the property. There is no provision for extension of time. The respondents have missed the bus and have passed the impugned order on 15-12-89 rejecting the permission on quite irrelevant consideration. This court would not like to extend the period and frame a fresh time schedule for the department specially when the Statute does not give any such power to the court. There is no worthwhile explanation as to why at this point of time, the Department wants to purchase the property except the only consideration that the prices have gone up. This will then be a case of unjust enrichment. In our opinion, there is no equity in their favour for allowing them another opportunity to make up their mind.
    20. Under these circumstances, we accept the petition and set aside the impugned order of the appropriate authority dated 15-12-89 and direct the respondents to issue no objection certificate u/s 269-UL of the Act for the registration of the Sale Deed of the property bearing plot no. A-101, Friends Colony, New Delhi.
    21. The petition stands disposed of. There will be no order as to costs.
    Petition accepted.
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    Mrs. Satwant Narang Petitioner v. Appropriate Authority, I.T Deptt., New Delhi
    (Dec 14, 1990)