P.K Bahri, J.:— These two Writ Petitions are being disposed of by this common judgment. Facts in brief are that M/s. Piyush Traders Private Limited, respondent No. 1. in both the writ petitions has constructed property bearing Municipal No. B-II/33, Mohan Cooperative Industrial Estate, Mathura Road, Badarpur, New Delhi. The petitioner. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, in both the writ petitions has sent a notice dated 30th March, 1984 proposing to fix the rateable value of Rs. 1,62,000 w.e.f 1st April, 1983. Respondent No. 1 filed objections to the said notice raiding the plea that soon after constructing the building the same was let out to M/s. Jainsons Engineers Private Limited w.e.f 1-10-83 for a period of 2 years vide a licence deed dated 26th October, 1983 at the rental of Rs. 6,000 per month, but the said tenant vacated the premises by the end of December, 1983 and the same name to be let out to American Embassy w.e.f January 1, 1984 on a monthly rental of Rs. 15,000. Hence the plea was taken that as the first letting has been made to M/s. Jainsons Engineers Private Limited, the rent of Rs. 6000 per mensum under the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act would be deemed to be the standard rent and the same could be taken as a basis for fixing the rateable value of the property in question for assessing property tax. The Assessing Authority after considering the objections and documents produced before it, however, gave the finding that the house in question was not fit far occupation till January 1984 and thus, there could not be any letting of unconstructed house and in fact, it was a camaflouge letting made to show the less rateable value and in fact the first letting after completion of the house took place in favour of American Embassy at the rent of Rs. 15000 per mensum and the said rent has to be treated as a standard rent for 5 years and thus, he fixed the rateable value at Rs. 2350 for vacant plot from 1st April, 1983 and Rs. 64,800 w.e.f 1-10-83 and at Rs. 1,59,890 w.e.f 4-1-1984. This assessment was made in respect of the year 1983-84 and in respect of the year 1984-85 the same rateable value was fixed. As a matter of fact if a finding has to be given that first letting was made in favour of American Embassy at the rental of Rs. 15,000 per month, then in view of the provisions of Section 6 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The said rent has to be treated as standard rent for a period of 5 years.
2. The respondent No. 1 was not satisfied of the aforesaid assessment orders and two appeals were filed under Section 169 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act. Shri B. S. Chaudhary, Additional District Judge, the competent authority under the Act, who heard and accepted the appeals, gave a finding that in fact the first letting took place to M/s. Jainsons Engineers Private Limited at the rental of Rs. 6000 and the said rent has to be treated as standard rent for a period of 5 years and he thus modified the assessment order and fixed the rateable value at Rs. 64,800 w.e.f 1-10-1983.
3. The Municipal Corporation of Delhi has challenged the said order by filing these writ petitions. On merits, it has been pleaded that the bare reading of the documents reduced before the Assessing Authority made it clear that the building was not fit for occupation till the same came to be let out to the American Embassy and the first Appellate Authority went wrong in law in ignoring the material evidence and thus, gave a wrong finding that the first letting took place in favour of M/s. Jainsons Engineers Private Limited. In both the cases a plea is also raised that the appeals to the Appellate Authority were not competent inasmuch as the respondent No. 1 had nor deposited the disputed property-tax as required under Section 170 of the D.M.C Act and the appeals were liable to be dismissed on that score alone.
4. In the counter to both the writ petitions, respondent No. 1 pleaded that the first Appellate Authority was right in coming to the conclusion from the documents and the evidence available before him that the first letting did take place of the constructed house in favour of M/s. Jainsons Engineers Private Limited and at the rental of Rs. 6000 per mensem, in the appeal against the Assessment Order for the year 1983-84 respondent No. 1 had deposited the property tax, while in the appeal against the order pertaining the assessment year 1984-85, an application was made before the Additional District Judge for permission to stay the deposit of the property tax but the Additional District Judge required the respondent No. 1 to deposit only part of the property tax and which was deposited and thus, it was pleaded by responent No. 1 that both the appeals were rightly heard by the first Appellate Authority. It has also been urged by respondent No. 1 in the counters that there is a discretion vested in the Appellate Authority to pass any order with regard to the deposit of property tax before hearing the appeal. The authority could even waive the deposit of the tax completely. Reference has been made to different provisions of the Municipal Corporation Act to highlight the plea that it is not clear as to what amount of property tax is to be deposited before an aggrieved person can get a hearing in his appeal.
