| Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, A.I.R. 1981 SC 487 |
Tests for determining whether a corporation is an "instrumentality or agency of the Government" under Article 12 (including share capital, government control, pervasive interest). |
The Court applied the tests laid down in Ajay Hasia to hold that TFAI is an instrumentality/state because the entire share capital is furnished by the Union, government officers are subscribers, and there is pervasive government control (appointment/removal by the President, lease of Pragati Maidan etc.). |
| A.M. Aggarwal v. Union of India (1981) 2 S.L.R. 407 |
Observation (by Prakash Narain, J.) that where employment/termination is not regulated by statute or statutory rules, principles of natural justice may not arise in employer-employee relations. |
The Court rejected reliance on this observation as broadly stated; it distinguished Aggarwal and noted subsequent authoritative decisions undermining that proposition for public employment. |
| Ved Prakash Malhotra v. State Bank of India, ILR 1974 (1) Delhi 660 |
Used in reasoning in earlier decisions about applicability of natural justice in certain employment contexts. |
The Court treated this decision as distinguishable in light of later Supreme Court authority (Sukhdev Singh) and subsequent local decisions; it did not allow Ved Prakash Malhotra to control the result. |
| Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagat Ram & Ors., A.I.R. 1975 SC 1331 |
Principles that statutory authorities/employers cannot deny statutory procedural protections/natural justice; relevant to employment disputes concerning disciplinary procedure. |
The Court relied on Sukhdev Singh to support the proposition that natural justice requirements apply and that denial of cross-examination and other fair hearing requirements can render action arbitrary/invalid. |
| Dr. Y.P. Gupta v. Union of India and others [Full Bench, II R 1975 (II) Delhi 453] |
Held that Indian Council of Agricultural Research could not be regarded as an Authority within Article 226 (earlier view). |
The Court noted that this earlier full-bench view had been overruled subsequently by the Supreme Court in Dr. Y.P. Gupta v. Union of India [1984 (2) SCC 141], and therefore the earlier decision could not be relied upon to deny writ jurisdiction. |
| Dr. Y.P. Gupta v. Union of India and others, 1984 (2) SCC 141 |
Supreme Court pronouncement affecting the standing of public bodies as authorities under Article 12/226. |
The Court cited the 1984 Supreme Court decision as authority that undermined earlier holdings to the contrary and as support for recognizing public bodies as amenable to writ jurisdiction where appropriate. |
| A.R. Josri v. The State Bank of India, ILR 1980 (1) Delhi 133 |
Recognition that employment in State Bank of India is statutory employment and employees are entitled to natural justice. |
The Court used this decision to show that employment in public/semipublic bodies attracts natural justice obligations and to counter the narrow view relied upon by the respondent's counsel. |
| E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 1974 SC 555 |
The principle that arbitrariness is violative of Article 14; arbitrariness as a key constitutional touchstone. |
The Court invoked Royappa to support the proposition that denial of procedural fairness (e.g., cross-examination) can amount to arbitrariness and thus violate Article 14. |
| A.L. Kalra v. P & E Corporation of India Ltd., A.I.R. 1984 SC 1361 |
An administrative authority is bound by the regulations it frames; procedural/regulatory obligations cannot be unilaterally disapplied. |
The Court relied on A.L. Kalra to hold that once conduct rules are framed by the Authority they are binding and the Authority cannot opt out of them; even in their absence, natural justice would apply. |
| Managing Director, U.P. Warehousing Corporation & Anr. v. Vinay Narayan Vajpayee, 1980 (2) SCR 771 |
Requirement that an employee be given opportunity to deny charges and cross-examine management witnesses as part of a fair enquiry. |
The Court cited this case to emphasize that natural justice in disciplinary enquiries includes the right to cross-examine management witnesses. |
| Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1962 SC 1166 |
First part of rule barring government servants from participating in demonstrations struck down as violative of Article 19; peaceful demonstrations are protected speech/expression. |
The Court relied on Kameshwar Prasad to hold that peaceful demonstrations and meetings for grievance redressal fall within Article 19(1)(a) and (b) and cannot be broadly proscribed. |
| O.K. Ghosh & Another v. Ex. Joseph, A.I.R. 1963 SC 812 |
Departmental proceedings for participation in demonstrations (in connection with strike) quashed as violative of Article 19(1)(b). |
The Court cited this decision as reinforcement of the principle that participation in peaceful demonstrations may be protected by Article 19. |
| Railway Board Representing the Union of India v. Niranjan Singh, 1969 (3) S.C.R. 548 |
Upheld prohibition on holding demonstrations inside railway premises; rule that government premises may not be open for demonstrations as of right. |
The Court distinguished Niranjan Singh on facts: Pragati Maidan was a public area open to the public (ticketed) and evidence indicated the Authority knew of the meeting and had not objected, so Niranjan Singh did not control the result. |
| Union of India v. H.C. Goel, A.I.R. 1964 SC 364 |
High Court jurisdiction under Article 226 to examine whether an administrative decision is based on no evidence (writ of certiorari available). |
The Court invoked Goel to support that where an administrative finding is based on no evidence, the High Court can quash it by certiorari. |
| M/s. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd. v. The Workmen Employed, A.I.R. 1981 SC 1626 |
Authority for remittal to industrial tribunal in some circumstances (analogy relied upon by respondent). |
The Court declined to apply the Firestone remittal analogy because the management had failed to prove the charges; remittal would unjustly permit the management another chance to prove a case it had failed to support on record. |
| Hindustan Time Works v. Its Employees, A.I.R. 1979 SC 75 |
General rule that reinstatement with back wages is the normal consequence where termination is held to be illegal. |
The Court cited this and related authorities to support the order of reinstatement with full back wages (subject to any proof of gainful employment by employer). |
| Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, 1980 Lab. IC 1292 |
Observation that quashing a termination ordinarily leads to reinstatement and back wages. |
The Court cited Surendra Kumar Verma to support the normal rule of reinstatement with back wages when termination is declared unlawful. |
| Mohan Lal v. Management of M/s Bharat Electronics Ltd., A.I.R. 1981 SC 1253 |
Support for reinstatement/back wages where termination is invalid. |
Cited as part of the consistent line of authority reaffirming reinstatement and back wages as the usual relief. |
| Delhi Transport Corporation v. Sh. Ram Kumar, 1982 (1) S.L.J. 255 |
Employer seeking to avoid full back wages must prove the employee was gainfully employed during the enforced idleness; the employer bears that burden. |
The Court applied this principle and held that the Authority failed to prove the petitioner was gainfully employed; therefore the petitioner is entitled to full back wages. |