5. Coming to the merits of the impugned order in both the writ petitions, even the Assessing Authority did not find any material or evidence to show that M/s. Jainsons Engineers Private Limited had any links with respondent No. 1. It is not shown that two companies are sister companies or their directors or some of their directors are common or they have any business association. Documentary evidence was produced before the Assessing Authority to show that the genuine letting took place in favour of M/s. Jainsons Engineers Private Limited w.e.f 1st October, 1983 for a period of two years at a rent of Rs. 6000 per month. The Assessing Authority has made reference to the contents of the agreement made by respondent No. 1 with the American Embassy and a photocopy of the said agreement has been filed along with the writ petition and wherein Clause 3, it was mentioned that the premises were expected to be ready for occupancy by January, 1984 that all other requirements and improvements to the structure as agreed per items listed in Annexure ‘A’ completed and all the sanitary, plumbing, electrical and civil work as per sanctioned plans completed. It was inferred by the Assessing Authority from this particular clause that the building was completely constructed in June, 1984 and even if incomplete building has been let out prior to January, 1984, the same would not be treated as first letting for the purpose of determining the standard rent under Section 9 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The Assessing Authority completely ignored the fact that vide Annexure ‘A’ to the aforesaid agreement respondent No. 1 was to carry out certain additions and alterations in the building and for the purpose of occupancy by American Embassy, the building was to be considered fit for occupation only when the improvements have been made in the building as per Annexure ‘A’. The Annexure ‘A's items do not show that they pertain to any structural construction which remained to be done in the building. There was no material before the Assessing Authority to come to the conclusion that the building was not fit for occupation or was not fully constructed when letting took place in favour of M/s. Jainsons Engineers Private Limited, rather the Assessing Authority itself had taken the rental of M/s. Jainsons Engineers Private Limited for fixing the rateable values for the period from 1st October, 1983 to January, 1984 meaning thereby even the Assessing Authority accepted the plea of respondent No. 1 that the building had been let out initially to M/s. Jainsons Engineers Private Limited at the rate of Rs. 6000 per month w.e.f 1-10-83. It did not lie in the month of the Assessing Authority to hold that the building was not fully constructed and fit for occupation till January, 1984 when the Assessing Authority itself issued a notice for assessing the property tax w.e.f 1st April, 1983.
6. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that respondent No. 1 had admitted before the Assessing Authority that respondent No. 1 had not applied for a completion certificate till January, 1984. So he has argued that unless and until a completion certificate is obtained the building could not have been let out. There is a fallacy in this argument. There is no requirement of law that unless and until a completion certificate is issued, the building cannot be considered fit for occupation and there is no legal bar placed by any statute prohibiting the letting of the building till a completion certificate is obtained. Section 346 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act requires the owner to obtain a completion certificate within one month of the completion of the building and Section 346(2) of the said Act prohibits occupation of the building till the permissios is obtained from the Commissioner in this regard. However, there is no provisions made in the Municipal Corporation Act making the occupation as invalid and not recognisable by law for other purposes. The violation of Section 346 of the Act could not be visited with penalties as contemplated by Section 351 read with Schedule 1 of the Act. Neither the letting made of such a building in respect of which occupation certificate is not obtained had been invalid by any provision of law nor there is any prohibition in the statute that no contract would be made for letting before obtaining the completion certificate and if made such a contract would be void. Even such a building is not immune from the assessment of property tax when the notice had been issued under Section 126 for assessing the property tax for the year 1983-84. Even the petitioner took a plea that the building was complete and was liable to be taxed. So it cannot be argued that no letting could take place till a proper completion certificate had been obtained as contemplated by Section 346 of the Act.
7. The Additional District Judge has rightly construed the provisions of the agreement entered into between respondent No. 1 and its two tenants and has come to the finding based on evidence that first letting of this building was made to M/s. Jainsons Engineers Private Limited. This finding does not appear to be vitiated by any illegality. As a matter of fact, it was a question of fact to be decided by the Appellate Authority as to whether the building was first let out to M/s. Jainsons Engineers Private Limited at the rent of Rs. 6000 or not. If the first Appellate Authority had good reasons for giving a finding based on evidence that such a letting did take place, this court is not to interfere in its writ jurisdiction to set aside such a finding of fact. So on merits, the petitioner cannot assail the impugned orders.
8. Counsel for the petitioner has argued that as the whole of the property tax was not deposited in the two appeals before the Additional District Judge, the appeals were not competent in view of the provisions of Section 170 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act. The right of appeal is a creature of the statute and if any condition is imposed by a statute before exercising such a right of appeal, such condition must be fulfilled before the right becomes available. In Judgement Today 1988 (J) SC 435, Shri Viiay Prakash D. Mehta/Sh. Jawahar D. Mehta v. Collector of Custom (Preventive) Bombay (1), the provisions of Sections 129A, 129(e) and Section 130E(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 came up for consideration wherein the right of appeal has been granted subject to payment of the tax levied or penalty imposed. However, there is a discretion vested in the Appellate Authority to dispense with such payment in case of undue hardship. The contention was raised that no such condition could be imposed while exercising the right of appeal. The contention was repelled and it was held that right to appeal is neither an absolute right nor an ingredient of natural justice the principles of which must be followed in all judicial and quasi-judicial adjudications. The right to appeal is a statutory right and it can be circumscribed by the conditions in the grant. Section 170 of the D.M.C Act provides that no appeal shall be heard under Section 169 unless (a) the amount, it any, in dispute in the appeal has been deposited by the appellant in the office of the Commissioner of the Corporation. There is no provision made in the Act giving any discretion to the appellate authority to waive the said requirement or to exercise discretion not requiring the appellant to deposit partly the tax in dispute. As far as the assessment order in respect of assessment year 1983-84 is concerned, respondent No. 1 has clearly pleaded in the counter that the whole of the tax due was deposited except the tax pertaining to water tax etc. It is pleaded that these taxes were not leviable because no such facility has been provided by Municipal Corporation or Delhi to the building in question or in the locality where the building in question is located. Counsel for respondent No. 1 has placed on record the letters of the Municipal Corporation waiving the said taxes. So, the first appellate authority has rightly heard the appeal inasmuch as the requirement of Section 170 of the Act stood met by respondent No. 1. If the order of the appellate authority in respect of assessment year 1983-84 is to be upheld, the rateable value fixed on the basis of the first letting, that assessment order has to remain in force for 5 years in terms of the provisions of Section 6 of the Delhi Rent Control Act with regard to the fixation of standard rent for 5 years. So as a corollary the assessment order in respect of assessment year 1984-85 has to be on the same rateable value, even allowing the plea the first appeal would have had the affect of giving the complete relief to respondent No. 1 in respect of not only assessment year 1983-84, but in respect of the assessment year 1984-85. So even if, for the sake of argument, it is held that in respect of second appeal the first appellate authority had no power to allow the deposit only part of the property tax, even then it would not have any effect as far as the fate of the assessment order is concerned. So I need not go into the detailed arguments addressed before me as to whether the appellate authority has the discretion to give relief regrading the deposit of property tax as required by Section 170 of the Act.
9. In view of the above discussion, both these writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. I accordingly dismiss the writ petitions and discharge the rule, but leave the parties to bear their own consts.
KKS Petitions Dismissed.